



THE  
COMMENTARIES  
OF  
C. JULIUS CÆSAR,

Of his Warres in GALLIA, and the *Civile* Warres  
betwixt him and POMPEY,

*Translated into English:*

With

Many excellent and judicious

OBSERVATIONS

Thereupon:

As also The Art of our *Modern Training*, or, *Tactick Practise*;

By CLEMENT EDMONDS *Esquire*,

Remembrancer of the City of LONDON.

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Whereunto is adjoyned

The EIGHTH COMMENTARY

of the Warres in GALLIA;

*With some short Observations upon it.*

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Together with

The LIFE of CÆSAR, and an Account of  
his MEDALLS.

*Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged.*



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L O N D O N,

Printed by R. DANIEL, and are to be sold by *Henry Tivyford*  
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*Caps 10. 16*





T O T H E  
P R I N C E .

S I R :



Having ended this task of Observations, and according to your gracious pleasure and command, supplied such parts as were wanting to make up the Totall of these Commentaries : it doth return again, by the lowest steps of humbleness, to implore the high patronage of your Princely favour ; emboldened specially because it carrieth Cæsar and his Fortunes, as they come related from the same Author : which, in the deep Judgement of his most excellent Majesty, is preferred above all other profane histories ; and so commended, by his sacred Authority, to your reading, as a chief pattern and Master-piece of the Art of war. And herein your admired wisdom may happily the rather deem it capable of freer passage, in that it is not altogether unproper for these happy daies ; as knowing, that War is never so well handled, as when it

BAZILAIKON ΔΕΠΟΝ.

( a 3 ) is

is made an Argument of discourse in times of sweet and  
plenteous peace. The blessings whereof may ever crown  
your years; as the sovereign good of this temporarie life,  
and the chiefeſt Ornaments of Princely condition.

The humbleſt

of your Highneſs ſervants,

CLEMENT EDMONDS.



In  
CLEMENTIS EDMONDI  
De re militari ad  
JUL. CÆSARIS *Commentarios Observationes.*

**C**ly creperos motus, & aperto prælia Marte  
Edmondus nobis pace vigente rejicit?  
Cur sensus mentisque Ducem vimatur, & effert?  
Diserteque Anglos bellica multa docet?  
Scilicet, ut media medietur prælia pace  
Anglia belli potens, nec moriatur bonus.  
Providus hac certe patria deponit in usus;  
Ilt patria pacem qui cupit, arma parat.

Guil. Camdenus, *cl.*

To my friend, Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

**W**ho thus extracts, with more then Chymick Art;  
The spirit of Books, shews the true way to find  
Th' Elxer that our leaden Parts convert  
Into the golden Metall of the Mind.  
Who thus observes in such materiall kind  
The certain Motions of his Practises  
Knows on what Center th' Actions of Mankind  
Turn in their course, and sees their fatalnes.  
And he that can make these observances;  
Must be above his Book, more then his Pen.  
For, we may be assur'd, he men can guesse,  
That thus doth CÆSAR know, the Man of men.  
Whose Work, improv'd here to our greater gain,  
Makes CÆSAR more then CÆSAR to contain.

Sam. Daniel.

To his worthy friend, Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

**O**bserving well what Thou hast well Observ'd  
In CÆSARS Works, his Warres, and Discipline;  
Whether His Pen hath earn'd more Praise, or Thine,  
My shallow Censur doubtfully hath swerv'd.  
If strange it were, if wonder it deserv'd,  
That what He wrought so fair, He wrote so fine;  
Me thinks, it's stranger, that Thy learned Line  
Should our best Leaders lead, not having serv'd.  
But hereby (Clement) hast Thou made thee known  
Able to counsell, aptest to record  
The Conquests of a CÆSAR of our own;  
HENRY, thy Patron, and my Princely Lord  
Whom (O!) Heav'n prosper, and protect from harms,  
In glorious Peace, and in victorious Arms.

JOSHUA SILVESTER.  
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TO MY FRIEND,  
MASTER  
CLEMENT EDMONDS.

*Epigramme.*

**N**OT *Cæsar's* deeds, nor all his honours wonne  
In these Welt-parts; nor, when that warre was done,  
The name of *Pompey* for an Enemy;  
*Cato* to boot, *Rome*, and her libertie;  
All yielding to his fortune: nor, the while,  
To have ingrav'd these Acts with his own stile;  
And that so strong, and deep, as might be thought  
He wrote with the same spirit that he fought;  
Nor that his Work liv'd, in the hands of foes,  
Un-argu'd then; and (yet) hath fame from those:  
Not all these, *Edmonds*, or what else put to,  
Can so speak *Cæsar*, as thy Labours do.  
For, where his person liv'd scarce one just age,  
And that 'midst envy' and Parts; then, fell by rage;  
His deeds too dying, save in books: (whose good  
How few have read! how fewer understood!)  
Thy learned hand, and true Promethean Art,  
As by a new creation, part by part,  
In every counsell, Itratagenie, delighte,  
Action, or Engine, worth a note of thine,  
Th' all future time not only doth restore  
His Life, but makes that he can dye no more.

*Ben. Johnson.*

*Another, of the same.*

**W**HO, *Edmonds*, reads thy book, and doth not see  
What th' antique Souldiers were, the modern be?  
Wherein thou shew'st how much the later are  
Beholden to this Master of the Warre:  
And that in Action there is nothing new,  
More then to varie what our Elders knew.  
Which all but ignorant Captains will confesse:  
Not to give *Cæsar* this, makes ours the lesse.  
Yet thou, perhaps, shalt meet some tongues will grutch  
That to the world thou shouldst reveal so much;  
And thence deprave thee, and thy Work. To those  
*Cæsar* stands up, as from his urne late rose  
By thy great Art; and doth proclaim by me,  
They murder him again, that envie thee.

*Ben. Johnson.*



CAIUS IULIUS CÆSAR DICTATOR  
PERPETUUS  
ÆTATIS SUÆ LVI.



CÆSARIS ELOGIUM.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR.

*Lucii Cæsaris F. Lux Cæsarum & Pater,  
Romanus Alexander, Terræ Mars :  
Omnibus tam metuendus, quam mitis ;  
Pretium fecit servituti.*

*Victo orbe Urbem victricem orbis vicit.  
Defuere illi hostes, hostem habuit Patriam,  
Ne deesset unquam quod vinceret.  
Ingratam Patriam patriis armis punit.  
Eam vicit invitus, quâ vixit invito.*

*Qui Romæ propugnator non regnavit, regnavit expugnator :  
Pro Româ triumphârat, de Româ triumphavit :  
Amavit tamen inimicam, nolenti profuit.*

*Sæpe à fulmine lauro servatus regiâ,  
Quem incremem timuerunt arma, armata necavit toga.*

*Cessit Civibus Cæsar Cæsus :  
Sero cognitum luxit Patria ;  
Viventem hostem, mortuum vocavit Patrem,  
Parricidium confessa cum patrem dixit.*

*Disce lector :  
Melius sæpe quæ non habes vides, quam quæ habes.*



THE LIFE  
OF  
C. JULIUS CÆSAR;  
with certain Historicall Observations upon  
his Medalls.



He excessive Lustre of a million of gallant atchievements successfully performed by *Cæsar* (the most illustrious and celebrated Favourite of Fortune) hath through all ages so dazzled the greatest part of Mankind, especially those, both ancient and modern, who made it their business to describe the great transactions either of their own, or former ages; that they have not onely parallell'd him with the greatest Heroes of the first ages, but have ballanc'd him with *Alexander*, the most generous and the most glorious of all Monarchs. Nay in their account *Cæsar* farre outweighs him, since that all that may be call'd great or illustrious, either as to *Virtue*, *Valour*, true *Magnanimity*, or *Clemency*, is more conspicuous in him then in all the *Roman* Emperours, who after him sate at the helm of that Monarchy. Those who made difficulty to assign him the first place among the *Roman* Emperours, considered not certainly that the designation of a building is the Master-piece of the Architect, and that superstruction may require no eminency of perfection. For having consummated those innumerable Trophies he had erected among the *Galls* by those about *Pharsalia*, he laid the foundation of that eternall fame the world hath deservedly honoured him with since: nay, to that height of adoration had he rais'd the minds of Posterity, that his very Successours thought it their greatest glory to wear the livery of his Name, and after him to be called *Cæsars*.

To offer at a perfect anatomy of this great man's actions, were to quote most Authours and writers that have been, and consequently a work of too long a breath. It shall therefore suffice to trace him out in those great designs whereby he laid the foundations of the *Roman* greatness.

The first thing worthy, not onely notice, but admiration, is the strange judgement of *Sylla* of him: who reflecting on the great perfections of *Cæsar* when yet a youth, and the strange vivacity and conduct of his first actions,

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*The life of Iulius Caesar.*

made that inhumane proposition that he might be killed, as he had caus'd divers of the Kinred and party of *Marius*, who had married *Julia* an Aunt of *Caesar's* by the mother side. Nor doth Envy want preferences, since as he conjectur'd, one *Caesar* contain'd many *Marius's*, and should, if suffer'd to live; prove the *Viper* of the *Common-wealth*. But this may be easily pass'd by, since that they are indeed the greatest actions that must expect Censure. But it must in the mean time denote a strange transcendency of courage and confidence, to think to conquer that people who had conquer'd the *Universe*, it must be the effect of an ambition more then humane, for this is commonly fetter'd to probabilities. The Emperour *Iulian*, though he hath made it his business to satyze against his predecessors, yet having to do with *Caesar*, he by a strange fiction discovers the greatness of his designations. *Caesar*, sayes he, a person of a gallant and gracefull presence, being entered the place, where *Romulus* was to entertain the *Gods*, and *Roman* Emperours at the *Saturnalian* feasts, came in with such an insolent deportment, that the *Gods* were of opinion, he was not come thither unless it were to manage some ambitious plots against the Majesty of Heaven, whereof *Jupiter* being very jealous, he was thrust by, till at last *Mars* and *Venus* made him place. The ingenuity of this *Satyrist* amounts onely to thus much, to paint ever that great *Vertue*, that great indulgence of *Nature*, and *Fortune* in the colours of an insatiable ambition, which had not this Censor been excessively guilty of, might have prov'd somewhat.

But the endowments of *Nature*, the constant presence of *Fortune*, and the surprizing *Glory* consequentall to his Actions, were the Genius's that rais'd him to such high adventures, as the sudden change of the *Democraticall* State of *Rome* into a *Monarchicall*, to pretend a title to the great acquests of a valorous people for 700. yeares, and to assume to himself an Empire far greater then the *Assyrian*, *Persian*, or *Macedonian*, both in extent of time greatness and power. For not to descend to the acquisitions of the later Emperours, we shall onely take a view of the *Roman* Empire as it stood, before *Caesar* seiz'd the reins of Government. In *Europe* they were Masters of all *Italy* and *Gallia Cisalphina*, or *Lombardy*, *Austria*, and *Illyricum* now call'd *Slavonia*, reaching as farre as *Danubius*; They had reduc'd all *Greece*, the States of *Athens*, *Lacedemonia*, *Thebes*, *Corinth*, and all *Peloponnesus* now call'd *Morea*; *Macedon*, and *Epire* now call'd *Albania*, and *Thrace*. They had the Islands of *Sicily*, *Sardynia*, *Creta*, *Candia*, *Cypres*, *Rhodes*, and *Negrepoint*, and divers others in the *Mediterranean* Sea. They had taken in all *Spain*, and (which was *Caesar's* own work) all *France* that part of *Germany* lying on the *Rhine*, call'd *Gallia Belgica*, and great *Britain*. They were Masters of all *Africk*, (the third part of the world then) even to pull down the pride of *Carthage*. The best Provinces of *Asia* were Tributaries, as *Syria*, *Phoenicia*, *Palestina*, *Judea*, *Phrygia*, *Caria*, *Cilicia* and *Bithynia*. *Egypt* and *Cappadocia* were confederates. In *Armenia* and *Colchos* they had forces. *Albania*, *Iberia* and some other Countries paid Contributions and did homage. In fine they were so great that they

were

*The life of Iulius Caesar.*

were unconquerable unless by their own strength, that so they might have this satisfaction and glory in their conquest, that they triumph'd over themselves.

It is easy to attribute to ambition and discord what is the design of Fate. Greatness must expect a period, and to be successfull presumes a happy conjuncture of men and affaires. Some differences there were between *Caesar* and *Pompey* (the most eminent and the most powerfull in *Rome*) rak'd up in the embers of the civile warre between *Sylla* and *Marius*, wherein the later being slain, the other made himself Dictator, and seiz'd *Rome*, but quitted both before his death. *Pompey* had sided with *Sylla*, *Caesar* with *Marius*, as being his Kinsman. But to ascend a little higher in these Broiles, we are to note that *Sylla* having dispower'd himself, *Pompey* and *Crassus* came into repute. The later was the more recommended by his wildome, eloquence, Nobility and excessive riches; the other had gain'd the popular esteem by his Victories and great actions in warre, even in *Sylla's* time. While the differences of these two increas'd with their greatness, *Caesar* returns to *Rome* from his Pratorship in *Spain*, bringing that reputation with him, that swell'd the greatness and ambition of his thoughts. He had gone through most charges Civile and Military, he had been *Questor*, *Tribune* of the Souldiers, *Edile*, *High-priest* and *Prator*. All which, with other accomplishments he was furnish'd with, which we shall mention elsewhere, though they brought him into much esteem, yet was he not yet arriv'd to near the Authority and reputation of either *Crassus* or *Pompey*.

*Caesar*, though he were come to *Rome*, yet stifled all thoughts of aspiring for a while: so that both *Crassus* and *Pompey* apply'd themselves to him, hoping by his accession to ruine one the other. But *Caesar* declin'd both, and carried himself with circumspection, that he endeavour'd to reconcile them, so hoping by his newtrality to undermine them both, which was, as *Plutarch* sayes, observ'd onely by *Cato*. At length he so order'd things, that he made an agreement between them, and so oblig'd both, which caus'd that, retaining some jealousies of each other, they equally courted *Caesar's* friendship, by which means he became equal to either: so that the power which before was between two, became now tripartite. Things being thus appeas'd, *Caesar* demands the Consulship: which obtain'd, he carried himself in it with that reputation, that his Co-Consul *Bibulus* left all to his managery. To maintain the authority he had got, he himself took to wife *Calpurnia* the daughter of *Lucius Pise*, who was to succeed him in the Consulate, and bestowes his own Daughter *Julia* on *Pompey*; and so taking in *Crassus*, they make a League, and being equally ambitious conspire to invade the *Common-wealth*. *Caesar* chuses for his Province the *Galls*, or *France*; *Crassus*, *Asia*; *Pompey*, *Spain*; whither they went with three puissant Armies, as if the world had been to be trichotomiz'd among these three. What *Caesar* did in his Province, what Battels he fought, what people he subdued, what

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valour,

valour, policy, successe follow'd him every where, may be seen in his own *Commentaries* of that war, approv'd by his very enemies as modest and impartiall, and attested by *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Suetonius*, *Appianus Alexandrinus*, *Lucan*, *Paulus Orosius*, *Florus*, *Eutropius*; too great a testimony against one censorious *Asinius Pollio*. By this war *Caesar* got the reputation of the greatest Captain that ever was, subduing all *France* from the *Pyrenean* hills to the *Alps*, and so to the *Rhene*. But to forbear particular instances, as that he conquer'd the *Swissers* and *Tigurins* (who were according to *Plutarch* 300000. men, whereof 10000. were well disciplin'd) this is most worth our remark, that during these so great warres, he omitted not, both by intelligence and presents, to endear his friends both at *Rome* and else-where, doing many things without the Senate's leave, upon the score of the League with *Pompey* and *Crassus*. Nay, his courting of all sorts of people, both Souldier and Citizen, was none of his least matter-pieces, by which means he had supplanted *Pompey* in matter of esteem, before he perceiv'd it. To this purpose hath *Pliny* observ'd, *Lib. 33. cap. 3.* that in the time of his *Adultery*, that is to say his *Shrivedome*, he was so prodigall, that all the *Vessells* and armes that he made use of at publick sports and combats, were all of silver, which yet afterwards were bestow'd among the people; and that he was the first that ever brought forth the beasts in chariots and cages of silver. This it was made some suspect him guilty of rapine, and that he plunder'd Temples and Cities *sepius ob prædâ quam ob delictum*.

But this reputation of *Caesar* begat jealousy in *Pompey*, which (the yet of their correspondence being loos'd by the death of *Julia*) was easily seen to break forth into a flame, especially now that *Crassus*, the third man, was together with divers stout *Roman* Legions buried with infamy in *Parthia*. Thus the foundations of Friendship and Alliance in great ones being once taken away, the superstructures fall down immediately. Nothing could decide the emulation of two so great persons, as *Pompey* and *Caesar*, (the one desying superiority, the other equality) but as great a war. It could not but be universall, when Senate, Armies, Kingdomes, Cities, Allies, all were some way or other embarqu'd in the quarrell. There was on one side 11. Legions, on the other 18. The seat of the warre was *Italy*, *France*, *Epirus*, *Thessaly*, *Egypt*, *Asia* and *Africa*, through all which after it had ravag'd 5. yeares, the controversy was decided in *Spain*. That Ambition (the imperfection only of the greatest minds) might have been the occasion of so inveterate a warre, hath been the opinion of divers others, who charge not *Pompey* with so great discoveries of it as *Caesar*, to whom they assign a greater then the Empire; as if their mutuall distrust and jealousy of one another, should be able to cause so many tragedies through so many Countries. Besides *Caesar* had his Enemies at *Rome*, and among others *Cato*, who threatned to impeach him when he was once out of command. What bandying there was against him, we find somewhat in the later end of the eighth Commentary, to this purpose. *Lentulus* and *Marcellus*, both of *Pompey's* Faction, being Consuls, it is mov'd in the Senate, that *Caesar* might be call'd home, and another sent to supply his command of the Army then

then in *Gallia*; since that he, having written for the Consulship, should according to Law have been personally in *Rome*. *Caesar* demands to be continued in Commillion and Government, and that he might demand the Consulship absent. This *Pompey* opposes, though he himself as much contrary to Law, had had the Consulship and other dignities before he was at full Age.

This deny'd, *Caesar* proposes, that he would come to *Rome* as a private man, and give over his command, so that *Pompey* quitted his employment in *Spain*. About this the Senate was much divided. *Cicero* proposes a mediation: but *Pompey's* party prevailing, it was decreed that *Caesar* should by a certain time quit his command, and should not passe his Army over the River *Rubicon*, which bounded his Province, declaring him an enemy to the Roman State in case of refusal. *C. Curio* and *M. Antonius* the Tribunes of the people, out of their affection to *Caesar*, endeavouring to oppose this decree, were thrust disgracefully out of the Senate, which occasion'd them to repair to *Caesar*; whereby they endear'd the affections of the Souldiery to him, the office of the Tribunes being ever held sacred and unviolable.

*Caesar* understanding how things stood at *Rome*, marches with 5000. foot and 300. Horse to *Ravenna*, having commanded the Legions to follow. Coming to the fatal passage of *Rubicon*, he entered into a deep deliberation, considering the importance, and miseries that might ensue that passage. At last in the midst of his anxiety, he was animated to a prosecution of his designs, by the apparition of a man of an extraordinary stature and shape, sitting near unto his army, piping upon a reed. The Souldiers went down to the River side to heare him, and approach'd so near, that he caught one of their trumpets, and leaping into the River, began with a mighty blast to sound, and so went to the bank of the other side. This resolves *Caesar*, who cry'd out, Let us go whither the Gods, and the injurious dealings of our enemies call us. With which he set spurs to his horse, and past the River, the army following. Who would be more particularly inform'd, may be satisfi'd out of *Appianus Alexandrinus*, *Suetonius*, *Plutarch*, in the lives of *Caesar*, *Cato*, and *Cicero*, *St. Augustine* l. 3. de c. d. *Caesar* himself in his *Commentaries*, *Florus*, *Livy*, *Paulus Orosius*, *Eutropius*, *Lucan*, *Pliny de viris illustribus*, *Valerius Maximus*, &c.

Having pass'd the River, and drawn the Army together, the Tribunes came to him in those dishonourable garments wherein they had fled from *Rome*. Whereupon he made an excellent oration to the Souldiery, opening to them his cause: which was answer'd with generall acclamations, and promises of duty and obedience to all commands.

This done he seizes *Ariminum*, and divers other Towns and Castles as he pass'd, till he came to *Corfinium*: where *Domitius*, who was to succeed him in his command, was garrison'd with 30. Cohorts.

*Caesar's* advance and intentions astonish'd *Rome*, Senate and people; nay, so surpriz'd *Pompey*, that he could not believe *Caesar* would thrust himself into so much danger, or that his forces were so considerable. But though *Pompey* was empower'd by the Senate to levy forces, recall the Le-

gions, and provide for the defence of Italy, yet all could make nothing against Caesar. The rumour of his advance spreading, Pompey and the Senate leave Rome, and repair to Capua, from thence to Brundisium; from whence the Consuls were dispatch'd to Dyrrachium, to unite what forces they could, since they despair'd of resisting Caesar in Italy: who hearing the Consuls and Pompey were at Brundisium, march'd thither, and having invest'd the Town, Pompey in the night time imbarques for Dyrrachium, where the Consul expected him: so that Caesar became absolute Master of Italy. Having not shipping to pursue him, he resolv'd for Spain, which held for Pompey, where his best Legions were, and two Captains, Petreius and Afranius.

Returning from Brundisium, he in 60. dayes master'd all Italy without any bloodshed, and coming to Rome, the memory of the devastations of Sylla's dayes frightened the people extremely. But Caesar's clemency, and his attributing the cause of all the distractions to Pompey, quieted all things. He so far justifi'd his own Cause, that he mov'd that Ambassadors might be sent to Pompey for peace, and causing himself to be chosen Consul, he opened the Roman Treasury, and made a dividend of it among the Souldiery. This done, he provides for Spain, having taken care for the civile as well as military government. Brundisium, Otranto, and other maritime places he fortifies against Pompey's entering into Italy, in case he should attempt it. Hortensius and Dolabella were to provide shipping for him at Brundisium against his return. Quintus Valerius he sends with a Legion into Sardinia against Marcus Cotta, who held it for Pompey. To Sicily he sends Curius against Marcus Cato: which when he had taken in, he was to march into Africa. He leaves Lepidus to govern at Rome, and Antonius for all Italy. Thus intending to leave Cicinius Crassus in France he with his wonted celerity went on his journey, meeting with no resistance, but at Marseilles; which leaving D. Brutus, and C. Trebonius with sufficient forces to besiege, he went forward towards Spain, where he was expected by Petreius and Afranius: with whom, though he met with the inconveniences of the Winter and high Rivers, he had divers skirmishes; yet at length he carried his business so, that the enemies were forc'd by hunger to a composition, the Legions and Captains, such as would not remaine with Caesar, having leave to depart whither they pleas'd.

The spring now coming on, (to leave nothing unsbud'd) he marches into Betica, now called Andaluzia, where quarter'd Marcus Varro, with one Legion of Souldiers, as Pompey's Lieutenant; who, conceiving himself unable to make opposition, resign'd both the Country and Legion to Caesar, whereby all was quieted.

Thence he marched to Cordova, where assembling the estates of the Provinces, he acknowledg'd their affection and devours, and so went to Cales; where he took such ships and Gallies as Marcus Varro had there, with what others he could get, and imbarqued. Having left Q. Caisius with

which four Legions in that Province he marches to Narbona and so to Marseilles, which having suffer'd great miseries during the siege, at length, surrendred, yet he protect'd it from any violence, preferring the consideration of the antiquity of the place, before the affronts he had receiv'd from it, and so having sufficiently garrison'd it, he marches into Italy and so to Rome, all things succeeding Prosperously to him, though not so to his Captains. For Antonius (who was joint General at sea with Dolabella) was over thrown and taken Prisoner by Octavius, Pompey's Lieutenant, in the gulfes Venice and that by a strange stratagem. Antonius being forc'd for want of ships to put his men into long boates, the Pompeians ty'd ropes under the water, by which means one of them which carried a thousand Opitergins, stout young men, was surpriz'd and assaulted by the whole Army, yet making resistance from morning till night, they at last seeing all their sorts ineffectual did by the instigation of their Commander Vulreius, kill one another. Dolabella was also overcome, as also Curius, who was ordered to go into Africa, was overthrown by Pompey's friend Iuba, King of Mauritania.

While Caesar was at Rome busy in causing himself to be made Dictator, and then putting off that Consul, that so he might send Prætors into the Provinces, as Marcus Lepidus into Spain, A. Albinus into Sicily, Sextus Peduceius into Sardinia, and Decius Brutus into France, and taking such further order as he thought fit; Pompey was as busy in Macedonia, raising of men and money and providing ships in order to his return into Italy. What his forces might amount unto, may be judg'd from the almost infinite assistances came in to him from divers Kingdomes and Provinces of Asia and Greece, from Syria, Pontus, Bithynia, Cilicia, Phœnicia, Capadocia, Pamphilia, Armenia the lesse, Egypt, Greece, Thessaly, Bœotia, Achæa, Epire, Athens, Lacedæmonia, the Isles of Creta and Rhodes and divers other places, there coming to his assistance in person the Kings Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes. These certainly, with those he had brought with him out of Italy, must needs make up a vast Army by land, nor could the number of ships and Gallies but be proportionable. However Caesar knowing all this, leaves Rome in December, and so marches to Brundisium, whence he was to imbarque for Macedonia, out of this consideration, that his Victory consist'd in expedition, though Pompey in the mean time upon intelligence of Caesar's being at Rome, had scatter'd his people into Macedonia and Thessaly, conceiving the inconveniences of the winter would have deser'd him from crossing the Seas. But Caesar being come to Brundisium, (now call'd Brindéz,) he imbarques seven Legions of his choicest men in the beginning of January, leaving order to those that were coming to make halt and joine with those which remained behind, all whom he would speedily send for.

Three dayes after he arrives upon the coast of Macedonia, before Pompey had so much as heard of his imbarquing, and lands in Spite of Pompey's Captains, and presently commands the ships to returne for the remainder of his Army, which done he takes it by storm



## The life of Iulius Caesar.

*Apollonia*, (now call'd *Bellona*) and *Oricum*, two Cities kept by *L. Torquatus* and *L. Straberius*, for *Pompey*; who alarm'd by this, sends for such troupes as were nearest, and marches to *Dyrrachium*, where all his Ammunition and Provision lay, to secure it from being surpriz'd by *Caesar*: which indeed he had attempted, but, by reason of the naturall strength of the place, to no purpose.

*Pompey* being come, both Armies lodg'd not many furlongs from one another, onely they were divided by a River. Which post as it gave occasion of divers skirmishes, so it begat many overtures of Peace from *Caesar*; which *Pompey*, presuming upon his strength, would not hear of. This proposition of *Caesar's*, though it proceeded from his meeknesse, which was not the least of his virtues; yet argu'd some confidence of his own weaknesse at this time. For he was extremely perplex'd, that the other part of his Army was not come, in so much that he embarked in a *Brigandine* disguized to fetch them. Having pass'd down the River, the sea was tempestuous, that the master of the vessel would not adventure out: whereupon, as it is said, *Caesar* discovered himself, and said to him, *Friend, thou carriest Caesar and his fortune*. Whereat the master being encourag'd, ventur'd out into the sea, but the Tempest was so violent, that it brought *Caesar* back again. This action of his was like to have rais'd a mutiny in his Army, as a thing which though it spoke courage, yet was a stranger to discretion: which it may be is the reason that *Caesar* hath made no mention of it in his Commentaries.

But some few dayes after *Antonius* arrives with four Legions of the remaining part of the Army, and sends back the ships for the rest. These joyning with *Caesar*, there pass divers skirmishes and pickerings (being so nearly lodg'd) between both Armies: but that which was most remarkable was near the City of *Dyrrachium*, wherein *Caesar's* Troupes were so routed, that no threats or entreaties could stay them from running to their Camp; which though fortifi'd, yet was abandon'd by some. *Pompey* in the mean time, either out of fear that the flight might be feigned, and in order to some ambush, or that he thought *Caesar* sufficiently conquer'd, doth not prosecute the victory. Which weaknesse in him *Caesar* dissembled not, when afterwards he said to his men, that *that day had ended the war, if the enemy had had a Captain that knew how to overcome*. But *Caesar*, as no Prosperity disorder'd him, so in Adversity he had a courage and such a confidence of Fortune that he was nothing cast down. He lost in that engagement, besides the Common-Souldiery, 400 *Roman* Knights, 10 Tribunes, and 32 Centurions, with as many Colours. This successe obtained, *Pompey* sends the news of it into all parts of the world, so advantageously to himself, as if *Caesar* were utterly routed; who though he did not decline fighting, yet thought it not policy to engage his men lately worsted (though indeed exasperated with shame and indignation at their losse) with those that were animated and flesh'd with a victory. He therefore disposes his maimed men into *Apollonia*, and in the night takes his way towards *Theffaly*: both to hearten and retire his Army, as also to draw the enemy further from the Sea-

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Sea-coast, where his main force and all his provisions lay; or at least to meet with *Scipio*, who, he had intelligence, was to join with *Pompey*.

This unexpected departure of *Caesar's* brought *Pompey* almost to a resolution to return into *Italy*, to recover that, with *France* and *Spain*, and afterwards to meet with *Caesar*. But the *Roman* Lords that were about him (a sort of proud, insolent, indisciplinable people, who indeed prov'd his ruine) dissuaded him, and caused him to alter his design: and so he fell upon the hot pursuit of *Caesar*, who, making a stay in the fields of *Pharsalia* till that his men had reassum'd their courage and resolution, was now willing and eager to fight. But *Pompey* perceiving this readinesse of *Caesar* to proceed from want of Provision, and a fear his Army should diminish, purposely avoided fighting, and would have prolong'd the warre, and so have defeated his enemy without hazzarding his own Army. But the murmurings, mutinies, and importunity of those that were about him had such a prevailing influence over him (as *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Caesar* himself acknowledge) that they forced him contrary to his intentions and policy, to give Battell; which was such, that all the flower and force of *Rome* was engaged in it. *Caesar's* Army (according to the computation of most writers) amounted to half *Pompey's*: but in compensation, his men were more active, and vers'd in warre, and knew their advantages; whereas the other's was a tumultuary sort of people raked together, (besides what *Romans* he had.) The exact number of both these Armies is not agreed on by Authors: some raise them to 300000. of which opinion was *Florus*; others bring them down to 70000. But if we agree with *Appianus*, we must conceive, that so many countries and nations having sent in their assistances on either side, there must needs be vast Armies on both sides: and therefore those who pitched upon the lesser number, meant onely the number of *Romans*, who were the maine force and hope of both Generalls. But here we may make a strange remark upon the uncertain events of warre. We have two of the greatest Captains that ever were, the stoutest Armies that ever met, such as experience, force, and valour was equally divided between, and, to be short, the most exasperated parties that could be, and yet it proved but a very short fight: so weak is the confidence and assurance that is onely placed in number. We may further note the strange influence of Religion upon Mankind in general, in that it enforces man in the greatest exigencies to confusion: for *Pompey* met with divers things that might somewhat have informed him of the successe of that famous Battell; The running away of the beasts destined for Sacrifice, the swarming of bees, the sky darkned, and his own fatal dream of being in mourning in the Theatre, seconded by his appearance in the head of his main Battell the next day in a black robe, which might signifie he mourned for the liberty of *Rome* beforehand.

Being both resolv'd to give Battell, they put their Armies in such order as they thought fit, and harangued their Souldiers according to their severall pretences. In the beginning, *Pompey's* horse, consisting most of the *Roman* Gentry and Nobility, prevailed over *Caesar's*, and made them give ground: which he perceiving, causes a Battalion, set apart for that purpose, to charge them;

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with order to ayme altogether at the face: which *Pompey's* horse not able, or not willing to endure, began to retreat, and so made way for the tall overthrow; by which means the foot being discourag'd, and seeing *Caesar's* horse falling on, the Victory was soon decided on *Caesar's* side, *Pompey* flying to his camp, and leaving the field to his adversary. Here was the greatest misfortune of *Pompey*, to out-live the Liberty of his Country (which he pretended so much to fight for) and his own glory in this Battell, being forc'd to a dishonourable flight, and to deliberate whither he should retire, whether into *Parthia*, *Africa*, or *Egypt*.

*Caesar* being thus Master of the field, and meeting with no opposition, falls upon *Pompey's* camp, which, without any great difficulty, he entered. Whereupon *Pompey* disguizing himself, takes up the first horse he met, and with four more (his own Son *Sextus Pompeius*, the two *Lentuli*, and *Favonius*) makes his escape, and stays not till he came to *Larissa*: where meeting with some of his own horse, who were in the same condition of running away, he continued his flight till he came to the shore of the *Ægean* Sea; where meeting accidentally with a certain Merchants ship of *Rome*, he embarks himself in her, and sailes to *Attylene*, where his wife and family were. Having taken them with him, and got together what men and ships a shattered fortune could furnish him with, he departed thence in very great doubt and perplexity, not able to resolve whither to dispose of himself. He was advis'd by some to march into *Africa*, and shelter himself with *Iuba*, whose friendship and affection towards him he had receiv'd testimony of but very lately; others were of opinion, his best course was to retire among the *Parthians*: but at last, by his own wilfulness, it was voted he should go into *Egypt*; which he was the more inclin'd to, out of a consideration of the friendship and correspondence which he had had with King *Ptolemy*, father to him who then reign'd; and so touching at *Cyprus*, he sailes towards *Egypt*, and arrives at *Alexandria*.

Thus was the controversy for no less than the known world decided in one day, *Caesar* being Master of the field and Victory. Of *Pompey's* side there were slain fifteen thousand, if you will take it upon *Caesar's* credit, and of his own not two thousand. *Caesar* having intelligence of *Pompey's* flight, pursues him without any stay with the swiftest and lightest of his Army, so to give him as little breath as he could afford, that he might not meet with any means or opportunity to recover or repair himself. Reducing all Cities as he passed, he comes to the Sea side, and taking up all the ships and galleys he could meet with, and such as *Cassius* (who was receiv'd into his favour) could furnish him with, he embarks such troops as he could, and passed into *Asia* the less: where understanding that *Pompey* had been at *Cyprus*, he easily presumed that he was gone for *Egypt*. He thereupon resolves to take the same course, and taking with him onely two Legions of his old Souldiers, he safely arrives at *Alexandria*: where he soon understood that *Pompey* was arrived, upon a confidence (as was said before) there might have remain'd some sense and memory in young *Ptolemy*, of the entertainment and favours he had done his Father. But he was as much mistaken in this, as he had been eluded by Fo-

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tune in the warre: for he finds that the friendship of great men and Princes seldom outlives their prosperity, and that adversity makes them the greatest strangers that may be. Being by this King *Ptolemy* invited into Protection, and upon that confidence coming towards the shore in a small Boat, he was, ere he could reach the land, murdered, by the same Kings commandment, by *Septimius* and *Achillas*, who thought by that means to purchase *Caesar's* favour. This was done by the contrivance of *Photinus* an Eunuch, whose authority both with King and Court was very great. *Caesar* receives also news, that *Cornelia*, *Pompey's* wife, and his Son *Sextus Pompeius*, were fled from that port in the same vessel wherein they came. Being landed and received into the City, he was soon presented with the head of the great *Pompey*; which out of a consideration of the horridness of the fact, he would not by any means see. His Ring also and his Seal, with his Coat of Armes upon it, were presented to him: which causing him to reflect on the great successes, adventures and prosperities of that great and glorious man (besides that he was to look on him as his Son in Law) it drew teares from him, to compare them with his unfortunate end. Thus is he who had three times triumph'd, been so many times Consul, been the most eminent and the most concerned person that *Rome* had for so many yeares together, one who had been acquainted with all the dignities so great a Common-wealth could conferre upon a deserving Citizen, most inhumanely and perfidiously assassinated, to the greatest regret of him who was look'd on as most desirous of it. This in the mean time concludes that opinion erroneous, that *Caesar* was so extremely over-joy'd at the newes of *Pompey's* death, that he caus'd upon that very place where he had ordered his head to be interr'd, a Temple to be built to the Goddess *Nemesis*; which some interpret a most unnatural revengefulness, a horrid insultation over a calamitous virtue, and a profanation of divine worship, to abuse the name of a Goddess for to immortalize the memory of his vengeance, and to authorize the injustice of it. But it is as easy to give the title of barbarisme and cruelty to magnanimity and height of courage, as to say the contrary: and therefore *Caesar* certainly could not be guilty of so great an Hypocrisy, as to shed teares over his enemy's head, when he was inwardly surpriz'd with joy.

*Caesar* upon his arrivall into *Egypt* findes it embroil'd in civile warres, arising from some differences between young *Ptolemy* and his sister *Cleopatra*, about the division and inheritance of the Kingdome, wherein *Caesar* (as Consul of *Rome*) thought fit to be a mediator. *Photinus* and *Achillas*, the plotters and practicers of *Pompey's* death, fearing from *Caesar* a reward of vengeance proportion'd to so horrid a crime, and perceiving his inclination to favour *Cleopatra*, take such order, by their great influence over King and Court, that they brought what Army the King had near the City, which consisted of about 20000. able men: and this they did out of a design to entrap *Caesar*, and act the same perfidious burchery upon him, as they had done upon *Pompey*. By this means there began between what forces *Caesar* had brought with him, and those of the *Egyptians* within and about the City, as also between the ships and galleys in harbour, the hottest disputes and sharpest encounters he ever met with: which we shall not particularize here,

(c 2.)

because



ving fatished himself, he, about the relieving of the watch, with a *Roman* resolution drew his sword, and ran himself into the Body. Being not quite dispatch'd, Physicians came in and apply'd something to the wound, which he suffer'd while they staid with him, but as soon as they were departed, he pull'd all off, and thrust his dying hand into the wound. *Scipio*, the Generall in this war, having escap'd, and shipp'd himself in certain Gallies, was met by *Caesar's* navy; but to avoid being taken by them, he gave himself some wounds, and leapt over-board, and so was drown'd.

*Caesar* being by this means absolute Victor, spends some time in ordering the Provinces of *Africa*: which done, and reducing *Numa's* Kingdom into a Province, he comes to *Treca*, whence he embark'd the third of June for *Sardinia*; where having staid some few dayes, he arrives at *Rome* July 25, whither as soon as he was come, there were granted unto him four Triumphs. The first was for his conquest and Victories in *France*, wherein were set forth the Rivers of *Rhoda* and the *Rhene* wrought in gold. In the second, which was for *Aegypt* and King *Ptolemy*, were represented the River *Nile*, and the *Pharos* of *Alexandria* burning. The third was for his Victory over King *Pharnaces*, wherein a certain writing represented the celerity he us'd in the prosecution of that Victory, which only contain'd three words, *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, I came, I saw, I overcame. The fourth was for his reduction of *Africa*; wherein was plac'd *Numa's* Son as a captive. As for the Battell against *Pompey*, *Caesar* would not triumph for it, becaule it was against *Roman* Citizens.

These triumphs ended, and great rewards scatter'd among the Souldiery, who had been assistant in so great Transactions, the People being also entertained with feasts, sports, and presents. *Caesar* is chosen the fourth time Consul. But there yet remain'd some sword-work to do, for *Gneius Pompeius*, Great *Pompey's* Son, had got together most of the remainder of the *African* Army, and was gone into *Spain* to joyn with his Brother *Sextus*, who (as was hinted before) was there, and had possess'd himself of a great part of *Spain*, with the Cities of *Sevill* and *Cordova*, the *Spaniards* being ready enough to come in to their assistance. *Caesar* takes with him his most experienc'd veterane Souldiers, and with extraordinary speed arrives in *Spain* within a few dayes, being accompany'd with his Nephew *Octavius*, who was about sixteen yeares of Age.

Being come into *Betica* (now *Andaluzia*) where the two *Pompeys* were with such Legions as they had got together, he soon began a hot and bloody war, whercof to be short the issue was this. *Caesar* and *Gneius* (*Sextus* being in *Cordova*) near *Alunda*, joyn battell, which proves the sharpest and most obstinate that ever was. It lasted almost a whole day, and that with such indifferencie as to point of Victory, that it was adjudg'd sometimes to one side sometimes to another. *Suetonius* and *Entropius* tell us that *Caesar* one time, upon his mens giving ground, was in such a plunge, that he was almost resolv'd to have kill'd himself, so to have avoided the shame and dishonour of being conquer'd; and that in that heat of indignation and despair he snatch'd a Target from one of his Souldiers, saying with a loud voice; as *Plutarch* relates (If you are not ashamed, leave me, or deliver me into the hands of these Boyes, for this shall be the last day of my life, and your honour. With which words the Souldiers being animated

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and heighten'd by his example, regain their lost ground, turn, by degrees, the scales of the Battell; and, towards the evening, the enemy fainting and flying, become apparent Victors. The Enemy lost in this field 30000. men: *Caesar*, beside the common Souldiery, 1000. all persons of quality. This did *Caesar* account the most glorious of all his Victories, (the commemoration of hazzards and suffering being to some the greatest satisfaction conceivible, for he would often say afterwards, that at other times he fought for *Fame* and *Victory*, but that that day he fought for his *Life*, which he had never fought for before. *Pompey*, who had performed all that a wife and stout captain could, persecuted by a malicious fortune, and seeing there was no other remedy, escap'd by flight: but being hopelesse and refugelesse, he was at last surpriz'd by some of *Caesar's* friends, kill'd, and his head brought to him; which was also the fate of *Labienus*. *Sextus* upon this quits *Cordova*, and shortly after *Spain*, leaving all to *Caesar*, who in a short time reduc'd and settled the whole Country. Which done, he returns to *Rome*, and triumphs for the warres of *Spain*, which was his fifth and last triumph.

Having thus conquer'd the greatest part of the world, and by consequence gain'd the reputation of the most famous and most powerfull man in it, it was at least a pardonable ambition, if he thought no title, name, or dignity too great for him. It requires some faith to believe that such vast bodies as *Roman* Armies, consisting of many Legions, could at an ordinary rate, march through so many Countries, and crosse so many Seas, had they had no enemy to engage; but to conquer them transcends it, and must be attributed to Miracle; for within lesse then five yeares, through infinite conquests and Victories, he consummated the *Roman* Monarchy, making himself perpetual Dictator, Sovereign Lord or Emperour. Which later title though it had not that height of signification which his Successors have rais'd it to, yet was it the greatest attribution of honour which that, or after-Ages have acknowledged.

But if his thoughts were so high, and his ambition so exorbitant as to deserve a severe Censure, certainly it may prove so much the more excusable, by how much it was inflam'd by the generall acclamations and acknowledgments. For both the Senate and people of *Rome*, some out of care, some out of affection, some out of dissimulation, were forward enough to invent those appellations of honour and preeminence, and afterwards to elevate them to the height of his ambitious mind. Hence was he call'd Emperour, Father, Restorer, and Preserver of his Country; hence created perpetual Dictator, and Consul for ten yeares, and perpetual Censor of their Customes; his Statue erected among the *Kings* of *Rome*; hence he had his thrones and chaires of state in the Theatre and Temples, which, as also all publick places, were filled with his pictures and images. Nay, their adoration ascended to that point, that from these humane honours they attributed to him divine; finding marble little enough for Temples and Statues for him, (which were dedicated to him with the same veneration as to their Gods) and metall little enough to represent his high and almost incredible adventures.

But all the power and command of so many nations as he had conquer'd,

was

Scipio  
Nepos  
in the Bay  
of Hippo.

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was inconsiderable as to the extent of his mind: whereby we may see what small acquaintance there is between Ambition and Acquiescence. It was not sufficient to have been personally engag'd in fifty signall Battels, and to have lay'd with their Bellies to the Sun a million ninety and odd thousand men, (abating all those that fell in the Civile warres) but there yet remains something to do greater then all this. The fierce *Parthians* break his sleep, they are yet unconquer'd, which once done, 'twere easy, like lightning, to passe through *Hircania* and other Countries to the *Caspian* Sea, and so scoure the Provinces of *Scythia Asiatice*, and so passing over the River *Tanais*, to come into *Europe*, and bring in *Germany* and the bordering Provinces under the wings of the *Roman* Eagle. In order to this expedition had he in sundry places raised 10000. horse and 16. Legions of choice foot: but another greater power thought fit he should leave some work for his successors.

Nay some things he aim'd at beyond Man's attempt, correcting even nature it self. As that design of making *Peloponnesus* an Island, by cutting of that neck of Land which is between the *Ægean* and *Ionian* Seas. He thought to have altered the courtes of the Rivers *Tiber* and *Arden*, and made them navigable for ships of the greatest burthen. He had begun to levell diverse hills and mountains in *Italy*, and to dry up Lakes and Fenns. He re-edified and re-peopled the once famous *Carthage* and *Corinth*. These and many other things he had done without doubt, had not an unexpected and barbarous death surpriz'd him in the midst of his designs. Which because it is the tragickall part of this Relation, we shall referre to the last place, while in the mean time we shall divert our thoughts, with a short entertainment of his personal excellencies and endowments, his extraction, birth, Deification, and names; as we have already satisfi'd our selves with the consideration of his Actions: and so passe to that part of our undertaking, wherein we presume to promise the curious and criticall reader no lesse content then he hath found in what he hath already reflected on, that is to say, the description and dilucidation of what MEDALLS have been snatch'd out of the jaws of hungry Time, that have had any relation to the great name of CÆSAR.

Cæsar was of a full & handsome composure of body, of a graceful carriage and deportment, of a whitish complexion, his eyes were somewhat big, black, quick and piercing, his nose straight and large enough, but his mouth was more then ordinary wide, his cheeks lean. In his later dayes he became bald towards the fore-part of his head, and, through his continual hazzards and hardships, much wrinkled in the forehead. These last imperfections are easily discernable in his Medalls, as also in some graven stones and Marbles: and this made him seem somewhat older then he was, his baldnesse, wrinkles, and wide mouth taking away much of the gracefulness of his countenance, and causing him to have a rustick Physiognomy. This gave occasion to *Silvius* the oldest among the *Satyr*s, very pleasantly (in the CÆSARS of the Emperour *Iulian*) to boast that, besides other similitudes between them, he had a head like *Iulius Cæsar*'s. But as to the bald-

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baldnesse, it is no more to be objected to him as indecent, then to diverse other great personages of Antiquity, as may be frequently seen in Medalls and Marbles, *Hercules* himself being one of the Tribe. They are the highest and sublimest things, nay the more divine, as approaching the sky, that are freed from all superfluities. The highest mountains are bald on their tops, though in other parts they are perriqu'd with woods, and have fertile descents. Cæsar was much troubled at the losse of his haire, inasmuch as, having effected his designs, he always wore a Crown of Lawrell, the better to cover the nakednesse, thrusting up the haire he had towards the hinder part of his head as much as he could, as may be remarked out of his effigies in the Medalls. He had a strong and vigorous body, able to endure any thing of labour or hardship; an active and lively mind, capable of any undertaking; his judgement and common sense most exquisite. He was furnished with a strange fore-sight and vigilance, a dexterity and presence of mind above ordinary, and an incredible resolution and courage in all exigences and emergencies. In the warres of *Asia*, under the Prætor *Marcus Terminus* he obtained a Civicall Crown. He was admirable for his Eloquence and incomparable Memory. He was well versed in *Astrology*, and by the assistance thereof foreknew many things. It was by that that he was jealous of the *Ides* of the months, as being fatal to him. Nay, he writ books of the motion of the starrs, regulated the year, and reduc'd it to the course of the Sun; which science he learned from the *Ægyptians*. From his skill in that science he rais'd himself to attempt that great change and alteration which he brought about, from the strange prodigies which had happened not long before, as you have them elegantly described by *Petronius* and *Lucan*; the heavens, earth, sea, nay the very mountaines and rivers intimating that great vicissitude.

But in the whole constellation of his virtues and perfections, none shines brighter then his Clemency and Generosity. His propensity to pardon his enemies, when conquered, whether Barbarians or Citizens, was exemplary: and it is much to be questioned whether his Lenity rais'd him more friends or enemies. When he had passed the *Rubicon*, he takes the City *Corfinium*, and in it *Domitius*, whom the Senate had design'd to succeed him in his Command in *France*: yet though all were at his mercy, he dismissed *Domitius*, with what part of the Legions would go with him, to repair to *Pompey*. Nor was his Clemency and Liberality lesse remarkable at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, where he not onely pardoned his enemies, but received some of the most inveterate into favour and familiarity, and engaged them into the government of Provinces and Countries: not to mention the confidence in him of *Cato Uticensis*, and his severe punishing of the Murderers of *Pompey*. Much more might be said of him, but since it is not our business to write any *Panegyrics* on him, we come to his extraction.

As for his extraction, we find that those of the *Iulian* family boasted that they were originally descended from *Iulus*, the Son of *Æneas*, the Son of *Anchises* and *Venus*, which was a common and yet no criminal ambition in those times. The Poets, above all other, those that lived in the times of

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Caesar and Augustus, strove who should most celebrate this Genealogie, and that by very remarkable calls of their inherent flattery. To omit what may be gathered out of *Lucan*, *Petronius*, and others, we shall content our selves with what we have from *Atanilius*, *Astron. lib. 1.*

*Venerisque ab origine proles  
Iulia descendit caelo, caelumque replevit.*

and *Propertius*, lib. 4. Eleg. 1.

*Tunc animi venere Decii, Brutique secures,  
Iexit & ipsa sui Caesaris arma Venus,  
Arma resurgens portans vittricia Trojae:  
Felix terrae tuos cepit, Iule, deos.*

But that which *Caesar* suffers in this business, is, that it was objected to him as a great vanity, to derive himself from this Goddess, as being so far guilty of it, that he recommended to her the success and conduct of his most signall enterprises, trusting her with all his good fortune. We mention not his dalliances with *Cleopatra*, because the temptation on her side was more then ordinary, not onely that of her beauty, but her strange prostitution other self, even to that point, that before she had seen *Caesar*, she caused her self to be put up into a Basket, and, as if it had been some present, to be brought to him, fearing, if she had come without this surpris, she might not have access. But if it be a vanity, 'tis easily discover'd in his Coins, being furnish'd with severall shapes of this *Venus Genitrix*, this Goddess of Generation, sometimes sitting on the prow of a ship, sometimes standing, bearing a Victory in her right hand, to represent a *Venus Vittrix*, such as whereof *Hermestera* dedicated a figure in the City of *Argos*, calling it *Nemesis*, bearing a Victory, which was the word *Caesar* gave at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, where in he was afterwards imitated by *Augustus* at the fight of *Actium*. The same reason may be given for his placing a *Venus Vittrix* upon the other side of his own effigies in his Medalls, with a globe, as conceiving she ought him the conquest of the Universe. Besides at the battel of *Pharsalia*, he made a vow to build her a Temple (as *Appianus* records l. 2.) and afterwards caused his statue to be plac'd next to that of this Goddess of Generation. To which Monuments seem to relate those antique Inscriptions which *Gruterus* mentions, forasmuch as concerns the worship of this *Venus*, observed by the *Romans* out of their Veneration of her and the *Iulian* family.

DIVO JULIO  
LIB. JULIA EBORA  
OB IULIUS IMMUN. ET MUN.  
LIBERALITATEM  
QUOUS DEDICATIONE  
VENERI GENETRICI  
CESTUM MATRONÆ  
DOMUM TULERUNT.

VENERI GENETRICI  
D....JULI  
IN MEMORIAM GENT.  
JULIÆ  
STATUAM CUM...  
JUNIUS VIRBIUS ATTICUS  
FLAM. DIVI JULI  
D. S. P. D.

But

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But we shall have more to say of this Goddess when we come to the *Medalls*, we therefore proceed to his *Activity*.

*Caesar* was born under *Sagittary*, that is to say, upon the twelfth day of *July*, which denoted to him great Victories, and many famous triumphs in his own Country, according to *Atanilius*, lib. 4. in these verses.

*Nec non arcitenens prima cum veste refurgit,  
Pectora clara dabit bello, magnisque triumphis  
Conspicuum patrias Vittorem ducet in arces;  
Sed nimium indulgens rebus Fortuna secundis  
Invidet in facie, sevitque asperissima fronti, &c.*

but the end should be dismall and unfortunate: as indeed it happen'd. But *Apollinaris Sidonius* in his Panegyrick of *Anthemius*, vers. 120. makes another obsequy, wherein of all Authours he is singular, saying that *Caesar* was born at the sametime when a crown of *Lawrell* was burning.

*Julius in lucem venit dum Laureæ flagrat.*

What preface could arise hence to signify his innumerable Victories, we have onely this Authour to inform us. But indeed there is one other discovers this mystery, but another way: for when they would preface the fertility or sterility of the ensuing year, they were wont to cast a crown of *Lawrell* into the fire, and according to the crackling of the leaves they gave their judgement. This is *Tibullus*. l. 2. Eleg. 5.

*Ut succensa sacris crepitet bene laurea flammis,  
Omine quo felix & sacer annus eat.  
At Laurus bona signa dedit, gaudere coloni,  
Disfendet spicis aurea plena Ceres.*

Therefore at *Caesar's* birth it may be thought some one out of superstition be thought him of this ceremony, or it happened by chance. But in fine, those that were assitant at the birth, were by that accident rais'd to a certain confidence that the child then born should prove a most fortunate man, and should arrive to great fame and wealth.

As concerning his *Deification*, there is not much to be said. In the first place, we suppose it a thing not so miraculous, that the *Romans* should believe that one who had done such great and transcendent actions, as *Caesar* did, might be thought somewhat more then a man, and had in him something divine, besides that he was one acknowledg'd to have descended from *Venus Genitrix*, the mother of the Universe. Other nations had that custome of adoring and invoking their Kings, as Gods, after their death; as the *Aegyptians*, *Persians*, and the *Moors*, who in *Caesar's* time put *Tuba* into the number of the Gods. In the second place, we meet with two censorious remarks upon this *Deification*. First, how that Genius of *Vertue* and generosity which was wont to animate the *Roman* people, was so metamorphosed into that of flattery and vanity, as to deify one who, by the greatest, if not the most, was look'd on as the greatest oppressor of the *Roman Liberty*, and

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*The life of Julius Cæsar.*

only the most fortunate Malefactor that ever was, when they had not vouchsafed that honour to *Numa Pompilius*, who had been the *Moses*, the Law-giver, the most just and the most pious among the *Roman* Princes. Secondly, whether, if he had miscarried at the battell of *Pharsalia*, he had not been the most infamous person among the *Romans* that ever was, and more abominable then *Catiline*; and on the contrary, whether rocks, mountains, seas, and the cabinets of conquered Kings and Citizens had furnished marble, porphyry, jasper and precious stones enough to erect pillars, statues, and Temples to celebrate the glory of the great *Pompey*, who was so zealous for the Liberty of *Rome*. But *Divine Providence* was pleased to use *Cæsar* as an Instrument to change that *Common-wealth* into a *Monarchy*, that the *Prince of Peace* and *Saviour* of the world should be born under the peaceable reign of one sole *Monarch*.

As for the name of *Julius*; since, as is before noted, the *Julian Gens* derived it self from *Iulus* the Son of *Æneas*, the Son of *Anchises*, by a prodigious coition with *Venus*, it must be granted *Iulus* was the Authour of this Family.

*Julius à magno deductum nomen Iulo.*

as *Virgil* says. This *Iulus* was also called *Ilus*, and more frequently *Ascanius*, from a place in *Phrygia* called *Ascanium*, or from a River named *Ascanius*. That of *Ilus* was in memory of *Ilus* the most renowned King of the *Trojans*, from whom *Troy* was called *Ilium*. But to be yet more critical, the name *Iulus* or *Iulus* was given him, because of his hairiness about the cheeks sooner then his age required, according to the same *Virgil*,

*At puer Ascanius, cui nunc cognomen Iulo  
Additur, Iulus erat dum res fletis Ilia regno.*

Upon which place *Servius* tells us, that that name was given after the battell that *Ascanius* gain'd against *Mezentius*, *ob barbae lanuginem (quam Græci dicunt) que ei tempore victoriæ nascebatur*. So that *ἰσλαος* signifies *the beard*, the soft haire which first appears upon the cheeks.

The name *Cæsar* seems to have some relation to the other, for that *Καῖσαρος*, in *Hesychius*, signifies *περικεφαλαία*, that is to say, a certain thick and clotted hairiness, such as women's, when they plait and twist their haire about their heads; and he that either naturally or artificially had such a one, had first the honour of that name, which likely was some one of the posterity of *Iulus*, the Son of *Æneas*; unless we would rather trust *Spartianus*, who would have the first of this family to be so called, *Quod cum magnis crinibus sit utero parentis effusus*, because he was born with abundance of haire. In fine, however it came, it was so venerable during the long reign of *Augustus*, that of *Tiberius*, and three more of the family, that it alone design'd the Emperour, and became a name of invocation upon any accident of halt, surprisè, or admiration.

We might here bring in what *Suetonius* delivers in the life of *Augustus*, that

*Medalls.*

that the first Letter of the name *Cæsar*, which is *C*. being dash'd out by a thunderbolt, it was predicted that he should dy within a hundred dayes, because that Letter stands for that number: and that after his decease he should be received into the number of the Gods, because *ÆSAR* signified in the *Hebrew* tongue *G O D*. This gave occasion to all that have commented on that Authour, to criticize and puzzle themselves about the signification of the word *CÆSAR*: but all being triviale, and imaginary, we forbear further disquisition, and passe to our observations upon his *MEDALLS*.

Observations upon

**CÆSAR'S MEDALLS.**

*Upon the first Medall.*

THE effigies of *Venus Genitrix* with a globe or world before her, without any inscription; though *Oëto* and *Yrsinus* mention one inscrib'd with *L. BUCA*, the other side hath *Venus* giving *Anchises* a meeting near Mount *Ida*: this it should seem *Cæsar* caus'd to be done out of flattery to himself, in that it served, both to make his originall more illustrious, and as a monument of that happinesse and good fortune which this Goddesse had procured him in all his enterprises. For it was his ambition, to have descended in a right line from *Anchises* and *Venus*, by whose indulgence he had conquered the Universe, as being his directrix in all his designs, as is represented by the globe, or world; whereof this Goddesse was thought to be in some sort the Protectresse, as being esteem'd the Sovereign *Genius* of Generation according to *Solinus*,

*Tu facibus auge  
Cuncta suis, totus pariter tibi paritur orbis.*

And her worship was questionlesse very ancient: For it was the head of *Venus Genitrix* that the *Saracens* and *Ishmaelites* worshipped, alledging that *Abraham* had by the means of it enjoy'd *Hagar*, from whom proceeded a great generation, as *Enthymius Zigabenus*, in his table of the opinions of that Nation, and the anonymous *Greek* Authour of the *Saracen* History, have observed. So have we here the same Goddesse according that great Heros to have issue by him. The *Genius* destin'd to further the establishment of the *Roman* greatness, hath a Scepter in his hand, to signify the future Majesty of that Monarchy.

The second Medall.

**L** SEPULIUS MACER. *Venus* standing with a Victory in her right hand, and a pike in the other, being the other side of that which bore the effigies of *Cæsar* and the starre of this Goddesse. *Servius* quoting an observation of *Varro*, says upon the first of the *Æneids*, that when this Heros left *Troy*, looking up into the sky he presently perceives *Venus* in the day-time, she shining then purposely to direct him to *Laurentum*, the place for which the Destinies had design'd him. The *Egyptians* represented this starre by the figure of a most beautifull woman, it being thought the brightest in the firmament, whence it was called *Καλλιζων pulcherrima*, being nam'd in the morning *Phosphorus* or *Lucifer*, in the evening *Vesper*. This starre therefore, that was *Æneas's* conductresse, was no other then that midwife of the Light, *Venus*, being the same which the *Saracens* call *Cubar* or *Kabar*, which word signifies, great; being also otherwise called *Astarte*, *Frania* or *Celestis*: by all which names is meant no other but this *Genetrix*, under which epithet the *Lacedemonians* ador'd and invoc'd her as an advancer of Generation. The *Romans* in the *Circensian* games brought forth the statue of *Cæsar* in pompe, having the Planet *Venus* on his head. Now this *Frania* (because of her procreative influence) was held in particular devotion by the women, as divers Medalls of the Emperreses discover, being commonly inscrib'd *Veneri celestis*, and having that Seare. *Gualternus* furnishes us with an inscription of a certain priestesse of hers, out of the ancient monuments of *Sicily*.

ΔΙΟΔΩΤΟΣ ΤΙΤΙΕΛΟΥ ΑΠΠΕΙΡΑΙΟΥΣ  
ΤΑΝ ΑΔΕΛΦΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΤΑΝ  
ΜΙΝΥΡΑΝ ΑΡΤΕΜΟΝΟΥΣ ΙΕΡΑΤΕΟΥΣΑΝ  
ΑΦΡΟΔΙΤΑΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΙΑΙ.

*Diodorus Tituli filius Appereus sororem suam Minyram Artemonis  
sistam Sacerdotem Veneris Celestis.*

She was also inscribed *Venus Celestis Augusta*, (possibly in favour of some Emperresse) as also, *Invicta Celestis*.

The third Medall.

**C**ÆSAR DICT. PERP. *Cæsar* perpetuall Dictator. A *Venus Victrix* naked, holding an Helmet and a Buckler. There is before her a Pillar, upon which is plac'd an Eagle, and behind a military Ensign. The meaning is this. We have *Venus* here naked with a Helmet in her hand, to signify her victorious over *Mars* by her charming attractions,

attractions, as if that God had quite lost all courage, delivering up his Armes, and rendering himself her Prisoner. Thus *Menelaus* casts away his pike, sword and buckler, having had but a glimpse of the delicate breast of the fair *Helen*. But in this Medall *Venus* denotes, that she had so fortunately assisted *Cæsar* (the minion of all her progeny) in all his warlike enterprises, that he had obtained absolute Victory over all his enemies; whereof the Helmet, Buckler and military Ensign being the marks, *Cæsar* had consecrated them to her in acknowledgement of her favours. The Eagle pitched upon a pillar, signifies, that his Victories have assured him the *Roman* Empire, which should be his eternally. The Eagle denotes Empire and Royalty, and prefigures and signifies absolute Victory. It signifies also that the Empire shall be assur'd to him, maugre all the force and opposition of the *Galles* and *Germans*, or any other whatsoever, whom he should despise, as this bird doth thunder; for that of all creatures it can ascend above the clouds, where it can suffer no injury.

The fourth Medall.

**G**ERMAN. INDUTII. III. A River lying by a mountain side pours out his water, having a boat or bark near him. This Medall seems to have been stamp'd purposely to exercise our divinations. We conceive it should be read GERMANA INDUTIA, and that the number three stands for nothing else but the year, taking the word INDUTIA to signify a Colony of *Germans* disposed into that place by *Cæsar's* order. This name indeed is not found among the Geographers, onely *Pliny* mentions a Town called INDUSTRIA, situated along the *Apennine*, upon the famous River of *Po*. Now there is a great conformity between the situation of this Town and this Medall, and possibly it may be an erratum in *Pliny*, and that it should be read INDUTIA instead of INDUSTRIA, which is not so likely to be the name of a City. For the three points III. they may signify the year of the establishment of that Colony, or of the foundation of the City. There is another Medall hath four IIII. denoting the fourth year; but it hath withall the devise of an Ox with his head stooping, and his knee bent, which posture implies the establishment and foundation of a City. In this posture doth *Xenopus* describe the Ox of *Cadmus*. Upon both these Medalls there is a *Venus Victrix* on one side, and what is before recited on the other; whence it is infer'd, that the planting of this Colony happened after *Cæsar's* most remarkable Victories against the *Germans*.



The fifth and sixth Medalls.

WE have these two Medalls from *Goltzius*: whereof one in *Greek*, hath a Tripod and two stars, the inscription of the head & the other side is ΚΑΙΣΑΡ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΑΡΧΙΕΡ. ΜΕΤΕΩΟΝΙΣΤΗΣ. *Cesar* *Imperator*, *Pontifex maximus*, *Augur*. This Tripod of *Apollo* hath something in it more particular. *Apollo*, *Augur*, or Φοῖβος, who is here design'd by one of the stars which accompanies that of *Venus Genetrix* or *Celestis*, shewes that *Cesar* was assist'd in his charge of *Augur*, and his study of *Astrologie*, and prefiging (whereof the *Litus* and the Tripod were the marks) by these two divinities. For *Phabus* or Φοῖβος hath two significations, which relate much to his starre and Tripod, that is to say, splendid and luminous, so that he is both foreteller and *Augur*. But to return to the starre of *Venus*, or *phosphorus*, or (as *Philo Judeus* calls it) *Phosphorus*, and to this Sun or starre of *Phabus Apollo*. It may be conjectured they are placed above this Tripod, to give us to understand, that these Gods should promise the *Roman Augur Cesar*, by a continuall successe in all his enterprises, the absolute conquest of both East and West.

The seventh Medall.

CÆSAR. An Elephant with a Serpent betwixt his legges. On the other side, the utensils and instruments that belong'd to sacrificing, with the head-ornament of the High-priest. Divers Antiquaries have so commented upon this Medall, as to make the word *Cesar* signifie an Elephant. But in my opinion, this devise signifies altogether as much as if it had this inscription about it, I M P. CÆSAR, or CÆSAR DICTATOR PER P. on one side, and PONTIF. MAX. on the other. For as the one shewes forth the Royall quality, the other supposes the Pontificall to have been in those times joyned with it in the person of *Cesar*. An Elephant in *Italy* (according to *Artemidorus*) signifies a Royall, imperiall or supreme Power. But *Achmet* in his *Oneirocriticks* ch. 271. tells us that this creature had the same signification in the *Indies* and *Egypt*, therefore *Artemidorus* hath not done well to restrain it to *Italy*. But it may be the *Moors*, imitating other nations herein, took an Elephant to signify a Monarch; and because *Cesar* was the most famous man that ever was, one that commanded Kings and Monarchs, would make his name stand for an Elephant, for this word is little lesse then *African*. The same *Artemidorus* sayes, that a Dragon seen in a dream signifies a King and a supreme Magistrare; which agreeing with what he sayes of the Elephant, and both these creatures being on the other side, I conceive my interpretation the more receivable.

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The eighth Medall

CÆSAR DICTATOR. *Cesar* with the augural stick. In the reverse there is L. LIVINEIUS REGULUS. A Bull furiously running with his head stouping. It is conceiv'd this was stamp'd by *Regulus*, in *Cesar's* favour, when *Cesar* was created Dictator, or shortly after. This Bull is brought in as an emblem of Principality, as *Dion Chrysostome* sayes, who hath made an excellent parallel between this creature, and a King and his Kingdome. But before him *S. Denys* in the 15. ch. of his *Hierarchy*, said that the strength of a Bull represents the force necessary for a Prince, and that his horns signify *Servatricem atque invictam vim*. *Stephanus* observes upon the word ταύρος, that the Ancients called ταύρους all things that were excessive for greatness or strength. The intention therefore of *Regulus* was to let *Cesar* understand, that, having overthrown *Pompey*, and become perpetuall Dictator, he was in effect the most powerful and most redoubted Monarch that ever was, and was in a condition to pursue and accomplish the utter ruine of his enemies, and protect his friends.

There is a reverse among the Medalls of *Augustus*, where there is also a Bull in a different figure and posture from this, bending his knee, to represent (as is conceived) the *Taurus Calestis*, which is under the dominion of *Venus*, which signified the invincibility of *Augustus*. It may be also considered, that this Bull may signify *Italy* subdued and subject to the Laws of *Augustus*, as being, now the civile warres were over, ready to receive the yoke. For that Province took its name from a Bull, which the *Tyrrhenians* called Ἰταλὸς; so that *Italy* submitted its neck to receive the yoke of the new government, as the Bull ———— *Summittit aratris*

*Colla, jugumque suis poscit cervicibus ipse.*

The ninth Medall.

DIVO JULIO. the effigies of *Cesar* deifi'd, the Starre of *Venus* before him, or if you will, *Cesar's* own. On the other side *Mars* upon an Altar, or rather *Cesar* representing *Mars*, before whom sits a figure, which hath a *Cornucopia*, or horn of abundance under the left arme, in the right, holds a Victory, which presents a Crown to him. This Medall seems to have been made shortly after *Cesar's* death, to keep his memory in veneration, and nourish that belief of the people, that he was, while living, a God transformed into a man. It was indeed an excellent artifice of *Augustus* and his party, to make the superstitious vulgar believe, that *Julius Cesar* was become a fellow-Commoner among the Gods, to make his succession the more plausible. For being already persuaded that no other then a deny-God, could have arrived to that glory which *Cesar* had

had, having baffled the Universe; it was not very hard to persuade them that the Comet which appeared in the North after his death, was his deified soul. But the cheat was, that this soul must appear there to render *Augustus* more illustrious; who to retribute the glory, and make the business more authentic, must erect *Cæsar's* statue in the Capitoll, representing upon the head of that Starre in Gold, and giving it this bold inscription; **ΚΑΙΣΑΡΙ ΗΜΙΘΕΩ**, to *Cæsar the Demi-god*. To make any long discourse upon Comets from hence, were superfluous, since all that can be said is, that they signify changes and revolutions of States and Empires, and sometimes favourably. This signified, in all likelihood, the warre then kindling against *Augustus*: after which, a generall peace ensuing, the Prince of Peace should be born; the Comet at whose birth denoted the universall change of Religion that afterward happened. To be short, all that the *Poets*, those fine Cooks of fictions and inventions, could dresse that would be any way digestible with the credulous vulgar, was serv'd up at this time to raise the memory of *Julius Cæsar* to the greatest reputation that might be: but it will be to no purpose to repeat their adulations in this place.

On the reverse of this Medall, we find *Mars*, who receives the Crown which *Victory* presents him with, represented with a dart. The *Victory* is *Venus Victrix*, or the Victorious City of *Rome*, and the *Mars*, *Julius Cæsar* himself, in the posture of that God. The statue is conceived to be the same with that of *Mars* erected by the *Romans* in the Temple of *Quirinus*, with this magnificent title, **ΘΕΩ ΑΝΙΚΗΤΩ**, *Deo invicto*. This supposition is confirmed by the dart, for *Mars* was ordinarily represented with a spear, as divers Medalls discover. But in this statue he hath a dart, which is that piece of Armes which is capable of furthest casting, and that indeed which the *Romans* most used, and at the sight of *Pharsalia* was one main cause of the *Victory*, *Cæsar* having given his men order that they should aime at the faces of the raw *Roman* Nobility they had to deale with, as divers Historians have delivered. Yet this argues not but that *Cæsar* sometimes made use of a javelin or Pike as well as *Mars*; but it is to be conceived this was more for the convenience of his travelling, which was as soon, (and that many times in the winter haply over the *Alpes*) according to the custome of most of the great Captains and Generalls of *Rome*, as *Livy* and *Plutarch* abundantly attest.

### The tenth Medall.

ΤΟΥΤΑΙΟΥ ΚΑΙΣΑΡΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΔΟΥΚ.  
ΤΑΤΟΡΟΣ. *Cai Julii Cæsaris Imperatoris Dictatoris*. The effigies of

of *Cæsar* crowned with a thick crown of Laurell, which closed before, the better to cover his baldness, the hair being thrust forward to help it. The reverse hath **ΙΑΙΩΝ ΒΙΞ ΝΕΩΚΟΡΩΝ** *Ilenſum bis Neocorum*; *Æneas* carrying his Father and the *Palladium* at their quitting of *Troy*, the little *Julus* going before with his bat in his hand. That which in this falls under question, is, First, to know the situation of this *Ilium*; wherein *Strabo* hath spent more sweat then all the Geographers; affirming it was not the *Ilium* of his time, a town well known, nor any thing built upon the ruins of the old one so ill-entreated by the *Greeks*, as being distant from this thirty *stadia*; that in that place there was only a small village bearing up the name; that it was built up by *Alexander*, from a small town that it was before, having a little Temple of *Minerva* much ruin'd, and received from him divers privileges and immunities, with a promise after his *Victory* over *Darius*, of a magnificent Temple, and the toleration and setting up of Games and exercises. This was partly executed after his death by *Lyſimachus*, who enlarged the City by a wall of forty *stadia*, disposing thither many out of the neighbouring Cities that were ruin'd. After which it was ruined and restored divers times; but lastly it received great favours from *Sylla*, which is conceived to be the reason that it declared against *Cæsar* in the Civile warres: whence it may be inferred, that those of that City knew not at that time that *Cæsar* pretended to be of the race of *Venus* and *Anchises*, which was only found out after his *Victory*. But at length *Cæsar* receives them into favour, restores and confirms their ancient privileges and immunities, and imitating *Alexander*, did them many courtesies.

In the second place, the understanding of these words **ΙΑΙΩΝ**, or **ΙΑΙΕΩΝ ΝΕΩΚΟΡΩΝ** *Ilenſum Neocorum*. The word *Neocorum* is translated commonly *Ædificiorum*; which we cannot render properly in English, but by *Overseers*, *Supervisors*, and those that are entrusted with the charge of the Temples, and dispose of all things sacred, or in some sort, they were such as we call *Church-wardens* in our Churches. But they are not those *Neocori* of the Temples that this Medall and divers others represent unto us, but the word was analogically applied to whole Nations, as also to Cities and Bodies corporate, to whom the Kings, and afterwards the Emperours gave Commissions, to make Panegyrics and Encomiastick Orations upon their Statues, Poms, religious worships, public recreations and exercises, to the honour of their Gods and Princes; which was done out of the publick stock, or by the contribution of the Corporations. As therefore the *Neocori* that belonged to the Temples, were disposers and guardians of the things sacred, that were in their Sanctuaries, may haply entertained the people or strangers, with the rarities and antiquities of their worships and mysteries; so these Nationall *Neocori* had the superintendency over the Poms and Solemnities, panegyricall celebrations, exercises, sacrifices, and ceremonies which were to be observed upon the more festivall dayes, whereof they had the absolute disposal. This

I build upon the conjecture of the Great and Learned SELDEN, who was the first cut this Gordian knot, upon a passage of the *Acts* of the Apostles chap. 19. There we have *Demetrius* and those of his profession raising a Tumult, and accusing *St. Paul* and others for preaching that the Statues made with the hands of men were not Gods. The *Town-Clark*, or the *Church-warden* having appeared the Tumult, tells them that it was well known that the City of *Ephesus* was then *Neocore* (in the English Translation *worshipper*) of the great Goddess *Diana*, and of the Image fallen from *Jupiter*, and that therefore there being no contradiction in that, they ought not to do any thing rashly. For these men, saith he, are neither sacrilegious, nor blasphemous persons, and therefore have done nothing against the Majesty of *Diana*. But if they had any matter against any man, the Law was open: but in case it were something else relating to their Goddess, whether by Blasphemy, impiety, or sacrilege, (the cognizance whereof did of right belong to the *Ephesians* in body, as being then *Neocori*) they should have satisfaction in a full assembly convoked for things of that nature. Now those silver shrines which *Demetrius* is said to make, are conceived to have been Modells of that magnificent Temple, which the *Ephesians* being *Neocori*, caused out of magnificence to be made of that rich Metall. Had this controversy between the Apostles and the Goldsmiths come to a decision, they had proceeded thus; They would have had some to make publick panegyricks of their Goddess in the first place; then, if *Paul* and his companions should not rest satisfied, this *Neocoran* people would have punished them according to their manner. Now that the *Neocori* of the Temples were used to commend to all comers (especially Travellers) the greatness and power of their Gods, and that the *Neocori* of Cities imitated them, but did it with great Pomp, employing persons eminent for Learning and Eloquence, as Poets and Orators, for the honour of their Gods, as also their Kings, Monarchs, Emperours, Founders, and that upon dayes instituted and ordained for that purpose, may be learn'd from *Horace*, who *lib. 2. Ep. 1.* writing to *Augustus*, call's those Poets *Aidinos*, who should immortalize the Vertue of that Emperour, or rather those who were charg'd to chose such as should do it, in these verses:

*Sed tamen est operæ pretium cognoscere quales  
Aidinos habent, belli spectata domique  
Virtus, indigno non committenda Poetæ.*

But besides *Selden* hath well observed, that there were none of these Medalls in the time of the Common-wealth, for that the Cities of *Greece* were not yet arrived to that esteem of the *Roman* greatness by the fabrick of their monies and other signes of veneration, which they have come to since it became a Monarchy. This is the opinion of that great judicious man, which yet is not absolutely true; for there were found the marks of this magnificence, under the title of *Neocori*, abundantly among the Medalls of *Alexander* the Great, where-  
of *Goltzius* reckons above 20. with this inscription *KOINON MAKE-  
ΔΟΝΩΝ ΝΕΚΟΡΩΝ*. Whence may be observ'd, that the people  
of

of *Macedonia* being generally *Neocori*, had caused these Coins to be stamp'd in the honour of *Alexander*, having upon the reverse, the figures of statues, chariots, temples, columns, &c. Nay, the *Maroneans* in *Philip's* time, though but the people of a particular City, were honour'd with the charge of *Neocori*, there being a Medall, which hath on the one side, the effigies of *Bacchus*, crown'd with Vine-branches, inscrib'd, *ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ*; on the reverse, that of *Philip*, thus, *ΜΑΡΩΝΕΙΤΩΝ ΝΕΚΟΡΩΝ*. In fine, the inhabitants of *Ilium* obtained leave of *Cæsar*, to make some magnificence, under the title of *Neocori*, to honour him and the *Julian* Family, having erected, in memory of his extraction from *Anchises*, *Æneas* and *Iulus*, some Colossus representing the posture of *Æneas* when he left *Troy*, doing a signall act of Piety both toward the Gods and men, having the *Palladium* in his hand, and carrying the old man his Father in his right arme, as women carry children, the little *Iulus* marching before, having his hat in one hand, and asking his father the way with the other. The word *ΒΙΣ*, signifies that this was the second time they had been honour'd with the quality and commission of being *Neocori*, and that they had celebrated the solemn dayes with Panegyricks, Poms, exercises, and other magnificences besitting the grandeur of *Cæsar*.

### *The Wives of Cæsar.*

His first wife was *COSSUTIA*, whom he married in his youth, but divorce'd her at the seventeenth year of his Age, before he had lived with her, though she was rich, and descended of a family of the *Roman* Knights.

The second was *CORNELIA*, the daughter of *Cornelius Cinna*, one who had been four times Consul; by whom he had only one daughter, named *Julia*, afterwards first wife to *Pompey*. He took her death very heavily, and publicly commended her, in a most elegant funerall Oration.

The third was *POMPEIA*, the daughter of *P. Pompeius*, who had gotten that evill report, as if *Publius Claudius* had been somewhat too familiar with her, which was the reason that *Cæsar* divorce'd her.

The fourth and last was *CALPURNIA*, who out-lived him, and was the daughter of *Lucius Piso*: a woman of a generous spirit and well spoken, and had that honour and affection for *Cæsar*, that after his death she herself made a most elegant funerall Oration to his honour, and afterward retir'd to *Mark Antony*.

The Medall of the

TRIUMVIRI.

THIS Medall is of Copper, small, of the Greek fashion; It represents the three effigies of *Cæsar*, *Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, done sideways, one upon another on the same side, without Inscription. On the reverse it represents an *Hermathena*; before which image there is an altar, out of which issues a serpent that lifts it self above it; behind there is a Legionary eagle: time hath worn out the inscription to this half word APXIEP. This figure represents *Mercury* and *Minerva* join'd in one statue; that is to say, the upper part is of that Goddess, arm'd with a Helmet, Buckler and Javeline; the Lower part is a *Terminus* or *Hermes*. For the interpretation of this device; This *Hermathena*, comprehending in it the God *Terminus*, with *Minerva* and *Mercury*, denotes an excellent union, as to affection, interest and good understanding, among the *Triumviri*, as well for the management and conduct of civile affairs, as military. Which being so, the invention must needs be ingenious, denoting that, though their employments were severall, yet there was such a concurrence between their Counsels and intentions, as that they jump'd into the same resolution for to carry on the interest of the Common-wealth. As for the Altar and Serpent, they signifie certain sacrifices performed by that people, for the welfare, union and concord of those three powers; as also either to obtain some Victory, or to give thanks to the Gods for one received. For a Serpent issuing from under a table was taken by *Sylla* to preface Victory, as the Historian *Sisenna* observes upon *Cicero*, lib. 1. de *Divinatione*. See also, *Val. Maximus*, lib. 1. ch. 6. and *Plutarch* in his *Life*. 'Tis therefore the Symbole of Health, Victory and Felicity. Of which opinion is also *Theophrastus*, who giving the marks of a Superstitious man, says, that if he surprize a Serpent in any place, he presently raises a chappell or an altar in that place, as it were to thank the Gods for so good an adventure. There may this further reason be given of this juncture in the *Hermathena*, that as *Minerva* hath a dominion over wrastling, as well as *Mercury*, so were they also both equally patrons of *Traffick* and *Merchandise*.

We shall divert a little to speak of another kind of statues, called *Hermacles*, consisting, the lower part of *Hermes*, the upper of *Hercules*. Both these and the *Hermathenas*, were placed in the places of publick exercises, *Mercury* and *Hercules*, implying strength and sleight. The reason why *Mercury* was so often joyn'd with the other Gods, was, that he could conform to any, and was one with all; as *Iamblichus* affirms, *Isque* (says he) *de Diis vere scientie præsidium*

Cæsar's Medalls.

*filium ac tutelam tenens, unus extat idem in universis*: for which reason, the Ancients dedicated all their works under his onely name. *Hercules* was held in such veneration for the God and Genius of all Gymnick engagements, that they camero to be called (*angustiori vocabulo*) *Herculeæ certamina*. He was the institutor of the *Olympick Games*, wherein having had the honour to wrastle with *Jupiter*, he was thought fit to be the patron of them: whence *Lycophron* call's him *παλαστής*, the *Wrastler*.

The second Medall.

M ANTONIUS IMP. AUG. IIIVIR. R.P.C. *Marcus Antonius Imperator Augur Triumvir Reipublica constituenda*. A sacrificing vessel called *præfericulum*, and the augural stick called *Litrus*. On the reverse there is L. PLANCUS IMP. COS. An urne between a thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*. It is to be noted first, that there is a vessell on either side of this Medall, and therefore it is not enough to say, that that on one side with the *Litrus*, is the mark of an augural dignity, which *Antonius* obtained from his favourite *L. Plancus* being Consul; but something must be said of this urne, so honourably plac'd between a thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*, on the other. *Appianus Alexandrinus* in his book of the warres against the *Parthians*, speaking of the design which *Mark Antony* had, being at *Athens*, to undertake the warre against them, and to partake of the glory might follow the ruining of so great and powerfull a nation, says, that, to satisfy the admonition of a certain Oracle, he carried with him a vessell full of water, taken out of the sacred fountain which was in that City, called *Clepsydra*. *Et ut oraculo cui-dam sitisficeret, etiam è Clepsydra fonte vas repletum aqua secum asportavit*. This fountain *Hesychius* says was within the Citadell of *Athens*. Now this is the representation of that vessell, and a monument of the transportation of that water by *Mark Antony*, which must needs be of great concernment to him, since he was advited to do it by the Oracle, and specified the fountain. As for the thunderbolt and *Caduceus*, they signify that *Mark Antony* should in that expedition make a thundring and dismal warre against the *Parthians*, with a great number of old experienced Legions, who should tread underfoot the *Parthian* greatness, elevated against the *Romans* by the miscarriage of *Cæssus* and his flourishing Legions; or those Barbarians should buy their peace very deare, which the Heralds of *Mark Antony* should offer them with the *Caduceus* in their hands, that being the embleme of an assured reconciliation.

WE should have no more to say of this *Cimber*, then we have of *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and the other Maffacrers of *Cæſar*, were it not that his Medall ſerves to correct divers paſſages in Hiſtory (which it hath been the main deſigne of theſe our obſervations to clear up) wherein his name is corrupted.

All who have mentioned this man, have been miſtaken in his name, except *Appianus Alexandrinus*, and that in one place only, for in ſome others he calls him *Τύλλιος*. Others call him *Tillius*, others *Tullius*, or *Annius*. *Seneca* Epitt. s 3. *Cui Cæſaris cæde (tillius dico qui, ſuperato Pompeio, Rempubli- cam tenuit) tam creditum eſt Tillio Cimbro quam Caſio: Caſius tota vita aquam bibit, Tillius Cimber & nimis erat in vino & ſordidus. In hanc rem jocatus eſt ipſe, Ego, inquit, quæquam feram, qui vinum ferre non poſſum?* Upon which paſſage (which gives a ſtrange intimation of the vicious qualities of this man) *Pintianus* ſayes, it ought to be read *Tullius Cimber*, as the ſame *Seneca* elſewhere calls him, and as he is called in *Plutarch* and *Suetonius*. But it is doubtleſſe he ſhould be called *Attilius Cimber*, and that *Suetonius*, *Quintilian*, and the other laſt Authors ſhould be corrected, as having truſted the corrupt Manuſcripts, and not ſeen this Medall.

But to come to the Deſign on the reverſe fiſt. The Cap ſignifies (as is obvious to any one) the Liberty obtained by the means of the poniard wherewith *Cæſar*, who oppreſſed the Commonwealth, was diſpatched. The wings, or Talaria of *Mercury*, with the ſerpents, and the rod, which was ceremonious at the manumiffion of ſlaves, or rather the wand which *Mercury* made uſe of to conduet the ſouls delivered out of the miſeries of this life to their expected reſt, ſignify that the diligence, dexterity, and prudence which *Attilius Cimber* had uſed in this execution, had reſtored the Univerſe to its Liberty, the Romans from the Tyranny of *Cæſar*, and had eſtabliſhed peace and tranquillity in all families. The conduet and aſſiſtance of *Mercury* to the departed ſouls with this wand, is expreſſed by *Statius* in theſe Verſes.

*Summa pedum propere plantaribus illigat alis,  
Obnubique comas, & temperat aſtra galero;  
Tum dextra virgam inferni qua pellere dulces,  
Aut ſuadere iterum ſomnos, qua nigra ſubire  
Tartara, & exſanguis animare adſueverat umbras.*

There is yet another thing whence it may be inferred that *Mercury* was a God very anciently eſteemed well-aſſected to Liberty; which is, that in the Iſle of *Creet*, (now *Candia*) they celebrated an anniversary, with they called *Ελευθεριον*, for the honour of this God, wherein, after the manner of the *Saturnalls* at *Rome*, ſlaves and ſervants had all manner of Liberty, and were magnificently waited on at table by their Maſters, as *Athenæus* aſſumes l. 14.

On the other ſide we have this inſcription, *ATILIVS CIMBER*,  
a man

a man beyond middle-aged, with a great beard, and a ruſtick countenance, with a long poniard before him. That which may be more particularly deduced hence is, that he was more then ordinarily deſirous that the conſpiracy ſhould proſper, though before he had been a great creature of *Cæſar's* (as *Seneca* aſſumes in his *Book de Ira*.) Nay, under pretence of preſenting a Petition to him, he was ſo importunate with him, and held him in diſcourſe with ſuch eagereſſe till he came into the Senate, that he had not the time to read a note which was preſented to him, wherein the whole conſpiracy was diſcovered. This poniard therefore ſtands to ſignifie the great Zeal he had to this execution, wherein he thought the Liberty of his Country was concerned; to vindicate which, as it was his ambition to appear the moſt eager and the moſt reſolute of all the gang, ſo he thought it his glory to give *Cæſar* the fiſt wound. Which conſideration leads us by the hand to what we had deſigned for the laſt part of this diſcourſe, namely the tragick Cataſtrophe of this miraculous perſon.

For motives to the conſpiracy, we may lay down partly the irreconcilable hatred that ſome bare, in others, the averſion they had from Tyranny, in others, a kind of zeal to publiſh Liberty: the encouragements, *Cæſar's* own careleſſeneſs of himſelf, according to that *Apoſtrophe* of his, when adviſed to take a guard about his perſon, *That it was better to dy once then live in continuall fear*; his not humouring that people who, if courted with *Majeſty* (as they had been wont in the time of the Commonwealth) had ſuffered any thing; his deſirous expreſſions of the Commonwealth, ſaying that it was a ſhadow, and an imaginary notion; *Antonius* his proſpering him a Crown, which though (ſeeing the acclamations of the people backward) he accepted not, yet was his deſigne eaſily diſcovered; the report that he was to be declared *King*, and would tranſlate the Seat of the Empire to *Troy*, whence he pretended to deſcend, or to *Alexandria*, to ſpend his dayes with *Cleopatra*; the Tribunes ſhewing a certain law to a friend of his, in writing, whereby it was lawfull to take as many wives as one would, the better to people the Commonwealth. Theſe and ſuch like paſſages gave occaſion to Libels and placards, which were ſet up at every Corner, whereof divers particularly addreſſed to *Brutus*, who by his influence over the chiefſt Citizens got together above 60. who under the conduet of *Brutus* (whoſe very name they thought to be fatal to Tyrants) would preferre the Liberty of their Country before Lives, Fortunes, or Relations. Some time before his death, ſo many ſignes and prodiges happened, that it was become the general belief that *Cæſar's* death was near at hand. Among other things, his ſoothſayer *Spurina* bid him beware of the Ides of *March*. All which put together, ſomewhat ſtartled him, inſomuch that he was once reſolved to deſerre the Senate for that day, had not *Brutus* adviſed him in no caſe to betray ſo much fear; whereupon he went.

Going therefore in his litter towards the Senate the fifth day of *March*, it could not be but diverſe would be preſenting petitions, and diſcourſing with him; but the Conſpirators kept ſome of them ſo cloſe to him, that he had not the leaſure to peruſe any thing he had taken, which if he had, he had in an epiſtle given him by *Artemidorus*, or ſome other, diſcovered the whole plot. Meeting by the way with *Spurina*, he told

### The death of Iulius Caesar.

him the *Ides of March* were come: to which he answered, 'tis true, but they are not past. Being come to the Temple, where the Senate was to sit that day, and sacrifice done according to the custome, he took his chair in the Senate. The first came up to him was one *Celer*, who while he was entreating him to release a Brother of his that was in captivity, the rest came up to him: whereat he suspecting some violence, cried out, what force is this? To which the above-mentioned *Aulus Cimber* answered him with a wound in the throat, which the rest of the Conspirators seconded with others. But that which amazed him above all, was to see *Brutus* among them, one whose authority was great, and one whom he had obliged beyond all expression of gratitude, when a conquered enemy; upon which he could not but break forth into these words, *And thou, son Brutus, art thou one?* Whereupon seeing there was no possibility of escaping, he remembered to keep the honour of his person, covering his head with part of his robe, and with his left hand settling his cloaths about him; and so having received 23. wounds, he fell to the ground a sacrifice to the publick Liberty, near the base of *Pompey's* statue, which was noted as a judgement of the Gods.

*Caesar* having neither Son nor Daughter legitimate, at his death, had by his will before, adopted his Nephew *Octavius Caesar*, who was afterwards called *Octavianus Augustus*, who studied in *Apollonia* at the time of this murder of *Caesar*, and expected to go with him to the war against the *Parthians*, being then about 17. yeares of age.

This death (as all extraordinary accidents) must needs beget tumult and confusion in the City; All Offices ceased, the Temples, and Courts of Justice were shut up; *Caesar's* friends were afraid of the Conspirators, & they reciprocally of them. This Tumult somewhat startled the Conspirators, who seeing the design took not with the people as they expected, to secure themselves, seized the Capitoll, crying as they went, *Liberty, Liberty, Liberty*. Whereupon, *Antonius* and *Lepidus* being all this while in *Armes*, divers treaties of accommodation passed between them, whereby it was at last agreed the Senate should sit, whither *Brutus* and *Cassius* came, *Antonius's* Sons being hostages for their return. The Senate approves the fact, the people dissemble their satisfaction: for, as the Authority of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, with the name of *Liberty*, was very charming on one side; so the horror of the fact, and the love some bare *Caesar*, exasperated them against the Murderers. But *Mark Antony*, endeavouring to trouble the waters as much as he could, among other things got *Caesar's* testament to be opened, wherein he had bequeath'd to the people of *Rome* certain gardens and heritages near the River *Tiber*, and to every Citizen of *Rome* a certain summe of money: which being known, it re-kindled their old affection to *Caesar*, and raised a compassion and a regret for his death. The day appointed for his funerall (the ceremony whereof was to burn his body in the field of *Mars*) *Antonius* being to make the Oration, brought with him the robe wherein *Caesar* was assassinated, which being all bloody he shewed to the people, using some expressions which raised in them both indignation and pity; inasmuch as before the solemnity of the funerall was ended, they all departed in great fury with the brands of the same fire,

to

### The death of Iulius Caesar.

to set afire the houses of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and the rest of the Conspirators, whom they fought running up & down the streets. In which fury they killed *Aulus Cimma*, mistaking him for *Cornelius Cimma*, who indeed was one of them. This Tumult forced *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and all who conceived themselves guilty of *Caesar's* death, to depart from *Rome*: whereupon *Antonius* took occasion to dispense with the decree of the Senate, and assuming *Caesar's* power and authority persecuted them all he could. *Brutus* and *Cassius* went into *Greece*, to govern those Provinces which *Caesar* (whom they had murdered) had conferred on them, which were *Macedonia* and *Syria*; and in like manner were all the rest dispersed, and that so unfortunately, that within the space of three yeares they all came to violent deaths.

He was slain in the 56. year of his age, somewhat above four yeares after the death of *Pompey*, 700. yeares after the foundation of *Rome*, 3010. yeares after the *Creation*, but according to the 70. Interp. 5157. in the 184. Olympiad, and 42. yeares before the birth of *Christ*. Having made himself perpetual Dictator, he enjoyed it 3. yeares, 4. months, and 6. dayes.

Thus have we traced this transcendent Personage through all his great and incomparable actions and achievements, we have viewed him in his distresses and extremities, and we have also seen him in his victories & triumphs, expressing the same greatness, that is, the same equality of mind in both; we have surveyed him in all his excellencies and abilities both of mind and body; we have considered the invincibility of his spirit, his incomparable courage, his clemency & magnanimity, his policy, vigilance, prudence, conduct; we have, as near as we can, enumerated the many battels he fought, the many victories obtained, the many people and provinces reduced, the many Kings and Countries subdued, so to figure a person imitable in all things, that may be called great or vertuous, not exceedable in any; we have described and dilucidated his *Medals*, wherein if we have committed any offence, it hath been in studying brevity, purposely omitting many things that might have been said, and forbearing the multitude and particularity of citations, least it might be thought a vanity: lastly, we have accompanied him to his funerall pile, the fire whereof consumed his murderers and enemies, while he himself is carried up by the same element, to shine eternally a starre of the first magnitude, in the firmament of famous and heroick spirits. And there we leave him, recommending the Reader to see and find him haply farre greater, then our commendations, in his own everlasting COMMENTARIES.

F I N I S.

The second and seventh pages of this *Life of Cæsar* being rashly put to working at the Press, before they were corrected, the Reader is desired to take notice of these ensuing faults with their emendations, and to think never the worse of the rest of the book.

In pag. 2. lin. 1. after, be killed, read (as if even virtue may be excessive and a crime) as he, &c. l. 20. for, paint ever, paint over. l. 33. for, Cifalpathina, Cifalpathina. l. 35. for, Lacedæmonia, Lacedæmon. l. 37, 38. for, Sardinia, Creeta, Candia, Cypres, Rhodes and Negrepont; Sardinia, Creet, Cyprus, Rhodes and Negropont.


In pag. 7. l. 1. for, w hich four, with four. l. 9. for, gulf Venice, gulf of Venice. l. 14. for their forts, their efforts. l. 15. for, Curius, Cutio. l. 19. for, that Consul, that, Consul. l. 28. for, Boetia, Lacedæmonia, Creeta, (in some copies) Bæotia Lacedæmon, Creet. l. 38. for, deferred him, deterred him. l. 46. for, takes it, takes in.

With some literall faults, and ill pointing.

IULIUS



CÆSAR





Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a souldier  
*perfect in the Art militarie, how great soever his*  
knowledge may be, which long  
*experience and much practice*  
of Arms hath gained.

**W**hen I consider the weaknesse of mans judgement in censuring things best known unto it self, and the disability of his discourse in discovering the nature of unacquainted objects; choosing rather to hold any sensible impression, which custome hath by long practice inured, then to hearken to some other more reasonable perswasion: I do not marvell that such souldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience, & consisteth in the rules of their own practice, are hardly perswaded that history and speculative learning are of any use in perfecting of their Arts, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the use of Armes and achievements of war seem to have their chiefest being. But those purer spirits embellished with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other mens fortunes, wherein variety of accidents affordeth variety of instructions; & the mutuall conference of things happened, begetteth both similitudes and differences; contrary natures, but yet joyntly concurring to season our judgement with discretion, and to establish wisdom in the government of the mind: These men I say, mounting aloft with the wings of contemplation, do easily discover the ignorance of such Martialists, as are only trained up in the school of practice, and taught their rudiments under a few years experience, which serveth to interpret no other author but it self, nor can approve his maxims, but by his own authority; and are rather moved to pity their hard fortune, having learned only to be ignorant, then to envy their skill in matter of war, when they oppose themselves against so manifest a truth as this, that a meer practicall knowledge cannot make a perfect souldier. Which proposition that I may the better confirme, give me leave to reason a litle of the grounds of learning, and discourse from the habitude of Arts and sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended; that from the variety of that indivi-

duality, the intellectuall power frameth generall notions and maxims of rule, uniting terms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diversities by differences of properties, aptly dividing the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his descriptions, duties, cautions and exceptions. For unless the understanding be in this sort qualified, and able by logicalall discourses to ascend by way of composition, from singularity to catholicke conceptions, and return againe in the same way to the lowest order of his partitions, the mind cannot be said to have the perfection of that Art, nor instructed in the true use of that knowledge: but guiding her self by some broken precepts, seeleth more want by that she hath not, then benefit by that she hath. Whereby it followeth that a science divided into many branches, and consisting in the multiplicity of divers members, being all so interested in the Bulk, that a maim of the smallest part causeth either debility or deformity in the body, cannot be said to be thoroughly attained, nor conceived with such a proffing apprehension as seeleth the mind with true judgements, and maketh the scholar master in his Art, unless the nature of these particularities be first had and obtained.

And for as much as no one science or faculty whatsoever, in multitude and plurality of parts, may any way be comparable to the Art military, wherein every small and unexpected circumstance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth such disparity and difference, that the resemblance of their equall participating properties is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing parts; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the variety of chances in the course of war, must needs be thought a more perfect souldier, and deservec a title of greater dignity in the profession of Armes, then such as content themselves with a few common precepts and over-worn rules: without which as they cannot be said at all to be souldiers; so with them and no more, they no way de-



serve the name of skillfull and perfect men of war. Now whether meer experience, or experience joynted with reading and discourse, do feed the mind with more variety and choice of matters, or entertain knowledge with greater plenty of novelties, incident to expeditions and use of Armes; I will not so other relate to determine of this question, then that which Franciscus Patricius allegedeth in his parallels, where he handleth this Argument which I intreat of.

Hethat followeth a war (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part only. If his knowledge extend no farther then a part, he hath learned lesse then he that saw the whole: I ut admit he hath seen and learned the intrications of one whole war, he hath notwithstanding learned lesse then he that hath seen the preceeding of two such wars: and he again hath not seen so much as another that hath served in three severall wars: and so by degrees, a fouldier that hath served ten years, must needs know more then one that hath not served so long. And to conclude, he that hath received 22 years discipline (which was the full time of service amongst the Romans before a fouldier could be dismissed) hath gathered means of experience then another, that had not so long a time followed the camp, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custom. And hence it consequently followeth, that in one or more of all these wars, there have happened few or no actions of service, which might teach a fouldier the practice of Armes; that then his learning doth not counterbalance his lack. And at the war through the negligence, or ignorance of the chief commanders have been all carried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of military discipline; if the part which he followed were defeated and overthrown, he knoweth by experience how to loote, but not how to gain. And therefore it is not only experience and practice which maketh a fouldier worthy of his name, but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise from the variety of humane actions; wherein reason & error, like merchants in traffick, interchange contrary events of fortunes, giving some time copper for silver, and balme for poyson, and repaying again the like civility as time and circumstances do answer their directions. And this knowledge is only to be learned in the registers of antiquity and in histories, recording the motions of former ages.

Caus Julius Caesar (whose actions are the subject of these discourses) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the provinces of Spain, by the strength of the Roman Empire at Phaultra, was held a fouldier, summing up every and all his exceptions; and yet, as wouldstarding all this he had

with Pharnaces king of Pontus, was like to have furnished the glory of his former conquests, in the dishonourable memory of a willfull overthrow. For having posselt himself of a hill of great advantage, he began to encamp himself in the top thereof: which Pharnaces perceiving, (being ledged likewise with his camp upon a mountain confronting the Romans) unadvised his men, marched down from his camp into the valley, and mounted his forces up the hill, where the Romans watchtuled at ever their interrelations, togethem battell. All which Caesar took for a blavado: and mistaking the enemy by himself, could not be persuaded that any such fool hardihood could carry men headlong into so dangerous an adventure, until they were come to tears; that he did leave any time to call the legions from their work, and to give order for the battell: which he ordered the Romans, that unlike, as Caesar himself saith, the advantage of the place and the clemency of the gods had greatly favoured them; Pharnaces had at that time received the covert row of Pompey and the Senate, and followed the Roman Empire to liberty. Which may learn us how necessary it is (I shides experience, which in Caesar was infinite) to perfect our knowledge with variety of chances; and to meditate upon the effects of our mens adventures, that their harms may be our warnings, and their happy proceedings our fortunate directions.

And all this amongst so many decads of History, which pregnant wars have presented to these later eyes, we seldom or never meet with any one accident which jumpeth in all points with another of the like nature, that shall happen to fall out in managing a war, or setting forth of an army; and so do seem to reap little benefit by that we read, and make small use of our great travell: yet we must understand that in the Audit of Reason, there are many slices, which through the sovereign power of the discursive faculty, receive great commodities by whatsoever fallen under their jurisdiction, and suffer no action to passe without due trial of his nature, and examination of his fate; that so the judgement may not be dejected of her accents, nor the mind of her learning: For notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of forms, which seem to cut off the privilege of imitations, and frustrate the knowledge we have obtained by reading; the intellectual faculty hath authority to examine the use, and look into the inconveniences of these wants and diversities, and by the help of reason to turn it to her advantage; or so to counterpoise the defect, that in trial and execution it shall not appear any disadvantage. For in all other sciences, and namely in Geometry, certain faire elements, and common sentences, which sense doth mitch to the apprehension, the powers of the

foul

soul frame admirable Theorems and Problems of infinite use, proceeding with certainty of demonstration, from proposition to proposition, and from conclusion to conclusion, and still make new wonders as they go, besides the strangeness of their Architecture, that upon such plain and easy foundations, they should erect such curious and beautiful buildings: so in the Art Military, these examples which are taken from histories, are but plain kind of principles, on which the mind worketh to her best advantage, and useth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities she concludes an equality, and of dissimilitudes meth sweet resemblances; and so the worketh out her own perfection by discourse, and in time growth to absolute knowledge, rather sufficiency needeth no further directions. But as Lomazzo the Milanese, in that excellent work which he writ of picturing, saith of a skillfull painter, that being to draw a portraiture of gracefull lineaments, he will never stand to take the symmetry by scales, nor mark it out according to rule; but having his judgement habituated by knowledges, and perfected with the variety of shapes and proportions, his knowledge guideth his eyes, and his eye directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with such facility of cunning, that each of them serves for a rule whereby the true measures of nature are exactly expressed: The like may I say of a skillfull Souldier, or any Artizan in his faculty, when knowledge hath once purified his judgement, and turned into the key of true apprehension.

And although there are many that will easily admit a reconciliation of these disagreements, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the resemblance of a well-tempered spirit; yet the will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous and inimitable examples of valour and magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigally and spendeth as though time should never want such treasure) can any way avail the manners of these dayes, which if they were as they ought to be, would appear but counterfeit to the lustre of a golden age, nor yet comparable to silver or brass, or the strength of iron, but deserve no better title then earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is between the customs of our times, and the actions of those antique Heroes? They observed equity as well in war as in peace; for virtue rather flourished by the natural disposition of men, then by law and authority; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deeds of armes which they had achieved for their country, adorning the temples of their gods with piety, and their private houses with glory, pardoning rather then persecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing injury: But the

course of our times hath another bias, for covetousness hath subverted both faith and equity; and our valour affected nothing but ambitious pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughts, and subtilty teacheth us to carry rather a false countenance, then a good nature; our means of getting are by fraud and extortion, and our manner of spending is by wast and prodigality, not esteeming what we have of our own, but coveting that which is not ours; men scorned and women impudent, using riches as servants to wickedness, and preventing natures appeire with wanton luxury; supplanting virtue with treachery, and using victory with such impurity, as though *injuriarum facere*, were *imperii mi*; and therefore the exemplary patterns of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serve to be gazed upon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtil to deal with honesty, and wanting courage to encounter valour. I must needs confesse, that he that compareth the history of Livie with that of Guichardine, shall find great difference in the subjects which they handle; for Livie triumpheth in the conquests of virtues and in every page erecteth trophies unto valour, marking his discourse like Cleanthes table, wherein virtue is described in her quiet majesty, and so sweetened with the pretence and service of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellency, and charmed with the love of her perfection: but Guichardine hath more then Theustus task to perform, being to wind through the labyrinths of subtilty, and discover the quaint practices of politicians, wherein publicke and open designs are oftentimes but shadows of more secret projects, and these again serve as foiles to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so mislured in the sleights of subtilty, that when you look for war, you shall find peace; and expecting peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissensions and wars: So crabbd and crooked is his argument in respect of Livies fortune, and such art is required to unfold the truth of those mysteries.

But to answer this objection in a word, and so to proceed to that which followeth; I say those immortal memories of virtue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be known, then any stratagems of subtler ages: for equity and valour being truly apprehended, so (saith the motions of the soul, that albeit in to corrupt a countie, they cannot peradventure stir up imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practices, and devilish devices, when evil is reformed by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steps which the present course of the world hath traced, and play the Cretian with the Cretian; this objection hindreth nothing, but that history, especially these of

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later times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a souldier perfect in that point.

Not therefore any man, despite the found instructions which learning affords, nor yet the weakly of a history doth offer to perfect the weakness of a fortior experience, especially when no worth can countervail the weight of so great a business: for I take the office of a chief commander, to be a subject capable of the greatest wisdom that may be apprehended by natural means, being to manage a multitude of differing minds, as fit instrument to execute a design of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualify both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidents which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true judgement which he ought to have of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our providence cannot have enough either from learning, or experience, to prevent disadvantages, or to take hold of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our judgements, so it serveth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as behold the achievements of vertue, commended to a perpetual memory, having themselves the like means to contrarie their memory to succeeding ages, which they may serve for examples of valour, and reap the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we reflect after the knowledge of our own fortunes, and how swift the end of that race which we have taken, such is the chiefest mark of consequence in the life of a man, as yet better conjecture can be made, then to look into the course of former times, which have proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like means, and therefore not unlikely to fort unto like ends?

And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice have the first place in this Art & service as a foundation to the rest of the buildings ; yet Marcus answer this question, who envying the nobility of Rome, faith thus, *Qui postquam confites fatis Junc, alia Altorum & Praeforum litterarum, arcepta legere ceperit : honorum, utilitatem, legere ceteris, tempore perferimus, ut quibusdam, ut eas (laudes) ita reading ought to go before practice, although it follow it in course of time, for there is no reading but of something practised before:* this preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helm of governments, begin to read when they should practice that which they knowest, and to bewray their insufficiency of time is most needful, because they have made Matters of reading and book-learning, as Marcus saith, an enemy to the faulr, for as much as all his knowledge, came by nre experience. But howsoever his judgement was good in this point : for

since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soul, and cannot well be produced, until the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the mind; according to which pattern the outward being, and sensible resemblance is duly fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expressed, when the mind is not directed by knowledge to dispose it in that fort, as shall best agree with the occurrences of such natures, as are necessarily interested both in the means and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramatontane, to direct the course of all practice is first to be respected.

But that I carry not seem partial in this controversy, but carry an equal hand between two necessary yoke-fellows, give me leave to conclude in a word the benefit of practice, and define the good which cometh from experience that to nothing that hath been spoken may seem to come from affection, or proceed from the force of unjust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practice giveth boldness and assurance in actions, and maketh men expert in such things as they take in hand : for no man can rely on his own strength, though the theoretic knowledge as he hath been learning, be verified by practice, and acknowledged by the testimony of allured proofe. Besides, there is many other complements gotten only by practice, which grace the preference of knowledge, and give credit to that which we have read : as first to learn the use and advantage of the armes which we bear : secondly, by frequent aspect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terror, to learn to fear nothing but dishonour, to make no difference between heat and cold, summer and winter, to sleep in all places as on a bed, and at all times as in a chamber, to suffer poverty, with many other difficulties, which come to men easily, and cannot be gotten but by use and practice.

And thus at length, I have brought a shallow discourse to an abrupt end, with-  
out greater zeal of affliction, than with  
manifest proof of reason, to demon-  
strate the necessity, that both these parts were  
by our founders to regarded, that neither prac-  
tice might march in obstinate blindness  
without learned knowledge; nor this again  
be entertained with an idle apprehension with-  
out practice: but that both of them may be re-  
spected, as necessary parts to make a compleat  
nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectuall  
part giveth life and spirit to the action, and  
practices as the materiall substance maketh it of  
a sensible being, and like a skilfull workman ex-  
presseth the excellency, which knowledge hath  
fore-conceived: withing no man to despair of  
effecting that by practice which the Theorick  
of knowledge commendeth. For *Cir deperes nunc  
posse fieri, quod jam visis, factum est*.



The summe of the first book of Cæsars commentaries;  
*with observations upon the same, discovering the*  
excellency of Cæsars Militia.

### The Argument.

**I**N this first book are contained the specialities of two great wars, begun and ended both in a summer: the first, between Cæsar and the Helvetii: the second, between him and Ariovistus, king of the Germans. The history of the Helvetians may be reduced to three principall heads: under the first, are the reasons that moved the Helvetians to entertain so desperate an expedition, and the preparation which they made for the same. The second containeth their defeat by Cæsar: and the third their return into their Country. That of Ariovistus divideth it self into two parts: the first giveth the causes that induced Cæsar to undertake that war: the second intreateth of the war it self, and particularly describeth Ariovistus overthrow.

Chap. I.  
Gallia described: the Helveticans dislike their native seat, and propound to themselves larger territories in the Continent of Gallia, Orgetorix feedeth this humour, for his own advantage.

**G**allia is all diuided into three parts; whereof the Belges do inhabit one, the Aquinanes another, and those which they call Celtæ, and we Gallies, a third: all these do differ each from others in manners, language, and in law. The river Gacon doth separate the Gallies from the Aquinanes, and Maine and Seine do bound them from the Belges. Of these the Belges are most warlike; as firstest oft the crueltie and politour of the Provinces, and lesse frequented with Merchants, or acquainted with such things as are by them imported to effeminate mens minds; as likewise being situate next to the Germans beyond the Rheine, with whom they have continual wars. For which cause also the Helvetians do excell the rest of the Gallies in deeds of Arms,

being in daily conflict with the Germans, for the defence of their own territories, or by invading theirs. The part inhabited by the Galles, begins with the river Rhone, and is bounded with Gatin, the Ocean, and the confines of the Belges; and reaching alo to the Rhene, as a Limit from the Sequans and Helveticus, it stretched northward. The Belges take their beginning at the extreme confines of Gallia, and inhabit the Country which lieth along the lower part of the Rhene, trindling to the North, and to the East. Aquitania spreadeth it self between the river Garun and the Pyenean hills, and butteth upon the Spanish Ocean, between the West and the North.

*Amongst the Helvetians, Orgetorix did far exceed all others, both for noble descent and store of treasure : and when M. Metellus and M. Piso were Consuls, being stirred up with the desire of a kingdom, he moved the Nobility to a commotion ; persuading the State to go out of their confines with their whole power : as an easy*

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maister for them, that excelled all other in valour and prowess, to seize upon the Empire of all Gallia. To which he did the rather persuade them, for that the Helvetians were on every side shut up, by the strength and nature of the place wherein they dwelt; on the one side, with the depth and breadth of the river Rhene, which divideth their Country from the Germans; on the other side, with the high ridge of the hill Jura, which runneth between them and the Sequans; on the third part they were flanked with the lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, parting their territories from our Province.

Hence it happened, that being thus straitened, they could not easily enlarge themselves, or make war upon the bordering Countries: and thereupon, being men wholly bent to Arms and war, were much grieved, as having too little elbow-room for their multitude of people, and the renown they had got of their Valour; their whole country containing but 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth. Spurred on with these inducements, and moved specially with the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to make provision of such things as were requisite for their expedition, bought great numbers of Carts, or horses, for carriages; loved much tilage, that they might have plenty of Corn in their journey; made peace and amity with the confining Countries. For the perfitting and supply of which things, they took two yeares to be sufficient; and in the third, enabled their setting forward by a solemn Law, assigning Orgetorix to give order for that which remained.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

HE that will examine this expedition of the Helvetians, by the transigrations and flitings of other Nations, shall find some unexamined particulars in the course of their proceeding: for, first it hath never been heard, that any people utterly abandoned that Country which Nature or providence had allotted them, unless they were driven thereunto by a general calamity, as the infection of the air, the cruelty and oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Suevians, who thought it great honour to suffer no man to border upon their confines; or some other universal, which made the place inhabitable, and the people willing to undertake a voluntary exile. But offencesmen we read, that when the inhabitants of a Country were so multiplied, that the place was over-charged with multitudes of off-spring, and like a poor father, had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new fortunes in

forraigne Countries, and to possesse themselves of a resting seat; which might recompense the wants of their native Country, with a plentiful revenue of necessary supplements. And in this sort we read that Rome sent out many Colonies into divers parts of her Empire. And in this manner the ancient Galles dislodged themselves of their superfluity, and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the Islands of the Baltick sea, and in Sulla his time (warned over Germany: besides many other Nations, whose transigrations are particularly described by Lælius. But amongst all these, we find none that to forsook their Country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same; from whence, as from a fountain, succeeding ages might derive the stream of that over-flowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moved them unto it. For their manner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to divide themselves into two or three parts, equal both in equality and number: for after they had parted their common people into even companies, they divided their Nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions: and then casting lots, that part which went out to seek new adventures, left their lands and possessions to the rest that remained at home; and by industry they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawn upon them. And this was the means, which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the flood, to people the uninhabited places; and to keep off the inconveniences of scarcitie and famine.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

HE that would prognosticate by the course of these severall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better success, hath greater reason to foretell happiness to these which I last spake of, then to the Helvetians; unless their valour were the greater, and quitted all difficulties which hatred and envy would cast upon them: for an action which favourer of necessity (which was always understood in sending out a Colony) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntary motion. For, as men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concern not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gain to punish pride with shame, and to oppole themselves against the other.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

ORgetorix, thirsting after princely dignity, discovered the humour of vain glory. For, not contented with the substance of honours, being already of greatest power amongst the Helvetians, and ordering the affairs of the State by his

his own direction, thought it nothing without the marks and title of dignity, unto which the inconveniences of Majesty are annexed: not considering that the least honour fitteth not always in imperiall thrones, nor waceth the Disadvantage of Princes; but oftentimes reflect it self in meaner places, and shineth better with obscure titles.

For proof whereof, to emit antiquity, take the family of the Medices in Florence, and particularly Cosmo and Lorenzo, whose virtue related them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferior to the greatest Potentates of their time: being themselves but private Gentlemen in that State, and bearing their proper names as their great titles. But howsoever, the opportunity of changing their soil was well observed by Orgetorix, as the fittest means to attempt an innovation: but the success depended much upon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition.

For, as a multitude of that nature can be content to attribute a great part of their happiness, wherein every man thinketh himself particular, to an common Leader; and in that universal estate of joy, will easily admit an alteration of their State: so, if the issue be a very respect, no man will acknowledge himself faulty. But, every one desiring to discharge his passion upon some object, a chief discontent is likeliest to be the mark, at which the darts of their discontent will be thrown; and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.

## Chap. II.

Orgetorix practices are discovered: his death. The Helvetians continue the resolution of their expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.

Cæsar.

ORgetorix thereupon undertook employment to the adjoining States; and first persuaded Callicus, the sonne of Catimantolides a Sequan (whose father had for many yeares reigned in that place, and was by the Senate and people of Rome stiled with the title of a Friend) to possesse himself of the Signory of that State which his Father formerly enjoyed; and in like manner dealt with Dumnoth the Heduan, Divitiacius brother (who at that time was the only man of that Province, and very well beloved of the Commons) to invade over the lake there; and withall, gave him his daughter in marriage. Shewing them by lively reasons, that it was an easy matter to effect their desires; for that he being sure of the sovereignty of his State, there was no doubt but the Helvetians would do much throughout all Gallia, and so made no question to settle them in those kingdoms, with his power

and force. Drawn on with these inducements, they gave faith and oath each to other, hoping with the support of the sovereignty of three mighty Nations, to possesse themselves of all Gallia.

This thing being discovered, the Helvetians (according to their customes) caused Orgetorix to answer the matter in divorce: whose punishment upon the Affairs, was to be burned alive. Against the day of trial, Orgetorix had got almost all his Family, to the number of ten thousand men, besides divers followers, and others far indeed, which were many; by whose means he escaped a judiciall hearing. The people thereupon being much incensed, agreed the Magistrate should execute their lawes with force of Armes, and to that end should raise the Country: but in the mean time Orgetorix was found dead, not without suspicion (as was conceived) that he himself was guilty thereof.

Notwithstanding his death, the Helvetians did pursue their former designe of leaving their Country: and when they thought themselves ready prepared, they set fire on all their Townes (which were in number twelve) together with four hundred Villages, besides private houses, and burnt likewise all the Corn, save that they carried with them; that all hopes of return being taken away, they might be the readier to undergo all hazards: And commanded that every man should carry so much Meale with him, as would serve for three Moneths.

Moreover also they persuaded the Rauraci, the Tulligii, and Latobrigi, their neighbour borderers, that putting on the same resolution, they would set fire on all their habitations, and go along with them. And likewise took unto them the Boii, which had dwelt beyond the Rhene, but were now seated in the frontiers of the Norici, and had taken the Capitall town of that Country. There were only two wayes, which gave them passage out of their Country: the one through the Sequans, very narrow and difficult, between the hill Jura, and the River Rhone, by which a single Cart could scarce pass; and had a high hill hanging over, that a small force might easily hinder them. The other was through our Province far easier and readier; forasmuch as the river Rhone, running between the Helvetians and the Allobroges (who were lately brought in obedience to the people of Rome) did give passage in divers places by Fords.

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Curatulus  
vinctus p  
pulis et p  
mon vici  
nos regule  
col. tur.

\* Savoyards

The utmost towns belonging to the Allobroges, that bordereth upon the Helvetians is Geneva, wherein is adjoineth a bridge leading to the Helvetians; who doubted not but to persuade the Allobroges (that seemed as yet to carry a great affection to the people of Rome) or at least to force them to give them passage. Things being now ready for their journey, they assigned a day when all should meet together upon the banks of Rhone: which day was the first of the Calends of April, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinus.

## OBSERVATION.

The omission on the Helvetian expedition.

As these provisions were all requisite; so one thing was omitted, which might have furthered their good fortune more than any thing thought of: which was, to have concealed by all means the time of their departure. For all the beats of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such Lions roused themselves out of their dens; and be then very watchful of their safety, when they knew the instant of time, when some of their spoils must needs be offered to appease their fury. Or at the least it behooved them to have dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to cross their designs might have been no hindrance of their proceedings: considering there were but two ways out of their Country by which they might go; the one narrow and difficult, between the hill Jura and the river Rhone, by the Country of the Sequani; the other through Provence, far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoever, their error was, that after two years provision to go, and having made an exterminating decree which enjoined them to go, when they came to the points they knew not what way to go.

## Chap. III.

Cæsar denieth the Helvetians passage through the Roman Province: he forceth the passage between the hill Jura, and the lake of Geneva.

Cæsar.

\* Rome.

As soon as Cæsar was advertised that their purpose was to pass through our Province, he halted to leave the City, and passing by great journeys into the further Gallia, he came to Geneva. And inslaving great forces throughout all the Province, for that there was but one legion in those parts, he brake down the bridge at Geneva.

The Helvetians having intelligence of Cæsar's arrival, sent divers of the best of their Nobility Embassadors unto him, whereof Numicius and Vercodotus were the chief, to give him

notice, that they had a purpose to pass peaceably through the Province, having no other way to go: and therein to pray his suffrance and permission.

Cæsar, well remembering how Lu. Cassius the Consul was slain, his Army beaten, &c. the soldiers put under the yoke, did not hold it convenient to grant their request. Neither did he think that men so ill affected could so bear to offer wrongs and insolencies, if leave were given them as was required. Hence, for the better gaining of time, and getting such forces together as were caused to be enrolled, he answered the Commissioners that he would take a time of deliberation; and so that end willed them to return again by the Ides of April. And in the mean time with that legion he had ready, and the soldiers that came out of the Province, he made a ditch, and a wall of sixteen foot in height, from the lake Lemanus, which runneth into the Rhone, to the hill Jura, that divideth the Sequans from the Helvetians, being in length nineteen miles, and disposed garrisons and sentinels along the work, the better to smother them, if happily they went about to break out by force.

At the day appointed, when the Embassadors returned for a resolution, he utterly denied to give any leave to pass through the Province; having neither custom nor president from the people of Rome to warrant him in that kind. And if they should endeavour it by force of Arms, he would oppose them.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

His manner of prolonging of time to reinforce the troops or get some other advantage, as it was then of great use to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes been practiced to good purpose; to doth it discover to a circumspect enemy by the directions in the mean time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inviteth him with greater courage to take the opportunity of that present advantage; especially if tract of time may strengthen the one, and not further the other: which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the Action.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The request of the Helvetians seemed to deserve a facile answer; being in effect no more then Nature had given to the river Rhone: which was to pass through the Province, with as much speed and as little hurt as they could. But Cæsar looking further into the matter, and comparing

paring things already past with occurrences that were to follow after, found the majesty of the Roman Empire to be interced in the answer; being either to maintain her greatness by resisting her enemies, or to degenerate from ancient virtue by gratifying such as sought her ruin: which in matter of State are things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an unsafe course to suffer an enemy to have means of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is always prompt to load him with further wrongs whom he hath once injured: not but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarrell upon that advantage; but fearing the other whom he wronged, to expect But an opportunity of revenge, he gets what advantage he can beforehand, and to catch not until he have added a bloody end to an injurious beginning.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Concerning this marvellous fortification between the hill and the lake, how serviceable such works were unto him in all his wars, in what sort, and in how small a time they were made: I will defende the treatise of them until I come to the height of Alesia, where he gave Rome ground of that hyperbolical speech, *An medietate non animadvertetis decem habere legiones quidem legiones populum Romanum, que non solum vobis obsisterent, sed etiam caelum dirivere possent?*

## Chap. IIII.

The Helvetians failing to pass the Rhone, take the way through the Country of the Sequani, Cæsar batteth into Italy, and there enrolleth more legions and returning, overleaveth part of them at the river Aar.

Cæsar.

The Helvetians frustrated of their former hope, went about, some with boats coupled together, others with great Flats (whereof they made great store) the rest by swords and places where the River was shallow, sometimes in the day, and oftentimes in the night to break out: but being beaten back by the help of the fortification, and the concourse of soldiers, and multitude of weapons, they desisted from that attempt.

There was only another way left through the Sequans, which they could not take by reason of the narrowness thereof, but by the favour of the Country. And so far as of themselves they were able to prevail little therein, they sent Messengers to Dumnorix the Heduan, that by his mediation they might obtain so much of the Sequans. Dumnorix, what through favour and bounteous carriage, was of great power in

his Country, much affecting the Helvetians, by reason of his marriage with Orgetorix daughter; and drawn on with a desire of kingdoms, gave his mind to new projects; labouring to gratify many States, to tie them the rather to favour his counsel. And thereupon undertaking the business, got the Sequans to give the Helvetians leave to pass through their Confinies; giving each other Pledges, that the Sequans should not interrupt the Helvetians in their journey, nor they offer any injury to the Country.

It was told Cæsar that the Helvetians were determined to pass through the territories of the Sequans and Heduans, on the confines of the Santons, who are not far from the borders of the Turonians, a people of the Province: which if they did, he foresaw how dangerous it would be to have a warlike Nation, and such as were enemies to the people of Rome to come so near them, and to have the advantage of an open and plentiful Country.

For which causes he left T. Labienus a Legate to command those works, and he himself made great journeys to get into Italy; where he enrolled two legions, and took three more out of their wintering Camps near about Aquileia: and with these five legions went the next way over the Alps into the further Gallia. Where by the way the Centrons, Gatocelli, and Catuiges taking advantage of the open ground, did seek to keep the Army from passage: but being beaten and put off by many skirmishes, they came in seven days from Ocellum, a town in the furthest parts of the nearer Province, into the confines of the Vocontii, a people of the further Province: from whence he led them into the territories of the Allobroges, and so unto the Sabaudians, that are the first beyond the Rhone, bordering upon the Province.

By that time the Helvetians had carried their forces through the straights and frontiers of the Sequans, into the Dominions of the Heduans, and began to forage and pillage their Country. Who finding themselves unable to make resistance, sent Messengers to Cæsar to require aid; shewing their deserts to be such from time to time of the people of Rome, that might challenge a greater respect than to have their Country spoiled, their children led into captivity, their towns assaulted and taken, as it were in the sight of the Roman Army. At the same instant likewise the Ambarrs, that had dependency and alliance with the Heduans, advised Cæsar that their Country was miserly

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wasted

wasted, and they scarce able to keep the Enemy from entering their towns. In like manner also the Allobroges that had farms and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled directly to Cæsar, complaining that there was nothing left them but the soil of their Country.

With which advertisements Cæsar was so moved, that he thought it not convenient to linger further, or expect until the fortunes of their Allies were all wasted, and that the Helvetians were come into the Santones. The river Aar, that runneth through the confines of the Helvians and Sequans into the Rhone, passeth away with such a stillness, that by view of the eye it can hardly be discerned which way the water taketh. His river did the Helvetians pass over by Flores and bridges of boats. When Cæsar was advertised by his Discoverers that three parts of their forces were already past the water, and that the fourth was left behind on this side the river; about the third watch of the night he went out of the Camp with three legions, and surprising that part which was not as yet got over the river, slew a great part of them: the rest fled into the next woods.

This part was the Tigurine Canton: and the Helvetians being all parted into four divisions, this Canton alone in the memory of our fathers slew L. Cassius the Consul, and put his Army under the Yoke. So whether it were by chance, or the providence of the Gods, that part of the Helvetic State which gave so great a blow to the Roman people, was the first that did penance for the same. Wherein Cæsar took revenge not only of the publick, but of his particular loss: forasmuch as the Tigurines had in that battle with Cassius slain L. Piso, his Grandfather of L. Piso, his father in law.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THIS defeat being chiefly a service of execution upon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which men call unaware, containing the two advices, first, not to neglect that advantage which *Sertorius* by the hairs of his horse's tail had proved to be very important; that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to overcome the whole. Secondly, it may serve for a caveat to transport an Army over a water, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so severed from the body of the Army, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off altogether, and separate them from themselves. The last, and most honourable way to transport an Army over a river,

is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troops of horse and foot, to defend the Army from sudden assaults as they pass over the water. And thus went Cæsar over the Rhene into Germany two several times.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning the circumstance of time, when Cæsar went out of his Camp, which is noted of the margin, the Romans divided the whole night into four watches; every watch containing three hours; and these watches were distinguished by several notes and sounds of Cornets or Trumpets; that by the distinction and diversity thereof it might easily be known what watch was sounded. The charge and office of sounding the watches belonged to the chiefest Centurion of a legion, whom they called *Præmulus*, or *Præm Centurio*; at whose pavilion the Trumpeters attended, to be directed by his hour-glass.

The first watch began always at sun-set, and continued three hours (I understand such hours as the night contained, being divided into twelve: for the Romans divided their night as well as their day into twelve equal spaces, which they called hours: the second watch continued until midnight; and then the third watch began, and continued likewise three hours: the fourth was equal to the rest, and continued until sun-rising. So that by this phrase of *tertia vigilia*, we understand that Cæsar went out of his Camp in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceive of the rest of the watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in history.

#### Chap. V.

Cæsar passeth over the river Aar: his horsemen encounter with the Helvetians, and are put to the worse.

As soon as he perceived this overthrow he caused a bridge to be made over the river Aar, and carried over his Army. He pursued the rest of the Helvetic forces, the Helvetians much daunted at his sudden coming, that had got over the river in one day, which they could scarce do in twenty. *Emballadours* unto him, of whom Divico was chief, that commanded the Helvetians in the war against Cassius: who dealt with Cæsar to this effect; that if the people of Rome would make peace with the Helvetians, they would go into any part which Cæsar should appoint them: but if otherwise he would prosecute war, that he should remember the overthrow which the people of Rome received by their valour; and not

Cæsar.

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to attribute it to their own worth, that they had surprised at unawares a part of their Army, when such as had passed the river could not come to succour them. They had learned of their forefathers, to contend rather by valour, than by craft and devices; and therefore let him beware that the place wherein they now were did not get a Name, or carry the mark to all future ages of an eminent calamity to the people of Rome, and of the utter destruction of his Army.

To this Cæsar answered; that he made the less doubt of the success of these business, in that he well remembered and knew those things which the Helvetic Commissioners had related: and was so much the rather grieved thereat, because it happened without any cause or desert of the people of Rome; who if he were guilty of any wrong done unto them, it were a matter of no difficulty to beware of their practices: but there was his error, that he could think of nothing which he had committed, that might cause him to fear; neither could he fear without occasion. And if he would let pass former insolencies, could he forget those late and fresh injuries for, that they had attempted to pass through the Province by force of Arms, sacked and pillaged the Hedians, Ambis, and Allobroges, that did so insolently vaunt of their victories, admiring that these injuries were suffered so long time to rest unrevenged, came all in the end to one pass. For the immortal Gods were wont sometimes to give happiness and long impunity to men, that by the happier alteration of things, the punishment should be the more grievous for their offences. Howbeit if they would give hostages for the performance of those things which were to be agreed upon, and satisfy the Hedians and Allobroges, together with their Allies, for the injuries they had done unto them, he would be content to make peace with them.

Divico replied, that they were taught by their Ancestors to take hostages rather than to give them, whereof the people of Rome were witnesses: and thereupon departed. The next day they removed the Camp, and the like did Cæsar, sending all his horse before, to the number of four thousand (which he had raised in the Province, and drawn from the Hedians and their Associates) to understand which way the Enemy took: who prosecuting the reeward overboldly, were forced to undertake the Helvetic Cavalry in a place of disadvantage; and thereby lost some few of their Company.

The enemy made proud with that encounter,

having with five hundred horse beaten so great a multitude, did afterwards make head with more assurance; and sometimes stuck not to fall out of the reeward and assault our Party. Cæsar kept back his men from fighting; and held it enough for the present, to keep the Enemy from spoiling and burning the Country; and went on for fifteen days together in such manner, as there were but five or six miles between the first troops of our Army, and the reeward of theirs.

#### OBSERVATION.

THIS example of the Helvetians may lesson a Commander, not to wax insolent upon every overthrow which the enemy taketh, but duly to weigh the true causes of a victory gotten, or an overthrow taken; that apprehending the right current of the action, he may neither vaunt of a blind victory, nor be dismayed at a casual mishap.

And herein let the heedful warlike to moderate the sequels of victory in a triumphing spirit, that the care and jealousy to keep (till that sweet-founding time on foot, may as far surpass the industrie which he first used to obtain it, as the continuance of happiness doth exceed the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soul, that although from her infancy even to the manhood of her age, she never found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she meeteth with a counterbuffet to check her appetite, and restrain her affections from their insatiable action, she is as much troubled in that want as if she had never received any contentment at all: for our will to overvie object which it seeketh after, begetteth always a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a former quittance, our either seeketh present payment, or returneth discontented unto the meane.

And as our soul is of an everlasting being, and cannot think of an end to her beginning; so the seeketh a perpetual continuance of such things as the lusteth after: which he that meaneth to hold Fortune his friend, will endeavour to maintain.

#### Chap. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the advantage of a hill, and so to give the Helvetians battle: but is put off by false intelligence. The opportunity being lost, he intendeth provision of Corn.

IN the mean time Cæsar pressed the Hedians from day to day to bring in Corn, according to their promise: for by reason of the cold temperance of Gallia, which lieth to the Northward, it hap-

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## Observations upon Cæsars

proved not only that the Corn was scarce from being ripe, but also that there was scarce forage for the horses. And the provisions which were brought along the river Arar found him in small stead at that time, forasmuch as the Helvetians had taken their journey clean from the River, and he would by no means forsake them.

The Helvians putting it off from one day to another, gave out still it was upon coming. But when Cæsar found the matter so long delayed, and that the day of meeting out Corn to the soldiers was at hand, calling before him the chiefest Princes of the Helvians, of whom he had great numbers in his Camp, and amongst them Divitiacus and Licus, who for that time were the sovereign Magistrates (which they call Vergobret, being yearly created, and having power of life and death) he did greatly blame them, that he was not supplied with Corn from them, the Enemy being so near, and inforced full a time, that it could neither be bought for money, nor had out of the fields; especially when for their sake, and at their request he had undertaken that warre. Whereat he was at the rather grieved, because he found himself forsaken of them.

At length Licus moved with Cæsar's speech, discovered (which before he had kept secret) that there were some of great authority amongst the Commons, and could do more being private persons, than they could do being Magistrates. These, by seditious and bad speeches, did deter the people from bringing Corn: shewing it better for them, sith they could not attain to the Empire of Gallia, to undergo the sovereignty of the Galles, than the Romans: for they were not to doubt but if the Romans vanquished the Helvians, they would bereave the Helvians of their liberie with the rest of all Gallia. By these men are our deliberations and counsels, or whatsoever else is done in the Camp, made known to the Enemy: that they were not able to keep them in obedience. That he knew well withall what danger he fell into by acquainting Cæsar with these things; which was the cause he had kept them from him so long.

Cæsar perceived that Dumnoix (Divitiacus brother) was shot at by this speech of Licus: but forasmuch as he would not have those things handled in the presence of so many, he speedily brake off the Councell. & retaining Licus, asked privately after those things which he had discovered in the Assembly; whereunto he spake more

freely and boldly then before. And inquiring secretly of others, he found it to be true, that Dumnoix was of great courage, & singularly favoured for his liberality of the Common people, desirous of novelties and changes, and for many years had kept at a low rate the Taxes and Impositions of the Helvians, forasmuch as no man durst contradiect what he would have done. By which course he had increased his private estate, and got great means to be liberall: for a great number of horsemen did only live upon his entertainment, and were continually about him, being not only powerful at home, but abroad also amongst divers of the neighbour States; and for this cause had married his Sister to a great Rich man, and of a Noble house, in the Countrey of the Bituriges, himself had too: a wife of the Helvetians, had matched his sister by his Mother, and others of his kin, into other States. For that affinity he favoured and wished well to the Helvetians: and on the other side hated the Romans, and specially Cæsar of all others; for that by their coming into Gallia his power was weakened, and Divitiacus his brother restored to his ancient honour and dignitie. If any misfortune happened to the Romans, his hope was to obtain the Principallitie by the favour of the Helvetians: whereat the sovereignty of the Romans made him not only despair of the kingdom, but also of the favours, or what other thing sever he now enjoyed. And Cæsar had found out by inquire, that the beginning of the flight, when the Cavalrie was routed, came from Dumnoix and his horsemen; for he commanded those troupes which the Helvians had sent to aide Cæsar; and out of that disorder the rest of the Cavalrie took a flight.

Which things being discovered, forasmuch as these suspicions were seconded with matters of certainty, in that he had brought the Helvetians through the confines of the Sequans, had caused hostages to be given on either side, and done all those things not only without warrant from the State, but without acquainting them therewith, and lastly, in that he was accused by the Magistrate of the Helvians, he thought it cause sufficient for him to punish him, or to command the State to do justice upon him. One thing there was which might seem to oppugne all this; the singular affection of Divitiacus his brother to the people of Rome; the great love he bare particularly to Cæsar, his loyalty, justice and temperance; and therefore he feared least his punishment might any ways alienate or offend Divitiacus sincere affection. And therefore before he did

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any thing, he called Divitiacus, and putting aside the ordinary Interpreters, he spake to him by M. Valerius Procillus, one of the principall men of the Province of Gallia, his familiar friend, & whom he specially trusted in matters of importance, and too; notice what Dumnoix had uttered in his presence, at a Councell of the Galles, shewing also what informations he had privately received concerning him; and therefore by way of advice desired, that without any offence to him, either he himself might call him in question, or the State take some course in the same.

Divitiacus embracing Cæsar with many tears besought him not to take any severe course with his brother; he knew well that all those things were true, neither was there any man more grieved thereat then himself. For whereas he had credit and reputation, both at home and amongst other States of Gallia, and his brother being of small power by reason of his youth, was by his aide and assistance grown into favour and authority, he feared those means as an advantage not only to weaken his authority, but to bring him to ruine: And yet nevertheless he found himself overruled through brotherly affection, and the opinion of the common people. And if Cæsar should take any stritt account of these offences, there was no man but would think it was done with his privitie, considering the place he held in his favour; whereupon would consequently follow on his behalf, a generall alienation and distaste of all Gallia.

As he uttered these things, with many other words accompanied with tears, Cæsar taking his right hand, comforted him, and desired him to intreat no further: for such was the respect he had unto him, that for his sake, and at his request he forgave both the injury done to the Commonwealth, and the displeasure which he had justly conceived for the same. And thereupon called Dumnoix before him, and in the presence of his brother shewed him wherein he had deserved much blame and reproof, told him what he had understood, and what the State complained on; advised him to avoid all occasions of mislike for the future; that which was past he had forgiven him, at Divitiacus his brothers intreaty. Howbeit he set eyes upon him to observe his counsels, that he might be informed what he did, and with whom he conversed.

The same day, understanding by the Discoverers that the Enemy was lodged under a Hill, about eight miles from his Camp, he sent some to take a view of the Hill, and of the ascent from

about the same. Which was found, & accordingly reported unto him to be very easie. In the third watch of the night he sent away T. Labienus the Legat with two legions, and those Guides that knew the way, commanding him to possess himself of the top of that Hill. Himself, about the fourth watch, marched on after the Enemy, the same way they had gone, sending all his horsemen before.

P. Caudius, that was held for a great soldier: first in the Army of L. Sylla, and afterwards with M. Crassus, was sent before with the Discoverers. At the breaking of the day, when Labienus had got the top of the Hill, and himself was come within a mile and a half of the Helvian Camp, without any notice to the Enemy either of his or Labienus approach (as was afterwards found by the Captives) Caudius came running as fast as his horse could drive, and told him that the Hill which Labienus should have taken, was held by the Galles; which he perceived plainly by the Armes and Ensignes of the Helvians. Whereupon Cæsar drew his forces to the next Hill, and imballated the Army.

Labienus (according to the directions he had from Cæsar, not to fight, unless he saw his forces near the Enemies Camp that they might both at the same time assault them from divers parts as once) when he had took the Hill, kept his men from battel, expelling our Army.

At length when it was farr in the day, Cæsar understood by the Discoverers that the Hill was possessed by his Party; as also that the enemy was dislodged, and that Caudius was so astonished with fear, that he reported to have seen the Enemy at the distance he had formerly used, and incamped himself three miles from them. The day following, forasmuch as the Army was to be paid in Corn within two days next after, and that he was but eighteen miles distant from Bibract, a great and opulent City of the Helvians, he turned aside from the Helvians, and made towards Bibract.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The getting of this hill as a place of advantage, was marvellous important to the happy success of the battel: for the advantage of the place in the not only noted as an especial cause of easy victory throughout this history, but in all their wars from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremities (soever they were put. The first reason may

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be in regard of their Darts and Slings, and especially their Piles; which being a heavy deadly weapon, could not any way be to available being cast countermount, or in a plain level, as when the declivity and downfall of a swelling bank did naturally second their violent impression. Neither can the shock at handy-blows be any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their batels) when the touldiers spent their strength in franchising the injury of a rising Mountain, as when the place by a natural inclination did further their course.

inclination. I conclude, if the battle succeeded not according to their desire, the favour of the place afforded them means of a strong retreat, in the highest part whereof they had commonly their Camps well fenced, and fortified against all chances. If it be demanded, whether the upper ground be of like use in regard of our weapons ; I answer, that in a skirmish of short take the advantage toly in the lower ground rather than on the hill; for the pcees being halfly charged, as commonly they are after the first volleys, it gives the better chance to ly loose, when the noise is so great, that the pcece is lower than the breech, it and needs therefore to be randomd, and yet altogether without effect; all which when the noise is raised upward to the tide of a hill, the halfly charged, rammed in with his own weight, will fly with great certainty and fury, considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is flopt, and that ins the more it seeketh to enlarge his room, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury.

Concerning other weapons, I take the upper ground in the shock and encounter to be advantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserve as great respect, if the controversy were decided by these weapons, as seldome times it is.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**BY** *Canfidus* his demeanour we see that verified  
what Phylarchus affirms: That nothing will  
sooner change our judgement, out of her proper  
seat, than the pallion of fear: and that amongst  
foolishers themselves, whose customs hath made  
familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it  
is able to turn a flock of Sheep into a Squadron  
of Coverts, and a few Cakes or Osters into  
Pikes and Lancies. Which may serve to advise a  
discreet Gen. not easily to credit a relation of  
that nature, with a man of reputation im-  
perfectly disciplined, and to experienced in the service  
of three famous Cities, was so inspired with  
fear, that he could not discern his friends from  
his enemies. But I will speak more of this pallion  
in the war with *Arivofin*.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Neverly relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first words are commonly these, *Reframur a comparatione*, as the foundation and strength of every expedition, without which no man can manage a war according to the true maxims and rules of the Art Military, but must be forced to relieve that inconvenience with the loss of many other advantages of great consequence. Which gave occasion to *Gilpin de Ceven*, that famous Admirall of *France*, amongst other Oracles of truth, whereunto his muse was manvellously turned, to offer to use this saying, *Thine that will have this word (meaning war) must beginne with this*. And this rule was afterwards observed by *Cato*, who belitt knew how to express the true proportion of that trait in due proportion and just remembrance.

The order of the *Romans* was, at the day of measuring, to give corn to every particular soldier for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances; and by the measure which was given them they knew the day of the next payment; for every footman received after the rate of a buthull a week, which was thought sufficient for him and his servant. For if they had payed them their whole stipend in money, it might have been waited in unneccessary expences; but by this means they were sure of provision for the time determined; and the sequell of the war was presently carried for by the General.

The Corn being distributed was husbanded, ground with hand-mills, which they carried always with them, and made into huffy cakes, but not enough for a families monthly no other but themselves and their servants. Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for *Saluf* reckoneth this up amongst other dishonours of the discipline corrupts that the families fold away their corn which was given them by the *Treasure* and bought their bread by the day. And this manner of provision had many special commodities, which are not incident to our culture of victualling; for it is impossible that victuallers should follow an Army upon service in the Enemies Country, and for thirty days together, with sufficient provision for an Army: And by that means the Generall cannot attend advantages and fitt opportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole upon unequal termes, or to found an unwilling retreat.

And whereas the Victuallers are for the most part voluntaries, respecting nothing but their gain; and the souldiers on the other side carelesse of the morrow, and prodigall of the present; in that turbulent marre-market, where the seller hath an eye onely to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publick good nor his private commo-

duties, there is nothing to be looked for but famine and confusion. Whereas the *Remans*; by their manner of provision, imposed the general care of the publick good upon the chief Commander, whose duty it was to provide store of Corn for his Armie; and the particular care upon every private souldier, whom it especially concerned to see that the allowance which the Commonwealth had in plentiful manner given him for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigality: which excellent order the nature of our vituals will not way admit. Their Provinces and the next considerable states furnished their Armies usually with Corn, as it usually is by this place, that for provision of grain be depended altogether upon the *Thedus*; and when they were in the Enemies Country; in the time of harvest the souldiers went out to reap and gather Corn, and delivered it pressed and cleaned to the Treasurer, that it might be kept until the day of payment.

But to leave this fugall and provident manner of provision, as unpossible to be imitated by this age, let us return to our historie, and see how the *Helvetians* were led, by a probable error, to their last overthrow.

## Chap. VII.

The Helvetians follow after Cæſar, and overtake the Rearward. He imbattaileth his legions upon the ſide of a hill; and giveth order for the battel,

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**W**hereof the Enemy being advertised by certain fugitives of the troop of horse commanded by L. Emilius, presently, whether it were that they thought the Romans did turn away for fear, (and the rather, for that the day before, having the advantage of the upper ground, they refused to fight) or whether they thought to cut them off from provision of Corn, they altered their purpose, and turning back again began to attack our men in the River. Whose Gallia perceiving, drew his forces to the next hill, and sent the Cavalrie to sustain the charge of the Enemy; and in the mean time in the midst of the hill made a triple battell, of four legions of old soldiers; and upon the highest ridge thereof he placed the two legions which he had lately wonned in the further Gallia, together with the associate forces, filling the whole front of the hill with men, and stowing the carriages in one place, which he commanded to be fenced and guarded by those that were in the uppermost battalions.

*The Helvetians on the other side conveyed their carriages and impediments into one place; and having beaten back Catars horsemen with a thick thinned Squadron, they put themselves into*

*a Phalanx, and so pressed under the first battell  
of the Roman legions.*

### THE FIRST OBSERVATIONS

Concerning the true sence of this triple battell  
which Caesar made upon the side of the hills,  
I understand according to the ancient custom  
of the *Romans*, where the infancy of their Mil-  
itary discipline divided their Army into three  
foulsides, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and  
*Triarii*; for I omit the *Vulgetes*, as no part  
of their standing battels; and of these they made  
three several battels, from front to back. In the  
first battell werethe *Hastati*, and they possessed  
the whole front of the Army, and were called  
*Acies prima*. Behind these, in a convenient  
distance, stood the *Principes* in like front and order  
disposited, and were called *Acies secunda*. And  
lastly, in a like correspondent distance were the  
*Triarii*, unbandelt, and made *Acies tertiā*.

Their legion consisted of ten Companies, which they called *Cohorts*, and every Cohort consisted of three small Companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a maniple of the *Hafars*, a maniple of the *Principes*, and another of the *Triarii*, as I will more particularly let down in the second book. And as these three kinds of soldiers were separated by distance of place from front to back: so was every battel divided into his maniples; and these were divided by little allies and wayes one from another, which I will expound in the third book. And in the front, did ever begin the battel; and if they found themselves too weak to repell the enemy, or were happily forced to a retreat, they drew themselves through their allies or distances, which were in the second battel, between the maniples of the *Principes* into the space which was between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*; and there they reformed themselves, whilst the Prince took their place and charged the Enemy. Or otherwise if the Commanders found it needfull, they filled up those distances of the *Principes*; and so united with them into one body, they charged the enemy all in front; and then if they prevailed not, they retreated into the third battel, which was the *Triarii*; and they gave the last assaults, all the three bodies beinge united into one.

Now if we examine by the current of the history whether *Cæsar* observed the same order and division in all his fights, we shall find little or no alteration at all thro' his first six *libres*. I have here mentioned, was no other thing but the division of the *Hafars*, *Principes* and *Triarii* according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dream of that ordinary division which is likewise threefold, the two corners and the battels and in that sense be might have said, made in *triduum Actum*, leaving us understand that the circumstances of the division have no coherence

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rence with that division: for in that he saith of the *Helvetians*, *successerunt sub Acem primis*, they pressed near the first battel or Vanguard, he maketh it clear that the Army was divided into a triple battel from front to back: for otherwise he would have said, *successerunt sub dextram aut sinistram cornu, aut medium Acem*; for so were the parts of that division termed. Again, in the retreat which the *Helvetians* made: to the hill, when he saith that the first and second battel followed close upon the enemy, and the third opposed it self against the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, and stood ready at the foot of the hill to charge the legions in the flank and on the back; it is manifest that no other division can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to back.

But that place in the first of the *Civill* wars taken away all scruple of controversy, where he useth the very same terms of *prima*, *secunda*, and *tertia* Acies: for being to encamp himself near unto *Afranius*, and fearing lest his souldiers should be interrupted in their work, he cauted the first and second battel to stand in Arms, and keep their distance, to the end they might flound and cover the third battel (which was implor'd in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemy; and this kind of imbatellling *Cæsar* observed in most of his fights: by which it appeareth that he used the very same order and discipline for imbatellling, as was intimated by the old *Romans*.

Concerning the ancient names of *Haslatis*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, which *Ramus* in his *Minuta Julia Cæsaris* urgeth to be omitted throughout the whole history, I grant they are seldom used in these Commentaries in the sense of their first intimation: for the *Haslatis*, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest poorest of the legionary souldiers; and the *Principes* were the lusty and able-bodied men; and the *Triarii* the eldest and best experienced. But in *Cæsars* Camp there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares between the *Haslatis*, *Principes* and *Triarii*; which he nameth *Primi*, *Secundi*, and *Terti* Acies; and therefore they were never termed by those names in respect of that difference.

Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that virtue might be rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the privilege of a more worthy place, the said distinctions and terms were religiously observed. For in the battel with *Petreus* at *Herda* in *Spain*, he mentioneth the death of *Q. Fulgencius*, *ex primo Haslatis legions quatuordecime*; and in the overthrow at *Dyrachium*, he saith that the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, commended the safety of his Ensigne to the horsemen, all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, *præter Principem proventum*.

And for the *Triarii*, there is no term more frequent in *Cæsar* then *Primpilus*; which names by the rules of the ancient discipline, was given to none but to the chieft Centurion of the first maniple of the *Triarii*; whereby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessary distinction, although peradventure the *Haslatis* were as good souldiers as either the *Principes* or the *Triarii*.

As touching the spaces between the maniples, wherinto the first battel did retire it self it occasion urgeth me, I never found any mention of them in *Cæsar*: excepting once here in *Englands*, where in a skumth the *Branni* besieged the court of guards, which kept watch before the *Roman* Camp; that *Cæsar* sent out two other Cohorts to succour them; who making distance between them as they stood, the court of guard retired it self in safety through that space into the Camp. Otherwise we never find that the first battel made any retreat into the allies, between the maniples of the second battel; but when it failed in any parts, the second and third went presently to second them: as appeareth in the battel following with *Arminius*, and in divers others.

Concerning the use of this triple battel, what can be said more then *Lappin* hath done? where he hath open the particular commodities thereof, as far forth as a speculative judgment can discern of things so far remote from the use of this age, which never imbateth this triple battel but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a Vanguard, a Battel, and a Rearward: but in imbatellling they draw these three Companies all in front, making two cornets and the battel, without any other troops to second them.

But let this suffice concerning *Cæsar* his manner of imbatellling, and his *triplex Acies*, until I come to the second book; where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battalions.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The *Macedonian Phalanx* is described by a *Phalanx Polybistio* to be a square battel of pikemen, consisting of sixteen in flank and five hundred in front; the souldiers standing close together, that the pikes of the fifth rank were extended three foot beyond the front of the battel: the rest, whose pikes were not serviceable by reason of their distance from the front, couched them upon the shoulders of those that stood before them; and to locking them in together in files, pressed forward, to hold up the way or giving back to the former ranks, and to make the assault more violent and unthrustable.

The *Grecians* were very skilful in this part of the Art.

## Lib. I.

## Commentaries.

Art Militarie, which contained order and disposition in imbatellling: for they maintained publick processions, whom they called *Tactici*, to teach and instruct their youth the practise and Art of all forms convenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici* found by experience that sixteen in flanks to ordered as they were in a *Phalanx* were able to bear any shock, how violent so ever it charged upon them. Which number of sixteen they made to consist of four doubles: as first unite maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and pluralitie; but unite doubled maketh two, the least of all orders; and this is the double; which doubled again maketh the second order, of four souldiers in a file; which doubled the third time maketh eight; and this doubled maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a unite; and in it they stayed as in an absolute number and square, whose root is four, the Quaduple in regard of both the extremes. For every one of these places the *Tactici* had severall names, by which they were distinctly known. But the particular declaration requireth a larger discourse then can be comprehended in their short observations. He that desireth further knowledge of them may read *Aelianus*, that lived in the time of *Adrian* the Emperour; and *Arianus* in his history of *Alexander* the great, with *Mauritius*, and *Leo* Imperator; where he shall have the divisions of *Triphalangeis*, *Diphalangeis*, *Phalangeis* unto a unite, with all the discipline of the *Grecians*. The chiefest thing to be observed is, that the *Grecians* having such skill in imbatellling, preferred a *Phalanx* before all other formes whatsoever; either because the figure in it self was very strong; or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether *Cæsar* termed the battel of the *Helvetians* a *Phalanx*, in regard of their thick manner of imbatellling onely, or otherwise forasmuch as besides the form, they used the natural weapon of a *Phalanx*, which was the pike, it remaineth doubtfull. *Brancetto* in his discourses upon this place, maketh it no controversy that every souldier carried a pike and a target.

The target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the time that their offensive weapons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that many of the legionary souldiers were wounded through the cart wheels, with *trigula* and *matres*, which are commonly interpreted Spears and Javelins; and I take them to be weapons longer then common darts; but whether they were so long as the *Sarrissus* of the *Macedonians* I cannot tell. However this is certain, that the *Helvetians* have ever been reputed for the true *Phalangites*, next unto the *Macedonians*; and that in their thick and close imbatellling, they failed not at this time of the form of a *Phalanx*: for they reeled it to thick with targets, that *Cæsar* saith they were fore

troubled, because many of their targets were fastened and tied together with piles darts through them. Which argueth that their *Phalanx* was very thick thronged, whatsoever their weapon was.

## Chap. VIII.

*Cæsar* sendeth away all the horses of ease; exhorteth his men, and begetteth the battel.

**C**æsar to take away all hope of safety *Cæsar* by flight, first caused his own, and then all the private horses of ease to be carried out of sight; and using some motives of courage, began the battel. The souldiers casting their Pikes, with the advantage of the hill, did easily break the *Helvetians* *Phalanx*, and then with their swords beset themselves in a furious close.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The ancient Sages found it necessary to a faithful and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the minds of their men with words of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceits, either of the unlawfulness of the cause, or disadvantage against the Enemy: for if at any time that saying be true, that *Oratio plus potest quam pecunia*, it is here more powerful and of greater effect. For a donative or liberanza can but procure a mercenary endeavour, ever yielding to a better offer, and do oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong, even amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slack to discharge their service with loyalty, yea offences of friends to become enemies. But inasmuch as speech discloseth the secrets of the soul, and discovereth the intent and drift of every action, a few good words laying open in the iurie which is offered to innocence, how equity is controlled with wrong, and justice controlled by iniquity (for it is necessary that a Commander approve his Cause, and settle an opinion of right in the mind of his souldiers, as it is easy to make that seem probable which so many offer to defend with their blood; when indeed every man relieth upon another's knowledge, and respecteth nothing less the right) a few good words lay well to fire up their minds in the serventice of the cause, that every man will take himself particularly engaged in the action by the title of Equitie; and the rather for that it impudh with the necessity of their condition. For men are willing to do well, when well-doing agreeth with that they would do: otherwise the Act may happily be effected, but the mind never approveth it as assent.

And this manner of exhortation or speech of encouragement was never omitted by *Cæsar* in any



any conflict mentioned in this historie: but he still used it as a necessary instrument to set virtue on foot, and the onely means to stir up alacrity. Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or cross accident, as they were at *Gergovia*, and at the two overthrows he had at *Dyrachium*, he never would adventure to give battell until he had incouraged them again, and confirmed their minds in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humour, that it cannot bear a speech in this key, found it never so gravely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side, discontinuance of so necessarie a part hath bred at length such an *inutilis pudorem* in our chief Commanders, that they had rather lose the gain of a great advantage, then buy it with words to be delivered in publick.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this Chapter we may further observe the violence of the *Roman* pile, which being a heave deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a *Phalanx*, or any other thick and close battell, or wheresoever else the stroke was certain, or could hardly deceive the aime of the calter: for in such encounters it fo galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keep their order, nor answer the assault with a resisting counter-buffe. By which it appeareth that the onely remedie against the Pile was to make the ranks thin: allowing to every fouldier a large possion, or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of it self fall without hurt, or by force might be prevented; as it shall plainly appear by the sequels of this historie, which I will not omit to note, as the places shall offer themselves to the examination of this discourse.

But as touching the Pile, which is so often mentioned in the *Roman* historie, *Polybius* described it in this manner: A Pile saith he is a casting weapon, the staffe whereof is almost three cubits long, and it hath *palmarem diametrum*, a hand-breadth in thicknesse. The staves were armed with a head of iron, equall in length to the staffe it self: But in that fort, that half the head was fastened up to the middle of the staffe, with plates of iron, like the head of a Halbert; and the other half stuck out at the end of the staffe like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thicknesse, and so decreasing lesse and lesse unto the point, which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the weight of the staffe would bend it as it stuck, as appeared in this battell of the *Helvetians*. This weapon was peculiar to the *Romans*, and was called *Pilum*, as *Arrian* noteth of *Pilum* a Pettell, *quod hostes ferit ut pilum*. *Lipsius* finding that *Palmarem diametrum* was too great a thicknesse to be managed

by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be four inches in circuit, if the staffe were either round or square, for they had both sorts, and so he maketh it very manageable, but nothing answerable to the description given by *Polybius*, either in forme or weight.

*Patricius* in his *Parallesi* maketh the staffe to Lib. 5. have *palmarem diametrum* in the butt end, but the rest of the staffe he maketh to decrease taperwise, unto the head of iron, where it hath the thicknesse of a mans finger; and so it answereth both in form and weight to a Pettell, as may be seen by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of *Polybius*. *Patricius* in that place setteth down four discommodities of the Pile. First, a furious and hot-spirited enemy will easily prevent the darting of the Pile, with a nimble and speedy close. And so we read that in the battell which *Cæsar* had with *Ariovistus*, the *Germans* came so violently upon them, that the fouldiers cast away their piles and took them to their swords. And likewise in that worthy battell between *Caesar* and *Marcus Perreus*, they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommodity was, that the piles being too heavy could not be cast any distance, but were only serviceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aime, or as they say, point-blank. And lastly, the fouldiers were to take advantage of ground backward when they threw them: which might easily disorder their troupes, if they were not very well experienced.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THE last thing, which I observe in this speciality, is, that the legionary fouldiers had no other offensive weapon but one pile or two at the most, and their swords. By which it may be gathered that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blows; for they came alwayes too near before they cast their pile, that they left themselves no more time then might conveniently serve them to draw their swords: neither would their Arms of defence, which was complete, besides a large target which they carried on their left arm, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase, whensoever a light-armed enemy did make any speedy retreat; as will more plainly appear by that which followeth.

## Chap. IX.

The *Helvetians* fainting in the battell, retire to a Hill: the *Romans* follow after, and the battell is continued.


It was a great hinderance to the *Cæsar* Gallies in their fight, that many of their Targets were struck through, and tied together with one fall of a Pile: for so it happened that it could neither be

Lib. 7. de  
belli  
Gallico.


The Roman  
Pile  
described.

Lib. 7. de  
militia  
Romana.

THE BATTEL WHICH CÆSAR HAD



WITH THE HELVETIANS. folio .18



led out, by reason of the bowing of the Iron, nor could they use their left hand for the defence of themselves. Whereby it fell out that many of them (after a wearisome toil) did cast away their targets, and fought naked and unarmed. At length, fainting with wounds, they began to give place, and retreated to a Hill a mile off.

The Hill being taken, and the Legions following on to drive them from thence, the Boii and Tulingi, to the number of fifteen thousand, being in the Rere of the Enemy, to guard the lag of their Army, setting on our men as they were in pursuit of the rest, did charge them upon the open side, and began to inclose them about: which the Helvetians that had got the Hill perceiving began again to fall upon our men, and renewed the battle. The Romans dividing themselves, turned their Ensignes two ways; the first and second Army fought against the Helvetians that returned from the Hill; and the third battle took charge of them that stood ready to inclose them about. And here the fight was doubtfull and furious for a long time; untill at length they were no longer able to endure the violence of the legionary soldiers: and so one part betook themselves as at the first to the Hill; and the other to the place where their Caris and baggage were lodged.

And hitherto there was not one man seen to have turned his back in all this conflict; although the fight continued from the seventh hour untill the evening.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Ensignes of the Romans.

Concerning the Ensignes of the Romans, we cannot understand that the chiefest Ensigne of every Legion was an Eagle, which always attended upon the Primpile or chief Centurion of the said Legion. The Ensigne of a Maniple was either a Hand or a Dragon, a Wolf or a Sphinx; as it appeareth (besides the testimony of history) by the Column of Trajan in Rome, wherein the Ensignes are figured with such proportions of living creatures, had their foreparts always carried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight. And therefore in this history by the aspect and carrying of the Ensignes, the front of the Army was commonly noted: as in this place it is said, that the Ensignes of the first and second battle were carried towards the hill, whither the Helvetians had made their retreat; and the Ensignes of the third battle looked another way, towards the Boii and Tulingi, which stood on the foot of the hill,

By which is signified how the legions were divided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning the time of the day, we are to understand that the Romans used not the same division of the day as we commonly do: for they divided their artificiall (which is the space between sun-rising and setting) into twelve equal parts, which the Astronomers called unequal or planetary hours. The first hour of the day began always at sun rising; the sixth hour was always high noon; and the twelfth hour was sun-setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these hours were either greater or lesse: neither did they agree with equal or equinoctiall hours, such as are now used, but only at the *Aequinoctium*: so that by this manner of reckoning, *Ab hora septima ad vesperum* is meant, the battle began about one of the clock according to our Computation, and continued untill the evening. The like we must understand throughout this whole history, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

#### Chap. X.

The Helvetians continue their fight at the carriage: but at length they leave the field, and march towards Langres.

IN like manner the fight was kept on foot at the carriages, untill it was far in the night; the place being fortified with Caris instead of a Rampier: and the Enemy casting their weapons from the upper ground, and with Darts and Javelins under the waggons, and from between the wheeles, did wound and gall many of our men. After a long conflict our soldiers took their carriages and their Camp; wherein Orgetox daughter and one of his sons were taken. There were saved out of that battle about one hundred and thirty thousand persons; who marching continually all that night, and making no stay in any place, came the fourth day into the confines of the Lingones: for by reason of the soldiers hurts, and the buriall of the slain, wherein there was spent three dayes, there was no pursuit made after them.

#### OBSERVATION.

IF we consider the nature of the action, and look into the true cause of their overthrow, as far as the right sense of the history shall direct our judgement, we shall find valour not to be wanting in the Helvetians, but rather superlatively

## Observations upon Cæsars

tively abundant in the *Romans*. For that vehement opinion of their valiancy and manhoods which carried them out of the fears of the Country to seek larger fortunes in other kingdoms, was not so abated with the loss of the fourth part of their Host at the river *Avar*, nor with the terrible fury of those veteran legions; but it yielded this effect, which *Cæsar* in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for five hours space or more there was not one man seen to have turned his back. Their manner of unbattelling, had not the *Romans* been the enemy, was unrefusable. For being cast into a *Phalanx*, which in the *Plaines of Asia* had made *Alexander* the great and the *Macedonians* famous, they did as far surpass any other form of battelling (supposing that the convenience of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole is divided into many particulars, as the violence of a great body exceedeth the force and motion of his parts, when it is divided into smaller cantons. For as in a phalanx many particular soldiers are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire body; so their several virtues are gathered into one head, and are as parts united into one general force; which easily followeth up the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally divided.

The advantage of the place which they got by retreat, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the *Romans*, both in front and flank, was able in an indifferent conflict to have made Fortune fugitive, and bear away on their side; or at the least to have troubled the swelling tide of victory, which carried the *Romans* so violently in the chase, that they might have been equal flanders in the honour of the day; had it not followed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, until it came to that height which true valour and unexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not so allay the heat of the *Helvetians* fury, but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when it came to the place where their carriages were laid, and cost much blood and many men's lives before they quitted the place: for they fought with that spirit and industry, as though they meant to make trial whether their fortune would prove no better in the night, than it had done in the day.

The overthrow of the *Tigurne* Canton at the river *Aar* proceeded rather from want of good directions (which were little to be marvelled at, considering they had no chief Commander as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the means of Military government require especially care in passing over a water; for then especially an Army is in great danger when it is disordered and divided. And therefore the *Romans* achieved this victory by the humble vigilancy

(as *Tully* calleth it) of their Commanders, who always watched opportunities *rei bene gerendæ*, as necessary and speedy means to overcome in all his wars.

### Chap. XI.

*Cæsar*, after three days respite, followeth after the *Helvetians*: he taketh them to mercy, and leadeth them back again to the Country.

**C**æsar sent Letters and Messengers *cautè* to the *Lingones*, forbidding to supply them either with Corn or any other thing; which if they did, he would esteem of them as of the *Helvetians*. Himself, after three days respite, followed after with all his forces. The *Helvetians*, pressed with the want of all necessary provisions, sent Commissioners unto him to treat of their rendition. His meeting him on the way, cast themselves at his feet, and with humble words and tears desired Peace. Being commanded to attend in the place they then were, they accordingly obeyed. *Cæsar* being come up unto them, required hostages, together with their Arms and servants; as also the fugitives that were fled unto them.

While those things were sought out and brought, in the night time, six thousand men or thereabouts of the Canton called *Verbigene*, whether moved through fear of being executed after their Arms were given up, or induced with hope of escaping (as thinking that amongst such a multitude of people that were there to be rendered, their flight should not be missed, or at least would be concealed) did in the beginning of the night leave the *Helvetian* Camp, and made toward the *Rhene*, and the confines of the *Germanians*.

*Cæsar* understanding through whose territories they passed, commanded them to seek them out, and bring them back again, if they would be blameless in that behalf: And being brought back, dealt with them as enemies. All the rest, after hostages, Arms and fugitives were given in, he received to mercy, and commanded the *Helvetians*, *Tulinges*, and *Latobriges* to return into their Country from whence they came. And forasmuch as having lost all their provisions of Corn, there remained nothing at home to satisfy hunger, he gave order to the *Allobroges* to supply them with Corn; and willed the *Helvetians* to reedyfify their Towns and Cities, that they had before destroyed and forsaken. Which he did specially for this cause; that the *Germanians* invading beyond the *Rhene* might not be invited with the richness of that soil, to tempt themselves

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## Commentaries.

so near neighbours to the Province of *Gallia*, and the *Allobroges*. The Boji, at the mediation of the *Heduns*, as knowing them to be men of great valour, were permitted to dwell in their Country; to whom they gave lands and possessions, and received them into the same liberties and immunities as they themselves enjoyed.

In the *Helvetian* Camp was found a List, or Register, writ in Greek, and brought to *Cæsar*, containing by tale the whole number that left their Country, how many of them were able to bear Arms; and in like manner the boys, old men and women were involl'd apart by themselves. The summary whereof was, that the whole number of the *Helvetians* amounted to two hundred sixty three thousand, the *Tulinges* to thirty six thousand, the *Latobriges* to fourteen, the *Aucaucates* to twenty three, the *Boii* to thirty two. Of these there were that bore Arms, one hundred ninety two thousand. The total of all were three hundred sixty eight thousand. A view being taken by *Cæsar* appointment of those that returned home, there were found one hundred and ten thousand.

### OBSERVATION.

The directions concerning their rendry and return were very sound, and of good consequence. For first, in that he commanded them to attend his coming in the place where they were, he took away all motions of new trouble, which often removes might have caused, by the opportunity of some accident which might have happened: assuring himself that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made show of; considering that the *Lingones*, in whose territories they were shut not for fear of *Cæsar*'s displeasure furnish them with any necessities in that extremity. Touching the security which the *Romans* required of the loyalty of such people as they conquered, their manner was to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men-children of the chiefest men of that Nation; whose lives depended upon their Parents fidelity, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion. Which custom, besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age; when as those children by conversation and acquaintance should be so affected to the *Roman* Empire, that returning to their own country, their actions might rather tend to the advancement thereof, than any way be prejudicial to the same. And least the love of liberty and freedom should prevail more with them, than that affection which Nature had injoyed them to bear to their children; he did what he could to

take away the means and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliver up such Arms and weapons as were there present: and so to become suitable to that petition of peace which they had made.

The summe of all is this; he corrected the intolency of a furious people, and reduced them to a feeling of their own madness. He kept them from lacking the possessions of many thousands in the continent of *Gallia*, and sent them back again to continue their name and Nation in the place where they first inhabited; which counteth unto this day. And thus we see that there is no honour to head-strong, nor to back with strength of circumstances, but it may meet with a remedy to qualify the intolency thereof, and make it subject to correction and controulment.

### Chap. XII.

The States of *Gallia* congratulate *Cæsar*'s victory: they call a council, and discover their inward grief concerning *Arminius* and his forces.

**H**e *Helvetian* war being thus ended, *Cæsar*, the Princes and chief men of all the States of *Gallia* came to *Cæsar*, to congratulate the happiness of this victory; inasmuch as they well understood, that albeit the people of *Rome* had by the course of this war revenged the injuries which heretofore they had done unto them: yet nevertheless the issue thereof did redound no less profitable to the peace of *Gallia*, then to the *Roman* Empire; forasmuch as the *Helvetians* left their houses and Country abounding with all plenty and prosperity, for no other purpose but to invade the whole Country of *Gallia*, and to bring it in subjection to themselves; and choosing out of that large Continent some fit and fruitful place of habitation, to make the rest of the States their Tributaries. They required further, that with his good leave they might call a general assembly at a day prefixed, of all the States of *Gallia*, forasmuch as they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired (with a common consent) to press to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath not to reveal the causes of their assembly, but so such as should be designed by common counsel.

The Parliament being broken up, the same Princes returned to *Cæsar*, and desired that they might in secret treat with him of the safety of themselves, and all the rest: which being granted, they cast themselves in lamentable manner at his feet, commending with a great earnest-

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ness, that those things which they delivered might not be revealed, as they did to have their petition granted: forasmuch as they saw that the discovery of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull upon them most grievous afflictions.

Divitiacus the Heduan, in the name of the rest, delivered, That Gallia was divided into two nations: the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Arevici of the other. These two States contending many years for the principality, the Arevici with the Sequans their Clients, hired the Germans to take their part; of whom at first three passed over the Rhene some fifteen thousand: but afterwards, these barbarous people having tasted the plenty and civility of the Gallies, drew over many more, that now there were no less than one hundred and twenty thousand. With these the Hedui and their Clients had once or oftener fought; but the success forced to their own calamity, and the utter overthrow of their Nobility and Senate: with which losses they were so broken and decayed, that whereas heretofore as well by their own credit, as by the favour of the people of Rome, they struck a great stroke throughout all Gallia; they were now driven to deliver the chiefest of their State as pledges to the Sequans, and to bind themselves by oath never to seek their release or freedom, nor to implore the aid of the people of Rome, nor to seek means to free themselves from their sovereignty: only himself of all the Heduians could not be brought to take that oath, or to give his children as hostages: for which cause he fled to Rome, and besought help of the Senate, being now way obliged to the contrary either by oath or hostages.

But it so fell out, that the victory became more grievous to the Sequans than to the Heduians: for that Ariovillus king of the Germans was planted in their territories; and being already possessor of a third part of their Country, which was the best part of all Gallia, did now require the Sequans to forgo another third part, for that a few months before there were come unto him twenty four thousand Harudes, to whom lands and possessions were to be allotted. Whereby it would come to pass within a few years that all the Gallies would be driven out of their dwellings, and all the Germans would come over the Rhene; for there was no comparison between Gallia and Germany, either in richness of soil or salubrity of life.

Concerning Ariovillus, after he had once de-

feated the Gallies in a battel near Amagetobrig, he carried himself very cruelly and insolently, requiring the children of all the Nobility for hostages, and shewing strange examples of torture upon them. If any thing were done not according to his command or desire, he would easily shew himself to be a barbarous, fierce and haughty man, whose tyranny they could no longer endure: and unless there were help to be found in Cæsar and the people of Rome, all the Gallies must, as the Helvetians did, forsake their Country, and seek new houses and seats of habitation, far remote from the Germans, and try their fortunes, whatever befell them. If these things should haply be discovered to Ariovillus, he would doubtlesse take a severe revenge of all the pledges in his custody. Cæsar might by his own authority, or the presence of his Army, or by the renown of his late victory, or by the countenance of the people of Rome, keep the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia, and defend it from the injuries of Ariovillus. This speech being delivered by Divitiacus, all that were present with much weeping besought Cæsar to give them relief.

Cæsar observed that only the Sequans of all the rest did no such matter, or were so affected as the others were; but with their heads hanging down, looked mournfully upon the ground: and wondering at it, asked them the cause thereof. To which they made no reply, but stood silent, with the same countenance of sorrow. And having oftentimes iterated his demand, without gaining any word of answer; Divitiacus the Heduan replied that the state of the Sequans was herein more miserable and grievous than the rest; that they of all others durst not complain, or implore aid, although it were in secret, as having before their eyes the cruelty of Ariovillus being absent, no less than if he were present. And the rather, for that other men had safe means of flying away; but the Sequans, having received Ariovillus into their Country, and made him Master of their townes, were necessarily to undergo all miseries.

These things being known, Cæsar encouraged the Gallies with good words, and promised them to have a care of that matter, as having great hope, that by his means and power Ariovillus should be forced to offer no further injuries. And thereupon dismissed the Council.

### OBSERVATIONS.

IN this relation there are divers points worthy recommended to the discretion of such as are willing;

willing to be directed by other mens misadventures. As first, into what extremities ambition doth drive her thirsty favoures, by suppressing the better faculties of the soul, and setting such unbridled motions on foot, as carry men headlong into most desperate attempts. For as it had deserved commendation in either faction, so to have carried their emulation, that by their own means and strength applied to the rule of good government, their authority might wholly have swayd the inclination of the weaker states: so was it most odious in the Sequani to call in foreign forces, to satisfy the appetite of their untemperd humour; and in the end they were accordingly rewarded.

Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrel which civile diffinition hath broached, when the party that called him in shall not be as able to refuse his assistance upon occasion, as he was willing to entertain it for advantage.

Lastly, the often discontents of these States shew the force of a present evil, which possiteth so vehemently the powers of the soul, that to any other calamity, either already past, or yet to come; how great joyes, seemeth tolerable and easy in regard of that smart which the present grief inflameth.

So the Sequani chose rather to captivate their liberty to the Barbarine of a savage Nation, then to endure the Hedui to take the hand of them. And again, to make themselves vassals to the Romans, rather then endure the usurping cruelty of the Germans. And finally (as the sequel of the history will discover) to hazard the loss of life and Country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans. So predominant is the present evil in mens affections, and so it prevaileth at the fear of our judgement.

### Chap. XIII.

The reasons that moved Cæsar to undertake this war.

Cæsar.

Many were the inducements which moved him to take that business to heart. As first, that the Heduians, who were oftentimes sited by the Senate with the title of Brethren, Cousins and Allies, were in the servitude and shraldome of the Germans, and that their hostages were with Ariovillus and the Sequans: which in so great a sovereignty of the people of Rome, he tooke to be very dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. As also for that he saw it very dangerous for the Roman Empire, that the Germans should accustom by little and little to flock in such multitudes into Gallia. Neither did he think he could moderate or restrain such

fierce and barbarous people; but that having possessed all the Continent of Gallia, they would, as the Cimbrs and Teutons had done before, break out into the Province, and so into Italy: especially the Sequans, being divided from the Province but with the river Rhone.

These things he thought fit with all speed to prevent: and the rather, for that Ariovillus was grown to that pride and arrogancy, as was not to be suffered. For which respects he thought it expedient to send Embassadors unto him, to appoint some indifferent place for parlee; for that he had to treat with him concerning publick affairs, and some matters that did much import both of them.

### OBSERVATIONS.

I May here take an occasion to speak somewhat concerning the authority of the Roman Generals, which we take to be very large; considering that Cæsar of himself, without any further leave of the Senate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this history) did undertake a war of that consequence, and put in jeopardy the Legions the Province, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia.

Wherein we are to understand, that when the State of Rome did allot the government of any Province to a Proconsul, they did likewise recommend unto him the careful managing of such accidents as might any way concern the good of that regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well-ordered government, are as well externall and foreign, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had been to small purpose to have given him only authority to maintain a course of wholesome government at home, and no means to take away such oppositions which fortaine accident might set up against him. And so we see that Cæsar undertooke the Helvetian war, in regard of the safety of the Province: and this again with Ariovillus, least the Germans should too multiply in Gallia, that the Province itself might at length be endangered. Neither had their Generals authority only to undertake these wars; but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what else they thought convenient for the advancement of the Commonwealth, did wholly rest upon their direction; *republica bene gesta* being the stile of the warrant for all their actions.

Neither may we think that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerful in the course of business as that which absolutely commandeth without controulment, and proceedeth according to the opportunity of time and occa-

occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the *Roman* affairs were distressed, and driven to an exigent, they created a Dictator, that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute command, that whatsoever power rested either in the Consuls or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gave way to the greatness of that Magistrate; that there might be no lett or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish for the good of the Commonwealth. And yet notwithstanding this absolute government, they attributed such power to the contrivance of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted upon delinquent and unfortunate Leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circumpect soever, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortunes as far forth as his means and industry could achieve it. For old *M. Fabius* pleading for the life of his gallant son, and opposing the rigour of *Papirius* the Dictator with examples of antiquity, faith, *Populi quidam; penes quem potestas omnium rerum, ostendit, nequam quidem inquam atrocitorem fuisse: meos qui temeritate atque insensu exercitus amississens, quam ut pecunia eos multaret: capite antiquitatem ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse.* The people, faith he, in whom the sovereign power of things consisteth never shewed greater displeasure against such as had lost an Army either by rashness or unskillfulness, then imposing a fine upon them: but to bring the life of a Generall in question for failing in his endeavours, was never heard of to that day.

The condition of the inferior Officers of their Camp was far otherwise in regard of Military discipline: for prescription guided them in all their services, and the chiefest part of their duty was obedience; although they law evident reason to the contrary, and found their directions unperfect in that behalf: and therefore *Cæsar* fastidiously that occasion, *Alia sunt legum præcepta imperatoris; alter omnia agere ad præscriptum, alii libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.* The office of a Legate or Lieutenant differeth from that of a Generall: the one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoever may concern the cause. And this course the *Romans* held concerning the authority of their Generalls.

## Chap. XIV.

*Arriovistus* his answer. A second Embassy, with the success thereof.

Cæsar.



That Embassy *Arriovistus* answered; that if his occasions had required *Cæsar's* assistance, he would have furthered them with his own

presence: and he thought it as reasonable, that if it were in his hand to please the *Romans*, *Cæsar* ought not to think much of the like labour. For his own part, he durst not come into those parts of *Gallia* which *Cæsar* possessed, without an Army; nor could he draw an Army to a head without great trouble and expence. The thing that he most wondered at was, that the *Romans* or *Cæsar* had to do in that part of *Gallia*, which the law of Armes had made his inheritance.

Upon the return of this answer *Cæsar* framed a second Embassy, the purport whereof was; Forasmuch as he thus required the honour wherewith the people of *Rome* had beautified his best dignity (for in *Cæsar's* Consulship the authority of their Empire had vouchsafed to esteem of him as a King in his dominions, and as a friend unto their State) and that he declined to admit of a Parlee concerning the common good; let him know that these were the things that he required to be performed by him: 1. *First*, that he should not suffer any more troops of Germans to be transported over the Rhene into *Gallia*. Secondly, that he should deliver up those Hostages which he had of the *Heduians* and *Sequans*, and should cease to molest them further with war or other injuries. These things if he did perform, *Cæsar* would assure him of a grateful acceptance on the behalf of the people of *Rome*: otherwise, forasmuch as in the Consulships of *M. Messala* and *L. Pilo* the Senate had decreed, That he that should obtain the government of the Province, should as near as it would stand with the good of the Commonwealth endeavour the defence of their Associates and Friends, he would not neglect the injuries done unto the *Heduians*.

To these *Mandates* *Arriovistus* replied: The law of Armes kept this tenure amongst all Nations, That a Conquerour might govern a subdued people according as he thought best for his own safety. The people of *Rome* did not direct the course of their government by another mans precept, but by their own arbitrement: as well as he had not directed the *Romans*, so ought not they to meddle with his proceedings.

The *Heduians* having tried the fortune of warre, were by right become his Stipendiaries; wherein *Cæsar* offered great wrong, for that his coming thither had made their tribute much lesse unto him then before. Touching their Hostages, his purpose was still to retain them. Neither would he make any unjust warre upon any of their Associates, if they observed the Articles of agreement, and paid their yearly tribute: but

if they failed in that, the fraternity of the *Romans* would come too late to their succour. If *Cæsar* would needs undertake their quarrell, he was to let him know, that no man ever contended with *Arriovistus* but to his own destruction. Try when he would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germans, that for fourteen years space never were covered with other roof then the Heavens.

## OBSERVATION.

And thus farre proceeded *Cæsar* with *Arriovistus*, in debating the wrongs and grievances of the *Heduians*. Wherein appeared the difference between a matter handled according to moral civility, in terms of mildness and pleasing accent; and that which is rudely delivered, and dependeth rather upon the plainness of the project, then fitted with words fit for persuasion. For that which *Arriovistus* alleged to make good his interest in *Gallia*, was as consonant to reason as any thing to the contrary urged by *Cæsar*.

But as the *Treecedonian* said of one, That he spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of *Arriovistus* his answer, that it wanted that sweetening humanity which giveth credit to verity it self, forasmuch as it proceeded from a well-tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controul the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true judgment; but rather feathering her conceptions with humility, doth covertly complain of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing delivity. And therefore how great a lover the contrivance of that party which exceeded not the bounds of modesty, but maketh mildness his chiefest advocate, will be prevail in any auditory that albeit equity doth disallow her titles, yet the damage of his carriage will clear him from offering wrong, in that he with the sequel of innocency to move his interest in that which he demanded. But to leave this circumstance, as only to be noted, let us proceed to the war it self, which I made the second part of this history.

## Chap. XV.

The *Treviri* bring news of one hundred townships of the *Suevi* that were come to the Rhene. *Cæsar* taketh in *Belacum* his foulities are surprised with an extreme fear of the Germans.

Cæsar.



The same time that this answer was returned to *Cæsar*, there came likewise Embassadors from the *Heduians* and *Treviris*. The *Heduians* complained that the *Hautes* lately transported into *Gallia*, did depopulate and waste their borders,

and that they could not buy their peace of *Arriovistus* with giving of Hostages for their allegiance. The *Treviris* brought news of one hundred townships of the *Suevi* that were come to the river Rhene, to seek a passage into *Gallia*, conducted by *Nalua* and *Cimberius*, two brethren. Whereat *Cæsar* being exceedingly moved, thought his best means of prevention to consist in celerity, least the difficulty of resisting should grow greater, when those new forces of the *Suevi* were joined with the power which was already with *Arriovistus*. And therefore having provided Corn, he made haste to seek the Germans. And having gone three dayes journey on his way, he had intelligence that *Arriovistus* with all his forces was gone to take in *Belacum*, the greatest town of the *Sequans*, and that he was three dayes journey on his way already.

*Cæsar* knowing how much it imported him to prevent that disadvantage (forasmuch as the Town abounded with all necessary provisions for warre, and was so fitted, that he that commanded it might prolong the warre at his own pleasure; being incircled with the river *Albiadus*, excepting a small space of six hundred foot, which was fortified with an exceeding high Hill, the foot whereof did at each end join unto the river, and the Hill strengthened with a wall, and so joined to the town) made all the haste he could to take the town, and there left a garrison. And as he rested there a few dayes, to make provision of Corn and other necessities, the *Romans* concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage invincible, and of great practice and experience in feates of Arms; wherof the *Galles* had oftentimes made tryall: For when they encountered them, they were not able to endure so much as the sternness of their countenance, or the fierceness of their looks. The whole Army conceived such a fear thereof, that all mens minds were wonderfully appalled. This fear began first amongst the Tribunes and Commanders of horse, and such others as for friendship sake followed *Cæsar* from *Rome*, and had small or no skill in matter of war. These men finding some excuse and some another, of very earnest business which called them home, desired leave to depart. Some others, whom shame would not suffer to forsake the Camp, betrayed the like passion in their countenances and behaviour: for hiding themselves in their Tents, they either bewailed their destiny secretly to themselves, or otherwise with their acquaintance and

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familiar friends. They lamented the danger they were all like to fall into; so that throughout the whole Camp there was nothing but making & signing of Testaments. And through the tale and fearfulness of these men the old soldiers and Centurions, and such as had great experience in the Camp, began by little and little to apprehend the terror wherewith the rest were amazed: and those that would seem to be less fearful, said, they feared not the enemy, but the narrowness of the wayes, and the greatness of the woods that were between them and Ariovitus; or otherwise they cast doubts: where they might have provision of Corn. And many stuck, not to tell Cæsar, that whensoever he should give commandment to march forward, or advance the Standards, the soldiers would refuse to do it.

## OBSERVATION.

Wherein forth that we find a strange alteration, no way victorious to that courage which a late-gotten victory doth usually breed in noble spirits; shall not be amiss a little to insist upon the quality of the accident, and to gather such brief instructions from their weakness, as may best serve to qualify the amazement of horror, and mitigate the frenzy of violent passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of Nature cannot promise any such learning, as may discover the true means and secret motions whereby a fore-conceived fear doth trouble the senses, and assaileth the mind; yet for the history's effect it is to our learning, we leave only to note the transgression of the circumstance, and rudely to delineate the posture of a beast, often seen then well known, using the unwieldy pile for my pencil, and fitting my speech to a warlike auditory. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receive intelligence of an eminent evil, which may either dispossess the soul of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth, the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their sovereign Mistress, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secret pavilions of the body, where the chiefest part of the soul is most resident: and so they leave the frontier quarters of her kingdom naked and ungarisoned, the better to strengthen that capital City of the heart, out of which the life cannot fly, but to utter ruin and destruction of the whole body. For fear is not only a perturbation of the soul proceeding from the opinion it hath of some evil to come; but it is also a contraction and closing up of the heart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward parts, to assist that place which giveth life and motion to all the rest. In this Chaos and confusion of humours and spi-

rits, when the multiplicity of faculties (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their service, and by the order of nature should be disposed into severall instruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confounded together, the conceptions of the mind, which presently rise from these advertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disordered mixture of so many severall properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our judgement or examined by reasons, for want of that ordinate uniformity of place which nature requirith in the powers of the mind. And hence proceedeth that amazedness and astonishment, which doth daunteth the hearts of men, when they are taken with this passion, that because the soul giveth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremity of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperour, in an overthrow which he had given him by the Hagæens, was stricken with such an excellent fear, that he could not bethake himself to flight (*Ado pavor etiam auxilia formidat*) until one of his chief Commanders flanking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep sleep, threatened him with present death, if he would not prevent the ruin of the Empire, by using that means which was only left for his safety.

Against in that turbulent confusory the spirits chance distinctly to receive any apprehension proceeding from the forging faculty of the soul, they carry it presently to execution before it be examined by reasons, and follow the action with such vehemency, that they leave no place for better advice and reknowledge. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremity of fear, to avoid one evil we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater danger in the means we use to avoid a lesse; because reason did not first try the apprehension, before it was delivered to external Agents. And so we find in the battle between Germanicus and the Almans, that two grosse troops of souldiers were driven into such an outcry of fear, that taking contrary courses to avoid one & the same danger, they either of them fled to that place which the other had quitted; neither could they be advised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after afforded them no remedy.

And albeit reason be called to counsell when a parley is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultation, that the will of it self concluded to be any verueto dishonour, and so to purchase peace with the losse of the souls chiefest treasure: which ought ever to be estimated at a higher rate than any other happiness which can befall the mind. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused fear, or is more

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amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there any misery greater, or any bondage more shameful, servile or vile, then this which maketh men very objects of all other creatures, to redeem the evil which the danger threatneth: and then doth shame follow after to bale a part, and aggravate the burden of the sin with loathsome disgraces, and penitential contentment; adding oftentimes Aloos to Wormwood, and making the end grievouther than the beginning. And thus doth danger breed fear, and fear yieldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, & shame being always mingled with wrath and anger, revealeth it self upon it self, and bringeth more peril then the first danger could threaten.

Whereby it appeareth that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another; so on the contrary part some are bridled and restrained by others: for as envy, hatred and anger rise, oftentimes of love; so joy followed with grief, envy with mercy, and fear with shame.

But forasmuch as all such perturbations proceed of ignorance and inconsiderateness, whereby we think that the evil is greater then indeed it is; let us consider what disposition of our judgement best moderateth the violent heat of these affections. And first, touching the passages whereby the soul receiveth her advertisements, as they are of divers natures the chiefest whereof are the eye and the ear; so are their avoices different in quality, and require a severall consideration to be rightly discerned. The intelligence by the eye is more certain then that which cometh by the way of hearing; forasmuch as the eyes a witness it self of every action whereof it taketh notice, neither is it deceived in its proper object; and therefore the judgement is not much troubled to determine definitively how great or how small the danger is, when the relations carry all ways that certainty. And albeit the ear in like manner be not deceived in her proper objects, for it faithfully giveth up that sense which found hath delivered unto it; yet forasmuch as the faintly hath greater scope to coin her vain conceptions in regard of the absence of the actions, it is necessary that the discerning faculty be called for an assistant, before the judgement can truly determine: and then it will appear that the truth doth not always answer the report which is made thereof; inasmuch as diseased spirits will not stick to dilate or qualify relations, according to the key wherein they themselves are tuned. And therefore this first cometh to be considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of these two senses the first intelligence was received. But concerning the judgement it self this is most certain, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the soul. And again, the purer the judgement is, and the higher it is lifted up from earthly natures, being no further interceded there-

in then to hold a resolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affections which trouble and molest it: for then it better discerneth the truth and fallshoods good or evil that is in things.

To redresse this inconvenience, Cæsar betook himself to the first and most proper remedy; which was by the authority of his speech to restore reason to her former dignity, and by discourse, which fear had interrupted in them, to put down a usurping passion, which had troubled the government of the soul, recalling it to the mean of true resolutions, which wasto moderate audacity with wariness, but not to choak valour with beauly cowardice: for these Oratory inducing persuasions were not the least point of their discipline; considering how they framed the inward habit of the mind (being the fountain and beginning of all motion) to give life and force to those actions, which the severity of outward discipline commanded. For as laws and constitutions of men enforce obedience of the body: so reason and persuasions must win the souls consent, according to that saying, *Hominis ducti volunt, non cogi*.

## Chap. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Army concerning this fear.

Cæsar being informed of these things, called a Councell of war, admitting all the Centurions, of what degrees they were, and orders sever, unto the same. And being thus assembled, he greatly blamed them, First, that any should be so inquisitive, as to imagine to themselves whither, or upon what service they were carried. Concerning Ariovitus, he had in the time of Cæsars Consulship most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome: and why then should any man misdeem that he should so unadvisedly go back from his duty? For his own part he was verily persuaded, that if Ariovitus once knew his demands, and understood the reasonable offers that he would make him, he would not easily reject his friendship, or the favour of the people of Rome. But if he were so mad as to make war upon them, why should they fear him? or why should they despair either of their own prowess, or of Cæsars diligence? For if it came to that point, the enemy that they were to encounter had been tried many times before; first in the memory of their fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, at what time the Army marched no lesse honour then the General: and now of late again in Italy, at the insurrection of the Bonandini; who were not a little

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furthered through the practice and discipline they had learned of the Romans. Whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute; inasmuch as whom for a time they feared without cause, being naked, and unarmed, the same men afterwards (although well armed and Conquerors withal) they nobly overcame. And to be short, these were no other Germans than those whom the Helveticans had vanquished in divers conflicts; and not only in their own Country, where the Helveticans dwelt themselves, but also even at home at their own doors: and yet the same Helveticans were not able to make their party good against our Armies.

If any man were moved at the sight and overbrow of the Gallies, upon inquiry he should find, that being wearied with continual wars (after that Aniovitius had for many months together kept himself within his Camp, in a boggy and fenny Country) and despairing of any occasion of battle, he suddenly set upon them as they were dispersed, and so overcome them, rather by policy than by force. Which although it too place against Savage and unskillful people, yet was not Aniovitius so simple as to think that he could inspire our Armies with the like subtilties. As for those that feared the cause of their fear to be the difficulty of provision of Corn, and the dangerousness of the way, they seemed very arrogant in their conceits, in presuming to direct their Generall, as if he had not known what pertained to his duty. The Sequans and Lingons had understood that charge; besides that Corn was almost ripe every where in the fields; and what the wayes were should shortly be seen.

Whereas it was given out that the soldiers would not obey his Mandates, nor advance their Standards, he little regarded it; for he was well assured, that if an Army refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either because he was thought to be unfortunate in his enterprises, or else for that he was notoriously convicted of Avarice; but the whole course of his life should witness his innocency, and the overthrow of the Helveticans his happiness. And therefore that which he was minded to have put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following, at the fourth watch he would dislodge from thence; that without further delay he might understand, whether shame and respect of their duty would prevail more with them, then fear or cowardise. And though he wist that no man else would follow him, yet

notwithstanding he would go with the tenth legion alone, of whom he had no doubt or suspicion, and would take them as a guard to his person.

Cæſar had chiefly favoured this legion, and put much trust in them for their valor.

Upon the making of this speech, the minds of all men were wonderfully changed; for it bred in every one a great alacrity and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to give him thanks by their Tribunes for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readiness to set forward to the war. And then likewise the rest of the legions made means by the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions of the first Orders, to give Cæſar satisfaction; protesting they neither doubted nor feared, nor gave any cause of the issue of that war, but always left it to the wisdom of the Generall.

Their satisfaction being taken, and a view being made of the wayes by Divitiacus (whom of all the Gallies he best trusted) and report being by him made, that in fetching a compass of fifty miles he might carry his Army in open and champion Countries; in the fourth watch of the night, according to his former saying, he set forward.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

In the speech it self are presented many specialities, both concerning their discipline and Military instructions, which deserve examination: amongst which I note first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Council: *Omnium ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis Centurionibus*; whereas there were usually no more admitted to their council of war, but the Legates, Officers, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first Orders; which I understand to be the first *Assessors*, the first *Principes*, and the first *Plato* of every legion. And this manifestly proposed out of the fifth Commentary, where Cæſar was besieged by *Ambiorix*; in which amongst other things were two valiant Centurions, *Pisus* and *Tarenus*, between whom there was every year great emulation for place of pre-eminence: *Et jam prius undecies appropriatibus, laudat Cæſar*; that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower orders of the legion and were very near the dignity of the first cohort; wherein, as in all the rest, there were three maniples and in every maniple two orders.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The first motive which hearketh to recall their excited judgement, discovered their breach of discipline: for contrary to the comle of Milita-

ry government, they had presumed not only to make inquiry, but to give out whether, and upon what service they were carried; which in the rigour of Camp-policy could not passe without due punishment. For what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, than to suffer it to be measured with the vulgar conceits, or weighed in the balance of such false judgements; especially when those weak Centurs are to be Actors and Executors of the designe: in then every man will see the nature of the action according to his own humour; although his humour be led with blindnesses, and have no other direction, then an uncertain apprehension of profit or disadvantage.

And in this case there cannot be a better precedent than Nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a work of absolute perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look upon; but yield themselves to be guided by a Moderator of infinite knowledge: to ought a multitude to submit their ability to the direction of some wise and prudent Captain, that beholdeth the action in true honour, and balanceth the helle of many particulars with the health and safety of the publick good. For if every man should prescribe who should obey? *Tunc neſcit quædam milites, quam ſere oportet*, said *Otho* in *Tacitus*, upon the like disorder; and again, *Parentis potius quam imperia dicimus* (*ſervamus, res, milites continentur*). Which proveth that the greatest virtue which is required in a souldier is obedience; as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

#### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

In the reason which he useth to prove their disparity of valour in regard of the *Romans*, who were superior to the *Helveticans* that had often times overrun the *Germanians*, he strengtheneth the argument with the advantage of the place, and saith that the *Helveticans* had put them to the worst, not only where the *Helveticans* dwelt themselves, but even in their own Country; and at home at their own doors; as though an enemy were charged with greater fury in the presence of a mans own Country and dearest friends, then in a strange and unknown land.

This question was handled in the *Roman Senate* by *Fabius Maximus*, and *Scipio* turned *Assessors*, when they late in council how to rid their Country of that subtle *Carthaginian*, that for sixteen years space had trecked like a canker the beauty of *Italy*, wasted the land, and brought it to desolation, sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duty, overthrown their Armies, slain their Consuls, and threatened their imperiall City with ruine and destruction. *Fabius*, upon the motion to make

war in *Africa*, thought it agreeable to nature first to defend that which was their own, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in *Italy*, then let war be set on foot in *Africa*; and first let them be without themselves, before they went about to terrify others: for those forces afforded little hope of victory in another kingdomes, that were not able to free their own Country from so dangerous an enemy. *Alexander* overthrew the *Athenians* Commonweal with the like counsell: and concerning *Hannibal*, let them be sure of this, that they should find him a fierer enemy in his own Country then in another kingdom.

*Scipio* on the other side, carried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor example to impugn *Fabius* his authority: for he shewed that *Agathocles* the *Syracusan* king, being a long time afflicted with the *Punic* war, averted the *Carthaginian* from *Sicily* by transporting his forces into *Africa*. But how powerfull it was to take away fearely retarding danger upon the Oppressors, could there be a preterer example then *Hannibal*? There was great difference in the nature of the action, between the spoil and waite of a strangers Country, and to see their own native Country waited with sword and destruction: *Plus animi est inferre periculum, quam propius sumere*. For he that invadeth another's kingdomes, easily discovereth both the advantage which may be taken against the enemy, and the strength wherupon he resteth. And amongst the variable events of war, many unexpected occasions arise, which present victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances to alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen.

With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no little doubt then importance was handled by two famous and worthy Captains, whose minds (as it seemed) were tangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their own humours, then to determine in sincerity of judgement upon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their positions. But to leave other commodities or disadvantages which were annexed unto either part, I will boldly set down some reasons, to prove how valour and accidents which rise in a war of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimony of an infallible truth being grounded upon the property of mans nature; that as advantage bringeth hope of victory, and hope conceiveth such spirits as usually follows, when the thing which is hoped for is effected, and thereby the courage becometh hardy and resolute in victory: so on the other side, disadvantage and danger breed fear, & fear doth check valour, and controulleth the spirits that virtue and honour give: placet distulband yield

Whether men have greater courage in their own Country, or in a Foreign Country.



## Observations upon Cæsars

up their interest to such directions as can afford nothing but diffidence and irresolution.

Neither can it be denied but that he fetcht up on an enemy in a strange country, and so prevented such attempts as might be made upon his own territories hath that advantage which giveth life unto action, and stealeth his enterprise with resolution. For besides the composure of leaving when he lists, and proceeding as far forth as he shall find his means able to fortune his attempts, he knoweth that the strife and controversy is not his is native Country, which he enjoyeth, and is reserved at all times to entertain him, howsoever Fortune shall favour his designs: but for a Strangers kingdom, which his ambition thirsteth after, wherein forasmuch as the riches and wealth of that State are laid before them as the recompence of their labours, besides the honour which is achieved thereby, every mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased, without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the mind. But when a Prince shall be altitud in his own kingdom, and in the sight of his subjects have isleand confirmed with ruine and destruction; the danger will to disturb the powers of the soul, that though the turbulent disorder of the weaker parts, the better faculties will lose their prerogative of advising how the enemy may be best resisted, when as every man shall apprehend the terror of the danger, and few or none conceive the true means to avoid it.

And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his soul, as the piety and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution; yet the motives are of such weight, as will rather make them diffident of their own worth, as insufficient to maintain to great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: forasmuch as their courage and fear of to great a danger will present a greater measure of woes to their minds, then the hope of victory can afford them joy.

Hence therefore groweth the difference between him that seeketh to maintain that estate which he hath in possession by force of Arms, and another that seeketh to increase his power by valour. For the former is presented with the danger of losing all his estate; which frighteth and troubleth, having no other reward propounded unto him: and the other looketh upon the advantage which he gaineth by overcoming, which much increaseth his valours, without any losse or disadvantage, if the chance be to put to the worst. And therefore there is always great odds between him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that means become desperate, having nothing further to lose; and another that yet keepeth his substances, but is in danger to lose it: for fear will to dismay his mind, that he will ra-

ther distrust his own ability, then entertain a resolution of valour.

To prove this, we need not seek other examples, then those imperiall Cities in which caule this controversy was first moved. For when *Hannibal* was come into *Italy*, and had defeated *Sempronius* the Consul at *Trebia*, the Romans were driven into such an extasy of terror, that they believed verily that the enemy was then coming to assault the City; neither had they any hope or aidein themselves to keep or defend the same. On the other side, *Scipio* was no looner landed in *Africa*, but there was such a tumult in *Carthage*, as though the City had been already taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which *Hannibal* by a conquering Army in *Italy* had confirmed for sixteen years together, prevail in the apprehension of so imminent a danger. And then that which *Fabius* borrowed of Nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their own, before they seek other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the *Carthaginians*: for with all speed they sent for *Hannibal* out of *Italy*, to be their Champion against young *Scipio*. If therefore other things be correspondent (as there are many other particulars concerning the power and strength of either Nation to be considered) I take it much better for a Prince to invade an enemy in his own country, then to attend him at home in his own kingdom.

### THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

THE last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it self peradventure as faulty as any other: wherein he shewed great Art and singular Wildome. For he that hath once offended, and is both burdened with the guilt of conscience and upbraided with the reproach of men, can hardly be persuaded that his fault can be purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memory of the fact will never be blotted out with any virtuous action, but still remaineth to cast dishonour upon the offender, and to accuse him of dissimulation.

And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an error being once rashly committed, through despair of redemption admitteth no true penitency, but either draweth on more grievous crimes, confirming that of the Poets, *Sceleris scelus incrementum est*; or maintaineth his error by willfull obstinacy: as isleand of the Lions, that being found by Hunters in a Cave, he will rather dy in the place then quit, for thame that he was found in toale a place of refuge; and therefore his propensity to this exprellid, *ingrediendo cavas, excedendo potius*. This did *Cæsar* wisely prevent, by clearing the tenth legion of that of which he

he accused the rest of the Army; which made them the more earnest to answer his expectation, inasmuch as they were witness to themselves of a common error: and the other legions envying at their fortune, resolved to shew as great alacrity in the sequel of the war, and to deserve more then the judgement of the Emperour had imputed to their fellows.

### Chap. XVII.

The treaty between Cæsar and Ariovistus.

Cæsar.

He seventh day, as he continued on his march, his Espials brought him word that Ariovistus with all his forces was within twenty four miles of that place: who as soon as he understood of Cæsar's coming, sent Embassadors unto him, declaring that forasmuch as he was come somewhat nearer, and that he might do it without danger, he was content to admit of a parlee. Cæsar refused not the offer, thinking now to find him reasonable, in that he offered of his own accord what he had formerly denied at Cæsar's request: and thereby was in good hope, that understanding what was required, he would in the end consider of the many favours he had received from the people of Rome, and desist from such wilful courses.

The fifth day following was appointed for the Treaty. In the mean time there passed often Messages reciprocally between them. Ariovistus required that Cæsar would not bring any footmen to the parlee, for that he feared to be circumvented by treachery; and therefore thought fit that either party should come only with their Cavalrie: otherwise he would not give meeting.

Cæsar, not willing to put off the Treaty for any such cause, nor yet daring to put himself in trust to the French horse, thought it most convenient to leave the French Riders behind him, and to let the souldiers of the tenth legion (whom he best trusted) upon their horses; that if he stood in need, he might have a faithfull guard of his friends about him. Whereupon one of the souldiers said presently, that Cæsar had done more for them then he had promised; for he had said before he would make the tenth legion as a guard to his person, and now he had smelted them all for horsemen.

There was a great and open Plain, and in the midst thereof a rising Mount, which was almost in the mid way between both the Camps: and thither, according to the agreement, they came to parlee. The legion which Cæsar had brought

with him on horseback, he placed two hundred paces from the said Mount: and likewise the horsemen of Ariovistus stood in the same distance. Ariovistus requested they might talk on horseback; and bring each of them ten persons to the conference. As they meeting, Cæsar began his speech with a commemoration of the favours and benefits the Senate had done unto him, in that he was by their authority intituled by the name of a King and a Friend, and thereupon had received great gifts: which favour fell but unto a few, and was by the Romans given only to men of great desert: whereas he, without any occasion of access unto them, or other just cause on his behalf, had obtained those honours through his courtesy, and the bounty of the Senate.

He shewed him further what ancient and reasonable causes of amity tied them so firm to the Helvians: what Decrees and orders of Senate had oftentimes been made in their favour, and behoof: That from all antiquity the Helvians had held the principality of Gallia; and that long before they were in amity with the Romans. The people of Rome had always this care, not only to endeavour that their Allies and confederates should not lose any thing of their property; but also that they might increase in dignity and reputation: and therefore who could endure to see that forced from them, which they quietly possessed when they entered league with the Romans?

In like manner he required the performance of such things which he had formerly given in charge to his Embassadors; that he should not make war either upon the Helvians, or their Associates: that he should restore their hostages; and if he could not return any part of the Germans back again over the Rhene, yet he should forbear to bring any more into that Countrey.

Ariovistus made little answer to Cæsar's demands, but spake much of his own virtues and valour: That he was come over the Rhene, not out of his own desire, but at the mediation and intreaty of the Galles; that he had not left his house and kindred but with great hope of high rewards; the possessions he had in Gallia were given him by themselves; their hostages were voluntarily delivered unto him; he tooke tribute by the law of Arms, which was such as Conquerors might lay upon the vanquished; he made no war upon the Galles, but the Galles made war upon him: All the States of Gallia came to fight against him, and had put themselves into the field, where forces were in one battell all dispersed.

spoiled and overthrown. If they were desirous to make another trial, he was ready to undertake them: but if they would have peace, it were an injury to retract that tribute which of their own accord they had paid until that time. He expected that the Amity of the people of Rome should be rather an honour and a safety, than a loss unto him, and that he had taught it to that end: but if by their means the tribute due unto him should be retracted, he would as willingly refuse their friendship as he had desired it. In that he had brought so many Germans into Gallia, it was rather for his own defence, then of any purpose to subdue the Country; as might appear by that he had not come thither but upon treaty, and set no war on foot but for his own defence. He was seated in Gallia before the Romans came thither; neither had the people of Rome before that time carried their Army beyond the bounds of their Province: and therefore he knew not what he meant to invade himself into his possessions. This was his Province of Gallia, as that was ours: and as it was not lawful for him to command in our quarters, so it was not fitting that they should disturb his government.

In that he alleged the Hedunians were by decree of Senate adopted into the amity of the people of Rome; he was not so barbarous, or unacquainted with the course of things, as to be ignorant that in the last war of the Allobroges they were aiding and assisting to the Romans: and in the quarrell the Hedunians had with the Sequans, the Romans were in like manner assisting unto them. Whereupon he had good occasion to suspect that Cæsar, under pretence of league and amity, kept his Army in Gallia for his ruin and destruction: and that if he did not depart and withdraw his Army out of those Countries, he would no longer take him for a friend, but for an enemy. And if his fortune were to slay him, he should perform a very acceptable service to many noble and chief men of Rome (as he had well understood by Letters and Messengers he had received from them) whose favour and amity he should purchase by taking away his life. But if he would depart, and leave him the free possession of Gallia, he would graunt him with great rewards: and what was sooner he desired to be undertaken, should be gone through without, without his perill or charge.

Many things were spoken by Cæsar, to shew why he could not desist from that course; for neither was it his life, nor the customs of the people

of Rome, to forsake their well-deserving Associates: neither could he think that Gallia did rather belong to Aniovilus then the Romans. The Atrevis and Rucnes were in due course of warre subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus: whom the people of Rome had pardoned, and not reduced to a Province, or made them Sispensaries. And if antiquite were looked into, the people of Rome had good claim to that Country: but forasmuch as the intention and will of the Senate was they should remain a free people, they were suffered to be governed by their own lawes, and left unto themselves, notwithstanding any former conquest by force of Armes.

Whilst these things were treated of in parlee, it was told Cæsar that Aniovilus horsemen did approach nearer to the Mount, and that accosting our men they assaulted them with stones and other weapons: whereupon he brake off, and betook himself to his Party, commanding them not to cast a weapon at the enemy. For albeit he well perceived he might without perill of that estate legio give battle to his Cavalry; yet he thought it to refrain, lest it should be said he had intrapped them with a parlee, contrary to faith made and agreement. After it was reported amongst the vulgar soldiers how arrogantly Aniovilus had carried himself in the treaty, forbidding the Romans to frequent any part of Gallia, and that their Cavalry had assaulted our men, and that thereupon the parlee brake off; the Army was possessed with a greater alacrity and desire to fight then before. Two dayes after Aniovilus sent Messengers to Cæsar, signifying that he desired to treat with him concerning those things which were left unpersift, and thereupon would him to appoint another day of meeting; or if he liked not that, to send some unto him with authority to conclude of such things as should be found expedient. Cæsar was unwilling to give any further meeting; and the rather, for that the day before the Germans could not be restrained from violence and force of Armes. Neither did he thinke he might safely expose the person of any of his followers to the inhumanity of such barbarous people: and therefore thought it fittest to send unto him M. Valerius Proculus the sonne of C. Valerius Cabiurus, a verie young man, and well bred, whose father was made free of Rome by C. Valerius Flaccus: which he did the rather in regard of his singular integrity, and his perfectness in the French tongue, which Aniovilus through long continuance had learned; and that the Germans

had

had no cause of offence against him. And with him he sent M. Titius, that was familiarly acquainted with Aniovilus, with instruction to hear what was said, and to make report thereof to Cæsar. Whom as soon as Aniovilus saw come into his Camp, he cried out in the presence of his Army, demanding wherefore they came thither, and whether they were not sent as Spies. And as they were about to make answer, he cut them off and commanded them to be put in Irons.

The same day he removed his Camp, and lodged himself under a hill, six miles from Cæsar. The next day he brought his forces along by Cæsar's Camp, and incamped himself two miles beyond him; of purpose to cut off all such corn and convoies as should be sent to the Romans by the Hedunians and Sequans. From that day forward by the space of five dayes together, Cæsar embattailed his men before his Camp: to the intent that if Aniovilus had a mind to give battle, he might do it when he would. But Aniovilus all this while kept his Army within his Camp, and daily sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the Romans.

This was the manner of fighting which the Germans had practised: there were 6000 horsemen, and as many strong and nimble footmen, whom the horsemen had selected out of the whole host, every man one for his safeguard: these they had always at hand with them in battell, and unto these they resorted for succour. If the horsemen were over-charged, these ever stepped in to help them. If any one were wounded or unhorsed, they came about him and succoured him. If the matter required either to adventure forward, or to retire speedily back again, their swiftnesse was such (through continual exercise) that hanging on the horse-mane by the one hand, they would run as fast as the horse.

## OBSERVATION.

It may seem strange unto the soldiers of our times, that the footmen should be mingled pell-mell amongst the horsemen, without hurt and disadvantage to themselves; so unlikely it is that they should either succour the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some have imagined that these footmen in the encounter cast themselves into one body, and so charging the enemy assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, & of others which I will allude to in this purpose, plainly evince that these footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist every particular man as his nature and occasion required: and therefore

the choise of these footmen was permitted to the horsemen, in whose service they were to be employed; that every man might take his friend, in whom he reported greatest confidence. When they were overcharged, these stepped in to help them; if any man were wounded or unhorsed, he had his footman ready to assist him: and when they were to go upon any speedy service, or suddenly to retire upon advantage, they layed themselves upon the mane of the horses with one hand, and so ran as fast as the horsemen could go. Which services they could not possibly have performed without confusion and disorder, if the footmen had not severally attended upon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election.

The principall use of these footmen of the Germans consisted in the aid of their own horsemen upon any necessity, not so much regarding their service upon the enemy, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romans had long before practised the same Art to a more effectual purpose; namely, as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troops of horse then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memory which history mentioneth is recorded by Livie in the second Punic way, at the siege of Capua, under the regiment of *Quintus Fulvius* the Consul; where it is said that in all their conflicts, as the Romans legions returned with the better, so their cavalry was always put to the worst: and therefore they invented this means, to make that good by Art which was wanting in force.

Out of the whole army were taken the choicest young men, both for strength and agility, and unto them were given little round bucklers, and seven darts apiece in stead of their other weapons: these bucklers practiced to ride behind the horsemen, and speedily to light from the horses at a watch-word given, and so to charge the Enemy on foot. And when by exercise they were made to expect, that the novelty of the invention no whit affrighted them, the Roman horsemen went forth to encounter with the enemy, every man carrying his foot-soldier behind him; who at the encounter suddenly alighting, charged upon the enemy with such a fury, that they followed them in slaughter to the gates of Capua. And hence, said Livie, grew the first institution of the *Velitæ*: which ever after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this stratagem is said to be one *Q. Nasius* a Centurion, and was honourably rewarded by *Fulvius* the Consul for the same.

Salust in the history of *Jugurth* saith, that *Marius* mingled the *Velites* with the Cavalry of the associates, *ut quacunqne in eorum equis hostium propositarent*. The like practice was used by Cæsar, as appeareth in the third book of the Civil war; saving that in stead of the

Footmen intermingled amongst horsemen.

## Observations upon Cæsar

the *Vélites*, he mingled with his horsemen four hundred of the lightest of his legionary soldiers, to assist the cavalry of *Pompey*, while the rest of his Army passed over the river *Genusium*, after the overthrow he had at *Dyrachium*: *qui tantum proficere*, faith the text, *ut equestris prælio commissa, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incloues ad agmen se recipirent*. Many other places might be recited; but these are sufficient to prove that the greatest Captains of ancient times (strengthened their cavalry with footmen dispersed amongst them. The *Roman* horsemen, faith *Polybius*, at the first carried but a weak limber pole or staffe, and a little round buckler; but afterwards they used the furniture of the *Grecians*: which *Josephus* affirmeth to be a strong lance or staffe, and three or four darts in a quiver, with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The use of their lance was most effectual when they charged in troop, pouldron to pouldron; and that manner of fight afforded no means to intermingle footmen: but when they used their darts, every man got what advantage of ground he could, as our Caribines for the most part do, and so the footmen might have place among them; or otherwise for to good an advantage they would easily make place for the foot-men to serve among them. But howsoever it was, it appeareth by this circumstance how little the *Romans* feared troops of horse, considering that the best means to defeat their horse was by their foot companies. But to make it more plain, of many examples I will only alledge two; the one out of *Livy*, to prove that the *Roman* horsemen were not comparable for service to footmen: the other out of *Hirtius*, to shew the same effect against strangers, & *Numidian* horsemen.

In the Conduits of *L. Valerius* and *Antony Horatius*, *Valerius* having fortunately overthrown the *Equi*, and the *Polles*, the *Horatius* proceeded with as great courage in the war against the *Sabines*; wherein it happened, that in the day of battell the *Sabines* reliev'd two thousand of their men to give a fresh assault upon the left Corner of the *Romans*, as they were in conflict: which took such effect, that the legionary footmen of that Corner were forced to retreat. Which the *Roman* horsemen (being in number six hundred) perceiving, and not being able with their horse to make head against the enemy, they presently forsook their horses, and made hast to make good the place on foot; wherein they carried themselves so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gave the like advantage to their footmen against the *Sabines*; and then betook themselves again to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point; the *Numidians*, as *Cæsar* witnesseth, were the best horsemen that ever he met with, and used the same Art as the

*Germani* did, mingling among them light-armed footmen. An Ambuscado of these *Numidians* charging the legions upon a sudden, the history faith *primo impetu legiones Equitatus & levis armaturæ hostium nullo negotio loco pulsa & deserta est de colle*. And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged upon the rearward of the Army, according to the manner of the *Numidian* fight, the history faith, *Cæsariani interitum non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani se convertissent, & pila viribus contra in Numidas insessos concessissent, amplius duorum millium ad numerum ea vertebant*. So that to free himself of this inconvenience he took his horsemen out of the rearward, and placed his legions there, *ita omni hostium per legationem multum commodus subsistebat*. And ever as he marched, he cauled three hundred soldiers of every legion to be free and without burthen, that they might be ready upon all occasions; *Quos in Equitatu Labienus immitit, Tum Labienus, conversis equis, signorum conspectu perturbatis turpissime contendit fugere, multis ejus occisis, compluribus vulneratis; milites legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signaque iter incipiunt exceperunt*. I alledge the very words of the history, to take away all suspicion of falsifying or wresting any thing to an affected opinion. If any man will look into the reason of this disparity, he shall find it to be chiefly the work of the *Roman* horsemen; especially when they were cast with the advantage of the place, and fell so thick that there was no means to avoid them.

But to make it plain that any light-armed footmen could better make head against a troop of horse, than the Cavalry of their own pautes, although they bear but the same weapons: let us consider how nimble and ready they were that fought on foot, either to take an advantage, or to shun and avoid any danger; casting their darts with far greater strength and more certainty, than the horsemen could do. For as the force of all the engines of old time, as the *Balistsæ*, *Aræ pulæ*, and *Tormentæ*, proceeded from that stability and resting Centre which nature affordeth as the only strength and life of the engine; to what force for ever a man maketh, must principally proceed from that firmesse and stay which Nature, by the earth, or some other unmovable rest, giveth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength according to the violence which it performeth; as he that lifteth up a weight from the grounds by so much treadeth heavier upon the earth, by how much the thing is heavier than his body. The footmen therefore having a surer stay to counterpoise their forced motion than the horsemen had, call their darts with greater violence, and consequently with more certainty.

*Cæsar* preventeth *Atiovilus* of his purpose, by making two Camps.

Cæsar.

When *Cæsar* perceived that *Atiovilus* meant nothing lesse than to fight, but kept himself within his Camp; least peradventure he should intercept the Sequans, and others of his Associates, as they came with convoies of Corn to the Romans, beyond that place wherein the Germans aboard about six hundred paces from their Camp, he chose a ground meet to incamp in: and marching thither in three battells, commanded two of them to stand ready in Armes, and the third to fortify the Camp. *Atiovilus* sent sixteen thousand foot and all his horse to interrupt the soldiers, and hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding *Cæsar*, as he had before determined, caused two battells to withstand the enemy, and the third to go through with the work: which being ended he left there two legions, and part of the associate forces, and led the other four legions back again into the greater Camp.

The next day *Cæsar*, according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his Camps; marching a little from the greater Camp, he put his men in array, and profered battell to the enemy: but perceiving that *Atiovilus* would not stirre out of his trenches, about noon he conveyed his Army into their severall Camps. Then at length *Atiovilus* sent part of his forces to assault the lesser Camp. The encounter continued very sharp on both parts untill the evening; and as sun-setting, after many wounds given and taken, *Atiovilus* overweighed his Army again into their Camp. And as *Cæsar* made inquiry of the captives, what the reason was that *Atiovilus* refused battell, he found this to be the cause; The Germans had a custome, that the women should by casting of Lots and Soothsaying declare whether it were for their behoof to fight or no: and that they found by their Arts the Germans could not get the victory, if they fought before the new Moon.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe what especiall importance this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the *Romans* observed, and by which they conquered so many Nations: for besides the safety which it afforded their own troops; it served for a hold well-fenced and man-

ned, or as it were a strong fortified town in any part of the field where they saw advantage; and as oft as they thought it expedient either to fortifie themselves, or impetish the enemy, by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking up his Camp, besides many other advantages, all averring the saying of *Domitius Corbulo*, *delatibra vincendum esse hostem*: a thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed by the Commanders of such forces as serve the States in the United Provinces of *Belgia*; whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertain the use of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoever, which may be thought worthy executioners of the deeds of Armes.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

In the second place we may observe that there was no Nation so barbarous (for I understand the Germans to be as barbarous, in regard of the motions of religion, as any known Nation of that time, being in a Climate so near the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make use in their great affairs, of that superstition to which their mind was naturally intrahled, and forge propheties and irregular motions, as well to stir up as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best serve to advantage their proceedings. Neither did *Cæsar* let slip the occasion of making use of this their religion: for understanding by their prisoners that their divinations forbade them to fight before the new Moon, he used all the means he could to provoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischief might prejudge their resolution to return Conquerors. Which may serve to prove, that a superstitious people are subject to many inconveniences, which industry or Fortune may discover to their overthrow.

It is recorded that *Columbus* being General of some forces which *Ferdinando* king of *Cassile* sent to discover the *West Indies*, and suffering great penury for want of victuals in the Ile of *Jamaica*, after that he had observed how the Indians worshipped the Moon, and having knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he told the inhabitants that unless they would furnish him with such necessities as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly appear towards them; by changing his bright shining face into obscurity and darkness: which was no sooner happened, but the poor *Indians*, stricken with a superstitious fear of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing back that might assist their enemies to depopulate and over-run their own Country.

## Observations upon Cæsars

Chap. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to give them battell, and the Germans dispose themselves thereto.

Cæsar.

**T**He next day Cæsar left a sufficient Garrison in each of his Camps; and forasmuch as the number of his legionary souldiers was small, in respect of the multitude of the Germans, he placed all the Auxiliarie troupes for a shew before the lesser Camp: and putting his legions in a triple battell, he marched towards the Camp of Ariovistus. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting every Tribe and people by themselves, in like distance and order of battell (as the Harudes, Marcomans, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians and Suevians) and environing their whole Army with Carts and carriages, that there might be no hope at all left to save any man by flight. And in these they placed their women, that they by their out-stretched hands and teares moving pity, might implore the souldiers, as they descended by course to the battell, not to deliver them into the bondage and thraldome of the Romans.

Cæsar assigned to every legion a Legat and a Quæstor, that every man might have an eye-witness of his valour: and he himself began the battell with the right Corner, forasmuch as he perceived that part of Ariovistus Army to be the weakest.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**He Romans, even from the infancy of their states, were ever zealous admirers of true honour, and alwayes desir'd to behold with the eye to what measure of vertue every man had attained; that the tongue with greater fecundity of spirit might found out the celebration of *Attilæ virtute*, which importeth more honour then any wealth that could be heaped upon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom; considering that the most pretious things that are lose much of their worth, if they be not sited with other correspondent natures, whose sympathy addeth much more excellency then is discerned when they appear by themselves without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which Nature hath given to the eye-pleasing Diamonds, when its not adorned with an artificiall form? or what perfection can the form give, without a foile to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them, if the light do not illuminate it? or what avail all these, where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a judgement to value it, and an heart to embrace it? Such a union hath Nature imprint in the diversitie of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, in whole

carriage there is a far greater exactnesse of correspondence required to approve them honourable, then was requisite to make the jewel beautifull. And this did Cæsar in all his battels; amongst the rest, that at *Alesia* is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter fuitum celari poterat, utroque & laudis cupiditas, & timor ignominie ad virtutem excitabat.* And when *Lævi* would expresse how valiantly an action was carried, he saith no more but *in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*: which is as much as to say, that forasmuch as the Romans were diligent observers of every mans worth, rewarding vertue with honour, and cowardise with reproch, every man bent his whole endeavour to deterve the good opinion of his Generall by discharging that duty which he owed to the Commonwealth with all loyalty and faithfullnesse of spirit.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**He Romans had four formes of the front of their battell. The first was called *Acies Rectæ*, when neither the corners nor the battell was advanced one before another, but were all carried in a right line, and made a straight front; & this was then most usuall manner of imbatelling.

The second forme of the front was called *Obliqua*, when as one of the corners was advanced nearer unto the enemy then the rest, to begin the battell: and this was commonly as *Vegetius* noteth the right corner; for the right corner of an Army had great advantage against the left of the enemies, in regard of their weapons and furniture. But Cæsar did it in this place, because he perceived that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a Maxime of great authority, That the weakest part of an enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an Arme: for so favourable are mens judgements to that which is already happened, that the sequelle of every action dependeth for the most part upon the beginning. *Dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet*, saith a Poet: and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connected to the sequelle by the nature of a precedent cause, that the end must needs erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that quality which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good end without a good beginning: for although the beginning be oftentimes disastrous and unluckie, and the end fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an evil end. And therefore that husmen might foresee a happy end in a good beginning, it behoved him with the best of his Army to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front is called *Simulata*, when both the corners are advanced forward, and



and the battell standeth backward off from the enemy; after the fashion of a half-moon. *Scipio* used it in *Spain*, having observed some dayes before that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best souldiers were alwaies in the midlt; and therefore *Scipio* put all his old souldiers in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge upon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controversie, before the other that were in the midlt could come to fight.

The last form is called *Gibbosa*, or gibbera *Acies*, when the battell is advanced, and the two cornets lag behind. This form did *Hannibal* use in the battell of *Cannae*; but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his souldiers, and placed his weakest in the midlt, that the *Romans* following the retreat of the battell, which was easily repelled, might be inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

## Chap. XX.

The Battell between *Cæsar* and *Arminius*.

Cal.

**T**He sign of the battell being thereupon given, our men charged upon the enemy very fiercely; and they on the other side returned so speedy a counterbuss, that the legions had no time to cast their pikes, and in that regard made hast to betake themselves to their swords: But the Germans, according to their manner, putting themselves into a Phalanx, received the force of their swords. In the battell there were many legions souldiers seen to leap upon the Phalanx, and to pull up with their hands the targets that covered it, and so to wound and kill those that were underneath: and so the left Cornet of the enemy was overthrowen and put to flight.

Now while the right Cornet was thus busied, the left Cornet was overcharged with an unequal multitude of the Germans: which young *Cæsar* the General of the horse no sooner perceived (having more scope and liberty then any of the Commanders that were in the battell) but he sent *tertium Aciem*, the third battell, to rescue and aid their fellows that were in danger; by means whereof the fight was renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight, and never looked back untill they came to the Rhene, which was about fifty miles from the place where they fought. Where some few of them saved themselves by swimming: others found some boats, and so escaped. *Arminius* lighting upon a little Bark tied to the shore, recovered the other side, and so saved himself: the rest were all slain by the horsemen. *Arminius* had two wives: one a

*Swevian*, whom he brought with him from home; and the other of *Notica*, the sister of King *Vocion*, sent unto him by her brother into Gallia, and married there: both these perished in that fight. His two daughters likewise being there, one was slain, and the other taken.

As *Cæsar* pursued the German horsemen, it was his chance to light upon *Valerius Proculus*, as he was drawn up and down by his Keepers bound in three chains: which accident was as grateful to him as the victory it self; being so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, and a man of sort in the Province, whom the barbarous enemy (contrary to the law of Nations) had cast into prison. Neither would Fortune by the loss of him abate any thing of so great pleasure and contentment: for he reported that in his own presence they had three severall times cast lots whether he should be buried alive; and that still he escaped by the fortune of the lots. And *M. Titius* was found in like manner, and brought unto him. The same of this battell being carried beyond the Rhene, the Swevians that were come to the banks of the Rhene returned home again: whom the inhabitants neare upon that river pursued, finding them terrified and dishearted, and slew a great number of them.

*Cæsar* having thus ended two great warres in one Summer, brought his Army into their wintering Campes, somewhat sooner then the time of the year required; and leaving *Labienus* to command them, himself returned into the better Gallia, to keep Courts and publick Diets.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**His Phalanx here mentioned can hardly be proved to be the right *Macedonian* Phalanx; but we are rather to understand it to be so termed, by reason of the close and compact imbatellings, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the *Helvetian* Phalanx. Secondly, I observe that *Cæsar* kept the old rule concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of *Tertius* be not mentioned in his history; yet he omitted not the assistance which was to have *primus*, *secundus*, & *tertium Aciem*; and that *primus Acies* should begin the battell, and the second should come forth and assist them: or peradventure if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battell were joyned together, and so charged upon the enemy with greater fury and violence; but at all adventures the third battell was ever in *subsidio*, as they termed it, to succour any part that should be overcharged; which was a thing of much consequence, and of great

wisdom. For if we either respect the encouragement of the soldiers, or the casualty of Fortunes, what could be more added to their discipline in this behalf, then to have a second and a third success, to give strength to the fainting weakness of their men, and to repair the disadvantage which any accident should cast upon them? Or if their valour were equally ballanced, and victory stood doubtful which of the two parties it should honour, they always step in, being fresh, against weary and over-laboured spirits, and to draw victory in despite of casualty unto themselves.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**C**oncerning use of lots, it shall not be amiss to look into the nature of them being in former times so general, that there was no Nation, civil or barbarous, but was directed in their greatest affairs by the sentence of lots. As we may not refuse for an undoubted truth, that which *Salomon* saith in the sixteenth of *Proverbs*, *The lots are cast into the lap, but the direction thereof belongs to the Lord*: through the knowledge whereof *Josua* was directed to take *Achan*, the Mariners *Tomas*, and the Apostles to consecrate *Marthas*. So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth could direct them no further then to senseless superstitions, and put them in mind of duty which they owed, but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed; whether these, I say, were persuaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destiny, and as the Gods would have it, it remaineth doubtful.

*Aristotle*, the wisest of the heathen concerning things naturall, nameth that event casual, or proceeding from Fortune, of which the reason of man could assign no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause. So that whatsoever happened in any action besides the intent of the agent and workman, was termed an effect of Fortune, or chance of hab-nab: For all other effects, which depended upon a certainty and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casual, or subject to the inconsistency of chance. And because many and sundry such chances daily happened, which like *terrores filii* had no Father, and could not be warranted as lawfull children either to nature or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of Fortune, as the principall efficient and soveraign Motor of all such unexpected events: that is, they made nothing else the Governesse and Directresse of many things. Which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all naturall causes, and was deified with celestiall honours, as the Poet saith, *Te Nos facimus Fortuna deam, cælogæ locamus*. By the providence of

this blind Goddesse, which held her Deity by the Tenue of mens ignorance, were all casual actions directed, and especially lots; the event whereof depended only upon her pleasure and decree. Neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, and the event could not have been called *Sors*, but must have been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledged a certain foregoing cause.

Whereby we see upon how weak an axletree the greatest motions of the godlesse world were turned, having irregularity and uncertainty for the *Intelligence* that governed their revolutions. And herein all sorts of men (although in divers respects) rested as well contented as if an Oracle had spoken unto them, and revealed the mysteries of fatal destiny.

*Rome* directed the main course of her government by the fortune of this mode of destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected with the free choice of their Commanders, and fixed their obedience with a well-liking authority: yet the publick affairs which each Consul was severally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an enemy were entered into their confines to depopulate and waste their territories, the lots assigned this Consul for the government of the City, and the other to command the legions, and to manage the war.

If forces were to be sent into divers Provinces, and against severall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could give to either Consul his task; but their peculiar charges were authorized by lots. If any extraordinary actions were to be done in the Cities as the dedication of a Temple, the sanctifying of the Capitol after a pollution; *Sors omnia versat*, that did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weak foundation of this practice in their Theologie and deepest Divinity) we may not think but these skillfull Architects of that absolute government, wherein vertue joynted with true wisdom to make an unexampled pattern, we may not think, I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no other way be prevented but by the use of lots. For when things are equally levelled between divers objects, and run with indifference to equall stations, there must be some controlling power to draw the current towards one Coast, and to appropriate it unto one channel; that the order of Nature be not inverted, nor a well-established government disturbed. So the state of *Rome* casting many things with equall charge upon her two soveraign Magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be invented to interrese the one in that office, and to discharge the other, then to appoint an Arbitrator, whole

whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be said why it was so, but that it was so. For if the wisdom of the Senate had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people called to determine of the matter; it might easily have burst into civil discord, considering the often contentions between the Senate and the people, the factions of Clients, and the constant mutability of every mans private affections necessarily inclining unto ones, although their worth were equally, and by true reason indiscernible; which might have made the one proud of that which peradventure he had not, and cast the other lower then would have well becomen his virtues: and therefore to cut off these with many other

inconveniences, they invented lots, which without either reason or will might decide such controversies.

By this it appeareth how little the ancient Lawmakers respected the ground and reason of an ordinance, so the commodity was great, and the use important to the good of the State: for as they saw the thing it self to be casual, so they saw that casual things are sometimes more necessary then demonstrative conclusions, neither ought the nature, and speculative consideration of Lawes and Statutes to belong to the common people; but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the Commonwealth flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of *Cæsar* his warre in *Gallia*.

## The second Commentary of the wars in GALLIA.

## The Argument.

**L**ike as when a heavy body lieth upon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it cover but a small parcell of the whole surface, yet the other quarters are burthened and kept under with a proportionable measure of that weight; and through the union and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one Totality, feel the same suppression which hath really seised but upon their fellow part: In like manner the *Belge*, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple Continent, seemed to repine at that heavy burthen which the *Roman Empire* had laid upon the Province, the *Hedui*, and other States of that kingdom. And least it might in time be further removed, and laid directly upon their shoulders, they thought it expedient whilst they felt it but by participation, to gather their severall forces into one head, and try whether they could free their neighbour Nations from so grievous a yoke, or at the least keep it from coming any nearer unto themselves. And this is the Argument of this second book, which divideth it self into two parts: the first containing the wars between *Cæsar* & all the States of *Belgia* united together; the second recording the battels which he made with some of the States thereof in particular, as time and occasion gave him means to effect it.

## CHAP. I.

*Cæsar* marcheth to his Army, marcheth towards the confines of the *Belge*, and taketh in the men of *Rheims*.

Cæsar.

**W**hile *Cæsar* was in his winter quarters in the higher *Gallia*, there came every day fresh rumours to him (the same thing being also certified by let-

ters from *Labiens*) that all the *Belge*, being a third part of *Gallia*, had leagued together against the people of *Rome*, and had given mutual hostages one to another. The grounds of their confederacy were these: First, they were afraid that *Cæsar* having seised all the rest of *Gallia*

in quiet, would bring his armies upon them. Secondly, they were solicited to do it by some of the Gallies, such namely who, as they did not desire the company of the Germans longer in Gallia, so they were very much troubled to think that the Roman army should winter and settle themselves there; and such again as leavy and inconstancy prompted to seek new governments; lastly such as saw that it was an easy matter for those men that were powerful and had the command of monies to seize upon kingdoms in Gallia, which they could not so easily do in those parts where the Romans bore sway. Cæsar being moved with letters and other intelligence to this purpose, levied two new legions in the winter Gallia, and as soon as Summer came on sent them by Q. Pedius his Legate into the further Gallia: and as soon as there was forage in the fields he himself came to the army. He had before given charge to the Senones and other of the Gallies that bordered upon the Belgæ, to learn every day what they could of their doing, &c. to give him an account thereof. These presently informed him that of a certainty there was nothing in Belgia but mustering of souldiers, and gathering their forces into one head. He thought it not therefore safe to make any further delay; but having made provision of corn, he drew out his Army from their wintering camps, and within fifteen dayes he came to the borders of the Belgæ. As soon as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for, the men of Rhemes being the uttermost of the Belgæ, next adjoining to the Celtæ, thought it best to entertain a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Ambrogius, two of the chief men of their State, unto Cæsar, to submit themselves and all that they had to the mercy of the Roman Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsel of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracy against the Romans. For proof whereof they were ready to give hostages, to receive them into their towns; and to furnish them with corn or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belgæ were all in Arms; and the Germans on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succour: yea their madness was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold back the Sueffones from that attempt: being their brethren and kinsmen in blood, and using the same laws and customs as they did, having both one magistrature and one form of government; but they would needs support the same quarrell which the rest of the Belgæ had undertaken.

## OBSERVATION.

I Might here take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular revolt in a general cause; and how a confederate State may in repaid of their own safety forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoever the universal society hath enacted prejudicial to their common weal; but that I only intend to discover warlike practices, leaving these questions of law and policy to men of greater judgement and better experience. O. I. I observe in the behalf of the Roman government, that such cities as yielded to the Empire, and became tributary to their treasury (howsoever they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldom or never repented them of their fact; in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that State; and of the due respect observed towards them.

## Chap. II.

The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

**C**æsar inquiring of the Embassadors Cæsar, which came from Rhemes what the States were that had taken Arms, and what they were able to do in matter of Warre, found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germans, who passing over the Rhene came out of mind, and finding it to be a fertile country, drove away the Gallies and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these only of all the Gallies kept the Cimbræ and Teutoni from entering into their country; and in that regard they challenged to themselves great authority, and could do much in their feats of Arms. Concerning their number they had these advertisements; The Bellovaci exceeded all the Belgæ in prowess, authority, and number of men, being able to make 100000 fighting men, and out of that number had promised 60000 towards this undertaking; and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. Next to them lay the Sueffones, who dwelt in a large and fruitful country, and had lately Divitiacus for their king, being the most powerful man in all Gallia, who had in possession a great part of these countries, and also of Britain itself. Galba was their king now, on whom, for his singular justice and prudence, generally with one consent they bestowed the management of the war. They had 12 walled towns, and promised to set forth 50000 men. The Nervii, who were the most barbarous amongst them all, and dwelt furthest off, promised

<sup>b</sup> The country about Bellovaci.

<sup>b</sup> The country about Sueffones.

<sup>b</sup> The people about Treveri.

<sup>a</sup> Arrebas.  
<sup>b</sup> Ambians.  
<sup>c</sup> Vermandois.  
<sup>d</sup> Treverians.  
<sup>e</sup> Liège.  
<sup>f</sup> Laon.  
<sup>g</sup> in all.

sed as many; the Arrebasii 15000. the Ambians 10000. the Vellocassii and Veromandui as many; the Morini 25000. the Menapii 9000. the Caletes 10000. the Aduacii 25000. the Eburones, Condrusi, and others 40000. Cæsar encouraging the men of Rhemes to persist in their faithfulness to the Roman Empire, propounded unto them great offers and liberrall promises of recompence, and commanded all their Senate to come before him, and bring with them their Noblest Sons to be given up for hostages: which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And having received two especial advertisements from the men of Rhemes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: he provided for the first by persuading Divitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keep ajunder the power of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might avoid the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the Marches of the Bellovaci, and sack their Territories with sword and confusion. Which Divitiacus promised to perform, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Upon the second advertisement, which presented unto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giving them battell, but first to prove by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowess could do, and what his own men durst do.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS rule of making tryall of the worth of an enemy, hath always been observed by prudent and grave commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true judgement of the event may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philoplophers, which teacheth that the word non parvum, I will it not, was never heard out of a wise mans mouth, hath any place in the court of humane actions; it ought especially to be regarded in managing their main points, whereon the State of Kingdoms and Empires dependeth. For, unless we be persuaded that blind chance directeth the course of this world, without an uncertain constitution; and that no foresight can give the ballance of our hap into either part of our fortune, I see no reason why we should not by all means endeavour to ground our knowledge upon true causes, and level our proceedings to

that certainty which riseth from the things themselves. And this is the rather to be urged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an enemy with equality of number, referring their valour to be tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of itself cannot discern the difference between two champions of like preference and outward carriage, unless it see their strength compared together and weighed as it were in the scale of trial: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to observe, before he would adventure the hazard of battell. For, besides his own satisfaction, it gave great encouragement to his men, when they saw themselves able to countermatch an enemy, and knew their task to be subject to their strength. Neither did he observe it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we find that he never encountered any enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour, to make head against them: which equality of strength being first laid as a sure foundation, he used his own industry and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as advantages to overthrow his adversaries; and to draw victory maugre fortune unto himself, and seldom failed in any of his battels.

## Chap. III.

Cæsar passeth his Army over the river Axona, leaving Titinius Sabinus encamped on the other side with six cohorts.

**A**S soon as Cæsar understood as well Cæsar, by his discoverers, as from the men of Rhemes, that all the power of the Belgæ was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to passe his Army over the River Axona, which divided the men of Rhemes from the other Belgæ, and there encamped. Whereby he brought to passe that no enemy could come on the back of him to work any disadvantage; and that corn might be brought unto him from Rhemes and other cities without danger. And further, that he might command the passage back again, as occasion should serve, to his best advantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the river with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titinius Sabinus a Legate to encamp himself on the other side of the river with six cohorts, commanding him to fortify his camp with a rampier of 12 foot in altitude, and a trench of 18 foot in breadth.

## OBSERVATION.

IF it be demanded, why Cæsar did passe his Army over the river, leaving it on his back, and did



did not rather attend the enemy on the other side, and to take the advantage of hindring him, if he should attempt to pass over; I will let down the reasons in the sequel of this war, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more evident. In the mean time let us enter into the particulars of these fix cohorts, that we may the better judge of such troops which were employed in the services of this war. But that we may the better conjecture what number of souldiers these fix cohorts did contain, it seemeth expedient a little to discourse of the companies and regiments which the Romans used in their Armies.

And first we are to understand, that the greatest and chiefest regiment in a Roman Army was termed by the name of *Legio*; as *Varro* saith, *quod leguntur milites in delectis*; or as *Plutarch* speaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus essent milites*; so that it taketh the name *Legio*, of the choice and selecting of the souldiers. *Romulus* is said to be the first author and founder of these legions, making every legion to contain 3000 souldiers; but shortly after they were augmented, as *Festus* recordeth, unto 4000; and afterward again from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion untill *Hannibal* came into Italy, and then it was augmented to 5000; but that proportion continued only for that time. And again, when *Scipio* went into Africa, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian wars, the legions that continued in Macedonia to keep the Province from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of *Cæſar* it cannot be gathered that a legion in his time did exceed the number of 5000 men; but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himself saith that in this war in *Gallia* his souldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the civile wars, where he saith that in *Pompey* his Army were 110 cohorts, which amounted to the number of 55000 men; and it being manifest as well by this number of cohorts, as by the testimony of divers authors, that *Pompey* his Army consisted of 11 Legions; if we divide 55000 into 11 parts, we shall find a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout being generally known to be the usual rate of a legion, the Romans always expressed the strength of their Army by the number of legions that were therein; as in this war it is said that *Cæſar* had eight legions; which by this account might arise to 40000 men besides associates, and such as necessarily attended the Army. Further we are to understand that every legion had his peculiar name; by which it was known and distinguished from the rest: and that it took either from their order of multers, or enrollment; as that legion

which was first enrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in the choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we read in this history, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *Legiones Germanicæ, Pannonicæ, Britannicæ*; and such others; and sometime of their Generall, as *Augustus, Claudius, Vellutianus legiones*; and so forth: or *triumphal*; to conclude, from some accident of quality, as *buſ, Rapax, Vêlitr, Fulminifer, Plundering, Victorious, Lightning*, and such like. And thus much of the name and number of a legion: which I must necessarily distinguish into divers kinds of souldiers, according to the first institution of the old Romans, and the continual observation thereof unto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller parts wherof a Legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to understand that after the Consuls had made a general choice and sworn the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of *Vêlites*. Their place in regard of the other souldiers was both base and dishonourable: not only because they fought afar off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forlorn hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kind, they proceeded to the choice of them which they called *Hastati*, *Hastati*, a degree above the *Vêlites* both in age and wealth, and termed them by the name of *Hastati*, forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Javelin, which the Romans called *Hasta*; but before *Polybius* his time they used Pikes; notwithstanding their ancient name continued unto the later time of the Empire. The third choice which they made, was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called *Principes*; the rest that remained were termed *Triarii*, as *Varro* saith, *2. ad tertio ordine Triarii, extremis subsidio disponuntur*. These were always the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third division of the battell, as the last help and refuge in all extremity. *Polybius* saith that in his time the *Vêlites*, *Hastati*, and *Principes* did consist of 1200 men apiece, and the *Triarii* never exceeded the number of 600, although the general number of a legion were augmented: wherof *Lipsius* allegeth these reasons; First, because these *Triarii* consisted of the best of the souldiers, and so might countervail a greater number in good words and valour. Secondly, they seldom came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controversy grew very doubtfull. Lastly, we may well conjecture that the voluntaries and extraordinary followers ranged themselves amongst these *Triarii*, and so made the third battell equal to either of the former;

former: but howsoever they never exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth that in *Polybius* his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this division of their men, consisted the ground of that well-ordered discipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their yeares and ability, they reduced their whole strength into severall classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the general composition of their whole body, every part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth was answerable to the fame: and so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct in parts and properties; that from every accident which met with any part of the Army, the judgement might determine how much or how little it imported the whole body: besides the great use which they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preference, matter of no small consequence, in the excellency of their government.

The souldiers at their enrollment being thus divided according to their yeares and ability, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they divided the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, each of them into 10 companies, making of those three sorts of souldiers 30 small regiments, which they called *Manipuli*: And again they subdivided every manipulus into two equal parts, and called them *Ordines*, which was the least company in a legion, and according to the rate set down by *Polybius*, contained 60 souldiers. In every *Ordo* there was a Centurion or Captain, and a Lieutenant, whom they named *Optio* or *Tergiductor*. The maniples of the *Triarii* were much bigger then the maniples of either the *Hastati* or the *Principes*; forasmuch as their whole band consisted but of 600 men. The *Vêlites* were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other maniples; and therefore the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* were called *subsignarii milites*, to make a difference between them and the *Vêlites*, which were not divided into bands, and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that every Manipulus had 40 *Vêlites* attending upon it. And now I come to the description of a Cohort, which the history here mentioneth.

The word *Cohors* in Latine doth signify that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house, which from the same word we call a court: and *Varro* giveth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farm house, faith he, many out-buildings joynted together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of severall maniples joynted together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for every le-

gion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these three maniples were not all of one and the same kind of souldiers, as three maniples of the *Hastati*, three of the *Principes*, and three of the *Triarii*; as *Particus* in his *Parallelis* seemeth to affirm; for so there would have remained an odd manipule in every kind; that could not have been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a manipule of the *Hastati*, a manipule of the *Principes*, and a manipule of the *Triarii*; and so all the thirty maniples were included into ten cohorts; and every cohort was as a little legion, forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of souldiers that were in a legion. So that making a legion to contain five thousand men, a cohort had five hundred; and so these fix cohorts which he encompassed on the other side of the river under the command of *Triarius Subinus*, contained three thousand souldiers; but if you make a legion to consist but of four thousand two hundred, which was the more usual rate, there were two thousand five hundred and twenty souldiers in these fix cohorts.

By this therefore it may appear that a legion consisted of four sorts of souldiers, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and every cohort contained three maniples, and every manipule two orders, and every order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troups, and every Centurion had his *Optio*, or Lieutenant, that stood in the tail of the troupe.

When a legion stood ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy, the least body or squadron that it contained was a manipule; wherein battell, the two orders were joynted together, making jointly ten in front, and twelve in file: and so every five files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rearward, to direct them in all adventures. In the time of the Emperours, their battalions consisted of a cohort, and never exceeded that number how great soever the Army were.

*Polybius* distinguishing a manipule into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, known by the name of *Primus ordo*; and the Centurion elected in the second cohort, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, that was present of them two commanded the whole manipule. And so we find that the Centurion of the first place was called *Prior Centurio*: in which sense *Cæſar* is to be understood, where he saith that all the Centurions of the first cohort were slain, *Præter principem priorem*. From whence we gather two particulars: first, the priority between the Centurions of the same Manipule; for a cohort consisting of three Maniples, wherof the first Manipule were *Triarii*, the second *Principes*, and the third *Hastati*.

Prima co.  
hors.

*Prima*, and every Maniple containing two orders, and every order a Centurion, he saith that all the Centurions of this cohort were slain, *Principes*. The second thing which I observe, is the title of the first cohort: for these ten cohorts whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthiness; and that which was held the worthiest in the centre of the Electors, took the priority both of place and name, and was called the first cohort; the next, the second cohort; and so consequently unto the tenth and last.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of preeminence, both in imbatelling and in encamping, according either to the seniority of their enrollment, or the favour of their General, or their own virtue. And so we read that in these wars in *Gallia* the tenth Legion had the first place in *Cæsar's* Army. And thus much concerning the divisions and severall companies of a Legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

The be-  
nefit of  
this discipline.

Upon this description it shall not be amiss briefly to lay open the most apparent commodities depending upon this discipline; the excellency whereof more plainly appears, being compared to that order which Nature hath observed in the frame of her worthiest creatures: for it is evident that such works of Nature come nearest to perfect excellency, whose materiall substance is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath every part indited with that property which best agrees to his peculiar service. For being thus furnished with diversity of instruments, and these directed with fitting abilities, the creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discover the worth of an excellent nature: whereas those other bodies that are but slenderly labour'd, and find lesse favour in Nature's forge, being as abjectives, or barbarously compos'd, wanting the diversity both of parts and faculties, are no way capable of such excellent uses, nor fit for such distinct services, as the former that are directed with so many properties, & enabled with the power of so well-distinguisht faculties. Which better works of Nature the *Romans* imitated in the Architecture of their Army, dividing it into such necessary and serviceable parts as were best fitting all uses and employments; as first Legions, and legions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein every man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion: and thus the universall multitude was by order disposed into parts, until it came unto a unity. For it cannot be denied but that these centuries were in themselves so sensibly distinguished, that every soldier carried in his mind the particular Map of his whole century: for in imbatelling, every century was disposed into five files, containing

twelve in a file; whereof the leaders were always certain, and never changed but by death or some other speciall occasion; and every leader knew his followers, and every second knew the third man, and so consequently unto the last.

Upon these particularities it plainly appeareth how easy a matter it was to reduce their troops into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flank, or flank front, when they were broken and disordered to rally them into any form, when every man knew both his own and his fellows station. If any companies were to be employed upon sudden service, the general *Adapt* of the Army being so deeply impressed in the mind of the commanders, would not suffer them to err in taking out such convenient troops, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safety of the Army, or nature of the action. At all occasions and opportunities these principles of advantage offered themselves as ready means to put in execution any design or stratagem whatsoever: the project was no sooner resolved, but every man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important in regard of the life and spirit of every such part, their loyalty was sweetened, or rather strengthened with the mutual acquaintance and friendship one of another; the captain marching always in the head of the troops, the ensign in the midst, and the lieutenant in the rearward, and every man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend, which bred a true and unfeigned courage, both in regard of themselves and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending upon this order were no small means to cut off all matter of civile discord, and intestine dissention: for here every man knew his place in the File, and every File knew his place in the Century, and every Century in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Army; and to every soldier had his place according to his virtues and every place gave honour to the many, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall government of this age with bloodshed and murders; whereof *France* is too true a witness, as well in regard of the *French* themselves, as of the *English* forces that have been sent thither to appeale their tumults: for through defect of this order, which alledged to every man his due place, the contrivancy grew between Sir *William Drax* and Sir *John Parvoves*, the ill use whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our Commanders in *France* have been negligent, so I may not forget to give due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the *English* troops in the service of the States in the United Provinces, where they are very curious

ous in appointing every man his place in the File, and every File in the Troup, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reviving the *Roman* discipline.

The benefit  
of small  
battalions,  
and the dis-  
advantage  
of great  
squadrans.

To conclude this point, I will only touch in a word the benefit which the *Romans* found in their small battalions, and the disadvantage which we have in making great squadrans. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troops stand best appointed for disposition and array of battalions, which standing strong to receive a shock, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for the principal things which are required in setting of a battell, are so to order the troops, that the depth in flank may serve conveniently to withstand the assault, taking up no more men then may well serve for that purpose, and giving means to the rest to fight with the enemy: and in these two points were both their defensive and offensive considerations comprehended. But smaller troops and battalions afford this convenience better then great squadrans, which drown up many able men in the depth of their flanks, and never suffer them to appear but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butchery of the enemy. The *Alexander* books, never came above fifteen in flank, and brought five hundred to fight in front. And these little battalions, considering them as they stood in battell ray, made as great a front or greater then that of the *Phalans*, keeping a depth answerable to the same; besides the second and third battell, which always were to succour them, which the *Phalans* wanted: neither would their thick and close imbatelling admit any such succour behind them. Now if we compare the advantages and disadvantages which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds between them. These great squadrans are not feasible but in plain, and open places, where they may either stand immovable, or make easy and flow motions without flinching, or disordering their body: but the latter are a scanning for all places, champaign or woody, level or uneven, or of what site or quality lower. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battalions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interested in the disorder as the dead ranks are, and hath lesse means to rally it self then any other lesser company: but if any violence chance to rout a Maniple it proceedeth no further in the Army then that part which it taketh: Neither can the disbanding of any one part betray the safety of the Army to disorder and confusion, so far as much as their distinction served to cut off such inconveniences, and yet no way hindered the generall uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter; but I only point at it, and leave the due consideration thereof to the

judgement of our Commanders, and return to our history.

## CHAP. IV.

The Belge attempt the surprize of a *Bibrax*: *Cæsar* array in the country of *Reclit*.

Here was a town called *Bibrax*, belonging to the state of *Rhemes*, about eight miles from *Cæsar's* camp, which the *Belge* thought to have surprized as they came along to meet with *Cæsar*; and suddenly assaulted it with such fury, that the townsmen could hardly hold out the first day. The *Celte* and *Belge* use one and the same manner in assaulting a town: For having beset the whole compass of the wall with ranks of soldiers, they never cease flinging of stones until they find the wall naked of defendants; and then casting themselves into a Tettudo, they approach to the gate and undermine the walls. Which thing was easily effected here; for so great was the number of them that threw stones and darts, that it was impossible for the defendants to abide upon the walls. As soon as the night had made an end of the assault, *Lucius* of *Rhemes*, a man of great birth and authority in his country, who at that time was governor of the town, and had been before with *Cæsar*, to treat and conclude a Peace, sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to hold out any longer. The same night about midnight (using the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretan Archers, & Slings of the *Iles* of *Baleares* to relieve the town; by means whereof the townsmen were put in good hope to make their party strong, and the enemy made hopelesse of winning the town: and therefore after a small stay, having depopulated their fields, and burned their villages, and out-buildings, they marched with all their power towards *Cæsar's* Camp, and within lesse then two miles of the Army they incamped their whole host; which, as was gathered by the smoke and fire, took up more ground then eight miles in breadth.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

In the description of their assaults, we are to observe two circumstances. The first is, the manner they used in a sudden surprize: The second is, the form and quality of a *Tettudo*. Although *Cæsar* seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a town as peculiar to the *Gallies*, yet we may not think but that the *Romans* used it as often as they had occasion to surprize any city: but be-

To take a  
town by  
surprize.

G 3 caule

cause the *Gallies* knew no other means to take a town but this, therefore he fettereth it down as peculiar unto them. The *Romans* called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, *Cingere urbem corona*, forasmuch as the fouldiers inclosed the town with a circle, and so resembled a crown or garland. *Ammianus* speaketh of a triple crown of fouldiers which encompassed a town: And *Josephus* telleth of *Jopata*, which the *Romans* besieged *duplex sedium corona*, with a double circle of footmen: besides theſe there was a third circle of horsemen outmost of all. There is no further matter to be observed but this, that in surprising a town, they inclosed it round about with thick continued ranks of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**he *Tessudo* requireth a larger discourse, and is lively described in *Livie* after this manner. In the *Amphibates*, where the people did often assemble to see strange sights and publick shows, were brought in (saith he) sixty lusty young men, who after some motion and seemly march, cast themselves into a square troupe, and roofing their heads close with their targets, the first rank which made the front of the *Tessudo*, stood up right on their feet; the second rank bowed it self somewhat lower; the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequently unto the last rank, which kneeled on the ground: and so they made a body resembling halfe the side of an house, which they called *Tessudo*. Unto this squadron so strongly combined together came two fouldiers running some an hundred and fifty foot off, and threatening each other with their weapons, ran nimblely up the side of the roof; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy that would have entered upon it, sometimes again encountering each other in the midst of it, leaped up and down as it easily as if they had been upon firm ground. And which is more strange, the front of a *Tessudo* being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men upon the said *Tessudo*, and fought in an equal height with other fouldiers that stood upon the said wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the fouldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, carried not their Targets over their heads as the other did, but covered their bodies with them; and some weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise thrown against it could any way hurt them; and whatsoever weight fell upon the *Tessudo*, it quickly glyded down by the declivity of the roof, without any hurt or annoiance at all.

Thus far *Livie* goeth; neither do I know

what to say further of it: the chiefest use thereof was in a surpris or sudden attempt against a town, before the townsmen were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This invention served them to approach the wall with safety, and to either to undermine it, or to climb up: and to that end they oftentimes erected one *Tessudo* upon another. *Tacitus* saith that the fouldiers climbed upon the wall *super iterum tessudum*, by one *Tessudo* made upon another. And this was the ancient form and use of a *Tessudo* in a sudden assault or surpris.

*Dio Cassius* in the acts of *Antony* saith, that being galled with the *Parthian* Archers, he commanded his whole Army to put it self into a *Tessudo*: which was so strange a sight to the *Parthians*, that they thought the *Romans* had sunk down for weariness and faintness; and so forsaking their horses, drew their swords to have made execution: and then the *Romans*, at a watch-word given, rose again with such a fury, that they put them all to sword and flight. *Dio* describeth the same *Tessudo* after this manner: They placed, saith he, their baggage, their light-armed men, and their horsemen in the midst; and those heavy-armed footmen that carried long gutter-called Targets, were in the utmost circles next unto the Enemy: the rest (which bare large oval Targets) were thronged together throughout the whole troupe, and so covered with their Targets both themselves and their fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy but a roof of Targets, which were soiled together, that men might safely go upon them.

Further, we oftentimes read that the *Romans* cast themselves into a *Tessudo*, to break through an Enemy, or to rout and dislance a troupe. And this use the *Romans* had of a *Tessudo* in field services, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a *Tessudo* in regard of the strength, for that it covered and sheltered as a shell covereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a *Tessudo*.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**hirdly, we may observe how carefully *Cæsar* provided for the safety of such persons as he sent unto *Libanus*: for he commanded the same messengers that came from the town to direct them, as the best and surest guides in that journey; least peradventure through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconveniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a war; but deserving an extraordinary opportunity to perfwade the necessity of this diligence: for a General that hath perfectly discovered the nature of the country through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the quality of the wayes, the compendiousness of journeys, the nature of the hills,

hills, and the course of the rivers, hath all these particularities as main advantages, to give means of so many severall attempts upon an Enemy. And in this point *Hannibal* had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the Commanders of his times, in making use of the way by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an Army by an unknown and undiscovered way, and maketh himself blindfold upon uncertain adventures, is subject to as many casualties and disadvantages as the other hath opportunities of good fortune. Let every man therefore perfwade himself that good Discoverers are as the eyes of an Army, and serve for lights in the darknesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good providence, and make the path of safety so manifest, that we need not stumble upon casualties. *Cæsar* in his journey to *Ariovistus*, used the help of *Dronianus* the *Heduan*, in whom amongst all the *Gallies* he reposed greatest confidence, to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would undertake his voyage unto *Britanie*, he well informed himself by Merchants and travellers of the quantity of the Island, the quality of the people, their use of war, and the opportunity of their havens. Neither was he furnished with their relations, but he sent *Caius Voluentius* in a ship of war, to see what he could further discover concerning their points. *Suetonius* addeth moreovers that he never carried his Army *per insidiosa iterum* through places where they were subject to be way-laid, unless he had first well discovered the places.

\* Now Eng-  
land.

The order  
which he is to  
be observed  
in discover-  
ing.

Concerning the order which skillfull Leaders have observed in discoveries, we are to know that this point consisteth of two parts; the one, in understanding the perfect description of the country; the second, in observing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we find as well by this as other histories, that the *Romans* used the inhabitants of the country for Guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not erre in so important a matter: provided always that their own scouts were ever abroad to understand what they could of themselves, that they might not altogether rely upon a strangers direction. The motions of the Enemy were observed by the horsemen: and these for the most part were *Veterans* well experienced in the matter of war, and to the Generall received found advancements: and yet they were not too forward upon any new motions, unless they found it confirmed by divers wayes; for some Ispials may erre, either through passion or affections, as it happened in the *Helican* war. If therefore the use and benefit which prudent and wise Commanders made of this sciences, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought upon the ignorant, have any authority to perfwade a circum-

spect care herein, this little that hath been spoken may be sufficient for this point.

## THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

**T**he fouldiers which *Cæsar* sent to relieve *Blingens* were Archers of *Creta* and *Nimius*, which were now called *Majorica* and *Minorica*, which kind of weapon because it seemeth ridiculous to the fouldiers of these times, whose conceits are held up with the fury of their fiery engines, I will therefore in brief discover the nature and use thereof.

The *Livines* (saith *Isidore*) called this weapon *fundus*, quod ex ea fundantur lapides, because out of it stones are cast. *Plinie* attributeth the invention thereof to the Islanders called *Baleares*. *Plinie* in his 3 book and 8 chap, saith that these *Baleares* used three sorts of slings, and no other weapon besides; and that a boy had never any meat given him before he had first struck it with a sling. *Strabo* distinguisheth these three sorts of slings which the *Baleares* used, and saith that they had one flung with long reines, which they used when they would long assure off; and another with short reines, which they used near at hand; and the third with reines of a mean size, to cast a reasonable distance. *Lippus* saith that in *Columna Antonina* at *Rome* he observed that the *Baleares* was made with one sling about his head, another about his belly, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinary manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold: the first was hemp or cotton, the second hairy, and the third sinews; for of either of these sluffs they commonly made them. The form and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the middle, with an Oval compass, and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or reines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twice or three about their head, and so to cast out the bulle: *Virgil* speaking of *Mezentius* saith,

*Ipsæ adæstæ cretam caput agit habera.*  
*Heſechi* the rein three times about his head. But *Vergine* preferreth that skill which cast the bulle with once turning it about the head. In *Suidas* we find that these *Baleares* did commonly cast a stone of a pound weight: which agreeth to these names in *Cæsars fundus librælis*. The leaden bullets are mentioned by *Salustius*, in the warre with *Jugurth*, and by *Livie*, where he saith that the Consul provided great store of arrows, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst divers nations, as well in regard of the readinesse and easy recasting of the blows, as also for that the bulle fled very farre, with great violence. The distance which they could easily

easily reach with their slings, is expressed in this verse.

Lib. a.

*Fundus Varro vocat, quem possimittere funda.* Fundum according to Varro is so much ground as a man may sling over. Which *Egeus* interpreteth to be six hundred foot. Their violence was such, as the same author affirmeth in his first book and sixteenth chap. that neither helmets, or cuirasses, nor coilets could bear out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slain *sine ulla singula*, as he saith in the same place. *Lucretius*, *Ovid*, and *Lucan*, three of the Latine Poets say, that a bullet skillfully cast out of a sling went with such violence, that it melted as it flew: whereof *Seneca* giveth this reason. Motion, saith he, doth extenuate the ayre, and that extenuation or subtilty doth inflame; and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoever *Dionorus Siculus* affirmeth that these *Belgarum* slingers brake both targets, head-pieces, or any other armour whatsoever.

Lib. a. n. quæst.

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by *Livy*, and the other by *Vergilius*. That in *Livy* is called *Cetropheus*, which cast a short arrow with a long thick head: the other in *Vergilius* is called *Fustibalis*, which was a sling made of a cord and a staffe. But let this suffice for slings and slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light-armed souldiers, and used chiefly in assaulting, and defending towns and fortresses, where the heavy-armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Harquebusers, which in their proper nature are *levis armatura milites* light armed souldiers, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

## Chap. V.

*Cæsar* consecret the Belge in form of battell, but without any blow given: the Belge attempt the passing of the river Axona; but in vain, and to their loile: they consist of breaking up the war.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar as the first resolved not to give them battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the general fame and opinion conceived of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his own men durst do. And when he found that his own men were nothing inferior to the Belge, he chose a convenient place before his camp, and put his Army in battell: the bank where he was encamped rising somewhat from a plain levell, was no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steep, and the front rose aloope by little and little, untill it came again to a plain, where the legions were imbatellled. And least the enemy abounding in multitude, should circumvent his

men and charge them in the flank as they were fighting, (which they might easily do with their number) he drew an overhauert ditch behind his Army from one side of the hill to the other, six hundred paces in length; the ends whereof he fortified with bulwarks, and placed therein store of engines. And leaving in his Camp the two legions which he had last enrolled in Lombardy, that they might be ready to be drawn forth when there should need any succour, he imbatellled his other six legions in the front of the hill, before his Camp. The Belge also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There lay between both the Armies a small Marsh: over which the enemy expected that Cæsar should have passed, and Cæsar on the other side attended to see if the Belge would come over, that his men might have charge them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Cavalry on both sides encountered between the two battells: and after long expellation on either side, neither party adventuring to pass over, Cæsar having got the better in the skirmish between the horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his own men, and the contesting of so great an Army, and therefore he conveyed all his men again into their Camp. From that place the enemy immediately took his way to the River Axona, which lay behind the Romans Camp: and there finding fords, they attempted to pass over part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortreffe which *Q. Titinius* kept, or break down the bridge, or spoile the territories of the State of Rheines, and cut off the Romans from provision of corne. Cæsar having advertisement thereof from *Titinius*, transported over the river by the bridge all his horsemen, and light-armed Numidians, with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himself. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them; the rest the desperate persons, adventuring to pass over upon the dead carcases of their fellows, were beaten back by force of weapons: and the horsemen incompassed such as had first got over the water, and slew every man of them.

When the Belge perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes of winning Bibrax, of passing the River, and of araving the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their own provisions began to fail them, they called a council of war, wherein they resolved that it was

best

best for the State in general, and for every man in particular, to break up their Camp, and to return home unto their own houses: and into whose confines or territories soever the Romans should first enter, to depopulate and waite them in hostile manner, that whither they should happen from all parts, and there give them battell: to the end they might rather try the matter in their own country, then abroad in a strange and unknown place, and have their own household provision always at hand to maintain them. And this rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that *Divitiacus* with a great power of the *Helvii* approached near to the borders of the *Bellocaci*; who in that regard made hast homeward to defend their country.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**F**irst we may observe the Art which he used to countervail the strength of so great a multitude, by chusing out to convenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battell: and having both the sides of the hill so steep, that the enemy could not ascend nor climb up, but to their own overthrow; he made the back-part of the hill strong by Art, and so placed his souldiers as it were in the gate of a fortress, where they might either issue out or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred security and safety before the vain opinion of fool-hardy resolutions, which savour of Barbarisme rather then of true wisdom: for he ever thought it great gain to loose nothing; and the day brought alwayes good fortune, that delivered up the Army safe unto the evening; attending untill advantage had laid his principles of victory: and yet *Cæsar* was never thought a coward.

And now it appeareth what use he made by passing his Army over the river, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather then on the side of the State of Rheines: for by that means he brought to pass, that whatsoever the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the land, his forces were ready to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of *Bibrax*: and yet notwithstanding he lost not the opportunity of making slaughter of them as they passed over the river. For by the benefit of the bridge which he had fortified, he transported what forces he would, to make head against them as they passed over; and to he took what advantage either side of the river could afford him.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**A**nd here the Reader may not marvel, if when the hills are in labour, they bring forth but a

mount; for how soon is the courage of this huge Army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was buied of their valour? but being hastily carried together by the violence of passions were as quickly dispersed upon the sight of an enemy: which is no strange effect of a sudden humour. For as in Nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durability or lasting qualitie of all actions proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the mind that are carried with an untemperate violence, and favour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away even with the smooke thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurable repentance. And therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualify their hasty resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering; that when their judgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedy execution.

But that which most bewrayeth their indiscreet intemperance in the hot pursuit of this enterprise is, that before they had scarce seen the enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open field, their vituals began to fail them: for their minds were so carried away with the conceit of war, that they had no leisure to provide such necessities as are the strength and sinew of the war. It was sufficient for every particular man to be known for a souldier in so honourable actions, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States in like manner thought it enough to furnish out forty or fifty thousand men apiece, to discharge their oath, and to save their hostages, committing other requisites to the general care of the confederacy: which being directed by as unskillfull governours, never looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to overthrow the *Roman* Empire. And thus each man relied upon anothers care, and satisfied himself with the present garbe.

So many men of all sorts and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such trife and emulation what state should seem in greast forwardnesse, were motives sufficient to induce every man to go, without further inquiry how they should go. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to be seen, considering the weakness of particular judgements, that having the lives of so many men depending altogether upon his providence, and engaged in the defence of their state and country, he do not fail in these main points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designs. To conclude this point, let us learn by their error how to carry a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling, is then it was before we first took it to our charge; as it here happened to the Belge. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other end, then to give *Cæsar* just occasion to make war upon them with such

H astu-

## Observations upon Cæsars

assurance of victory, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood meet with the like strength again, in the continuance of that war. And this was not only *gravis bellum successori traderet*, to leave a more considerable war unto his successors, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued war; but to draw a dangerous war upon their heads that otherwise might have lived in peace.

## Chap. VI.

The Belge break up their Camp, and as they return home, are chased and slaughtered by the Romans.

**THE** general resolution being entertained by the consent of the whole council of warre, in the second watch they departed out of their camp with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or government, every man pressing to be foremost on his journey, and to be first at home: in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof Cæsar having notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his Camp. In the dawning of the day, upon certain intelligence of their departure, he sent first his horsemen under Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta two Legates, to stay the revereard, commanding Labienus to follow after with three legions: these overtaking the Belge, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And while the revereard staid, and valiantly received the charge of the Romans, the van-guard being out of danger, and under no government, as soon as they heard the alarm behind them, brake out of their ranks and betook themselves to flight: and so the Romans slew them as long as the sun gave them light to pursue them; and then sounding a retreat, they returned to their Camp.

## OBSERVATION.

It hath been an old rule amongst souldiers, That a great and negligent error committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to treachery. We read of Fulvius a Legate in the Roman Army lying in Tuscane; The Consul being gone to Rome to perform some publick duties, the Tuscans took occasion by his absence to try whether they could draw the Romans into any inconvenience; and placing an ambuscado near unto their camp, sent certain souldiers attired like shepherds, with flocks of cattell to passe in view of the Roman Army: who handled the matter so, that they came even to the rampier of the camp. Whereto the Legate wondering as at

a thing void of reason, kept himself quiet untill he had discovered their treachery, and so made frustrate their intent. In like manner Cæsar not perswaded that men should be so heedlesse, to carry a retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not discamp his men to take the opportunity of that advantage, untill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was unlikely. And thus 308000 Belge were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romans, for want of government and order in their departure.

## Chap. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belge into the Countrey of the Suetonices; and there besiegeth Noviodunum.

**THE** next day after their departure, Cæsar, before they could recover themselves of their fear and flight, or had time to put themselves again in breath, Cæsar, as it were continuing still the chase and victory, led his Army into the countrey of the Suetonices, the next borderers unto the men of Rhemes: and after a long journey came unto Noviodunum a town of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed along by it. For he understood that it was altogether unfurnished of defensive provision, having no forces within to defend it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore having fortified his camp, he began to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Suetonices, that had escaped by flight, were received into the town: howbeit when the Vinæ were with great expedition brought unto the wall, the mount raised, and the turret built, the Gallies being amazed at the highnesse of the works, such as they had never seen nor heard of before, and the speed which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadours to Cæsar, to treat of giving up the town; and by the mediation of the men of Rhemes obtained their suit.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

In this relation we may observe the industrious art which the Romans used in assaulting, & taking holdes & towns; wherein we find three sorts of engines described, Vinæ, Agger, and Turres.

Vinæ is thus described by Vegetius: A little strong-built house or hovell, made of light wood, that it might be removed with great ease; the roof was supported with divers pillars of a foot square, whereof the foremost were eight foot high, and the hindmost six, and between every one of these pillars there was five foot distance. It was alwayes made with a double roof, the first or lower roof was of thick planks, and the upper

Novion.

Suetonices.

lib. 4.  
A Vinæ or  
Vine de  
Cæsar.

per

per roof of hurdles, to break the force of a weight without further shaking or disjoyning the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the fouldiers that were under it: the whole length was about sixteen foot, and the breadth seven, the upper roof was commonly covered with green or raw hides, to keep it from burning. Many of these hovels were joynted together in rank, when they went about to undermine a wall: the higher end was put next unto the wall, that all the weights which were thrown upon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the four sides and groundslis had in every corner a wheel, and by them they were driven to any place as occasion served. The chiefest use of them was to cover and defend the fouldiers, as they undermined or overthrow a wall. This engine was called *Vinea*, which signifies a Vine, for it sheltered such as were under the roof thereof, as a Vine covereth the place where it groweth.

Agger or  
mount.

*Aggers* which we call a mount, is described in divers histories to be a hill or elevation made of earth and other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, untill it approached near unto the place against which it was built; that upon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an advantage of height. The matter of this mount was earth and stones, faggots and timber. *Josephus* saith that at the siege of *Jerusalem* the Romans cut down all the trees within a mile compass, for matter and stuff to make a mount. The sides of this *Agger* were of Timbers, to keep in the loose matter: the forefront which was towards the place of service, was open without any timber-work; for on that part they still raised it, and brought it nearer the walls. That which was built at *Masfita* was 80 foot high, and that at *Avaticum* 80 foot high and 30 foot broad. *Josephus* and *Eusebius* write that there was a fortress in *Judea* 300 cubites high: which *Sulla* purposing to win by assaults, raised a mount 200 cubites high; and upon it he built a castle of stone 50 cubites high, and fifty cubites broad; and upon the said castle he erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, and so took the fortress. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a haven, and commonly to over-top a town, that so they might fight with much advantage.

Amongst other engines in use amongst the Romans, their moveable Turrets were very famous: for they were built in some safe place out of dangers, and with wheels put under them were driven to the walls of the town. These turrets were of two sorts, either great or little: the lesser sort are described by *Vitruvius* to be sixtie cubites high, and the square side seventeen cubites; the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the breadth at the base, and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner

pillars were at the base nine inches square and six inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, and windows in every story. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the square side 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the base; and in every one of these were commonly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept between the stories; for the lowest commonly was 7 cubites and 12 inches high, the highest story 5 cubites and the rest 4 cubites and a third. In every one of these towers were fouldiers and engines, ladders and casting bridges, by which they got upon the wall and entered the town. The forepart of these turrets was covered with iron and wet coverings, to save them from fire. The fouldiers that removed the tower to and fro, were always within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-work by Broken-wares in *London* much resembleth one of these towers.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

UPON the building of these mighty engines, it was no marvel if the *Suessones* submitted themselves to such powerful industry. For whatsoever is strange and unusual, doth much affright the spirits of an enemy, & breed a motion of distrust & diffidence, when as they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practises: for novelty always breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes being unknown, we apprehend it as diverse from the usuall course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangeness thereof: and wonder, as it addeth worth to the novelty, so it increaseth diffidence, and so consequently fear, the utter enemy of martial valour.

#### Chap. VIII.

*Cæsar* carrieth his Army to the Territories of the *Bellovacii*, *Ambiani* and the *Nervii*.


*Cæsar* taking for pledges the chieffest of their Cities, and amongst the rest *king Galba's* own two sons, upon the *Romans* delivery of all their Armes received the *Suessones* to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the *Bellovacii*; who having conveyed both themselves and their goods into the town called *Braculapantium*, and understanding that *Cæsar* was come within five mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying by the stretching forth of their hands, and by their suppliant words, that they yielded themselves up to *Cæsar's* disposal, and would no longer bear armes against the people of Rome. And so again when he was come near the town, and had there set down his army, the very boys and women appearing upon the walls with extended hands (as their custome is) besought him.

The *Bellovacii* taken to mercy.

H 2

songhs

Towers or  
Turrets de-  
scribed.



CÆSARS march where in every Legion had his Cariadges in front.

## Observations upon Cæsars

sought peace of the Romans. For these Divitiacius became a mediator, who after the Belgæ had broken up their Camp, had dismissed his Heduan forces and was returned to Cæsar. The Hedui, saith he, have always found in the Bellovacæ a faithfull and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not been betrayed by their mobility (who made them believe that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Romans, and suffered all villany and despite at their hands) they had never withdrawn themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romans. The authors of this counsel perceiving into what great misery they had brought their country, were fled into Bitanie: where not only the Bellovacæ, but the Hedui also in their behalf besought him to use his clemency towards them. Which thing if he did, it would very much greater the esteeme & authority of the Hedui amongst the Belgæ, who formerly in their wars had recourse to them for supplies and assistance. Cæsar, in regard of the Hedui and Divitiacius, promised to receive them to mercy; but forasmuch as the State was very great, and more populous and powerfull then other towns of the Belgæ, he demanded six hundred hostages: Which being delivered and their armour brought out of the town, he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani: who without further lingering, gave both themselves and all that they had into his power. Upon these bordered the Nervii; of whom Cæsar found thus much by inquiry. That there was no recourse of Merchants unto them, neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their country: for they were persuaded that by such things their courage was much abated, and their virtue weakened. Further, he learned that these Nervii were a savage people, and of great valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgæ for yielding their necks to the Roman yoke, openly affirming that they would neither send Embassadors, nor take peace upon any condition.


Cæsar having marched three dayes journey in their country, understood that the river Sambre was not past ten miles from his camp; and that on the further side of this river all the Nervii were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the Romans. With them were joyned the Atrebatæ and Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to abide the same sort of war with them. Besides they expected a power from the Aduacii. The women

and such as were unmeet for the field, they bestowed in a place inaccessible for any Army, by reason of fens and bogs and marshes. Upon this intelligence, Cæsar sent his discoverers and Centurions before to chuse out a fit place to incamp in.

Now whereas many of the surrendered Belgæ and other Gallies were continually in the Roman Army, certain of these (as it was afterward known by the captives) observing the order which the Romans used in marching, came by night to the Nervii, and told them that between every legion went a great sort of carriages; and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soon as the first legion was come into the camp, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set upon them upon a suddain before they were disburdened of their carriages, and so to overthrow them: which legion being cut off and their stuffe taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this advice, that forasmuch as the Nervii were not able to make any power of horse, but what they did they were wont to do with foot, that they might the better resist the cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any rode into their marches, their manner was to cut young trees half asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thorns and briars plained between them they made them so thick, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them: so that when by this occasion the passage of the Roman Army must needs be hindered, the Nervii thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The place which the Romans chose to incamp in was a hill of like levell from the top to the bottom, at the foot whereof ran the river Sambre: and with the like levell on the other side rose another hill directly against this, to the quantity of two hundred paces; the bottom whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the Nervians kept themselves close: and in the open ground, by the river side, were only seen a few troupes of horse, and the river in that place was about three foot deep.

Cæsar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power. But the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Nervii: for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand, Cæsar (as his custome was) led



CÆSARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand

led six legions always in a readinesse, without burthen or carriage of any thing But their Armes: after them be placed the baggage of the whole Army. And the two legions which were last inrolled, were a reuerward to the Army, and guarded the stuffe.

## OBSERVATION.

This treacherous practice of the surenndered *Belgae* hath fortunately discovered the manner of *Cæsar's* march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carriage of a march, by this circumstance it may be gathered that *Cæsar* principally respected safety, and secondly convenience. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of hostility, he was content in regard of convenience, to suffer every legion to have the oversight of their particular carriages, and to insert them among the troops, that every man might have at hand such necessities as were requisite, either for their private use or publick discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy, he then omitted convenient disposition in regard of particular use, as disadvantageous to their safety; and carried his legions in that readinesse, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march or incumbrance of their carriages, receive the charge in that form of battell as was best approved by their military rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitors.

The old *Romans* observed likewise the same respects: for in unsafe and suspected places they carried their troops *agmine quadrato*, in a square march, which, as *Livie* seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments which might hinder them in any sudden alarme. Nei-

\* Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.

der doth that of \* *Hirtius* any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith that *Cæsar* so disposed his troops against the *Bellovaci*, that three legions marched in front, and after them came all the carriages, to which the tenth legion served as a reuerward; and so they marched *pene agmine quadrato* almost in a square march. \* *Seneca* in like manner noteth the safety of *agmen quadratum*, where he saith that where an enemy is expected, we ought to march *agmine quadrato* ready to fight. The most materiall consequence of these places alleged is, that as oft as they suspected any onser or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their usuall manner of imbatellling; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratum* or a square march inasmuch as it kept the

same disposition of parts as were observed in *quadrate Acte*, in a square body. For that triple forme of imbatelling which the *Romans* generally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each battell, contained almost an equall dimension of front and file: and so it made *Actem quadratam* a square body; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum* a square march.

*Polybius* expresseth the same in effects as often Lib. 6. as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the carriages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the country was plain and champaign, and gave space and free scope to clear themselves, upon any accident the *Romans* marched in a triple battell of equall distance one behind another, every battell having his severall carriages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselves according to the opportunity of the place either to the right or left hand; and so placing their carriages on the one side of their Army, they stood imbatelled ready to receive the charge.

The contrary form of marching, where the place afforded more security, and gave scope to convenience, they named *agmen longum* a long march or train; when almost every maniple of order had their severall carriages attending upon them, and strove to keep that way which they found most easy both for themselves and their impediments. Which order of march as it was more commodious then the former in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous where the enemy was expected: and therefore Lib. 5. de *Cæsar* much blamed *Sabinus* and *Cotta* for bello Gall. marchings, when they were deluded by *Ambiorix*, *longissimo agmine* in a very long train; as though they had received their aduertements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

And albeit our modern wars are farre different in quality from them of ancient times, yet in this point of discipline they cannot have a more perfect direction then that which the *Romans* observed, as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Convenience: whereof the first dependeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the leaders; and the other will easily follow, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better counseil can be taken then that maner of imbatelling, which shall be thought most convenient if an enemy were present to confront them? for a well-ordered march must either carry the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfection of strength which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore a prudent and circumspect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and

The manner of the Roman march.

The two respects which Cæsar had in ordering a march.  
1. Safety.  
2. Convenience.

*Agmen quadratum*.

*Agmen longum*.

The use of that may be made of this, in our modern wars.



## Observations upon Cæsars

orderly march, is diligently to observe the nature and use of each weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest use and advantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequently inter the best and exactest disposition of imbatrelling, as the said forces are capable of; which, if it may be observed in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactness of imbatrelling will not admit convenient carriage of such necessary adjuncts as pertain to an Army, the inconvenience is to be relieved with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgement shall be found expedient; that albeit the form be somewhat changed, yet the principles and grounds, wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplify the practices of many great and experienced commanders, what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rearward, in what part of the Army the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their severall judgements thought most expedient in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that observed this rule before prescribed, did seldom miscarry through an unsafe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper use in that diversity of weapons in his Army, how they are serviceable or disadvantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy; and he will speedily order his battel, dispose of his march, and bestow his carriages, as shall best fall out both for his safety and convenience.

Cæsars custom was to send his Cavalry and light-armed footmen before the body of his Army, both to discover and impeach an Enemy; for these troops were nimble in motion and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the rearward than in the front, the horsemen marched in the tail of the Army, and gave security where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in *Africa* against the *Numidians*; he then removed them as he best found it convenient, and brought his legionary souldiers, which were the main strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulk of the Army, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antique prescription and uniformity of custom, according as he found himself best able to disadvantage an Enemy, or make way to victory.

### Chap. IX.

The Romans begin to fortify their camp: but are

interrupted by the Nervii. Cæsar maketh haste to prepare his forces to battell.

**T**He Roman horsemen, with the sling-casters and archers, passed over the river, and encountered the Cavalry of the Enemy: who at first retired back to their companies in the wood, and from thence sallied out again upon them; but the Romans durst not pursue them further then the plain and open ground. In the mean time the six legions that were in front, having their work measured out unto them, began to fortify their camp. But as soon as the Nervii perceived their former carriages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imbatelled within the thickets, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen: which being easily beaten back, the Nervii ran down to the river with such an incredible swiftness, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods, as the river, and charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence, having passed the river, they ran up the hill to the Roman camp, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Cæsar had all parts to play at one instant: the flag to be hung out, by which they gave the souldiers warning to take Arms, the battel to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the souldiers to be recalled from their work, and such as were gone farre off to get swift and maister for the rampier, to be sent for. The battel to be ordered, his men to be incouraged, and the sign of battel to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortness of time, and the sudden assault of the Enemy.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**A**S the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customs, so especially in their camp-discipline they strove to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academy, or a City of civile government, then a camp of souldiers; so careful were they both for the safety, and skillfull experience of their men at Arms. For touching the first, they never suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a camp, wherein they were inclosed with ditch and rampier, as in a walled town: neither was it any new invention or late found out custom in their State, but in use amongst the ancient Romans, and in the time of their kings. Their manner of encamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centurions that went before to chuse out a convenient place, having found a fit situation

The desire  
of one of the  
Roman  
camp with  
the parts  
belonging  
unto it.


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
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
Principia



Prætorium




Principia



Quiriana

Quiriana



Porta Decumana

tion for their camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperours pavilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the camp; from whence he might easily overview all the other parts, or any alarm of *ignem pugna* might from thence be discovered to all quarters. This pavilion was known by the name of *Prætorium*, for as much as amongst the ancient Romans the Generall of their Army was called *Prætor*. In this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they stuck up a white ensign, and from it they measured every way a hundred foot, and so they made a square containing two hundred foot in every side; the Area or content whereof was almost an acre of ground: the form of the *Prætorium* was round and high, being as eminent among the other tents, as a Temple is amongst the private buildings of a City; and therefore *Josephus* compareth it to a Church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or chair of the estate, and the place of divination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of majesty and authority.

The Generall tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the pavilion lay most commodious for forage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions, every legion divided one from another by a street or lane of fifty foot in breadth; and according to the degree of honour that every legion had in the Army, so were they lodged in the camp, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towards the sides which was of meaner reputation. And again, according to the place of every cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pavilion of the Emperours towards the heart of the camp; and so consequently every manipule took place in the cohort, distinguishing their preeminence by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outward, according as they distinguished the place of their legions. There went a street of fifty in breadth overthwart the midst of all the legions, which was called *Quintana*, for that it divided the fifth cohort of every legion from the sixth.

Between the tents of the first maniples in every legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a way of a hundred foot in breadth throughout the whole camp, which was called *Principia*; in this place the Tribunes sat to hear matters of justice, the souldiers exercised themselves at their weapons, and the leaders and chief commanders frequented it as a publick place of meeting; and it was held for a reverent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperours pavilion, in a direct line to make even and straight the upper side of the *Principia*, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched, every Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: above them, towards the head of the camp, were the Legates and Treasurer: the

upper part of the camp was strengthened with some select cohorts and troops of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Army.

*Polybius* describing the manner of encamping which the Romans used in his time, whenas they had commonly but two legions in their Army, with as many associates placeth the *Ablecti* and *Extraordinarii*, which were select bands and companies, in the upper part of the camp, and the associates on the outside of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier that compassed the whole camp about, was two hundred foot distant from any tent: whereof *Polybius* giveth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the camp in battell array, might there dissolve themselves into maniples, centuries and decuries, without tumult or confusion; for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And again, if occasion were offered to fall out upon an Enemy, they might very conveniently in that spacious room put themselves into companies and troops: and if they were assaulted in the night, the darts and fire-works which the Enemy should cast into their camp, would little indamage them, by reason of the distance between the rampier and the tents.

Their tents were all of skins and hides, held up with props, and fastened with ropes: there were eleven souldiers, as *Vegetius* saith, in every tent, and that society was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chieftest was named *Decanus*, or *Canius*.

put *Contubernii*.

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions, every manipule having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his Century; the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: the souldiers being girt with their swords and daggers, digged the ditch about the camp, which was always eight foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not far off, the ditch was always eleven or fifteen or eighteen foot in latitude and altitude, according to the discretion of the Generall: but what scantling soever was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in height, and sometimes four, made after the manner of a wall, with green turfs cut all to one measure, half a foot in thickness, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place wherein they were incamped would afford no such turfe, they then strengthened the loose earth which was cast out of the ditch with boughs and faggots, that it might be strong and well-fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung over

The space between the tents and the rampier.

The ditch and the rampier.

Agger. I over

The *Prætorium*.

The lodging of the legions.

Quintana.

Principia.

The tents of the Tribunes.



hubbub and outcry of those that came along with the carriages, who being extremely troubled and dismayed at the business, ran some one way and some another. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Terviti (who for their prowess were reputed singular amongst the Galles, and were sent thither by their State to aid the Romans) first when they perceived the Roman camp to be possessed by a great multitude of the Enemy, the legions to be overcharged and almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without any further expedition they took their way homeward, and reported to their State that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and that the Enemy had taken their carriages.

Cæsar departing from the tenth legion to the right cohort, finding his men exceedingly overcharged, the engines crowded together into one place, and the soldiers of the twelfth legion so thick thronged on a heap, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slain, the ensign-bearer killed, and the ensign taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grievously wounded that he could scarce stand upon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning tail and forsaking the field; the Enemy on the other side giving no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open field, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any means or succour to relieve them: he took a target from one of the hindmost soldiers, (for he himself was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battle, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the engines to be advanced toward the enemy, and the Maniples to be enlarged, that they might with greater facility and readiness use their swords.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

This Publius Sextus Baculus was the chief Centurion of the twelfth legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniples of the Triarii that was of the first Cohort in that legion: for that place was the greatest dignity that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipilus* or simply *Primipilus*, and sometimes *Primipilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly punished

the mandates and edicts of the Emperor and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions at all times had an eye unto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensign of every legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniples. Neither was this dignity without speciall commodity, as may be gathered out of divers Authors. We read farther, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribuneship was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding there was a law made, I know not upon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of *P. S. Baculus*.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

And here I may not omit to give the Target an honour I may: and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Cæsars hands, as in the place of greatest dignity, and much honouring the excellency thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to contain two foot and an half in breadth, overthwart the convex surface thereof and the length four foot, of what form or fashion forever they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Targets amongst their legionaries; the first carried the proportion of that figure which the Geometricians call Ovals, a figure of an unequal latitude, broadest in the middle, and narrow at both the ends like unto an eggs, described in *Plinio*: the other sort was of an equal latitude, and resembled the fashion of a gutter tile, and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made was a double board, one fattened upon another with lunt and Bulls glue, and covered with an Ox hide, or some other stiffe leather; the upper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keep it from cleaving; and in the middle there was a bottle of iron or brasse, which they called *Umbo*. *Romulus* brought them in first among the Romans, taking the use of them from the *Sabines*. The wood whereof they were made was for the most part either fallow, alder, or fig-tree: whercof *Plinio* giveth this reason: for Lib. 16. althum as these trees are cold and waterish, <sup>cap. 40.</sup> and therefore any blow or thrust that was made upon the wood, was presently contracted and shut up again. But inasmuch as the Target was of such reputation among the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatness of their Empire, let us enter a little into the consideration of the use & commodity thereof; which cannot be better understood then by that comparison which *Polybius* hath made between the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I have thought good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons.

I Promised in my sixth book that I would make a comparison between the weapons of the Romans and Macedonians: and that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies, how they do differ one from another; and in what regard the one or the other were either inferior or superior: which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And forasmuch as the Armies of the Macedonians have given so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by overcoming the Armies as well of *Asia* as of *Greece*, and that the battels of the Romans have conquered as well those of *Africa*, as all the Eastern countries of *Europe*; it shall not be amiss, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times have not once, but many times seen trial both of their battels and forces: that knowing the reason why the Romans do overcome, and in their battel carry away the better, we do not as vain men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we give them their due praises, according to the direction of reason and sound judgement. Concerning the battels between *Hannibal* and the Romans, and concerning the Romans losses, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armes; but to the dexterity and indoltry of *Hannibal*. But we have intreated thereof when we made mention of the battels themselves, and the end it self of that warre doth especially confirm this our opinion: for when they had gotten a Captain equal with *Hannibal*, even consequently he with all his victories vanished. And he had no sooner overcome the Romans, but by and by rejecting his own weapons, he trayned his Army to their weapons: and so taking them up in the beginning, he continued them on unto the end.

And *Pyrrhus* in his war against the Romans did use both their weapons and order, & made as it were a medley both of the cohort and phalanx: but notwithstanding it served him not to get the victory, but always the event by some means or other made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not unfit that I should say something, least in being altogether silent, it might seem to prejudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if I have the disposition and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose it self against it, or to sustain the violence thereof; as may easily by many documents be approved. For when an armed man doth stand firm in the space of three foot in so thick an array of battel, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis or standing fence

foot, but according to the true and right convenience of them fourteen cubits, out of which are taken four allowed for the space between the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butt end thereof, whiles he stands in a readiness to attend the encounter; being thus ordered, I say, it is manifest that the length of ten cubits doth extend it self before the body of every armed man, where with both his hands he doth advance it ready to charge the Enemy. By which means it followeth that some of the pikes do not only extend themselves before the second, third, and fourth ranks, but some before the foremost; if the phalanx have his proper and due thickness, according to his natural disposition, both on the sides and behind: as *Homer* maketh mention when he saith that one target doth enclose and fortify another; one head-piece is joined to another, that they may stand united & close together.

The circumstances being rightly and truly set down, it must follow that the pikes of every former rank in the phalanx do extend themselves two cubits before each other, which proportion of difference they have between themselves: by which may evidently be seen the assault and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of sixteen ranks in depth or thickness. The excess of which number of ranks above five, forasmuch as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the foremost ranks, they grow utterly unprofitable, and cannot man by man make any impression or assault: but serve only by laying their pikes upon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustain and hold up the sways and giving back of the former ranks which stand before them, to this end, that the front may stand firm and sure; and with the thicknesse of their pikes they do repell all those darts, which passing over the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those ranks which are more backward.

And farther, by moving forward with the force of their bodies, they do so presse upon the former, that they do make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the foremost ranks should give back.

This therefore being the general and particular disposition of the phalanx, we must now speak on the contrary part touching the properties and differences, as well of the Armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battel. For every Roman souldier for himself and his weapons, is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the encounter are moved man by man, every one covering himself with his targets, and mutually moving whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which use their swords, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest that they have three foot more allowed them to stand

stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from back to belly, that they may use their weapons with the better commodity. And hence it cometh to passe that one *Roman* souldier taketh up as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the *Macedonian* Phalanx: so that one *Roman* is as it were to oppose himself against ten pikes, which pikes the said one souldier can neither by any agility cometo offend, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behind him are not only unable to repell their force, but also with convenience to use their own weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impolitic that any battell being assaulted by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustain the violence thereof, if it have his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the *Romans* do overcome, and that those that do use the phalanx are voyd of the hope of victory? Even from hence, that the *Roman* Armies have infinite commodities, both of places and of times to fight in. But the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kind whereto it may profitably apply itself: so that if it were of necessity that their enemy should encounter them at that instant, especially with their whole forces, it were questionless not only without dangers, but in all probability likely that the phalanx should ever carry away the better. But if that may be avoided, which is easily done, shall not that disposition then be utterly unprofitable, and free from all terror? And is it faster evident that the phalanx must necessarily have plain and champain places, without any hindrances or impediments, as ditches, uneven places, vallies, little hills and rivers; for all these may hinder and disjoyn it. And it is almost impossible to have a Plain of the capacity of twenty *stadia*, much lesse more, where there shall be found none of these impediments. But suppose there be found such places as are proper for the phalanx: if the Enemy refuse to come unto them, and in the mean time spoil and sack the Cities and country round about, what commodity or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? for if it remain in such places, as hath been before spoken of, it can neither relieve their friends, nor preserve themselves. For the convoies which they expect from their friends are easily cut off by the Enemy, whilst they remain in those open places.

And if it happen at any time that they leave them upon any enterprises, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose that the *Roman* Army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not adventure itself in gresse at one instant, but would by little and little retire it self; as doth plainly appear by their usual practice. For there must not be a conjecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that

which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battell, that they do assault the Enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the Enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx do press them that come to assault them and be repelled, the force of their order is dissolved. For whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that do assault them, these do disjoyn themselves from part of their Army; by which means there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: so that now they need not any more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth, but to assault where the breach is made, both behind and upon the sides. But if at any time the *Roman* Army may keep his due propriety and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place being not able to do the like, doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great between the goodnesse of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities imposed upon an Army: which is to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselves to possess places of advantages to be sieged, and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemy. For all these occasions necessarily accompany an Army, and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory, to which the *Macedonian* phalanx is no way fit or convenient; forasmuch as neither in their general order, nor in their particular disposition, without a convenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: but the *Roman* Army is apt for all these purposes. For every souldier amongst them being once armed and ready to fight, refuteth no place, time nor occasion; keeping always the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the Army, or particularly by himself man to man.

And hence it happeneth that as the commodity of their disposition is advantageous, so the end doth answer the expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because many of the *Grecians* are of an opinion that the *Macedonians* are not to be overcome. And again, many wondered how the *Macedonian* phalanx should be put to the worse by the *Roman* Army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth *Polybius* in comparing the weapons and embattelling of the *Romans* with the use of Arms amongst the *Macedonians*: wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered, according as the wife *Grecians* could best proportion it with that form of battell, which might give most advantage to the use thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes jump not with the per-

fect manner of a phalanx, (as we see they do not) they fall to much short of that strength, which the wildome of our *Grecians* and the experience of other nations imparted unto it. But suppose we could allow it that disposition in the course of our warres, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of *Polybius*, the said manner of embattelling is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight, I hold it not so profitable a weapon as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as *Ireland* is, where the use is cut off by such inconveniences as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtlesse, if our Commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike and *Ireland*, they would not proportion to great a number of them in every company as there is; for commonly half the company are Pikes, which is as much as to lay in the practice of our wars, that half the Army hath neither offensive nor defensive weapons, but onely against a troop of horse. For they seldom or never come to the push of pike with the foot companies, where they may charge and offend the enemy: and for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more advantage to play upon them, as far off with shot, it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand fair in the mean time to entertain a volley of shot with the body of their battalion. As I make no question but the pike in some services is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my self there are weapons, if they were put to trial, that would countervail the pike, even in those services wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Targets, we see it take the hands in the judgement of *Polybius*, of all other weapons whatsoever, as well in regard of the divers and sundry sorts of embattelling, as the quality of the place whereforever: for their use was effectual in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troops and great companies; in thin and spacious embattelling; as in thick-thronged *Trochades*.

Neither could the nature of the place make them unserviceable; for whether it were plain or covert, level or unequal, narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the target was as necessary to defend as the sword to offend: besides the convenience which accompanied the target in any necessity imposed upon an Army, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedy retreat, to incamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to be sieged, and to be sieged, as *Polybius* saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accompany an Army. The use of this weapon hath been too much neg-

lected in these later ages; but may be happily renewed again in our Nation; if the industry of such as have laboured to present it unto these times in the best fashion, shall find any favour in the opinion of our Commanders. Concerning which target I must needs say thus much, that the light target will prove the target of service, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made proof are so heavey and unwieldy (although they be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the use thereof) that they overcharge a man with an unsupportable burthen, and hinder his agility and execution in fight with a weight disproportionable to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Harquebusers and Muskeeters are stronger in the offensive parts than any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for service. Neither did the *Romans* regard the proof of their targets further then was thought fit for the ready use of them in time of battell, as it appeareth in many places both in the Civil wars, and in these Commentaries: for a *Roman* Pike had oftentimes darted through the Target, and the body of the man that bare it, and fastened them both to the ground; which is more then a Musket can well do, for the bullet commonly retheth in the body. And although it may be said that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it serveth to prove that their targets were not proof to their offensive weapons, when they were well delivered, and with good direction. For I make no doubt but in their battels there were oftentimes some hindrances, which would not suffer so violent an effect as this which I speak off: for in a volley of shot we must not think that all the bullets fly with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proof will hardly hold out some of them, so slender Armes, and of no proof, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a battell or encounter at hand, a man shall meet with more occasions suiting the nature and commodity of this light Target, then such as will advantage the heavy Target of proof, or countervail the surplus of weight which it carrieth with it.

Some men will urge, that there is use of this Target of proof in some places and in some services: which I deny not to those that desire to be secured from the extremity of peril. But this faileth out in some places, and in some particular services; and hindereth not but that the universal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targets, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

Thus much I am further to note concerning the sword of the Targets, that according to the practice of the *Quens*, it must always hang on the right side; for carrying the Tar-

## Observations upon Cæsars

Get upon the left arm, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoyance. And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side it must be very short, otherwise it will never be readily drawn out: I say, that the sword of the Targetier is of a very short scabbard, whereas the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compass of his Target, as such as look into the true use of this weapon will easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the use of the Pike and the Target.

### Chap. XI.

The battle continueth, and in the end Cæsar overcometh.

Cæsar.

**A**T the presence of their Generall the soldiers conceived some better hopes; and gathering strength and courage again, when as every man bestirred himself in the fight of the Emperor, the burnt of the enemy was a little stayed. Cæsar perceiving likewise the seventh legion, which stood next unto him, to be sore overlaid by the enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little to join the two legions together, and so by joining back to back, to make two contrary fronts; and being thus secured one by another from fear of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the meantime the two legions that were in the rearward to guard the carriages, hearing of the battle, doubled their pace, and were deserv'd by the enemy upon the top of the hill. Titus Labienus, having won the Camp of the Nervii, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the river, sent the tenth legion to help their fellows: who understanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fled in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Camp, the legions, and the General was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there happened such an alteration and change of things, that even such as were sunk down through extreme grief of their wounds, or leaned upon their Targets, began again to fight afresh; and the Pages and the boyes perceiving the enemy amazed, ran upon them unarmed, not fearing their weapons.

The horsemen also striving with extraordinary valour to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionary footmen. Howbeit the Enemy in the utmost peril of their lives shewed such

manhood, that as fast as the foremost of them were overthrowen, the next in place bestir'd their carcases, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise overthrowen, and their bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained possess themselves of that Mount of dead carcases, as a place of advantage, and from thence throw their weapons, and intercept the piles returned them again to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered, that there was great reason to deem them men of haughtie courage, that durst passe over so broad a River, climb up such high rocks, and adventure to fight in a place of such inequality; all which their magnanimity made easy to them. The battle being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Nervii being well-near swallowed up with destruction the elder sort with the women and children, that before the battle were conveyed into Islands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, and saw now that there was nothing to hinder the conquerours, nor any hope of safety to the conquered, by the consent of all that remained alive sent Embassadors to Cæsar, and yielded themselves to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their State affirmed, that of six hundred Senators they had now left but three, and of sixty thousand fighting men, there was scarce five hundred that were able to bear Arms. Cæsar, that his clemencie might appear to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting unto them the free possession of their townes and country, and streightly commanding their borderers not to offer them any wrong or injury at all.

### OBSERVATION.

**A**Nd thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battle, which the Romans complaineth of as a confused narration, much differing from the direct and methodical stile of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good which learned Rhetoricians have observed in their Oratory, That an imperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect manner; then by Romans leaves if any such confusion do appears, both favour of eloquence, and well fitted the turbulent carriage of the actions wherein order and skill gave place to Fortunes and providence was swallowed up with peradventure. For that which Horatius faith of the overthrow he gave to Pharnaces may as well be said of this that he got the victory, *quæ cum omnibus bellis cæsaribus intersum, tem præcipue his quibus nihil ratione potuit adiuvare*, *Lib. de Militia Ju. Cæ.*

## Lib. II.

*frangi*; by the very great favour and assistance of the gods; who as they give aid in all cases of war, so especially in those where reason and good skill are at a losse. For so it fell out in this battle, and the danger proceeded from the same cause that brought him to that push in the battle with Pharnaces: for he well understood that the Nervii attended his coming on the other side the river Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his Camp in the face of an enemy without fear or dangers as we have seen in his warre with Ariovistus; when he marched to the place where he purposed to incamp himself with three battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Armes to receive any charge which the enemy should offer to give, that the third battel in the mean time might fortify the Camp. Which course would easily have frustrated this stratagem of the Nervii, and made the hazard lesse dangerous: but he little expected any such resolution, to contrary to the rules of Militarie discipline, that an enemy should not tickle to passe over so broad a river, to climb up such steep and high Rocks, to adventure battle in a place so disadvantageous, and to hazard their fortune upon such inequalities. And therefore he little mistrusted any such unlikely attempt, wherein the enemy had been ready to receive them.

Which may teach a Generall that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses, nor too careless in his best advised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily be prevented, and the safest course weakened with an unexpected circumstance: so powerfull are weak occurrences in the main course of the weightiest actions, and so infinite are the ways whereby either wildome or fortune may work. Neither did this warn him to provide for that which an enemy might do, how unlikely soever it might seem unto him; as appeared by that accident in the battle with Pharnaces. Which practise of attempting a thing against reason and the art of warre, hath found good successe in our modern warres as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding it is to be handled sparingly, as no way favouring of circumpect and good directions, for as much as *Temeras non sperem felix*, Rashness does not always speed well, as *Faciunt* the great answered *Scipio*.

The chiefest helps which the Romans found, were first the advantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Helvetian warre. Secondly, the experience which the footmen had got in the former battels, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they carried themselves as men acquainted with such casualties. Lastly, the valour and undaunted judgement of the Generall, which overbore the perill of the battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherewith

## Commentaries.

we may observe, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battle left upon his directions, he wholly intended warlike and circumpection: so in the hazard and perill of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valour, and over-top fury with a higher resolution.

### Chap. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Cæsar.

**A**T He Aduatici before-mentioned coming with all their power to aid the Nervii, and understanding by the way of their overthrow, returned home again; and forsaking all the rest of their Towns and Castles, conveyed themselves and their wealth into one strong and well-fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steep downsils, sitting in one place of two hundred foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easy ascent: which passage they had fortified with a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones and sharp beames upon the walls, ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbrici and Teutoni, who in their journey into Italy, left such carriages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conveniently take along with them, and 6000 men to look to them: who, after the death of their fellows, being many years disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes invading other States, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in.

At the first coming of the Roman Army, they sallied out of the town, and made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Cæsar had drawn a rampier about the town of twelve foot in height, fifteen miles in compass, and had fortified it with Castles very thick about the town, they kept themselves within the wall. And as they beheld the Vines framed, the Mount raised, and a tower in building asseise off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing speeches from the wall, began to aske with what hands, and with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romans were but little men in respect of the Gallies) a tower of that huge massive weight should be brought unto the wall. But when they saw it removed, and approaching near unto the town (as men astonished at the strange and unaccustomed sight thereof) they sent Embassadors to Cæsar to intreat a peace,

Cæsar. Eight dayes or thereabouts.

## Observations upon Cæsars

peace, with this message; They believed that the Romans did not make war without the special assistance of the Gods; that could with such facility transport engines of that height, and bring them to encounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town; and therefore they submitted both themselves and all that they had to Cæsar's mercy, desiring one thing of him earnestly, which was, that if his goodness and clemency (which they had heard so high praises of) had determined to save their lives, he would not take away their Arms from them; forasmuch as all their neighbours were enemies unto them, and envied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliver up their Armour: so that they had rather suffer any inconvenience by the people of Rome, than to be butchered by them, whom in former time they had held subject to their command.

To this Cæsar answered; that he would save the City rather of his own custom, then for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Rams touched the wall; but no condition of remedy should be accepted without present delivery of their Armes: for he would do by them as he had done by the Nervii, and give commandment to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the City, they seemed contented to do whatsoever he commanded them: and thereupon casting a great part of their Armour over the wall into the ditch, inasmuch as they fill'd it almost to the top of the rampier, and yet (as afterward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that day carried themselves peaceably. Towards night Cæsar commanded the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to be drawn out of the town, least in the night the townsmen should be any way injured by them. But the Aduaticis, having consulted together before (forasmuch as they believed that upon their submission the Romans would either set no watch at all, or at the least keep it very carefully) partly with such Armour as they had retained, and partly with targets made of bark, or wrought of wicker, which upon the sudden they had covered over with leather, about the third watch, where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest, they issued suddenly out of the town with all their power: but signification thereof being presently given by fires, at Cæsar had commanded, the Romans hastened speedily to that place. The Enemy fought very desperately, as men in the

last hope of their welfare, encountering the Romans in a place of disadvantage, all their hopes now lying upon their valour: at length, with the slaughter of four thousand, the rest were driven back into the town. The next day, when Cæsar came to break open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the soldiers, and sold all the people and spoil of the town: the number of persons in the town amounted to fifty three thousand bondslaves.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the surprise attempted by the Bèges upon *Bithynia*, I let down the manner which both the *Gallies* and the *Romans* used in their sudden surprising of a town: whereof if they failed (the place importing any advantage in the course of war) they then prepared for the siege in that manner as Cæsar hath described in this place. They inveigled the town about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the said rampier with many Cattles and Fortresses, erected in a convenient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any foreign succour or relief: and withall secured themselves from sallies, or other stratagems which the townsmen might practice against them. And this manner of siege was called *circumvallatio*; the particular description whereof I referre unto the history of *Alexius*, where I will handle it according to memory.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE Ram, which Cæsar here mentioned was of great note amongst all the Roman Engines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our wars. *Varronius* doth attribute the invention thereof to the *Carthaginians*, who at the taking of *Cadix*, wanting a fit instrument to raze and overthrow a Cattle, they took a long beam or timber-tree, and bearing it upon their arms and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake down the uppermost rank of houses; and to descending by degrees they overthrowed the whole tower. The Romans had two sorts of Rams; the one was rude and plain, the other artificiall and compounded: the first is that which Aristotle in the *Carthaginians* ruled at *Cadix*, and is portrayed in the column of *Trajan* at Rome. The compound Ram is thus described by *Josephus*: A Ram, saith he, is a mighty great beam, like unto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of iron fashioned like unto a Ram, and thereof took the name. This Ram is hanged by the middle with ropes unto another beam, which lieth cross a couple of pillars: and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward and recoiled backwards.

ward, and so beated upon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any tower so strong, or wall so broad, that is able to stand before it.

The length of this Ram was of a large furlong; for *Plutarch* affirmeth that *Antony* in the *Parthian* war had a Ram fourscore foot long. And *Vitruvius* saith that the length of a Ram was usually one hundred and six, and sometimes one hundred and twenty; and this length gave great strength and force to the engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Century or order of soldiers; and their forces being spent, and they were seconded with another Century; and so the Ram played continually upon the wall without intermission. *Josephus* saith that *Titus*, at the siege of *Jerusalem*, had a ram for every legion. It was oftentimes covered with a Vine, that the men that managed it might be in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a town had continued out until the ram had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptance of rendry; forasmuch as by their obstinacy they had brought in perill the lives of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which afforded such mercy as the Victor pleased.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THE *Aduaticis*, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small security which one State can give unto another, that commended their safety to be protected by it: for as *Archian* the *Pythagorean* saith, A body, a Family, and an Army are then well governed, when they contain within themselves the causes of their safety; so we must not look for any security in a State, when their safety dependeth upon a foreign protection. For the old saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propriam arma non texere*. Neither wals nor friends will save him, whom his own weapons do not defend. Although in this case the matter was well qualified by the majesty of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of *Gallias*, whereof the *Hedui* with their associates were very gainfull witnesses: but amongst kingdoms that are better fitted with equality of strength and authority, there is small hope of safety to be looked for, unless the happy government of both do mutually depend upon the safety of either Nation. For that which *Polybius* observed in *Antigonus* King of *Macedonia*, taken place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature discern no man either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall find them unserviceable to their projects. And contrariwise it cutteth off many occasions of practices and attempts, when it is known that a State is of it self able and ready to resist the designs of foreign enemies, according to that of *Martialus*; *Offendit modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videmus*

*vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent*. Do but shew them war, and you shall have peace: let them see you are provided to resist force, and they will do you nothing but right.

## THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

THE manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great use in the night season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appear far greater then indeed it is; forasmuch as that part of the aire which is next unto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire it self, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance. And contrariwise in the day time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the clear brightnesse of the air doth much obscure that light which proceedeth from a more groffe and materiall body: and therefore their custom was to use fire in the night, and smook in the day, tising the transparent middle with a contrary quality, that it might more manifestly appear to the beholder.

## THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

AND albeit after the victory, the Romans inflicted divers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as *Flavius Lucanus* saith in *Lucius*, there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercy then the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to have used towards a conquered Nation were these; either they punished them by death, or sold them for bondslaves *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub jugum*, or merced them in taking away their territories, or made them tributary States.

Of the first we find a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Cæsar having overthrown the *Veneri* by sea, inasmuch as they had retained his Embassadors by force, contrary to the law of Nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*. *Cæsar* saith that an enemy was said to be sold *sub corona*, inasmuch as the captives stood crowned in the Market-place where they were set out to sale: as *Cato* saith in his book *De re militari*, *Ut populus sua opera porius ob rem bene gestam coronatus supplicium eat: quæque male gesta coronatus vaneat*. That the people may rather for well performing go to supplicate crowned, then for ill performance be sold crowned. And *Gellius* affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, forasmuch as the soldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incited them round about to keep them together; and this round-about-handing was called *coronatio*. *Festus* saith that oftentimes they used a spear, and there-

To give notice of an Alarm by fire.

The punishment which the Romans laid upon a conquered Nation.

Circumvallatio.

In the fifth Comment.

Arise, or the Ram.

Cattle.

Arise, or the Ram.

Arise, or the Ram.

Arise, or the Ram.



therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: forasmuch as amongst the *Greeks*, by the spear or pike was signified the power of Arms, and majesty of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub jugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a pair of gallows, under which they caused all the captives to passe, as a sign of bondage: for they had to conquer them by force of Arms, that they laid upon their neck the yoke of thralldome.

*Lucius* faith that *Quintus* the Dictator dismissed the *Aequos sub jugum*; and this *jugum* was made of three speares, whereof two were stuck upright in the ground, and the third was tied overthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub jugum* were ungirt, and their weapons taken from them, as *Festus* faith.

Sometimes again they took away their lands and territories, and either sold it for money, and brought it into the treasury, or divided the land amongst the *Roman* people, or let it out to farm: rent of all which *Lucius* hath many pregnant examples.

Of the second for the selling of the *Peni* in his fifth book, and of 7000 *Samnites* in his ninth book. Of the third, that remarkable example of passing the two Consuls *T. Petrus Culevius*, and *Spurius Postumius*, with the Legates, Tribunes, and whole *Roman* Army *sub jugum*, by *Caius Pontius* leader of the *Samnites*, in his ninth book. Of the fourth in all kinds thereof frequently through his history.

## The third Commentary of the warres in GALLIA.

### The Argument.

**H**is Commentarie beginneth with an Accident which happened in the latter end of the former Sommer, wherein the *Belgae* had so lean a harvest: and then it proceedeth to the war between *Cæsar* and the *Veneti*, *Crassus* and the *Aquitani*; *Titurinus Sabinus* and the *Carisofolite*; and *Titus Labienus* with the *Treviri*.

### CHAP. I.

*Sergius Galba* being sent to clear the passage of the *Alpes*, is besieged by the *Seduni* and *Veragri*.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar taking his journey into Italy, sent *Sergius Galba* with the twelfth legion and part of the horsemen into the *Nantuates*, *Veragri* and *Seduni*, whose territories are extended from the river *Rhone* and the lake *Lemanus* unto the tops of the highest *Alpes*. The end of this voyage was chief-

### CHAP. XIII.

*Crassus* taken in all the maritime Cities that ly to the *Ocean*: the legions carried into their wintering Camps.

**H**e same time *Pub. Crassus*, whom he had sent with one legion to the *Veneti*, *Unelli*, *Osismi*, *Carisofolite*, *Scluvii*, *Aulerci*, and *Rhedones*, being the maritime Cities that ly to the *Ocean*, advertised him that all those States had yielded themselves to the people of *Rome*. The warres being thus ended, and all *Gallia* being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this warre among other barbarous people, that from *Nations* beyond the *Rhone* there came Embassadours to *Cæsar*, offering both hostages, and obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he then had led into *Lombardie*, after he had placed his legions in their wintering Camps, willed them to repair unto him again in the beginning of the next Sommer. He himself therefore, after he had first disposed his army into winter-quarters amongst the *Canaves*, *Andes*, and *Turonis*, cities next to those places where his warres had been, took his journey forthwith for Italy. For these things, upon the sight of *Cæsar's* Letters, a general application was proclaimed in *Rome* for fifteen dayes together, which honour before that time had happened to no man.

Of this application I will speak in the latter end of the fourth book.

## OBSERVATION.

named *Octodunus*. This town being sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mighty high hills, was divided by a river into two parts; whereof he gave one part to the *Gallies*, and the other he chose for his wintering Camp, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampier. After he had spent many dayes of wintering, and given order that corn should be brought thither for provision; he had intelligence upon a sudden, that the *Gallies* in the night time had all left that part of the town that was allotted unto them; and that the hills which hung over the valley wherein the town stood, were possessed with great multitudes of the *Seduni* and *Veragri*. The reasons of this sudden commotion were chiefly the paucity of the *Roman* forces, nor making a complete legion forasmuch as two cohorts wintered amongst the *Nantuates*; besides many particular souldiers that were wanting [some being gone to fetch in provisions, and others upon other necessary occasions]. And besides their being thus contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such advantage, that they were persuaded by reason of the steep declivity of the hill, that the *Romans* would not endure the brunt of the first assault. Besides this, it grieved them exceedingly to have their children taken from them under the title of hostages; and the *Alpes*, which nature had exempted from habitation, & placed as bounds between two large kingdoms, to be seized upon by the *Roman* legions, not for their passage so much, as for their perpetual possession, & to be united to their Province.

Upon these advertisements *Galba*, not having as yet finished the fortification of his Camp, nor sufficiently made provision of corn and forrage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of war, being secured of their amity and obedience, both by hostages and ready, presently called a Councell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which Councell the minds of many were so amazed with the terror of so unexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed souldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the Enemy, and no hope left of any succour or relief; that they could think of no other way for their safety, then leaving behind them their baggage and impediments, to fall out of their Camp, and so to save themselves by the same way they came thither. Notwithstanding the greater part concluded to reserve that resolution to the last push, and in the mean time to attend the fortune of the event, and defend the Camp.

**W**hich advice although at this time forced to small effect; yet it better suited the valour of the *Romans*, and favoured more of tempered magnanimity, than that former hazard, which argued the weakness of their minds, by their over-hasty and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to break through the thickest troops of their enemies, and so by strong hand to save themselves by the help of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terror, and a stronger impression of fear, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashness is fitter sooner of fear, than of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a less troubled eye, and qualified the terror of death with the life of their spirits, reserving extremity of help to extremity of need, and in the mean time attended what chances of advantage might happen unto them upon any enterprise the enemy should attempt; they, I say, gave greater scope to Fortune, and enlarged the bounds of changing accidents.

### CHAP. II.

The enemy fetcheth upon the wintering Camp: *Galba* overcometh them.

**H**e Councell being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such things as were agreed upon for their defence, but the enemy, at a watchword given, assaulted the Camp on all sides with stones and darts, and other casting weapons. The *Romans* at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vain any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part so ever of their camp seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of help, thither they came with succour and relief. But herein they were over-matched; for the enemy being spent and wearied with fight, whensoever any of them gave place and forsook the battel, there were always fresh combatants to supply it. But the *Romans*, by reason of their small number, had no such help: for their extremity in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for weariness nor wounds to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And having thus fought continually the space of six hours: when both strength & weapons waned, the enemy perishing with greater fury to fill the ditch, & break down the rampier; & their hopes relying upon the last expectation, *P. S. Bacu.*

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the Principle of that legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Nervian battel, and Caius Voluentius Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ran speedily to Galba and told him, that the only way of safety was to break out upon the enemy, and to try the last refuge in that extremity. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease a while from fighting, and only to receive such weapons as were cast into the Camp; and so to rest themselves a little and recover their strength: and then at a watch-word to fall out of their Camp, and lay their safety upon their valour. Which the souldiers executed with such alacrity and courage of spirit, that breking out at all the gates of the Camp, they gave no leisure to the enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfy his judgement touching so unexpected a novelty. And thus Fortune being suddenly changed, the Romans encompassing those who came with full expectation of spoiling their camp, slew more than the third part of thirty thousand, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay upon the hills near about them. Having thus overthrown the enemy whole strength, and taken their armes, they drew again into their quarters.

## OBSERVATION.

WHICH strange alteration lively describeth the force of novelty, and the effectual power of unexpected adventures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the Camp, and the Gallies charged it by assailable victory held constant with the Gallies, and threatened death and mortality to the Romans: Neither had they any means to recover hope of better success, but by trying another way; which so much the more amazed the Gallies, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victory, by a set fight continuing the space of six hours, without any likelihood of contrariety or alteration. Which practise of frustrating a design intended by an indirect and contrary answer, served the Romans oftentimes to great advantage; as besides this present example, in this commentary we shall afterward read, how Titinius Sabinus defeated the Ætelli with the same stratagem, and overthrew them by eruption and falling out, when they expected nothing but a defensive resistance from the rampier. From whence a Commander may learn to avoid two contrary inconveniences, according as the quality of the warre shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a judicious eye will easily discover) that a fallly made out at

divers parts of a hold, will much mitigate the heat of a charge, and controll the fury of an Enemy. And on the other side, he that betwixt any place, what advantage soever he hath of the defendants, may much better assure himself of good fortunes, if he appoint certain troops in readiness to receive the charge of any eruption; that the rest that are busily employed in the assault may provide to answer it without disorder or confusion. Which order if the Gallies had taken, they had not in likelihood to often been deceived.

## CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Province; the Ætelli give occasion of a new warre.

After this battell, Galba unwilling to try fortune any further, and considering that he had met with business which he never dreamed of when first he came thither to quarter, especially finding himself in want both of corn and forrage, having first burned the town, the next day returned towards the Province, and without let or resistance brought the legion safe into the Nantuates, and from thence to the Allobroges, and there he wintered.

After these things were dispatched, Cæsar supposing for many reasons that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further fear of any new warre, the Belge being overthrown, the Germans thrust out, and the Séduni amongst the Alps subdued and vanquished, in the beginning of the winter was gone into Illyricum, having a great desire to see those nations. But there grew a sudden tumult and dissension in Gallia upon this occasion: Pub. Crassus wintering with the seventh legion in Anio near unto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of corn in those parts, he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen and Tribunes into the next cities to demand corn, and other provisions for his legion: of whom Titus Terra-fidius was sent unto the Ætelli, Marcus Trebibus to the Cutiliolæ, Q. Velanius and Titus Silvius to the Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authority amongst all the maritime nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with which they did traffick in Britannie, and exceeded all their neighbour States in skill and experience of sea-faring matters; having command of as many ports as lay to those seas, and the most part of such as used those sea tributaries to their State. These Veneti first adventured to retain Silvius and Velanius, hoping thereby to recover their hostages which they had

had given to Crassus. This intimate Cities induced by their authority and example, (as induced the resolutions of the Gallies are sudden and hasty) for the same reason laid hold upon Trebibus and Terra-fidius; and sending speedy embassages one unto another, conjured by their princes and chiefest magistrates to do nothing but by common consent, and to attend all the same event of fortune; soliciting also other cities and States, rather to maintain that liberty which they had received of their Ancestors, than to endure the servile bondage of a stranger.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE circumstance in this history which noteth the sudden breaking out of wars, when the course of things made promise of peace, sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse in calculating the nativity of After-chances: which to seldom answer the judgement we give upon their beginnings, that when we speak of happiness, we find nothing but misery; and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not marvel if when almost all nations are at odds, and in our best conceits threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace: or if peace be in speech, loosing the world with pleasing tranquillity, and through the uncertainty of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles; there follow greater wars in the end than the former time can truly speak of. Which being well understood, may humble the spirits of our haughty politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times under the premises of their weak projects, and predetermine succeeding ages according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of shall break the main stream of our judgements, and falsify the Oracles which our understanding hath uttered. And it may learn them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander to prevent an evil that may cross his designe, (how unlikely soever it be to happen) by handling it in such manner as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it left both the causes of his being, and the direct means to resist the repugnancy of a contrary nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THIS practice of the Veneti may instruct a circumcise Prince in cases of this nature, to have a more watchfull eye over that Province or city which shall be found most potent and might

ty amongst the rest, then of any other inferior State of the same nature and condition: foras example of it felt is of great authority, making the Author, improbabilities seem full of reason, especially if it be when the intention shall sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull means, and graced with the Act of superiour personages, it must needs be very effectual to stir up mens minds to approve that with a strong affection, which their own single judgement did no way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this advantage to a Prince, which difference cannot afford, that albeit example do set on foot any rebellious motion, yet no supereminency shall authorize the same.

## CHAP. IIII.

Cæsar having advertisement of these new troubles, hasteth into Gallia, and prepareth for the warre.

ALL the maritime States being by this means drawn into the same conspiracy, they sent an embassage unto Crassus in the name of them all, that if he would have his men again, he must deliver up the hostages which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, inasmuch as he was then a great way distant from his Army, he commanded Gallies and ships of warre to be built upon the river Loire, which runneth into the Ocean, and that Gallie-men, Mariners, and ship-masters should be gathered, as soon as the time of the year would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacy understanding of Cæsar's arrival, and considering how hainous a fact they had committed, in detaining the Ambassadors and casting them into iron, whose name is held sacred and inviolable amongst all nations; prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, and especially such necessities as pertained to shipping and sea-fights.

## THE OBSERVATION.

FROM hence I may take occasion briefly to touch the reverent opinion which all nations, how barbarous soever, have generally conceived in the quality and condition of Embassadors: in which and what the grounds are of this universal reverence, customs which in all ages and times have held authentically. And first we are to understand that all mankind (as induced with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane society, that albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are unnatural, as proceeding from corruption and defect) drive them into extrem

discord and division of spirits, and break the bonds of civil conversations which otherwise we do naturally affect; yet without a necessary entercourse and traffick of forces, we are not able to keep on foot the very discord it self in terms of reason and orderly proceeding; but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion and go to wrack; for want of these mutual offices performed by messengers: so straight are the bonds of Nature, and so powerful are the laws which she enacteth. And therefore it is we for no other end which might sort to the benefit of either party, (as there are many good uses thereof) yet to hold up the quarrell and keep it from falling, making war according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made: a law, ought as religiously to be observed as an Oracle of our own belief. Secondly, forasmuch as the end of war is, or at the least should be, peace, which by treaty of mutual messengers is principally to be consummated, to the end that no people may seem so barbarous as to maintain a war which only intendeth blood, and propoeth as the chiefest object the death and mortality of mankind; no way respecting peace and civil government; such as stifle the entercourse of messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are justly condemned in the judgement of all nations as unworthy of humane society. Last of all, it is an injury of great dishonour, and defective the reward of extracim infamy, to revenge the matter his quarrell upon a servant, and punish Embassadors for the faults of their State: considering that their chiefest duty consisteth in the faithful relation of such mandates as they have received; which may as well tend to the advancement and honour of that City to which they are sent as to the dishonour and ruin of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire war or peace, the liberty of Embassy order of Embassadors is reverently to be respected, and defended from breach and unnatural violence.

## CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either party in the entercourse of this war.

Cæsar.

**T**He Veneti conceived great hope of their enterprise, by reason of the strength of their situation: forasmuch as all the passages by land were broken and cut off with armes and creeks of the sea; and on the other side navigation and entrance by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether unacquainted with the channels and shelves of the coast, and there were so few ports. Neither did they think that the Roman Army could long continue there without corn, which was not to be

had in those quarters. And if it happened that the course of things were carried contrary to this probable expectation, yet they themselves were strong in shipping, whereas the Romans had none at all. Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and Islands of that coast where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow sea to be far different from that which they were accustomed unto in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution they fortified their townes, stored them with provision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes, against whom Cæsar (as it was reported) would begin to make war, taking the Osismi, Lexovii, Nannetes, Ambialites, Morini, Menapii, Diablintes, as conforts and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Cæsar to undertake this war: as namely the violent detaining of the Roman knights; their rebellion after they had yielded themselves by render, and given hostages of their loyalty; the conspiracy of so many Cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and States to the like insolvency. And therefore understanding that almost all the Gallies were inclining to novelty and alteration, and of their own nature were quick and ready to undertake a war; and further, considering that all men by nature desired liberty, and hated the servile condition of bondage, he promoted all further insurrections of the other States with the presence of the Roman forces in severall places at once; and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalry unto the Treviri, that bordered upon the Rhene: to him he gave in charge to visit the men of Rhemes and the rest of the Belgæ, to keep them in obedience; and to hinder such forces as might peradventure be transported over the river by the Germans, to further their rebellious humour of the Gallies. He commanded likewise Pub. Cælius with twelve legionary cohorts and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, least there might come any aid from those nations, & such considerable forces join together. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions unto the Lexovii, Curiosolites, and Uxelini, to dispossess any practice which rebellions minds might intend. And making D. Brutus chief Admirall of the navy, & of those French ships which he had got together from the Pictones, Santones, & other provinces which continued quiet & obedient, he gave him in charge to make towards Vannes with what speed he could: and he himself marched thitherward with the foot forces.

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## THE OBSERVATION.

**I**N the first book I observed the authority which the Roman Leaders had to undertake a war, without further acquainting the Senate with the consequence thereof: in this place let us observe the care and circumspection which the Generals had, who did not undertake a troublesome and dangerous war upon a humour, or any other slender motion: but diligently weighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill and hazard of the war, with the good and consequence of the effect, informed their judgements of the importance of that action, and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labour. And thus we find the reasons particularly delivered that moved Cæsar first to undertake the Helvetian war; and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariovistus; then followeth the necessity of that war with the Belgæ; and now the motives which induced him to this with the maritime Cities of *Belgica*, and so consequently his passage into Germany, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he layeth down as the grounds and occasions of those wars, and could not be avoyded (but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire).

Further, I have observed the means he used to prevent the inclination of the Gallies, and to keep them in subjection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into divers quarters of that Continent, and so setting the wavering disposition of the further skirts with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his legionary fouldiers, which he sent ready to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not break out to the prejudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good success of his proceedings: besides the advantage which he gained in the opinion of the Enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the upshot of that quarrell, that he had disposed of a great part of his Army upon other services, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

## CHAP. VI.

The manner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.

Galili.

**T**He situation of almost all these Cities was such, that being built in points, or promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwayes twice in 12 hours, be approached by foot-forces nor yet with shipping for again in an ebbe the vessels were laid on the ground, and so left as a prey to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea with mounts which they raised equal to the walls of the town, and were at the point of entering and taking it; yet the towns-men having

such store of shipping, would easily convey both themselves and their carriages into the next town, and there help themselves with the like advantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar the greatest part of the summer: for the Roman fleet by reason of continual winds and foul weather, durst not adventure to put out of the river Loire into so vast a sea, wherein the havens and roads were few, and farre distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Gallies was thus built and rigged: the keel was somewhat flatter then the Romans shipping, the better to bear the ebbs and shallows of that coast: the fore-deck was altogether erect and perpendicular; the poupe was made to bear the hugeness of the billowes and the force of the tempest. And in a word they were altogether built for strength: for the ribs and seats were made of beams of a foot square, fastned with iron pines of an inch thick; in stead of cables they used chains of iron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linen, or ignorant of the use thereof, or because sailes of linen would hardly serve to carry ships of that burthen, or endure the tempestuousnesse of these seas, and the violence of the winds.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman navy with this kind of ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speedy nimbleness with force of oars; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foul weather, were farre inferior unto them: for the strength of them was such that they could neither hurt them with their beak-heads, nor cast a weapon to any purpose into them by reason of their altitude, and high-built bulwicks. And if any gust chanced in the mean time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the weather, their shipping would better bear the rage of the sea, and with greater safety shelter it self amongst flats and shallows, without fear of rocks or any such hazards: of all which chinces the Roman navy stood continually in danger.

## OBSERVATION.

**A**ND here let it not seem impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the general use which the Islanders have of navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the seas, as far forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a fouldier: which albeit they may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret: yet forasmuch as they stand for true principles of regularity, and well-

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well-approved rules in our Art of navigation, let us take them for no less than they effect, and give them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath granted to those forged circles in the heavens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet forasmuch as they serve to direct our knowledge to a certainty in that variety and seeming inconsistency of motion, we esteem of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right sphere (for in that position the Naturalists chiefly understand celestial influence to have operation in this liquid element of the water) it is divided by the Horizon and Meridian into four quarters: the first quarter is that between the east horizon and the noon meridian, which they call a flowing quarter; the second from the noon meridian to the west horizon, which they make an ebbing quarter; third from the west horizon to the midnight meridian, which they likewise call a flowing quarter; and again from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heaven. The instruments of these sensible qualities and contrary effects are the sun and the moon, as they are carried through these distinct distinct parts of the heaven. And although experience hath noted the moon to be of greater power in watry motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force which the sun yieldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therefore we are to understand, that when the moon or the sun begin to appear above the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heaven which I termed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount up to their meridian altitude, so it increaseth until it come to a high flood. And again, as those lights passing the meridian decline to the west, and run the circuit of the ebbing quarter, so the water decreaseth and returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they let under the west horizon, and enter into the second flowing quarter, so the sea beginneth again to flow, and still increaseth until they come to the point of the night meridian: and then again it rifloweth, according as the sun and moon are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian to the west horizon. And hence it happeneth that in conjunction or new of the moon, when the sun and the moon are carried both together in the same flowing and ebbing quarters, that then the tides and ebbs are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moon, when these lights are carried in opposite quarters, which we have described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing, that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as

both these Planets, through the symbolizing quarters wherein they are carried, do join their forces to make perfect this work of Nature in the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And contrariwise in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moon, when as the moon is carried in a flowing quarter, and at the same instant the sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of Nature doth necessarily require, then are the tides lessened, as daily experience doth witness.

And forasmuch as both the right horizon and the meridian also divide every diurnal circle, which either the sun or the moon make in their revolutions, into equal parts; it followeth that every tide is continually measured with the quantity of six hours: and therefore that which *Cæsar* here faith must needs be true, that in the space of twelve hours there are always two high tides. And least any man should imagine that every inland City standing upon an ebbing and flowing river, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule; let him understand that this which I have delivered is to be conceived principally of the sea it self, and secondarily of such ports and havens as stand either near or upon the sea: but where a river shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding Meanders before it come to the place of calculation, it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought convenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martial knowledge.

Concerning the shipping of the Romans, the manner whereof posterity hath only received the bare of these names, and some few circumstances touching the manner of their Equipages, the Criticks of these times have laboured to set forth a fleet answerable to that which the terms and tide mentioned in their history seem to report: but yet the gain of their voyage doth not answer their charge. For many men rest unsatisfied, first touching the names themselves, whereof we find these kinde; *Longas*, *Triremes*, *Oncarias*, *Quadriremes*, *Altiarias*, *Quingueremes*.

The first we may understand to be Gallies or ships of service; the second ships of burthen; the third ships that were driven forward with force of oars; and the rest founding according to their Names, for I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Now whether these Names *Longas* and *Altiarias* were a several sort of shipping by themselves, or the general Names of the *Quadriremes*, *Triremes* and *Quingueremes*, forasmuch as every kind of these might be called both *Longas* and *Altiarias*; as it yet remaineth in controversy, so it is not much material to that which we seek after. But that which most troubleth our sea-Criticks is, in what sense

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sense they may understand these vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadriremes*, and *Quingueremes*: whether they were so termed in respect of the number of rowers or water-men that halied continually at an oar, as the custom of the Gallies is at this day; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of oars on either side, a *Quadrireme* four, and a *Quinguereme* five, whereof they took their distinction of Names.

Such as hold that a *Trireme* had on each side three ranks of oars, and so consequently of a *Quadrireme* and *Quinguereme*, alledge this place of *Lætie* to make good their opinion. In the wars between *Rome* and *Carthage*, *Lælius* meeting with *Asdrubal* in the streights of *Gibraltur*, each of them had a *Quinguereme* and seven or eight *Triremes* a piece: the current in that place was so great that it gave no place to *Arms*, nor carried the vessels according to the fall of the Billow: in which uncertainty the *Triremes* of *Asdrubal*, being encircled with the *Quingueremes* of *Lælius*; which either because they were *ponderosior*, as *Lætie* saith; or otherwise for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus funduntibus*, *velociter, facilius regeretur*, in regard of the plurality of banks of oars which repelled the billow and steamed the current, the sink two of the *Triremes*; and to get the victory. From hence they prove that a *Quinguereme* had *plures remorum ordines* than a *Trireme* had; and therefore it took the name from the plurality of banks of oars, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oar.

But the contrary opinion doth interpret *Ordo remorum* to be a couple of oars one answering another on each side of the vessel, which we call a pair of oars: So that a *Quinguereme* being far greater and longer than a *Trireme*, had more pairs of oars, then a *Trireme* had, and those oars were handled with five men at one oar, according to the use of our Gallies at this day. But to leave this, and come to their manner of sea-fights: we must understand that the Romans wanting the use of Artillery, and managing their ships of war with force of oars, failed not to make use of their Art in their conflicts and encounters by sea: for all their ships of service, which we term men of war, carried a strong beak-head of iron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ran one against another, with as great violence and fury as their oars could carry them. And having Art gave great advantage; for he that could best shall to turn his ship with greatest celerity, and to frustrate an offer, or with speedy and strong agitation follow an advantage commonly got the victory.

In debated which *D. Brutus* had with the *Asiaticum*, we read that two *Triremes* charging the *Admiral* wherein *Brutus* was, on each one side and the other at the other, *Brutus* and his Mariners to cunningly handled the matter, that

when they should come to the horns they speedily in a trice of time wound themselves from between them, and the two *Triremes* met with such a carver one against another, that one brake her beak-head, and the other split with the blow.

For this skill and fortune will all *Embrasures* the *Rhodium* was of great fame in *Cæsar's* time although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that whom Fortune honoured with many good days, she oftentimes referreth to a harder destiny; as other sea-men besides *Embrasures* can truly witness.

This first brunt being ended, when they came to grapple and bording one of another, then the art and practices of their land services came in use: for they erected towers upon their decks, and from them they fought with engines and casting-weapons, as slings, arrows, and pikes: and when they entered they fought with sword and target. Neither did the less ordinary scolders find any distance when he came to the point: between their fight at sea and that at land; saying that they could not be martialled in troops and bands, in regard whereof the sea-service was counted more base and dishonourable; and the rather, inasmuch as it decided the controversy by slings and casting-weapons, which kind of fight was of less honour than buckling at handy-blows.

### CHAP. VII.

The battel continued: and *Cæsar* overcometh,

**T**he Romans having taken one town *Cæsar*, after another, the enemies still conveyed themselves to the next; so that *Cæsar* deeming it but lost labour, whilst he could neither hinder their escape, nor do them any mischief, resolved to wait the coming of his navy. Which was no sooner arrived, but the enemy desiring it, presently made out 220 saile of ships well-appointed and furnished in all respects to oppose them. Neither did *Brutus* the *Admiral*, nor any *Viburne* or Centurion in his navy know what to do, or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Gallies was so strong, that the beak-head of their *Quingueremes* could perform no service upon them; and although they should raise towers according to their use, yet these would not equal in height the pump of the Enemies shipping: so that therein also the Gallies had advantage. For as the Romans could not much annoy them with their weapons, in regard they lay so low under them; so on the contrary their darts must needs fall with great advantage upon the Romans. Yet one thing there was amongst their provisions which stood them in great stead: for the Romans had provided great sharp books

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scales.

or *sickles*, which they put upon great and long poles; these they fastened to the tacking which held the main-yard to the mast; and then baling away their ship with force of Oars, they cut the said tacking, and the main-yard fell down. Whereby the Gallies, whose only hope for their navy consisted in the sailes and tacking, lost at one instant both their sailes and the use of their shipping: And then the controversy fell within the compass of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Gallies; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Cæsar and the whole Army, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the hills and cliffs which afforded near prospect into the sea, were covered with the Roman Army.

Their main-yards being cut down, and the Romans (though every ship of theirs had two or three of the enemies about it) endeavouring with great fury to board them, failed not to take many of their ships: which the Gallies perceiving, and finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began all to fly, and turning their ships to a fore-wind, were upon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out very fit for the Romans, who now fighting ship to ship easily too, them, inasmuch that of so great a navy very few (through the help of the evening) escaped to land, after they had fought the space of eight hours: with which battel ended the warre with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritime nations. For all sort of people both young and old, in whom there was either courage, counsel, or dignity, were present at this battel, and all the shipping they could possibly make was here engaged, taken and lost; so that such as remained knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their towns any longer; and therefore yielded themselves to Cæsar: towards whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people not to violate the law of nations by injuring Embassadors: for he slew all the Senate with the sword, and sold the people for bond-slaves.

## THE OBSERVATION.

In this battel I chiefly observeth the good fortune which usually attended upon industry: for amongst other provisions which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the use of this war, they had made ready these hookes, not for this intent wherein they were employed, but at all occasions and chances that might happen as serviceable complements rather than principall instruments: and yet it to tell out, that they proved

the only means to overthrow the Gallies. Which proveth true the saying of Cæsar, that industry commandeth fortune, and buyeth good successe with extraordinary labour: for industry in action is as importunity in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and strive through continual pursuit to make good the motives by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition which will easily admit whatsoever is required. In like manner diligence and labourome industry, by circumspect and heedfull carriage, seldom fail either by slip or cunning to make good that part wherein the main point of the matter dependeth. For every action is entangled with many infinite adherents, which are to interested in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherents, some of them are by wildome foreseen, and directed to that course which may fortunate the action; the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, and are all under the regiment of fortune; for inasmuch as they are beyond the compass of our witless reach, and in the way either to assist or disadvantage. Of these industry hath greatest authority, inasmuch as the armeth her self for all chances, whereby she is able to command fortune.

## Chap. VIII.

Sabinus overthroweth the Veneti, with the manner thereof.

While these things happened in the Cæsar's state of Vannes, L. Titinius Sabinus entrench with his forces into the confines of the Veneti. Over these Viridovix ruled, who was at present made commander in chief of all the revolted cities, which furnished him with a great & potent army. Besides this the Aulerci, Eburonices, and Lexovii, having slain their Senate, because they would not countenance the warre, shut their gates, and joined with Viridovix. Also there came great multitudes to them out of Gallia, men of broken fortunes, thieves and robbers, whom the hope of prey and spoil had made to preferre the warres before husbandry and day-labour. Sabinus incamping himself in a convenient place, kept his soldiers within the rampier. But Viridovix being lodged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his camp, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battel gave him opportunity to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not only to be suspected by the Enemy of cowardise, but to be taunted with the reproachfull speeches of his own soldiers. The opinion of his being fearful thus settled in the minds

minds of the enemy, he used all means to increase it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy durst approach the very rampier of the Camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but upon some good opportunity, or in a place of advantage. In this general persuasion of fear, Sabinus chose out a subtle-witted Gall, an auxiliary in his army, whom he persuaded with great rewards and further promises to fly to the Enemy, and there to carry himself according to the instructions which he should give him. This Gall coming as a revoler to the Enemy, laid open unto them the fear of the Romans; the extremity that Cæsar was driven into by the Veneti; and that the night following Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his camp, and to make all the haste he could to relieve Cæsar. Upon which advertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this opportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other devices, they would go and assault the Roman camp. Many circumstances persuaded the Gallies to this resolution: as first the lingering and doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battel; secondly, the intelligence which this fugitive had brought; thirdly, the want of ordnance, wherein they had been negligent and unduly careless; fourthly, the hope they conceived of the war of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly believe that which they would have come to passe. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridovix nor the rest of the Captains to dismisse the Council, until they had yielded that they should take Armes, and go to the Roman Camp. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and faggots to fill up the ditch; and with cheerful hearts, as though the victory were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped; which was the top of a hill, rising gently from a level, the quantity of one thousand paces. Hither the Gallies hastened with all expedition: and to the intent the Romans might not have so much time as to put on their Armour, the Gallies for haste ran themselves out of breath.

Sabinus encouraging his soldiers, gave the sign of battel; and falling out at two severall gates of his Camp upon the enemy, who were hindered with their loads of rubbish, it fell out that through the opportunity of the place, the weariness and unexperience of the Enemy, the valour of the Roman soldier, and their exercise in for-

mer battels, that the Gallies could not endure the brunt of the first encounter, but presently besook themselves to flight. Ours being fresh and lusty pursued after and slew great numbers of them: then chasing their horse, suffered very few of them to save themselves by flight. And so it happened, that at one time Sabinus had news of the overthrow at Sea, and Cæsar of Sabinus victory by Land. Upon these victories all the Cities and States yielded themselves to Titinius: for as the Gallies are prone to undertake a warre; so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequences and calamities thereof.

## OBSERVATION.

This practice of a counterfeit fear was often put in use by the Roman Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an Enemy, as to draw Romans then into an inconvenience, and so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battel. Cæsar coming to licentious the camp of Cicerus, made such use of this Art, that he put to rout a great Army of the Gallies with a handful of men; which I will refer unto the place where it is particularly set down by Cæsar.

The chiefest thing in this place which brought them to their overthrow was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in business of small consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the mind hath disposed her self to one only intent, and in the upshot meet with a counterblow to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entreated: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceed in a course of victory and humour our conceits with that we wish and would have to happen, and in the end meet either with bondage or death, mult our best wits be appalled, having neither recourse nor means to think how the evil may be best prevented? Which the wise Romans well understood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shameful cowardise; by such as knew not the secrets of wildome; while they in the mean time forelaw their good fortunes, shrouded under the cloak of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a Leader so to take the opportunity of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the designs as for his own safety and the security of his Army. For order is as the sinews and strength of martiall disciplines, without the particular members into the firm composition of a well-proportioned body: and so it maketh more powerful then any number of disjointed parts, how able or infinite soever.

or sickness, which they put upon great and long poles; these they fastened to the tackling which held the main-yard to the mast; and then hauling away their ship with force of Oars, they cut the said tackling, and the main-yard fell down, whereby the Gallies, whose only hope for their navy consisted in the sailes and tackling, lost at one instant both their sailes and the use of their shipping: And then the controversy fell within the compass of valour, wherein the Romans excelled the Gallies; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Cæsar and the whole Army, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the bills and cliffs which afforded near prospect into the sea, were covered with the Roman Army.

Their main-yards being cut down, and the Romans (though every ship of theirs had two or three of the enemies about it) endeavouring with great fury to board them, failed not to take many of their ships: which the Gallies perceiving, and finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began all to fly, and turning their ships to a forewind, were upon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out very fitly for the Romans, who now fighting ship to ship easily took them, inasmuch that of so great a navy very few (through the help of the evening) escaped to land, after they had fought the space of eight hours: with which battle ended the warre with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritime nations. For all sort of people both young and old, in whom there was either courage, counsel, or dignity, were present at this battle, and all the shipping they could possibly make was there engaged, taken and lost; so that such as remained knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their towns any longer; and therefore yielded themselves to Cæsar: towards whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people not to violate the law of nations by injuring Embassadors: for he slew all the Senate with the sword, and sold the people for bond-slaves.

## THE OBSERVATION.

In this battle I chiefly observe the good fortune which usually attendeth upon industry: for amongst other provisions which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the use of this war, they had made ready these hookes, not for this intent wherein they were approved, but at all occasions and chances that might happen, as serviceable complements rather than principal instruments: and yet it to tell out, that they proved

the only means to overthrow the Gallies. Which proveth true the saying of Cæsar, that industry commandeth fortune, and buyeth good successe with extraordinary labour: for industry in action is as opportunity in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and shriveth through continual pursuit, to make good the motives by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition which will easily admit whatsoever is required. In like manner diligence and labour some industry, by circumspect and heedfull carriage, seldom fail either by hap or cunning to make good that part whereon the main point of the matter dependeth. For every action is entangled with many infinite adherents, which are so interested in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherents, some of them are by wisdom foreseen, and directed to that course which may fortune the action; the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, and are all under the regiment of fortune; forasmuch as they are beyond the compass of our witless ready and in the way either to assist or disadvantage. Of these industry hath greatest authority, inasmuch as the armeth her self for all chances, whereby she is able to command fortune.

## Chap. VIII.

Sabinus overthroweth the \*Unelli, with the manner thereof.

While these things happened in the Castrum, state of Vannes, L. Titius Sabinus eniveth with his forces into the confines of the Unelli. Over these Vitiodix ruled, who was at present made commander in chief of all the revolted cities, which furnished him with a great & potent army. Besides this the \*Aulerci, \*Eburonices, and Lexovii having slain their Senate, because they would not commence the warre, shut their gates, and joined with Vitiodix. Also there came great multitudes to them out of Gallia, men of broken fortunes, thieves and robbers, whom the hope of prey and spoil had made to preserve the warres before husbandry and day-labour. Sabinus incamping himself in a convenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But, Vitiodix being lodged within lesse than two miles of Sabinus his camp, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battle gave him opportunity to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not only to be suspected by the Enemy of cowardise, but to be taunted with the reproachfull speeches of his own souldiers. The opinion of his being fearful thus seized in the minds

minds of the enemy, he used all means to increase it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy durst approach the very rampier of the Camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but upon some good opportunity, or in a place of advantage. In this general persuasion of fear, Sabinus chose out a subtle-witted Gall, an auxiliary in his army, whom he persuaded with great rewards and further promises to fly to the Enemy, and there to carry himself according to the instructions which he should give him. This Gall coming as a revoler to the Enemy, laid open unto them the fear of the Romans; the extremity that Cæsar was driven into by the Veneti; and that the night following Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his camp, and to make all the haste he could to relieve Cæsar. Upon which advertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this opportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other devices, they would go and assault the Roman camp. Many circumstances persuaded the Gallies to this resolution: as first the lingering and doubt; which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battle; secondly, the intelligence which this fugitive had brought; thirdly, the want of vituals, wherein they had been negligent and unduly careless; fourthly, the hope they conceived of the way of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly believe that which they would have come to passe. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Vitiodix nor the rest of the Captains to dismiss the Council, until they had yielded that they should take Armes, and go to the Roman Camp. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and faggots to fill up the ditch; and with cheerful hearts, as though the victory were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped; which was the top of a hill, rising gently from a level, the quantity of one thousand paces. Either the Gallies hastied with all expedition: and to the intent the Romans might not have so much time as to put on their Armour, the Gallies for haste ran themselves out of breath.

Sabinus incouraging his souldiers, gave the sign of battle; and salting out at two severall gates of his Camp upon the enemy, who were hindered with their loads of rubbish, it fell out that through the opportunity of the place, the weariness and unexperience of the Enemy, the valour of the Roman souldier, and their exercise in for-

mer batels, that the Gallies could not endure the brunt of the first encounter, but presently besook themselves to flight. Ours being fresh and lusty pursued after and slew great numbers of them: then chasing their horse, suffered very few of them to save themselves by flight. And so it happened, that at one time Sabinus had news of the overthrow at Sea, and Cæsar of Sabinus victory by Land. Upon these victories all the Cities and States yielded themselves to Titius: for as the Gallies are prone to undertake a warre; so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequences and calamities thereof.

## OBSERVATION.

This practice of a counterfeit fear was often put in use by the Roman Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an Enemy, as to draw Romans them into an inconvenience, and so to defeat made of a counterfeite fear. Lib. 5. Cæsar coming to licour the camp of Cicerus, made such use of this Art, that he put to rest a great Army of the Gallies with a handful of men; which I will refer unto the place where it is particularly set down by Cæsar.

The chiefest thing in this place which brought them to their overthrow was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in business of small consequence, to be frustrated of a select expectation, when the mind hath disposed her self to one only intent, and in the upshot meet with a counterbuffet to crosse her purposes, and to defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceed in a course of victory, and humour our conceits with that we wish and would have to happen; and in the end meet either with bondage or death, mult our best wits be appalled, having neither recourse nor means to think how the evil may be best prevented? Which the wise Romans well understood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shameful cowardise, by such as knew not the secrets of wisdom; while they in the mean time foresaw their good fortunes, shrouded under the cloak of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a Leader so to take the opportunity of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the design as for his own safety, and the security of his Army. For order is as the sinews and strength of martial discipline, uniting the particular members into the firm composition of a well-proportioned body: and so it maketh it more powerful, then any number of dissiminated parts, how able or infinitesimally lesser.

## Observations upon Cæsars

I might here alledge infinite examples to confirm this truth: but let the battel of *Drenx* serve for all; wherein the Proceitants, overcharging the Catholick Army, followed the retreat to hard, that they quickly became Masters of the field; and then neglecting martiall discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitudes, to make the victory more glorious by slaughter and mortality. The Duke of *Guse* all this while budged not a foot; but in unexampled patience kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their Generall that was taken, untill the regiment of the Prince of *Condé* was likewise dispersed and broken: and then perceiving no difference of order between the victor Proceitant and the vanquished Catholick, he dissolved that terror which had hung too long in stupidity and to the change of the fortune of the day, that he took the chiefest of their Princes prisoners, with little or no loss of his own men: So powerful is order in the deeds of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victory. And thus we have first seen the inconveniences which a counterfeit fear, well dissembled, may call upon a credulous and unadvised enemy, when pretence and appearance had brought them into an error, which their own credulity doth afterward avouch: and secondly, what itrength and safety consisteth in order; and how powerful it is to throw down, and to set up.

### CHAP. IX.

The proceedings of *Cæsar* in Aquitania.

*Cæsar*.

**A**T the same instant of time it happened also, that *Pub. Crassus* coming into Aquitania (which both in regard of the large extension of the Countrey, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make warre in those parts where *L. Valerius Præconius* the Legate was slain, and the Army overthrown, and where *Lucius Manlius* was slain to fly, with the loss of his carriages; he thought that his affairs required no mean diligence: and therefore having made provision of Corn, and mustered many Auxiliary forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men by name from *Tolouse*, *Caracane*, and *Narbonne*, either bordering upon the province, he carried his Army into the confines of the *Sontates*. Which was no sooner known, but they levied great forces both of horse and foot, and with their horse, in which their principall strength consisted, charged upon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as ours followed the retreat, suddenly the infantry of the Gallies severed it self in a Val-

\* Evocati.

ley as it lay in ambush. These setting upon the Romans renewed the battel, and there the fight continued not a long time. The *Sontates* being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitania rely upon their virtue; and the Romans on the other side desired to show what they were able to do of themselves, without their grand Captain, and under the conduct of a young souldier. At length the enemy overwaged with provell, and wearied with wounds, betook themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number, and then marched directly to the town of the *Sontates*, and laid siege unto it: the siege grew hot, the Romans approaching the walles with vines, turrets, and mounts. The towns-men defended themselves sometimes by sallying out, sometimes by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the Aquitani are very skillfull. But when they perceived the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they irritated *Crassus* to accept their rendy. Which being granted, and all the Army intending the delivery of their Armes, *Accutianus* their chief Magistrate fled out in the mean time at another port of the City, with six hundred devoted companions, whom they called *Solduri*; whose manner is, to enjoy all good things in common with those whom they have chosen for their friends; and if any misfortune befall them, either to dy with them, or presently kill themselves: neither was it ever known in the memory of man, that any of them refused to dy when his friend was slain. But as they attempted to escape, the souldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his evasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betook themselves to Armes, and so after a sharp conflict repelled him again into the town; where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissive multitude, which was granted. *Crassus*, having taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the *Vocates* and *Tarulates*.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

These skillfull and experienced men which *Crassus* sent for out of all the Cities in Aquitania were those whom the Romans called *Evocati*, such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their laws from giving their names in multitudes, either by reason of their yeares, or the magistracy which they had borne, or for some other causes which gave them that privilege: and in that regard were sent for by Letters, intreating their assistance in the carriage of that war,

*Evocati*.

## Lib. III.

## Commentaries.

as men well acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferior to the Centurions for advice and direction, although they had no part in command or authority.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N this fight we may further observe their manner of defence against Mounts and Cavalries, which we find chiefly to be Mines. *Josephus* in the Jewish war saith, that the Romans having raised an exceeding high mount, the Jews undermined the same with such Art, that as they digged underneath, they supported the Mount with huge props and planks that it might not shrink: and watching a time of greatest advantage, they set all the timber-work which under-proped the mount on fire; which taking fire with the help of Brimstone and Pitch, the Mount fell upon a sudden, to the great terror & amazement of the Romans.

Lib. 7. li. 3.  
Bello Gal.

At the siege of *Avaricum*, we find how the Gallies by undermining did take the earth from the Mount, as fast as it was carried unto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it unusefull. Shall. But if it were for the most part made of wood, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all means to burn it; as it happened at the siege of *Mastila*: and oftentimes when both burning and undermining failed, they confronted it with another Mount within the walles, to disappoint the disadvantage by equally contesting of it, and so made it unprofitable.

Concerning Mines, thus much may I say without prejudice to that Art, that the chiefest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a designed place; which is best got by instruments and help of Geometry, where other marks of certainty are wanting. Secondly, the direction of the Mine, that we may not erre in our countie which the Conspicillie affords. Thirdly, the strengthening of the Mine with timber-work, if need require. Lastly, the countermine, and cross-mining. All which parts have very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse than may be thought pertinent for this place.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**He strange contract between these *Solduri* and their Chiefmen may well deserve a place amongst these observations; especially considering the obligatory conditions which either party bound w<sup>o</sup> to serve: for the Captain was to make his *Solduri* partakers of all his happinesse in this, in regard whereof they were to take care of whatsoever ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensual misery, took hold of their head,

these devoted were tied voluntarily to follow him the self-same way: neither in any memory was there (saith he) ever man found that refused to dy, if he to whom he was devoted chanced to be slain. Which bloody league of amity as it was repugnant to the course of Nature, multiplying particular destiny to a general calamity; so was it dangerous in a well-ordered State, if the Ring-leader were either ambitious, or sought to practice any thing contrary to good government: for he himself would presume much upon the assistance of his *Solduri*; and they on the other side must needs with well to his attempts, that were too intressed in his life and death.

### CHAP. X.

The Gallies raise new forces against *Crassus*.

**T**He barbarous Gallies were much troubled, that a town of that strength both by nature and Art should so soon be taken; and therefore they sent Embassadors into all quarters, conjured one with another, confirmed their covenants with mutual hostages, and levied what power they were able to make; sending for aid out of Spain, and from other States that bordered upon Aquitania. At the coming of these forces they began to make warre with a great power, and with many souldiers of great fame: for they appointed such Leaders as had seen the experience of Scertorius his warres, and were great in the opinion of men for their skill and knowledge in the Art Militarie. These, according to the custome of the people of Rome, began to take places of advantage, to fortifie their Camp, and to intercept the Romans from free passage of convoies, and necessary intercourses. Which when *Crassus* perceived, and considering withall that his own forces were so few that he could not well distinguish them upon any service or advantage, and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding a sufficient garrison in his Camp, by which means corn and provision would in time grow scarce with him, whilst the enemy waxed every day stronger; he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to give them battel.

The matter being referred to a Council of warre, when he understood that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to give them battel: and in the dawning putting his men in a double battel, and placing the Auxiliarie forces in the middle, he attended to see what the enemy would do. The Gallies, although they were persuaded that they might ad-

## Observations upon Cæsars

venture battle, both in regard of their multitude and ancient promise of warre, as also in respect of the paucity of the Romans; yet they thought it better to block up the passages, and so cut off all carriages and convoies of corn, and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of Corn should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with travell, heavily laden with their burthens, and dejected in their spirits. This resolution being approved by the whole Council of the Galles, when the Romans imbarrelled their forces, they kept their men within their Camp.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

SEN. iiii.

THIS *Servilius* had followed the faction of *Marius* and *Cinna*, and when *Sylla* had overthrown both the elder and younger *Marius*, he fled into *Spain*, and there maintained the quarrel on foot against *Pompey* and *Metellus*, and overthrew them in many battles: but in the end was treacherously slain by *Pergandus* a banished man. He was a man of great spirits, and of admirable dispatch; and under him were the Romans brought up which *Cæsar* commended for their skill in Armes.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN histories propounding to our consideration the deeds and monuments of former ages, we may observe two special means which the great Commanders of the world have entertained to achieve victory, and overcome their enemies: the first by cunning and wise carriage of a matter before it come to trial by blows; the second by forceable means and waging of battle the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soul; and the other depending upon the strength and ability of the body.

Concerning the first, it hath ever been held more honourable, as better fitting the worth of the spirit and the divine efficacy of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the adverse party may be weakened by wit, and prevented in the projects of their better fortunes by anticipation of means and occasions, and so through advantages taken from their own proceedings, to be driven to that exigent which may determine of the controversy before they come to blows, and conclude the matter by terms of Art taken from the directions of good providence. For to speak a truth, the action of battle, as it is the last part in that faculty, so it is the worst in regard of Christian duty, and better fitted the progeny of *Lamech* his second wife (which the Divines do note to be born to the ruin and destruction of mankind) then the children of grace, whose joy consisteth in peace and love.

*Cæsar* in the first of the *Civile* wars respected

the same thing, but from other grounds: for having shut up *Afranius* and *Petrenus* in a place of disadvantage, so as he might have cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victory coming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captains that were earnest upon the enemy; *Curi, etiam secundo prelio, aliquos ex suis amittere? cur vulnerari patere optime de se meritis militum? cur denique fortunam periculisque? Why should he lose any of his soldiers in battle, though he got the day? why should he suffer those to be wounded who had defied so highly at his hands? or why should he hazard his good fortune? And this could did the *Galles* take which under *Servilius* had learned the Roman Arts, and the Roman industry: and were now become so experts, that they had almost beaten the Romans at their own weapon.*

This first means is principally to be embraced, as the safest way in these uncertain and casual events: for that which reiteth upon corporal strength, and maketh execution the means to a conclusion, is very terrible even to the better party, full of hazard, and of little certainty. For it were a miracle of Fortune never heard of, yes, to carry a battle upon what advantage or means to cover, that the victor Army should buy too great a fortune without bloodshed or loss of men; and erect a Trophy to Honour at the sole cost of the Enemy, without loss or expence of his own treasure.

And for the uncertainty in a battle, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in every small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides unconform in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and fear, joy and sorrow? And therefore *Cæsar* thought it not best to tempt the waywardness of Fortune, when by other means he might obtain his desires.

This, I say, is chiefly to be embraced, if our means will afford us that happiness, but howsoever I hold it wisdom so to entertain this course of victory, that we omit not the chief helps of furtherance when it cometh to blows; but to think of this conquest by art and wit, as necessary if our means will serve us to compass it; & of the other, means as necessary whether we will or no, for the history maketh it plain, that when *Brutus* found himself destitute of means to undertake that course of victory which proceedeth from providence and directer carriage, he then betook himself necessarily to the latter, and by the help of battle fought to free himself from those disadvantages into which the *Galles* had brought him.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

I observe further out of this place, that what course soever be taken, a discreet Leader will not

## Lib. III.

Place to foregoe an advantage.

not easily foregoe an advantage without great assurance of a better fortune, nor change the certainty of a benefit upon probabilities of other hopes, until it have paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which is promised to perform. For so he might forgo his fortune, by presuming too much upon the favour of future chances, which are often seen to cross the our purposes, rather than to further the way which is taken.

### THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

FURTHER I observe this double battle to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their usual manner was to make a triple battle, that the first might have a second and a third help; but where their number would not afford that commodity, they then made two battles, that there might be the succour of a second supply. But they never fought with one single battell, for ought that may be gathered by their histories.

### THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

The place where the pitched fight was first showed in battle.

THE last thing which I observe is the place where *Cæsar* bestowed the Auxiliary forces: in the disposition of his troops to battle, which is here said to be in *mediam Aciem*; for as their Armies were divided into three battels, so every battel was divided into three parts, the two corners and the battel, wherein these Auxiliary forces were in this service bestowed: of these he afterward faith, that inasmuch as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serve the Romans in time of battle with stones and weapons, and to carry earth and turf to the Mount. The reason why suspected troops are placed in the battel, rather than in either of the corners, is, for that the battel hath not such scope to fling out, or take advantage of place to do mischief, as the corners have: for whereover there have been set battels fought, the strength of their Army consisted always in the corners, as the two principal instruments of the battel; and as long as these stood sound, the victory went always certain on that part; for the corners both kept the enemy from incompassing about the body of their Army, and had the advantage also of charging upon the open side of their adversary.

At the battle of *Cannæ*, *Hannibal* put the weakest of his forces in the battels, and advancing them towards the enemy left the two corners behind: so that when the enemy came to charge upon the battels, they easily beat them back, and as they followed the retreat left in between the two corners wherein the strength of the Army consisted, and being by them uncompassed on each side, were defeated and overthrown. And thus we see the advantage which a Generall hath when his

## Commentaries.

two corners stand firm, although the battel shrink in the encounter. *Hannibal* in the battel he had with *Scipio* in *Africa* placed the Strangers in the front and in the rearward; according to peradventure as he found their number, and the use of their Armes: which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather upon the judgement of a Generall, than of any prescription that can be given in this matter.

### CHAP. XI.

*Cæsar* taketh the Camp of the *Galles*; and with their overthrow endeth that warre.

**C**æsar understanding their drift, *Cæsar*, and finding his men chearfull and willing to fight, the whole army crying out that they would stay no longer, but immediately set upon the enemies in their camp, encouraged his soldiers, and to the contentment of all men went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill up the ditch, and others with casting weapons to beat the *Galles* from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliary forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the soldiers that fought, and to carry earth and turf to the Mount, that so they might make a show of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, & to cast their weapons from the higher ground to the great hurt of the Roman soldier, the horsemen in the mean time riding about the Camp of the *Galles*, brought word to *Cæsar*, that the rampier at the Decumane port was not fortified with such diligence as they found it in other places, but would admit an easy entrance. *Cæsar* dealt earnestly with the Commanders of the horse to incourage their men with great promises and rewards, and instructed them what he would have done. They, according to their instructions, took four cohorts that were left in the Camp fresh and no way tired, and carrying this a further way about, that they might not be discovered by the Enemy, while all mens eyes and minds were intent upon the fight, they speedily came to the place of the fortifications which the horsemen had found to be weak; which being easily broken down, they had entered the Camp before the Enemy either saw them or could tell what was done. And then a great clamour and shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renewing their force, as if fallen out always in hope of victory, began to charge them afresh with great fury. The *Galles* being

Two means to achieve victory and to overcome their enemies.

Tabularia by war, and Hannibal by the sword.



circumvented on each side, and despairing of their safety, casting themselves over the rampiers, sought by flight to escape the danger. But so far as much as the Country was open, and champion, the horsemen pursued them with their execution, that of fifty thousand which came out of Aquitania and Spain, there scarce remained the fourth part.

Upon the news of this fight the most part of the Aquitanians yielded to Cæsar, and of their own accord gave him hostages: amongst these were the Tabelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, Vocates, Taurinates, Eluantes, Garites, Aulci, Garumni, Sibuziæ, and Cocates. Only some few that lived farther off, trusting upon the coming on of winter, held off and did not submit themselves.

## OBSERVATION.

Lib. 5.  
Aquitania  
to Gauls.

FROM this place *Brancatio* takes occasion to dispute, how an Enemy that is strongly intrenched, and for some advantage will not move, may be dislodged whether he will or no. A point of great consequence in matter of war, and therefore deserves due consideration. Concerning which he layeth this down for a maxim; that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot; and that camps and lodgings are taken by the head. By which is meant, that he who purpoth to win a fortress well manned and provided, must first get the foot, and take hold of the ditch, and then seize himself upon the rampiers, and to get the place: for he saith that mounts and eminent elevations are of little use against fortresses or scones, unless they over-top them; which may be easily prevented, by raising the parapet of the fortress in front, and the curtain in flank, according as the enemy shall carry his mounts aloft; and so they shall never come to over-top the holds. But all Camps and lodgings are taken by the head; that is, by munts and elevations, which by the advantage of their height command the champion: for he holdeth it impossible to raise a mount within the Camp in so short a time, to content that which the enemy shall make without.

This foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discover a way how to raise a mount, manage the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillery, or murder them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Cæsar at the siege of *Gergovia*. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like unto the line which the Geometricians call *Helicall*. By this double ditch he maketh his approach to any place of most advantage, where he may in a night raise a mount high enough for the advantage to play upon any quarter of the Camp. The capture of this practice I referre to our judicious souldiers,

who may, if it please them, take a better view of the particulars of this stratagem in *Brancatio* himself. Thus much I dare affirm in the behalf of these works, that they were of high esteem amongst the *Romans*; whom daily experience and the exigents of hazard had taught to trust in the ready means both for security and victory. And if our souldiers could be brought to take the commodity of these works, either by persuasion or imposition, it were the best part of their war-like practices: but our men had rather fly upon desperate adventures, and seek victory in the jaws of death, than to clear all hazard with pains and diligence.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsar undertaketh the warre with the *Atrepi* and *Morni*.

THE same time also, although the summer was almost at an end, yet so far as much as all Gallia was in peace, and the *Morni* only with the *Atrepi*. Menapii flood out in Armes, and had never either sent Embassadors, or otherwise treated of Peace; Cæsar thinking that war might quickly be ended, led his Army into their country. At his coming he found them to carry their warres farre otherwise then the rest of the Gallies had done: for understanding that the greatest Nations of Gallia, which had waged battell with the Romans, were beaten and overthrown; and having whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conveyed both themselves and their goods into those quarters. Cæsar coming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortify his Camp, not discovering any enemy near about him; but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly allyed out of the woods, and assaulted the Romans; but being speedily driven in again, with the losse of many of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, they had some few of their men slain.

The time that remained Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting down the woods: and least the souldiers might be taken unawares while they were busied in that work, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut down on either side of the Army, that they might serve for a defence against sudden assaults. A great quantity of ground was thus rid within a few dayes, so that their goods and cattell was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened such a continuall rain, as forced them to leave off

off the work; and the souldiers could no longer endure to ly in tents of skimes: and therefore Cæsar, after he had wasted and spoiled their Country, burned their towns and their houses, carried back his Army, and placed them amongst the *Aulci*, *Lexovii*, & in other cities to winter in, which were subdued in the late wars.

## OBSERVATION.

THE *Irish* rebels having the like commodity of woods and bogges, do entertain the like course of warre as the *Morni* did with Cæsar. The means which he used to disappoint them of that practice was, to cut down the woods; which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of war, let them consider that the *Romans* discipline wrought greater effects of valour, then can be made credible by the use of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of it self was able to frame patterns of unexampled magnanimity, their industry was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such uncessant travell, that the souldiers thought it more happy to see when they came to wage battell with the Enemy; and could have meant to quit their continuall travell with the hazard of their lives.

Neither let it seem strange that the *Romans* undertook to cut down the woods; but rather let us admire their facility in so difficult a task: for as the history witnesseth, *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*, a great quantity of ground was rid in a few dayes, with incredible speed. And after the woods were cut down, they took more paines in placing it on each side of the legions to hinder any suddain assaults, then they did in cutting it down: which deserves as great admiration as the former part. There is another place in the sixth book of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serve to acquaint us with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The *Eburones*, or the men of *Liege*, had the like commodity of woods and bogges, and made use of them in the warre they had with Cæsar. The waters saith he, required great diligence, not so much in regard of the perill of the whole Army (for there could no danger come from an enemy that was frightened and dispersed) as the safety of every particular souldier, which in part did pertain to the welfare of the whole Army. For the desire of a booty carried many of the souldiers farre from the body of the Army; and the woods being full of unknown and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thick together, or close in battell. If he desired to have the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to be rooted out, he must of force make many small companies, and divide his men into many bodies: but if he would have the Maniples to keep at their Ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the *Roman* Army required, then the place was a shelter and defence to the enemy. Neither did they want courage to lay Ambushments, and to circumvent such as they found alone straggling from their companies. In these difficulties there was as much done as diligence could do, providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all mens minds were set on fire with revenge) than to hurt the enemy with the losse of the *Roman* souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the *Eburones*, and they should have all the prey for their labour: that the life of the *Gallies* rather then his legions souldiers, might be hazarded in those woods; as also that with a great multitude, both the race and name of that people might be quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation which concern the true motion of the *Irish* wars, which may be better observed by such as know those warres by experience, then by my self that understand them only by relation: and therefore to prevent such exceptions as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases, I will leave it to be done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentary.

## The fourth Commentary of the warres in GALLIA.

### The Argument.

**T**He *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri* are driven to seek new seats in *Gallia*; they drive the *Menapii* out of their territories: but in the end are overthrown by *Cæsar*. That warre being ended, he maketh a bridge upon the *Rhene*, and carrieth his Army over into *Germany*. He taketh revenge upon the *Sicambri*; and giveth liberty to the *Ubii*: returneth into *Gallia*, and carrieth his Army over into *Britannie*; with the occurrences of that warre.

### CHAP. I.

\* Those of  
Zaphen.  
\* Of Illia.  
The "Uspetes and "Tenchtheri being great multitudes of people over the Rhene into Gallia. The nature of the Suevi.

Cæsar.

**T**He winter following, Pompey and Crassus being Consuls, the *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri*, two German Nations, passed over the *Rhene* with great multitudes of people, not farre from the place where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their sitting was, the ill treaty which for many years together they had received of the *Suevi*, the greatest and warlikest nation amongst the Germans. For these *Suevi* had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearly furnished their warres with a thousand men apiece; and kept as many at home to maintain both themselves and their Armies abroad; and these the year following were in Armes, and the other stayed at home and performed the like duty; and so by this means they all continued their experience both of tillage and matter of warre. No man had any ground proper to himself, neither might they abide longer then a year in one place. They lived chiefly upon castell and milk, and used much hunting; which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continuall exercise, and liberty of life, being never brought up to any calling or tyed to any discipline, nor urged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong and of a large stature: and they had used themselves so to it, that they never cared for any clothing in the coldest place they came in, more then skins and hides, which covered

but part of their body, the rest being naked: and they wash their bodies usually in the rivers. They have merchants that frequent their parts, not so much to bring them any commodities from abroad, as to buy the prey and spoil they take in warre. And whereas the Gallies take much delight in oxen and other beasts, and stick not to give any price for them; the Germans care not for the bringing of them amongst them, but rather use their own mishapen ugly cattle, which by daily inuring they bring to perform any service. Their horsemen oftentimes in time of battell forsook their horse, and fought on foot; their horses being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might return unto them. Neither was there any thing accounted more base, or uselesse in the course of their life, then to use furniture for horses: and therefore they would adventure to charge upon great troops of horse that used Equipage, with a few of their own quality. They admitted no wine to be brought in unto them, lest it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them unwary for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion was to have their bordering Territories by waste and desolate: for so it would be thought that many States together could not resist their conquering valour: and it was reported that the country lay waste from the *Suevi* one way six hundred miles together.

### THE OBSERVATION.

**B**y this practice of the *Suevi* it appeareth how little a naked resolution of valour availeth when it wanteth the ornaments of martiall train-  
at

age and civile discretion, to make use of that greatnelle which provell hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike and of good ability, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it forced to no other end then to maintain barbarisme at home and desolation abroad; whereas true valour is always subordinate to the preservation of Commonweals, and is as the defensive Armes of civile society. Which I have the rather noted inasmuch as it resembleneth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular haught of our young Gallants; whose naked valour revealing it self only in the lie and in the flabb, for want of other assitant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a metall, leadeth them into such inconveniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof into giddy-headed rashnesse; and in lieu of vertues guardon, is repaid with irrisi-on.

### CHAP. II.

The motives inducing the *Uspetes* to come over the *Rhene* into *Gallia*.

Cæsar.

**N**Ext unto these *Suevi* inhabited the *Ubii*, a very ample and potent State: and through their intercourse and traffick with merchants, being seasoned also with the manners of the Gallies their neighbours, somewhat more civil then the rest of the Germans. With these the *Suevi* had often waged battel: and albeit they could not expell them out of their country forasmuch as their State was very great and populous; yet by continuall incursions they brought them under, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri* before mentioned: for having made head against the *Suevi* for many years together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions, and wandering the space of three years through the Continent of Germany, at last they arrived where the *Menapii* inhabited the banks on either side the river *Rhene*: who being terrified with the arrivall of such a multitude, forsook all their dwellings beyond the river, and planted themselves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

\* Goldes  
and Cleeves.

The *Uspetes* with their associates having tried all means, and not finding themselves able to passe over by force for want of boats, nor by stealth by reason of the diligent watch of the *Menapii*, and a retreat to their old habitation: after three dayes journey, their horsemen in one night speedily returned again, and slew the *Menapii* both unguarded and unprovided, For

they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to return over the river into their towns and houses. These being slain and their shipping taken, they got over the river before the rest of the *Menapii* had any notice of their coming: by which means they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that winter upon the provision they found there.

Cæsar understanding of these things, and fearing the weaknesse of the Gallies, inasmuch as they are sudden and quick in their resolutions, and withall desirous of novelty, he durst no way trust their unconfrancy: for it was their practice and custome to stay travellers and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about Merchants in faires and markets, and learn of them whence they came, and what news they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hear-sayes they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but soon repent themselves: being grounded upon such weak intelligence as was usually comd to please the multitude. Which came being known, Cæsar to prevent a greater warre, hastied to his Army sooner then he was wont to do.

### OBSERVATION.

**S**uch as have spent their time in the contemplation of Nature, and have made diligent search of the temperature and quality of climates and nations, have all with one consent made Choler the Regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people with such attributes as the said humour usually breedeth. Neither have these conditions which Cæsar so long ago observed in the ancient Gallies, any diffeimbrance from that which the learned of this age have delivered concerning the nature of the said inhabitants; but that irreloute contumacious which breeds such novelties and contrarities of actions, continueth the same unto these times in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customs and people; or what else to long a time hath changed: which argueth the unresistible power of celestiall influence, establishing an uniformity of nature, according as the fire of the place lieth capable of their powerful aspect.

Thereofon of the diversity in the temperature of nations which are differenced by North and South, is not without apparent cause attributed to their propinquity or distance from the course of the sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern and Southern climates of the earth, and separateth the inhabitants thereof by the dominion of their active qualities. But the reason why two Nations which are both in the same climate,

climate, and under the same parallel, receiving the virtue of the celestial bodies by the same downfall and rebound of their beams, being diffused only by East and West, are to much undetermined nature, and so unlike in dispositions is not to appear: whether it be, as some have imagined, so much as the all-including sphere, which remaineth quiet and immovable above the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diversely distinguished with variety of properties, which by continual reference and mutual aspect are imparted in the correspondent quarters of the earth, and so keep a perpetuall reidency of one and the same quality in one and the same place, and make also the variety of fashions in such parts as otherwise are equall favourites of the heavens majesty, by receiving an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the said quarters of the earth are in themselves diversely noted with severall qualities, which appropriate the self-same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other unknown cause: I will leave every man to satisfy himself with that which seemeth most probable unto him, and proceed to the discovery of this cholerick passion. Wherein I will endeavour to shew how impatience, sudden resolution, and desire of novelty, are natural adjuncts of this humour. And if Cæsar made use of this Philosophy in the managing of that war, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a General to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first I must lay for a maxime that which long experience hath made authentical, that the motions of the mind are either quick or slow, according as the complexion is tempered either with heat or cold: for as the phlegmaticall humour is of a moist, cold and heavy nature, begetting weak and grosse spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a livelisse disability; so is the motion of the internal faculties proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments whereto it moveth: and therefore men of this watery constitution are no way apt to receive an impression, nor to entertain any sensible apprehension, unless it be beaten into them with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceed as slowly in discounting of the consequence, and linger in the choice of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flava bilis*, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the active vertue of the fire, doth to purify the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the vivacity of motions, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented unto them with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily received, and possesseth the apprehending faculty with such facility of entrance, that it moveth the other powers of the soul with as great efficacy as

the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troops of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of undoubted truth. It followed therefore (by reason of the subtle and fit disposition of the instruments, which proceeded from heat the chiefest quality in choler) that the object is at the first moment so (strongly) fettered in the first receiving faculty, that the other powers of the mind with as great speed manifest their offices concerning the apprehension, and deliver a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so impatient of delay, and so suddenly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discursive power to examine the substance thereof by conference of circumstances, nor to give judgement according to the course of our intellectuall court. It becometh therefore every man in that untidy disposition, especially in matter of moments to be suspicious of his own credulity, and not to give place to resolutions before his judgement is informed by discourse of the strength or weakness of the conceived opinion.

But to leave these speculative meditations to Philosophers of learned conceits; forasmuch as the right use of passions is either true wisdom, or cometh nearest to the same: I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best befiteth a soldier, or how it availleth or disadvantageeth in matter of war. And first it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sincerity of a good judgement, then this of anger which we now speak of. Neither is there any motion that more pleaseh it self in his own actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to shew it self, and convince a false pretended cause as the author of that passions it oftentimes redoubleth the rage even against truth and innocency. *Piso* condemned a soldier for returning from foraging without his companions, being perswaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution the other that was missing returned, and with great joy of the whole Army they were carried to the General, thinking to have much gratified him with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despights being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withall, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the first because the sentence of death was past against him, and was not to be recalled without the breach of law: the second for that he was the cause of the death of his companion: and thirdly the executioners, for not obeying his commandment.

Concerning matter of war as it consisteth of different parts, so hath choler divers effects. In case of discourse and consultations, whereas the powers of the mind ought to be clear of all violent

Salut.

lent affections, it greatly darkeneth the understanding, and troubleth the sincerity of a good judgement, as Cæsar noted in his speech to these nations concerning *Cetina*: and therefore a Commander must by all means endeavour to avoid even the least motions of so hurtfull a passion, and feeleth of spirits that no turbulent disposition may either hinder his understanding, or withhold his will from following that course, which reason appointeth as the best means to a fortunate success; always remembering that all his actions are presented upon a stage, and passe the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud grave and patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdom, and disallow of passionate and headstrong affections, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how just soever otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and fury of battell, I take angere to be a necessary instrument to set valour on foot, and to overawe the difficulties of terror with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of passions, I take anger to be the first means to advance the valiant carriage of a battell; for as fear is treacherous and unfaithful, anger is confident and of an unquenchable heat. And therefore a Commander ought by all means to suggest matter of anger against an Enemy, that his men may behold them with a wrathfull regard, and thirst after the day of battell to satisfy their fury with the blood of their adversaries. If any urge that it hath been heretofore observed of the *Gallies*, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the later end they were lesse then women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for service, as we seem to make it: I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was observed in the *Gallies*, and the passion of anger well kindled in the mind: for the first is subject to alteration and contrariety of actions; but the other is furious, invincible, never satisfied but with revenge. And so that of *Aristotle* is proved true, that anger serveth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue: wherunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature; for we do manage other weapons, and this doth manage us; our hand guideth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth us, & not we, as it happened in the reign of *Tiberius* amongst the malicious legions at *Vercina*: and therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom he maketh the object of that anger which kindleth in his Army. For as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regard of obediences, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his soldiers.

But to leave this hasty matter, and fall nearer

that which we seek after: I may not omit the Prognostication which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the natural disposition of the people; the event whereof proved the truth of his predictions: which sheweth what advantage a learned General that hath been somewhat instructed in the school of Nature, hath gained of him whom only experience hath taught the active rudiments of the wars, and thought of no further lesson in that arts then that which the office of a Sergeant or Lancepredado containeth.

#### CHAP. III.

Cæsar cometh to his Army, marcheth towards the Germans, and by the way treateth of conditions of Peace.

**C**æsar being come to his Army, found that to have happened which he before suspected: for some of the States of Gallia had sent messengers unto the Germans, to leave the banks of Rhene, and to come further into the Continent, where they should find ready whatsoever they desired. Whereupon the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the land as farre as the confines of the *Eburones* and the *Conduci*, who were under the protection of the *Treviri*. The Princes of the *Gallies* being called together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered concerning their revolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their loyalty, he commanded certain troops of horse to be levied, and resolved to make war upon the Germans: and having made provision of corn, he directed his march towards them. From whom, as he was on the way within a few dayes journey of their Camp, he received this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make war upon the Romans first, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood if they were justly provoked; for their ancient custom was to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet thus much they would confesse, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driven by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, and either give them territories to inhabit, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the law of Armes, they might prove profitable friends unto them. They only yielded to the *Suevi*, to whom the Gods in fears of Armes were inferior; any other Nation they would easily conquer.

To this Cæsar answered what they thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, That he could

could not make any league with them if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable that they could not keep their own, would get possessions out of other mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome amongst the Ubii, whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the injury of the Suevi, and desiring aid against them; thus much he himself would intrust of the Ubii. The messengers went back with these Mandates, promising within three dayes to return again to Cæsar: in the mean time they desired him not to bring his Army any nearer their quarters. Which request Cæsar denied. For understanding that a few dayes before a great part of their Cavalry were passed over the Mola to the Ambivari, there to pillage and get provisions, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more than the return of their horsemen.

The river Mola hath its rise from the mount Vogellus in the dominions of the Lingones, and having run farre, it receives the river *Walis*, which is a part of the Rhene: these two joining make the island of the Batavi: fourscore miles below which it falleth into the sea. The Rhene ariseth amongst the Leponiti, a people inhabiting the Alpes; and after a tedious course through the Nannates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci and Treveri, drawing near the sea, it divides into severall branches, and so makes many considerable islands, most of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous people, some whereof live only upon fish and the eggs of birds: after this the river empties it self at severall mouthes into the Ocean.

When Cæsar was come within twelve miles of their Camp, their Ambassadors returned, and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them. But being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those troops of horse which marched before the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter; and that he would give them leave to send messengers to the Ubii: of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and Senate would swear faith and safe continuance unto their people: neither would they require more then three dayes to negotiate this business. Cæsar conceived this intreaty to import nothing else then the return of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within three dayes; notwithstanding he promised them to march but four miles

further that day, to a convenient waiting-place, and bade that a considerable number of them should come thither to him next day, that he might know what they desired: in the mean time he sent to the Commanders of the horse that were before, not to provoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustain the charge untill he came nearer with the Army.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe his dissembling of the practice of the Gallies with the Germans; and the encouragement which he gave them in a faithfull and loyall affection to the people of Rome, when he himself knew they had started from that duty which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for he well understood that his pretence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; and therefore to have objected unto them their enroushment, not been to heal, but to cut off their wounds. Only he took the way to cut off their hopes of any practices which they might attempt against the Roman people; and held them in the mean time in the appearance of faithfull friends, that they might not be discouraged by the detection of their revolt.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, upon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans if they continued on this side the Rhene, we may observe how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such contents and denials, as might manifest his readiness to further what he made shew of, and not weaken the means of his best advantage. For as he was content they should keep a quiet farewell of Gallia, and plant themselves in the possessions of the Ubii; so was he loath to yield to any condition which might disadvantage his forcible constraints, or weaken his commands; if persuasion failed: for he well knew that powerful means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a parley, then any other motive how reasonable soever.

Moreover we may observe how careful he was not to impose upon the Germans a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding unto them the association of the Ubii) by which they might avoid the hazard of battel. Which thing was always observed by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neither of those noble instruments whereby man worketh such wonders (I mean the hand and the tongue) had ever brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, unless they had been forced there-

therunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict upon a violent guard, we give occasion to the Enemy, by the way of Antipathetis, to redouble his strength and to furnish him with that powerful engine, which *Scipio Africanus* calleth *ultimum* and *maximum telum*, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appear by these examples.

Some few of the *Samnites*, contrary to the articles of peace between them and the *Romans*, having made incursions into the territories of the *Roman* confederates, the Senate of that State sent to Rome to execute the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction. But being rejected, *Claudius Pontius* General of their forces, in an excellent Oration which he made, shewed how the *Romans* would not hearken to peace, but chose rather to be revenged by war; and therefore necessity constrained them to put on Arms: *Iustum esse bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium*; & *piam quibus nulla nisi in Armis spes esset*. That war is just which is necessary; and it is pety in this men to take up arms, who have no hope but in taking up arms. The issue thereof was, that the *Samnites* intrapped the *Romans* in a place of advantage, so that they were forced upon dishonourable terms to save their lives, as it is at large in the ninth book of *Livy*.

Cæsar *Mantius* conducting the Roman legions against the *Peis*, part of the *German* Army had entered the Roman Camp; which *Mantius* perceiving, he halted with a band of men to keep the breach, and to shut in the *Peis*: which they no sooner perceived, but they fought with that rage and fury that they slew *Mantius*; and had overthrown the whole Camp, had not a Tribune opened them a passage by which they fled away.

In like manner *Antistius*, the wilest of the *Roman* Captains, being entered into the City of the *Peis*, that he might take it with great facility, and dilame the Enemy of that terrible weapon of necessity, he caused it to be proclaimed, that no *Peis* should be hurt that was found unarmed. Whereupon every man cast away his weapons, and to the town was taken without bloodshed.

Let a soldier therefore take such hold of occasions and opportunities as are offered unto him that in time of battel he may seem to call necessity upon his own cause, and retain it in huspary: considering how the power thereof altereth the works of Nature, and changeeth their effects into contrary operations; being never subject to any ordinance or laws, and yet making that lawfull which proceedeth from it.

## CHAP. III.

The Germans, contrary to their own request made to Cæsar, set upon the Roman horsemen, and overthrew them.

Notwithstanding the Germans request Cæsar concerning the truce, as soon as they saw the Roman horsemen, which were in number five thousand (whereas the Germans had not above eight hundred horse, those that went over the Mola to forage not being yet returned) they charged upon the Romans not expecting any hostile encounter, inasmuch as their Embassadors were never departed from Cæsar, and had obtained that day of truce: but being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their usuall customs, forsook their horse, and fighting on foot ran our horses into the bellies, and overthrew many of our men, so that they easily put the Romans to flight; who never looked back, untill they came into the sight of the legions. In that battel were slain 74 Roman horsemen. & amongst the rest *Piso* an Aquitaine, a valiant man, and born of noble parentage, whose grandfather was the chief ruler in his city, and called friend by the Roman Senate. This *Piso* seeing his brother compassed about by the enemy, brake in upon them and rescued him: but having his horse wounded under him in the alion, and being dismounted, he fought stoutly on foot, till such time as the enemy hemmed him in, and gave him severall wounds; then he fell down. Which his brother seeing assest off (for he had left the battel) he clapp'd spurs to his horse, and rushing upon the throng to rescue him, was there slain.

After this battel Cæsar thought it not safe either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and meant nothing but warre: And to attend any longer untill their horsemen returned, was but to give them that advantage against him, especially considering the weakness of the Gallies, amongst whom the Germans by this battel had gained great reputation; and therefore he durst not give them space to think upon it.

## OBSERVATION.

This cunning of the Germans offered occasion to speak somewhat concerning that main controvercie of policies, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great Commanders are always to be attended with integrity and faithfull accomplishment thereof. Wherein I will only set down such arguments and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honesty on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christian mind) and the daily practice of States-men on

on the other side, alledge to make good their contrary assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend virtue in a shew, and not in *esse* and being, and study to maintain their states only with humane reason, not regarding the authority of divine ordinance, set this down as a *maxime* in their Art; That he that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end, losing to his contentments mult in all respects be like qualified, both in judgement and disposition, as the party is with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared to hold himself strong in the matters, which he undertaketh. For a wrestler that cometh with more strength to encounter another that hath both strength and cunning, may bestrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laugh't at as an unworthy Champion for serious sports: in like manner in this universal confusion of infidelity, wherein subtilty flyeth at to high a pitch, that the think with simplicity of spirit to wind through the labyrinth of falsehood, and avoyd the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and bethrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity. For it is the course that every man taketh which must bring us to the place to which every man goeth: and he that opposeth himself against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceits, and never attain that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore as craft and deceit are so generally, it behoveth a man of publick negotiations to carry a mind apt and disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that which ancient writers report of *Achilles*, who was sent to *Chiron* the Centaur, half a man and half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of Princely carriage; that of the brutish part he might learn to strengthen himself with force and courage, and of the humane shape to manage reason, that it might be a fit instrument to answer or prevent whatsoever means we might forge to overthrow him. Neither ought a private man to wonder at the strangeness of these positions, considering that the government of kingdoms and Empires is carried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affairs in a well-ordered State: wherein truth-breakers and faithless dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they necessarily enforce the ruin thereof. But these that sit at the helm of governments, and are to shape the course of a State according to the variation of times and fortunes, derive their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferior subjects are no more capable, then men are able to understand the works of the Gods: and therefore they are called *arcana imperii*, secrets of State, to be revered rather then lookt into.

To conclude, the affairs of particular persons are of so short extensions, and included in so small

a compass, that a mean capacity may easily apprehend the advantages or inconveniences which may ensue upon the contract: and therefore it is requisite they should stand to the adventure, and their judgement is worthily taxed with the losse: but the busines of the Commonweal are both subject to so many casualties of fortune, and rely upon such unexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirits, how provident soever, to foresee the issue in that variety of chances. Besides that every particular subject is much interested in the fortune of the event, and may justly challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwreck through the error of their Pilot: And so the safety of the State doth balance out the losse of credit in the Government.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirm virtue to be the same both in Prince and people: neither doth condition of state or calling, or the quality of publick or private businesse alter the nature and essence of goodnesse: for to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity were to break the bond of civill society, which is the basis and ground of all States and Commonweals. They do not deny but that a wise Prince may to carry a treaty, that he may seem to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he may use with great honour the practices and stratagems of war, when the fortune of both parties consisteth upon their own industry: but to break any covenants agreed upon may well get a kingdom, but never honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means whereby a State is continued in happy government: whereof thus much I dare say by the warrant of this History, that he who falleth his word upon advantage, howsoever he regard his honour, had need to pay them home in regard of his own safety: for if they once recover the losse, and get any advantage against those truth-breakers, they will find as little favour as the Germans did with *Cæsar*.

## CHAP. V.

*Cæsar* marcheth directly to the Camp of the Germans, and cutteth them all in pieces, and so endeth that warre.

**U**PON these considerations, *Cæsar* manifesting his resolution to the Legates and *Questor*, there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next day very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chieftest of the Germans came unto *Cæsar* into his Camp, to excuse their fraudulent practice, and withall to constraine their petition of truce. Whereof *Cæsar* was exceeding glad,

glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camps commanding his horsemen to follow the Germans, because they had been daunted with so late an overthrow. And making a triple battell, marched speedily eight miles, and so came upon the Germans before they had notice when had happened. Who being terrified with our sudden arrivals, and the departure of their own leaders, knew not whether it were their best course to bring forth their forces, or defend their Camps; otherwise to seek their safety by flight. With tumult and fear was no sooner perceived by the Roman soldiers, but calling to mind their perfidious treachery, they brake into the Camp, and were at first a little resisted. In the mean time the women and children (for they had brought all they had over the Rhene) fled everyone away: which *Cæsar* perceiving sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and shrieking behind their backs, and seeing their friends pursued and slain, did cast away their weapons, for sake the engines, and fled out of the Camp: and coming to the confluence of the Male and the Rheine, such as had escaped cast themselves into the river: where what through fear, weakness, and the force of the waters, they were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man. The number of the enemy was 430000, with women and children. To them whom he had retained in his Camp, he gave leave to depart: but they fearing the cruelty of the Gallies for the mischief they had done, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which *Cæsar* agreed unto.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS relation affordeth little matter of war, but only a severe revenge of hardill treachery: notwithstanding, I will hence take occasion to discover the offices of the *Questor* and the Legates: and shew what place they had in the Army. And first concerning the *Questor*, we are to understand that he was elected by the common voice of the people in the same Court which was called to create the Generall. His office was to take charge of the publick treasure, whether it came out of their *tributaries* for the pay of the Army, or otherwise was taken from the enemy.

Of him the soldiers received their stipend, both in coin and money: and what other booties were taken from the enemy he either kept them or sold them for the use of the Commonwealth.

The Legates were not chosen by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as Assistants and Coadjutors to the Emperour for the publick service, and were altogether directed by the Generall in whole absence they had the absolute com-

mand: and their number was for the most part uncertain, but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Army.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar* maketh a bridge upon the Rhene, and carrieth his Army over into Germany.

**W**HEN the German war being thus ended, *Cæsar* thought it necessary to transport his Army over the Rhene into the Continent of Germany for many causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily persuaded to bring their Colonies and their vagrant multitudes into Gallia, he thought good to make known unto them, that the Roman people could at their pleasure carry their forces over the Rhene into Germany. Moreover, those troops of horse which were absent at the late overthrow of the Germans, being gone as I said before for spoil and provision over the Mosel, after they saw their friends overthrow, were fled into the confines of the Stambis, and joyined with them. To whom when *Cæsar* sent messengers to demand them to be sent unto him, they answered that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene: and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why should *Cæsar* challenge any authority in their quarters? Lastly the *Albis*, who amongst all the rest of the Germans had only accepted of *Cæsar's* friendship, and given pledges of their fidelity, had made earnest suit unto him to send them aid against the Suevi; or at the least to transport his Army over the Rhene: that would serve their turn, that would be help and encouragement enough to them; for the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, and of such fame, what with *Attilius's* overthrow, and this last service, that it founded honourable amongst the farthest Nations of Germany, so that it was the greatest safety to have them their friends. For these reasons *Cæsar* resolved to passe the Rhene: but to carry his Army over by boat was neither safe, nor for his own honour, nor the majesty of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficulty, by reason of the breadth, swiftnesse and depth of the river, to make a bridge: yet he resolved to try what he could do, otherwise he determined not to passe over at all. And so he built a bridge after this manner.

At two foot distance he placed two trees of a foot and halfe girth, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the river: these he let down into the water with engines, and drove them in with commanders, not perpen-

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dicularly after the fashion of a pile. but gable-wise, and bending with the course of the water: opposite unto these he placed two other trees, joined together after the same fashion, being forty foot distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottom of the water, and reclining against the course of the river. These two pair of couples thus placed he joined together with a beam of two foot square, equalling the distance between the said couples, and fastened them at each end on either side of the couples with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the work and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the stream was, and the faster it fell upon the timber-work, the stronger the bridge was wated in the couplings and joints. In like manner he proceeded with couples and beams, until the work was brought unto the other side of the river: and then he laid straight planks from beam to beam, and covered them with knivels; and so he made a floor to the bridge. Aftercover on the lower side of the bridge he drove down supporters, which being fastened to the timber-work, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water: and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boats, or what else the enemy might cast down to trouble the work, or hurt the bridge. Within ten dayes that the timber began to be cut down and carried: the work was ended, and the Army transported. Cæsar leaving a strong garrison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri. In the meantime Embassadors came to him from many cities desiring peace and the friendship of the Romans: whom Cæsar answered courteously, and required hostages of their fidelity.

## OBSERVATION.

IT shall not be amiss to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge, as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Cæsar; whom we may observe to immit with as great plenty of wit and expedience in presenting unto us the facility of this invention in such manner of laudable works, as upon any other part of his actions: as this particular description of the bridge may sufficiently witness: Besides the fortifications at Alesia, and the intrenchments in Britany, for the safety of his shipping with many other works, which he might well record as the greatest designs of an heroic spirit, and the wonderful effects of magnanimous industry, that succeeding

ages might not boast either of Art or prowess which his virtue had not expell'd, or otherwise might wonder at that worth which they themselves could not attain unto. And to that purpose he entertained Varro the Father of Architecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that faculty, as his Master Cæsar is in that of Arms. By whose example a great Commander may learn how much it importeth the certainty of his fame to beautify his greatest designs, with Arts and to esteem of such as are able to execute the Mathematicall Muscs to shew themselves under the shape of a sensible form: which albeit, through the indolence of the matter, fall far short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their leaves expelleth such a majesty of Arts that no time will suffer the memory thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double posts, whereof the first order bending with the stream, and the lower rack against the stream, when they came to be coupled together with overwart beams, which were fastened in the couplings with braces which he nameth *libulas*, the more violent the stream fell upon the works, the faster the joints of the building were united as may better appear by a modell of that making, than can be exprest by any circumstance of Words.

I might hence take occasion to speak of the diversity of bridges, and of the practices which antiquity hath devised to transport Armies over Rivers: but inasmuch as it is a common subject for all that undertake this Military task, and hath been handled by *Lappes* upon the occasion of this bridge, I will refer the Reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, inasmuch as Cæsar made the means correspondent to the end which he intended. For considering that the chiefest end of his passage was to let the *Germans* understand that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the *Rhene*; and that a river could not separate their territories; but that they were able to join both the Continents together, and make a common road-way where it seemed most unpassable: he thought it best to passe over his Army by a bridge, that to the *Germans* might know the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories united unto Gallia, or to be united at the pleasure of the Romans with a firm *Ashmans*, and plain passage by foot, which in times past had always been separated by a mighty river. Neither would a transportation by boat have wrought that effect, forasmuch as the daily use thereof was so familiar to the *Germans*, that it nothing altered their imagination of an unpassable passage: but when they saw to strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily understand that they were not to

lib. de machin.

farre

## Lib. III.

farre off, but that they might be overtaken, and so direct their demeanour accordingly. Let this suffice therefore to prove that a passage over a river by a bridge is more honourable, late, and of greater terror to the enemy, than any other way that can be devised; especially if the river carry any depth, such as the *Rhene* is: otherwise it have other shallows or fords, whereof by men may wade over without any great incumbrance; it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge, but rather to think of it as of a place incumbrd with such hindrances as men often meet with in a march.

## CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh revenge upon the Sicambri: giveth liberty to the Ulbi; and returneth again into Gallia.

Cæsar.

HE Sicambri understanding that Cæsar was making a bridge over the *Rhene*, prepared themselves to fly; and at the persuasion of the *Ulpes* & *Tenchent* forsook the *r* country, and conveyed themselves and the *r* possessions into woods and solitary Deserts. Cæsar, tarrying a few dayes in their quarters, having set on fire the *r* villages and houses, and burned up the *r* corn and provisions, came to the *Ulbi* promising them aid against the *Suevi*: by whom he understood that assault on the *Suevi* had intelligence that he was about to make a bridge, calling a Council, according to their manners, they sent unto all quarters of their Sines that they should forsake their towns, and carry their wives and children, and all that they had into the woods; and that all that were able to bear Arms should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their Country; and there they attended the coming of the Romans, and were resolved in that place to give them battle. Which when Cæsar understood, he ended all his thoughts in regard whereof he came into Germany, which was chiefly to terrify the *Germans*, to be revenged upon the Sicambri, to let the *Ulbi* at liberty; having spent in altogether dayes beyond the *Rhene*, and done enough as well in regard of his own honour, as the good of the commonwealth, he returned into Gallia, and brake up the bridge.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a voyage into Britanie: he enquireth of Merchants concerning the nature of that people.

Cæsar.

ALTHOUGH the Summer was almost spent, and that in those parts the winter had ended on apace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolved to go over into Britanie, forasmuch as he understood

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that in all the former wars of Gallia, the *Enemys* had received most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the year would not suffer him to finish that war; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Island, to understand the quality of the inhabitants, and to know their quarters, their ports, and their landing-places; whereof the *Gallies* were altogether ignorant; for seldom any man but Merchants did travel to them. Neither had they discovered any thing but the sea-coast; and those regions which were opposite unto Gallia. And therefore calling Merchants together from all quarters, he enquired of them what quantity of the Island was; what nations of men dwelt there; were they inhabited; what use or expense of war they had; what laws or customs they used, nor what haven they had to receive a navy of great shipping.

## OBSERVATION.

AS the *Germans* had oftentimes fired up motions of rebellion among the *Gallies*, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdoms; so the *Britans* had upheld most of their wars, by furnishing them with such supplies as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Cæsar or the Roman people would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable government in Gallia, they had chafed the indolence of the *Germans*, and sent them back again with greater loss than gain; so was it necessary to make the *Britans* know, that their assistance in the war of Gallia would draw more tumults upon them than they were well able to manage. For as I have noted in my former discourses the causes of an unpeaceable government are as well external and foreign, as internal and bred in the body; which need the help of a Physician to continue the body in a perfect state of health, he require as great a diligence to qualify their malicious operations, as any internal sickness whatsoever.

In the second Commentary I briefly touched the commodity of good discovery; but because it is a matter of great consequence in the fortunate carriage of a war, I will once again by this example of Cæsar remember a General not to be negligent in this duty. *Suetonius* in the life of our Cæsar reporteth that he never undertook any expedition, but he first received true intelligence of the particular life and nature of the Country, as also of the manners and quality of the people; and that he would not undertake the voyage into Britany, until he had made perfect discovery by himself of the magnitude and situation of the Island. Which *Suetonius* might understand by this first voyage, which Cæsar would needs undertake in the later end of a Summer, although it were, as he himself saith, but to discover.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that governed the world in their time, gave great honour to the exercise of hunting; as the perfect image of war in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discovery and knowledge of a Country; without which all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in wars, were frivolous and of no effect. And therefore Xenophon in the life of Cyrus sheweth, that his expedition against the King of Armenia was nothing but a repetition of such sports as he had used in hunting. Howsoever, if the infinite examples registered in history, how by the dexterity of some Leaders it hath gained great victories, and through the negligence of others irrecoverable overthrows, are not sufficient motives to persuade them to this duty; let their own experience in matters of small moment manifest the weakness of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they have in hand. But let this suffice in the second place to prove the necessity of good discovery, and let us learn of Cæsar what is principally to be inquired after in the discovery of an unknown country: as first, the quantity of the land; secondly, what Nations inhabit it; thirdly, their use of war; fourthly, their civil government; and lastly, what Havens they have to receive Navy of great shipping. All which circumstances are such principall Articles in the body of a State, that the discovery of any one of these demands would have given great light concerning the motion of the whole body.

## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sends C. Voluentius to discover the coast of Britanie; and prepareth himself for that voyage.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar sent out Caius Voluentius with a Galley to discover what he could concerning these things, with charge that he having made perfect discovery, he should return again unto him as speedily as might be: he himself marching in the meantime with all his forces unto the Morini; forasmuch as from thence lay the shortest cut into Britanie. Thither he commanded that ships should be brought from all the maritime Cities of that quarter, and namely that fleet which he had built the year before for the war at Vannes. In the mean time his resolution being known, and carried into Britanie by Merchants and others, many private States of that Island sent Embassadors unto him, promising him hostages of their loyalty, and signifying their readiness to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberal promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them back again. And with them he sent Comus, whom

he had made King of Attas, whose wisdom and virtue he held in good account, and whom he took to be faithful to him, and of great authority in those Regions. To him he gave in charge to go to as many of the States as he could, and persuade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and acquaint them that Cæsar himself would presently follow after.

Voluentius having taken view of the Country he could (for he durst not go on shore to commit himself to the barbarism of the enemy) after five dayes returned to Cæsar, and related unto him all that he had discovered. Whist Cæsar stayed in those parts for the furnishing of his fleet, the Morini sent messengers unto him, excusing themselves for their former faults, that being a rude and barbarous people, and altogether unacquainted with our customs, they had made war against the people of Rome; and withall manifesting their readiness to obey his commands.

Cæsar not willing to leave any enemy behind him, or to engage in a new war at this time of the year, or to neglect his voyage into Britanie for such small matters, willingly accepted of their submission, having first received many hostages of them: and having made ready eighty ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he divided the Gallies to the Questor, the Legates, and the Commanders of the horse. There were also eighteen ships of burthen more, which lay wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen. The rest of the Army he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus and Luc. Antonius Cocca, commanding them to go to the confines of the Menapii, & into those parts of the Morini who had sent no Embassadors to him: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus a Legate to keep the Port with a sufficient garrison.

## CHAP. X.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie, and landeth his men.

**T**hese things being thus dispatched, Cæsar having a good wind, in the third watch he put out to Sea, commanding his horsemen to march themselves at the further Port and follow him: which was but slowly performed. He himself arrived upon the coast about the fourth hour of the day, where he found all the Clifts possessed with the forces of the enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the hills lay so steep over the seas, that a weapon might easily be cast from the higher ground

ground upon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing-place; notwithstanding he cast anchor until the rest of the Navy were come up unto him.

In the mean time calling a Councell of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared unto them what advertisements he had received by Voluentius, and told them what he would have done; and withall admonished them that the course of Military affairs, and especially Sea matters, that had so sudden and unconstant a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, having both wind and tide with him, he weighed anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, unto a plain and open shore.

The Britains perceiving the Romans deterrations, for their horse and chariots (which they commonly use in war before, & the rest of their forces followed after to the place where the Romans intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to lend his men for these respects: the ships were so great that they could not be brought near unto the shore; the soldiers in strange and unknown places, having their hands laden with great and heavy weapons, were at one instant to go out of the ships to withstand the force of the billows, and to fight with the enemy; whereas the Britains either standing upon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in known and frequented places, and managed their horses accustomed to such services.

The Romans being terrified with these things, and altogether misfitt of this kind of fights, did not use the same courage as they were wont to do in land-services, which when Cæsar perceived, he caused the Gallies, that were both the first use to the Britains, & render for us to be removed from the ships of burthen, and to be rowed up, and down, and laid against the open side of the enemy; that from thence might be beaten up from the water side, which stood the Romans in good stead. For the Britains being troubled with the strangeness of the Gallies, the motion of their Oars, and the unusual kind of engines, were somewhat dismayed, and began to retire back, and gave way to the Romans. But the soldiers still lingering, and especially for fear of the depth of the seas the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion desiring the Gods that it might fall out happily to the legions. If you will, saith he, forsake your Eagles, O ye soldiers, and betray it to the enemy; for mine own part, I will do my duty both to the Commonwealth and to my Imperator. And heyn spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himself into the Sea, and carried the Ea-

gle towards the Enemy. The Romans exhorting one another not to suffer such a disposition to be committed, they all leaped out of the ships; which when others that were near at hand perceived, they followed them with as great alacrity, and pressed towards the enemy to encounter with them.

The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keep any order of battle, nor to get any firm footing, nor to follow their Engines, forasmuch as every man kept with those Engines which he first met with, all) were wonderfully troubled. But the Enemy acquainted with the flats and shallows, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships putting stays to their horses, would set upon them uncombed and unprepared, and many of them would over-take a few: they would get the advantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troops of them, which when Cæsar perceived, he caused the ships and smaller vessels to be manned with soldiers; and where he saw need of help, he sent them to rescue such as were overcharged.

As soon as the Romans got footing on the firm lands, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight: but they were not able to follow them; nor take the Island at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Cæsar's wanted fortune.

## THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

**U**Pon this circumstance of landing, I may justly take occasion to handle that controversy which hath been often debated by our English Captains; which is, whether it be better in question of an invasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing upon our Coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to give him battle. It seemeth that such as first let this question on foot, and were of an opinion that we ought not by any means to encounter an enemy at his landing, for so we might much endanger our selves and our Country, did ground themselves upon the authority of Monsieur de Langey not observing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For where he stretch down that position, he plainly smeth at such Princes as border one upon another in the same Continents: but where their territories are disjoined by so great a bar as the Ocean, they have not such means to surprise one another, it were more fully to hold good that rule, as shall better appear by the sequel of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons that may be urged to prove it unsafe to oppose an enemy

my at his landing, not as being urged by that party (for I never heard any probable motive from them which might induce any such opinion) but for down by such as have looked into the controversies, both with experience and good judgement.

And first it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landings, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: for being ignorant in what place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will prove more frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defensive forces be sufficient according to the particular quality of every place subject to danger: which, considering the large extension of our maritime parts, and the many landing-places on our Coasts will require a greater number of men than the Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number as might seem in some sort sufficient, yet the uncertainty of the time of the enemies arrival would require that they should be lodged either upon or near the places of danger many days at least if not many weeks, before the instant of their attempt; which would exhaust a greater mass of Treasure, than could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected that all our landing-places are of such disadvantage for the defendants, that were no safety at all to make head against him at the landing: for inasmuch as such places are open and plain, they yield no commodious shelter the defendants from the fury of the artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long boats and landing vessels; which beating upon the beach (for most of our landing-places are of that quality) will scatter them, that no man shall be able to endure the inconvenience thereof.

The third objection may arise from the disparity both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either party. For the first, it must needs be granted that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the quality of the forces, it is with question that a great and potent Prince (for such a one it must be that undertakes to invade the territories of an absolute and well-ordered Prince as her Majesty is) would draw out the flow of his soldiery whosoever; besides the garrisons troops of voluntaries, which do commonly attend such levies. Now these being his qualified and drawn into one head, and being to make as it were but one body, how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like virtue and experience.

These are the reasons which may be drawn

from the disadvantage which they have that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that have been urged by me as maintaining his opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the answer of these reasons, I will lay this down for a principle, That it is impossible for any foreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to invade a State so populous, and of respective of their Sovereign (notwithstanding the pretences devised to defend the same) but it must of necessity be discovered before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest myself in the example of the year eighty eight, which proveth the discovery of the pretended invasion before it could come to execution.

Concerning therefore the first objection, it cannot indeed be denied but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtful, and therefore our care must generally extend it self to all places of access: but that our defensive forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in question.

To prove that our forces are sufficient, we must necessarily enter into particulars, wherein I will take *Ken* for a precedent, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which if I detect not my self, is a shore of as large extension upon the maritime parts as any other within this kingdom. For the breadth thereof enlarging it self from the point of *Nesse* by *Lish*, which is the uttermost skir of the coast of *Staffes*, unto *Margate* upon the coast of *Essex*, is by computation about twenty four miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugeness of the cliffs, which do include a great part of that skirt, and partly in regard that much of that quantity which may be landed upon such eminent and difficult places near adjoining, as an Army that should put it self there on shore, should find it self being opposed by but a small force, to be frightened, as they would not, easily find a way out without apparant ruin of their whole forces.

Further, it cannot be denied but that generally along the coast of *Ken* there are to many rocks, shelves, flats, and other impediments, that a Navie of great ships can have no commodity to anchor near the shore; and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchour:

chour: all which particularities duly considered, it will appear that this large skirt of *Ken* will afford a far better part for the landing of an Army, than was thought of at the first. And were it that to publish a treatise as this is would admit with good discretion such an exact relation as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would undertake to make it so evidently by the particular description both of the number, quantity, and quality of the places themselves, as no man of an indifferent judgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular satisfaction in this publick discourse, give me leave, submitting my self always to better judgements, to give a general tale of that means as would secure all places with a competent number of men.

Having showed you before the circuit of the maritime parts of *Ken*, I would observe this order: first to make a triple division of all such places as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be twelve thousand, of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of *Nesse*, and three thousand about *Margate*, and six thousand about *Penkylton*, which I take to be as it were the centre; for my greatest care should be to dispose of them, as they might not only favour one another in the same thing, but as every three thousand one upon another, so they should mutually give help one unto another, as occasion should be offered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about *Nesse*, not only the six thousand lodged as I have said should march to their succours, but such also of the *Staffes* forces as were near unto that party, and so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a force would in few hours be furnished for the reinforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the out-skirts of the whole forces are thus lodged in the centre of the Shires, which is nearer to all parts than any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quatering of them an especial care I had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to furnish them out along the coast by regiments and companies, as the Country might afford best opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the later part of this objection, which ingeth the uncertainty of time when the enemy shall make his approaches, I hold it must require that our defensive forces should be drawn into a head, before the enemy should be discovered near our coast, ready to put himself on shore: for it were a gross absurdity to imagine that companies could upon such a sudden be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march with such expedition as the necessity of

the occasion would require. Now, for that last-handling respect of her Majesties orders, which is urged to such extremity as it would be impardonable for this State to transgress I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that supposed immediate expense; so I assure my self, that men of sound judgement will deem it much out of season to dispute about unnecessary things, when the whole kingdom is brought in question of being made subject to a stranger.

*It is against her Majesties service to neglect her orders: no expert service is to be plumed for: these eyesight might see the troops of men, will not then that will to save thy self?*

The enemy (I perceive) hath kept thirty thousand men in pay two months before, to make havoc of our Country, and to bring us into perpetual thralldom; shall we think it much to maintain sufficient forces upon our Coasts, to assure our selves that no such enemy shall enter into our Country? The expense of this charge would be qualified by our good equal, which would proportion our attendance with the necessity which is imposed upon us to be careful in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to prove that our forces are sufficient to keep the Sea-coast, and that the uncertainty of time when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty which the careful respect of our Prince and Country impose upon every good subject; which is the substance of the first reason which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason, which the author urgeth the disadvantage of the place in regard of the security of the Enemies artillery; there is that consideration, by which places as yield the Enemy commodity of landing are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no covert at all. What then? shall a soldier take every place as he findeth it, and use no Art to qualify the disadvantages thereof? Or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of advantage, rather than he will relieve with industry the difcommodity of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious Commander, being in seasonable time lodged with convenient forces upon any of those places, yet upon the beach it self, which is as unsuited to make defensible as any place whatsoever, would use such industry as might give sufficient security to his forces, and over-weigh the Enemy with advantage of place; especially considering that this age hath afforded such plentiful examples of admirable inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies attempt, that our Commanders may have some time to make ready store of Gabions, and hand-baskets with such moveable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.



Neither let this trouble any man; for I dare avouch it, that if our forces are not drawn into a head before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some inland place to give them battle, our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to betink our selves of these necessities, and we will easily overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the firm land to repell an Enemy, weakened with the Seas, tossed with the billows, troubled with his weapons, with many other hindrances and discouragements, which are presented unto him both from the Land and the Sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of *Futall* in the year ninety seven, can somewhat judge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the Seas, the steepness of the Cliffs, and the trouble of the multitude of their Armies, the soldiers were so incumbered, that had not the Enemy been more than a coward, he might well with two hundred men have kept us from entering any part of that Island.

The answer to the third reason.

Concerning the third Objection, this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to regard that our forces do equal them in numbers, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the places, to make it good against the Enemies landing: for we know that in places of advantage and difficult access, a small number is able to oppose a great; and we doubt not but all circumstances duly considered, we shall proportionally equal the Enemy both in number and quality of their forces: always presuming, that our State shall never be destitute of sufficient forces trained and exercised in a competent manner, to defend their Country from foreign Enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward to make a prey of us, and to make us unfit not only to oppose an Enemies landing, but to defend our selves from being overrun as other Nations living in security without due regard thereof have been.

And thus much concerning the answer to these three reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the commodities which follow upon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousness of disunion: as first, we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any watchings, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentiful a Country as this is, especially considering that we

have no strong towns at all to repose our selves upon. Whereof we need no further testimony than is delivered unto us out of the seventh book of the Commentaries: in that war which *Cæsar* had with the *Crengerni*.

Secondly, obedience, which at other times is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakened at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malecontents and ill-disposed persons either to make head themselves, or to fly to the Enemy. Fourthly, 'tis madnesse to adventure a kingdom upon one stroke, having it in our disposition to do otherwise: with many other disadvantages which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE word *Imperator*, which the Eagle-bearer <sup>of the name Imperator.</sup> attributed to *Cæsar*, was the greatest title that could be given to a Roman Leader: and as *Zonaras* in his second Tome faith, was never given but upon some great exploit, and after a just victory obtained; and then in the place where the battle was fought, and the Enemy overthrown, the General was saluted by the name of *Imperator* with the triumphant shout of the whole Army; by which acclamation the soldiers gave testimony of his worth, and made it equivalent with the most fortunate Commanders.

This Ceremony was of great antiquity in the Roman Empire, as appears by many Histories, and namely by *Tacitus*, where he faith that *Liberius* gave that honour to *Blesud* that he should be saluted *Imperator* by the legions; which he sheweth to be an ancient dignity belonging to great Captains, after they had foiled the Enemy with an eminent overthrow. For every victory was not sufficient whereby they might challenge to great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certain number of the Enemies to be slain. *Appian* in his second book faith, that in old time the name of *Imperator* was never taken but upon great and admirable exploits; but in his twentieth thousand of the Enemy being slain in one battle was a sufficient ground of that honour. *Cicero* faith that two thousand slain in the place, especially of *Thracians*, *Spaniards* or *Gallies* did wonderfully increase the name of *Imperator*. Howsoever, it seemeth by the same Author that there was a certain number of the Enemy required to be slain, where he faith, *Se infra v. the* *Imperator* *appellatur*, that he was called *Imperator* upon a due and full victory.

#### CHAP.

#### CHAP. XI.

The Britans make peace with *Cæsar*, but break it again upon the loss of the Roman shipping.

Cæsar.



THE Britans being overthrown in this battle, as they had received their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to *Cæsar* to intreat for peace, promising hostages, and obedience in whatsoever he commanded. And with these Ambassadors returned Comus of Arates, whom *Cæsar* had sent before into Britany, and whom the Britans at his first landing with *Cæsar*s mandates, had seized upon and thrown into prison; but after the battle they released him, and becoming now suitors for peace, threw all the blame thereof upon the multitude, excusing themselves as ignorant of it, and so desiring to be pardoned. *Cæsar* complained, that whereas they had sent him into Gallia to derive peace, they were notwithstanding at his coming they made war against him without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded his hostages to be delivered unto him: which they presently performed in pairs, and the rest being to be let further off, they promised should be rendered within a short time. In the mean while they commanded their people to return to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their States to *Cæsar*. The peace being thus concluded, four daves after that *Cæsar* came into Britany, the eighteen ships which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind; and approaching so near the coast of Britany, that they were within view of the Roman Camp, there arose such a sudden tempest, that none of them were able to hold their course; but some of them returned to the port from whence they came, other some were cast upon the lower part of the Islands, which lieh to the West-ward, and there casting anchor took in so much water, that they were forced to commit themselves again to the sea, and drell their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened that the moon being in the full, the tides were very high in those seas; whereof the Romans being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies that transported the army which were drawn up upon the shore were filled with the tides, and the ships which lay at anchor were broken with the tempest. Neither was there one help to be given unto them; so that many of them were rent and split in pieces, and the rest left both their anchors cables and other tacklings, and by that means became altogether unserviceable, whereat the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for

there was no other shipping to recover them back again; neither had they any necessities to new furnish the old; and every man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia, forasmuch as there was no provision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britany, that were assembled to confer of such things as *Cæsar* had commanded them to perform, when they under stood that the Romans wanted both their horsemen, shipping, and provision of corn, and considering the purity of their forces by the small extent of their Camp, that which made it of less compass than usual being that *Cæsar* had transported his soldiers without such necessary carriages as they used to take with them; they thought it their best course to rebel, and to keep the Romans from corn and conveyes of provisions, and so prolong the matter until winter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrown and cut off from returning into Gallia, never any man would afterwards adventure to bring an Army into Britany. Therefore they conspired again in the second night, and conveyed themselves by stealth out of the Camp, and got their men privately out of the fields, to make head in some convenient place against the Romans.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the ebbing and flowing of the seas, and the causes thereof, it hath already been handled in the second book: to which I will add thus much, as may serve to shew how the Romans became so ignorant of the spring-tides, which happen in the full and new of the Moon. It is observed by experience, that the motion of this watery element is altogether directed by the course of the moon; wherein the exerteth her regency according as the fineth the matter, and her influence. And forasmuch as all lited for her influence. And forasmuch as all mediterranean seas, and such gulfs as are inclosed in finnes and botomes of their course, and through the inequality of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power as the Ocean it self; it consequently followeth that the *Insular* seas, wherewith the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon as the main sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit, and through the plentiful abundance of his parts, better answereth the virtue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestiall bodies, taking her course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a current between the *Orades* and the main of *Norwegia*, that the filleth our channel between *England* and *France* with great swelling tides, and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters than

then in any other parts of the world. And hence it happened that our river of *Thames*, lying with her mouth so ready to receive the tide as it cometh, and having withal a plain levelled belly, and a very small fresh current, taketh the tide as far into the land as any other known river of *Europe*. And for this cause the *Romans* were ignorant of the spring tides in the full of the moon.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Such as either by their own experience, or otherwise by observation of that which history recorded, are acquainted with the government of Commonweals, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation that either hath long lived in liberty, or been governed by Commanders of their own chusing, is made subject to the yoke of bondage, or reduced under the obedience of a stranger. For as we are apt by a natural inclination to civil society; so by the same nature we desire a free disposition of our selves and possessions, as the chiefest end of the said society; and therefore in the government of a subdued State, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the Victour, or how indirectly soever it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captive people behold it as a part of their adversaries overthrow; and conceive thereupon such spirits as answer the greatness of their hope, and fort with the strength of their will, which always maketh that seem easy to be effected which is desired. And this was the reason that the *Britains* altered their resolution of peace, upon the losse which the *Romans* had received in their shipping.

## CHAP. XII.

*Cæsar* new trimm'd his late shaken navy: the *Britains* *ſaw* upon the *Romans* as they harveſted; but were put off by *Cæſar*.

*Cæſar*, although he had not discovered their determination, yet conjecturing of the event by the losse of his shipping, and by their delay of giving up hostages, provided against all chances: for he brought corn daily out of the ships into his Camp; and took the hulls of such Ships as were most dismembred, and with the timber and brasse thereof he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessities to be brought out of *Gallia*. Which being handled with the great industry and avell of the Soldiers, he lost only twelve ships, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in action, the seventh legion being sent on by course to fetch in corn, and little suspecting any motion of war, as parties the soldiers continued in the field, and the rest went & came between them and the Camp, the station that watched before the gate of the Camp gave advertisement to *Cæſar*, that the

same way which the legion went there appeared a greater dust then was usually seen. *Cæſar* suspecting that which indeed was true, that the *Britains* were cur'd into some new resolutions, he took those two cohorts which were in station before the ports, commanding other two to take their places, and he rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him; and went that way where the dust was desired. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his men overcharged with the Enemy, and scarce able to sustain the assault, the legion thronged together on a heap, and weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For when they had harveſted all other quarters, there remained one piece of corn, whither the Enemy suspected the *Romans* would at last come, and in the night time conveyed themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued until the *Romans* were come into the field: and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed, and occupied in reaping, they suddenly fell upon them, and slaying some few of them, roined the rest, and encompassed them about with their horsemen and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Chariots was, first to ride up and down, and cast their weapons as they saw advantage; and with the terror of their horses and railing of their wheels to disorder the companies; and when they had wound themselves between any troops of horse, they forsook their Chariots, and fought on foot: in the mean time the guides of their chariots would drive a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their masters needed any help, they might have an easy passage unto them. And thus they performed in all their fights both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firm stability of footmen; & were so ready with daily practice, that they could stop in the decivity of a steep hill, & turn short or moderate their going as it seemed best unto them, and run along the beam of the catch & rest upon the yoke, or harness of their horses, & return as speedily again at their pleasure. The *Romans* being thus troubled, *Cæsar* came to relieve them in every good time: for at his coming the Enemy stood still, & the soldiers gathered their spirits unto them, & began to renew their courage that was almost spent. *Cæsar* taking it an unfit time either to provoke the Enemy or to give him battle, continued a while in the same place, & then returned with the legions into the Camp. While these things were a doing, and the *Romans* thus busied, the *Britains* that were in the field conveyed themselves all away.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

By this we plainly find that there were usually two cohorts (which according to the rate of one hundred and twenty in a maniple amounted to the number of 720 men) which kept the

## CHAP. XIII.

day-watch before the gate of the Camp, and were always in readinesse upon any service. The commodity whereof appeareth by this accident: for considering that the advertisement required halte and speedy recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue, to have so many men ready to march forward at the first motion; that they might give what help they could until the rest of their fellows came in.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Their manner of fight with Chariots is very particularly described by *Cæsar*, and needeth not to be stood upon any longer: only I observe that neither in *Gallia*, nor any other country of *Europe*, the use of Chariots is ever mentioned; but they have ever been attributed as a peculiar fight unto the Eastern Countries, as futable to the plain and level situation of the place, whereof we find often mention in the Scripture. Which may serve for an argument to *Geoffrey of Monmouth*, to prove the *Britains* descent from *Troy* in *Asia*, where we likewise find mention of such Chariots.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, we may observe the discreet and moderate temper of his valour, and the means he used to make his soldiers confident in his directions: for notwithstanding the *Britains* had exceedingly urged him to make hazard of a present revenge; yet finding it an unfit time (inasmuch as his men had been somewhat troubled with the fury of the *Britains*) he thought it best to expect some other opportunity. And again, to avoid the inconveniences of a fearful retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full persuasion in his soldiers that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a careful respect of their safety: which gave his men resolution when they were carried upon service, being assured that what service loever they were employed upon was most diligently to be performed, as matter much importing the fortunate issue of that war: whereas if they had perceived that headstrong fury (which carrieth men on with a desire of victory, and never looketh into the means whereby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their proceedings they might with reason have drawn back from such importments, and valued their safety above the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion which the soldiers have of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of war.

The *Britains* make head with their forces; and are beaten by *Cæſar*: his retreat into *Gallia*.

After this for many dayes together there followed such tempests and foul weathers, that both the *Romans* were constrained to keep their Camp, and the *Britains* were kept from attempting any thing against them. But in the mean time they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the small number of the Roman forces, and amplifying the greatness of the booty, and the easy means offered unto them of perpetuall liberty, if they could take the Roman Camp. Shortly upon this, having gathered a great company both of horse & foot, they came to the place where the *Romans* were encamped. *Cæsar* (although he foresaw the event by that which before had happened, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would avoid the danger by flight) yet having some thirty horse, which *Comus* of *Avares* had carried with him at his coming into *Britany*, he imboldened his legions before his Camp, and so gave them battle. The Enemy not being able to bear the assault of the Roman soldiers, turned their backs and fled: the *Romans* followed them as far as they could by running on foot, and after a great slaughter with the burning of their towns far and near, they returned to their Camp. The same day the *Britains* sent messengers to *Cæsar* to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into *Gallia*. And forasmuch as the *Æquinoctium* was at hand, he thought it not safe to put himself to the sea in winter with such weak shipping; and therefore having got a convenient time he hoisted sail a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe unto the Continent. Two of these ships by burthen, not being able to reach the same haven, put in somewhere lower into the land: the soldiers that were in them which were about three hundred being first on shore, and marching towards their Camp, the *Morini*, with whom *Cæsar* at his going into *Britany* had made peace, in hope of a booty, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them upon pain of death to lay down their weapons: and as the *Romans* by casting themselves into an Orbe began to make defences, at the noise and clamour amongst them there were suddenly gathered together about six thousand of the Enemy. Which thing being known, *Cæsar* sent out all the horsemen to relieve them. In the mean time the *Romans* sustained the force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly about the space of four hours; and receiving themselves only some few wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. As soon as the Roman horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast away their weapons.

## Observations upon Cæsars

pons and sleds, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

### OBSERVATION.

OF all the figures which the *Tattici* have chosen to make use of in military affairs, the circle hath ever been taken for the fittest to be applied in the defensive parts, as inclosing with an equal circuit on all parts whatsoever is contained within the circumference of that *Area*: and therefore Geometry termeth a circumference a simple line, so far as much as if you alter the site of the parts and transport one arch into the place of another, the figure notwithstanding will remain the same, because of the equall bending of the line throughout the whole circumference. Which property as it proveth an uniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end, this is front or this is flank: so doth that which *Euclid* doth demonstrate in the third of his Elements, concerning the small affinity between a right line and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) that the great circle of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which howsoever they seem as speculative qualities, conceived rather by intellectual discourse than manifested to sensible apprehension; yet so far as much as experience hath proved the strength of this figure in a defensive part, above any other manner of imbatelling, let us not neglect the knowledge of these natural properties, which discover the causes of this effect: neither let us neglect this part of military knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain valour, and the finew of all our ability: for order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a well-ordered discipline to be irregular, or void of order. And therefore the *Romans* did neither eat nor sleep without the direction of the Consuls, or chief Commander; otherwise their valour might rather have been termed fury than virtue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time, it never failed as long as the said order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore how important it is for a Commander to look into the diversity of orders for imbatelling, and to weigh the nature thereof, that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The *Romans* termed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body both with a concave and a convex surface: in resemblance whereof I understand this *Orbe* of men imbatelled to be so named; which might peradventure consist of five, or more, or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so many circles described about one Centre; so

that either the midst thereof remained void, or otherwise contained such carriages and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbatelling was never used but in great extremity: for as it was the safest of all others, so it gave suspicion to the fouldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battels; wall hereafter appear by the testimony of *Cæsar* himself in the fifth Commentary, upon the occasion which happened unto *Sabinus* and *Cotta*.

### CHAP. XIII.

**H**e next day *Cæsar* sent *Titus Labienus* a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of *Britany*, against the revolted *Morini*; who having no place of refuge because their bogs and fens were dried up, where they had sheltered themselves the year before, they all fell under the power of his mercy. *Q. Titurinus* and *A. Cotta* the Legates, who had led the legions against the *Menapii*, after they had wasted their fields, cut up their corn, burnt their houses (for the *Menapii* were all hid in thick woods) returned to *Cæsar*. These things being thus ended, *Cæsar* placed the wintering Camp of all his legions amongst the *Belge*: in which place two only of all the Cities in *Britany* (whose hostages unto him, they were neglecting it) these wars being thus ended, upon the relation of *Cæsar's* letters, the Senate decreed a supplication for the space of twenty dayes.

### OBSERVATION.

IN the end of the second Commentary we read of a supplication granted by the Senate for fifteen dayes; which was never granted to any man before that time since the first building of the City: but so far as much as in this fourth year of the wars in *Gallia* it was augmented from fifteen unto twenty dayes, I thought it fit to refer the handling thereof unto this place. We are therefore to understand, that whensoever a *Roman* General had carried himself well in the wars, by gaining a victory, or enlarging the bounds of their Empire, that then the Senate did decree a supplication to the gods in the name of that Captain. And this dignity was much sought after: not only because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged with the concurrence and gratulation of the *Roman* people; but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honour in the *Roman* government: And therefore *Cato* nameth *Lib. 11.* the prerogative of a triumph. And *Lucius* in his 26 book saith that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was

there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured with supplication and thanksgiving to the gods for things happily effected. The manner of the Ceremony was, that after the Magistrate had publicly proclaimed it with this form or stile, *quod bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset*, that he had happily and successfully administered the affairs of the commonwealth, the *Roman* people clothed in white garments and crowned with garlands, went to all the Temples of the gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victory in the name of the General. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplication was at first included within one or two dayes at the most, as appeareth by *Lucius* in his third book, where he saith that the victory gained by two several battels was spitefully shut up by

the Senate in one dayes supplication; the people of their own accord keeping the next day holy, and celebrating it with greater devotion than the former.

Upon the victory which *Camillus* had against the *Veii* there were granted four dayes of supplication; to which there was afterward a day added, which was the usual time of supplication unto the time that *Pompey* ended the war which they called *Mithridaticus*, when the usual time of five dayes was doubled and made ten, and in the second of these Commentaries made fifteen, and now brought to twenty dayes. Which fetheth forth the increments and rewards of well doing, which the *Romans* propounded both at home & abroad to such as endeavoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge to the benefit of their Commonwealthis. And thus endeth the fourth Commentary.

## The fifth Commentary of the wars in GALLIA.

### The Argument.

**C**æsar causeth a great navy to be built in *Gallia*: he carrieth five legions into *Britany*, where he maketh war with the *Britanni* on both sides the river *Thames*. At his return into *Gallia* most of the *Galles* revolt; and first the *Eboracens*, under the conduct of *Ambiorix*, set upon the Camp of *Q. Titurinus* the Legate, whom they circumvent by subtilty, and then besiege the Camp of *Cicero*: but are put by, and their Army overthrown by *Cæsar*.

### CHAP. I.

*Cæsar* returneth into *Gallia*: findeth there great store of shipping made by the fouldiers, and commandeth it to be brought to the haven *Itius*. \* Calice †

**U**lcus Domitius and Appius Claudius being Consuls, *Cæsar* at his going into Italy from his winter-quarters (which he yearly did) gave order to the Legates to build as many ships that winter as possibly they could, & to repair the old; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch than those which are used in the mediterranean seas for the speedier lading and unlading of them, and because the sides in these seas were very great: and so far as much as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottom than such as were usual in other places, and all of them to be made for the use of Oars, to which purpose their low building served very conveniently. Other necessities and furniture for rigging he gave order to have brought out of Spain. *Cæsar* after an assembly of the States in Lombardy, went presently into Italy, where he heard that the *Pinutes* infected the province by their incursions. As soon as he came thither he levied fouldiers, and appointed them a rendezvous, which the *Pinutes* hearing of, they sent embassadors presently to him, offering the business as not done by publick consent, and expressing a readiness to make any satisfaction that should be demanded. *Cæsar* having heard their message, appointed them to give hostages, and to bring them by such a day, or else they must expect nothing but war and ruine to their city. Hostages were brought by the appointed time; whereupon *Cæsar* deputed certain to arbitrate differences between the cities, and to punish as they saw cause for it. These things being

being over, he returned forthwith into Lombardy, and thence to his army in Gallia.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**T**his *Itinus Porcius Flaccus* thinketh to be *Calpurnius*; others take it to be *Saint Omer*; partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in itself very low, hath notwithstanding very high banks, which incompartie the town about, and in times past was a very large haven. To this may be added the distance from this town to the next Continent of the Island of *Britany*, which *Strabo* maketh to contain 220 stadia; which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leagues: *Cæsar* maketh it thirty miles. This is the haven which *Pliny* calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum*.

## CHAP. II.

*Cæsar* preventeth new motions amongst the *Treviri*, and goeth to his navy, *Dumnorix* includeth to accompany him into *Britany*: his flight, and death.

**C**æsar leaving souldiers enough to do their business, himself marched with four legions and eight hundred horse into the country of the *Treviri*; in regard they neither to his commands, nor were further reported to follow him the Germans beyond the *Rhene* to new commotions. This city was the most powerfull of all *Gallia* for matter of horse, having likewise a great force of foot, and lying so conveniently upon the *Rhene* for assistance: wherein there was at that time a contention betwixt *Induciomarus* and *Cingetorix* who should be chief ruler. *Cingetorix* as soon as he heard of the coming of *Cæsar* with his army, came in to him, assuring him of the fidelity of his party, and their constancy to the friendship of the people of *Rome*; discovering withall unto him the present proceeding amongst the *Treviri*. On the contrary *Induciomarus* gathered together what horse and foot he could, resolving upon nothing else therein; securing all the old and young folk not fit to bear arms in the wood *Arduenna*, which is a very large wood beginning at the *Rhene*, and running through the middle of the *Treviri*, to the borders of the people of *Rhemes*. While things were thus preparing, a diviser of the chief of the city, some through the favour they bore to *Cingetorix*, others through the coming of our army, came forth to *Cæsar*; and since they could not do it for the whole city, they endeavoured to make every man his own peace. *Induciomarus* seeing this, and fearing to be left at last alone, sent *Embulodenus* to *Cæsar*, excusing what he had done in not coming to him, which he said was done only to keep the city the better in obedience; for if all the nobility should

have left it, the common people would have been apt to have made new troubles: that the city was now at his command, and if *Cæsar* would give leave, he was ready to wait upon him in his camp, and to lay the lives and fortunes of himself, and the whole city at his feet. *Cæsar*, albeit he well knew why all this was spoken, as if what he had put him besides his former resolution, yet rather then spend the summer in these parts, having all things in readiness for his *Britann*, he commanded *Induciomarus* to come to him, and bring two hundred hostages with him. *Induciomarus* did as *Cæsar* commanded, and withall brought along with him his son and all that had any near relation unto him: whom *Cæsar* bade be of good cheer, and exhorted to continue firme in his duty and fidelity. After this calling to him the chief of the *Treviri* man by man, he reconciled them to *Cingetorix*, as well looking at the desert of the man himself, as at his own interest and advantages to have such a man near the chief sway in his city, who had expressed so notable affection and good will towards him in this business. It troubled *Induciomarus* not a little to find his respect and authority thus impaired; inasmuch that he who before was no friend to *Cæsar*, was now vexed at this became a bitter enemy.

Things thus failed here, *Cæsar* came with his legions back to the port called *Uxellæ*: where he understood that forty ships which were built amongst the *Meldæ* were hindered by tempests that they could not keep their course, but were forced back from whence they came; the rest were well provided and ready to set sail. Hither also were gathered all the cavalry in *France*, to the number of four thousand, and the chief men of every city: some few of which whose fidelity *Cæsar* had had experience of, he intended to leave at home; and to take the rest along with him for hostages, lest in his absence they should begin any new stir in *Gallia*.

Amongst the rest was *Dumnorix* the *Heduan* formerly mentioned. Him of all the rest *Cæsar* intended to take with him, knowing him to be a man desirous of change, greedy of rule, a man of courage and resolution, and one of greatest authority amongst the *Gallies*. Besides this, *Dumnorix* had given out at a meeting of the *Heduan* that *Cæsar* had conferred upon him the government of the city, which much troubled the *Heduan*; yet they durst not send any man to *Cæsar* to hinder or revoke it. This *Cæsar* came to hear of. When he saw he must go with the rest, first he besought with all the intreaties he could that he might stay in *Gallia*; alleging one while that he was afraid of the sea, having as yet never been used to sailing, another while that he had some religious ac-

COUNT

counts that kept him here. When he perceived this would not serve his turn, but so he must, he began to deal with the rest of the chief men of the *Gallies*, taking them man by man, persuading them to continue in their own country; telling them that it was not without ground *Cæsar* went about to despoil *Gallia* (this of his nobility this drift being to carry them over into *Britany* and there murder them, whom he was afraid to put to death amongst their friends at home. He went farther so to ingage them to fidelity, and to tie them by oath to proceed upon joint consultation to the alighting of what should be thought of most concernment and behoof for the good of *Gallia*. These things were by divers persons related to *Cæsar*: who as soon as he knew thereof, in regard of the great respect he bore to the *Heduan* State, he resolved by all means possible to curb and deter *Dumnorix* from his late conference; in regard that he saw him thus to increase in his madness, he thought it seasonable to prevent his endangering either the commonwealth or himself. So staying in the place where he was about twenty five days, the North-west wind (which usually blows in these parts) all that while hindering his putting to sea, he made it much of his business to keep *Dumnorix* quiet, and yet at the same time to flye out the whole drift of his design. At last the wind and weather serving, he commanded his souldiers and horsemen on ship-board. And whilst every mans mind was taken up about this, *Dumnorix* with the rest of the *Heduan* horsemen, unknown to *Cæsar*, had left the camp, and were marching homeward. Which when *Cæsar* heard, he stopp his voyages, and letting every thing else alone, sent a great part of his cavalry to attack him, and bring him back with command that if he stood upon his defence, and did not readily obey they should dispatch him. For he could not believe that this man could mean any good to him if he once got home, since he made so light of his commands when present with him. The horse having overtaken him, he stood upon his guard and made resistance, imploring also the aide of those that were with him; still crying out that he was a Free-born man and of a Free city; whereupon they, as they were commanded, beamed him in and so killed him: the *Heduan* horsemen returning every man to *Cæsar*.

## CHAP. III.

*Cæsar* saileth into *Britany*: landeth his forces, and seeketh the enemy.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar having prepared all things in readiness, he left *Labienus* in the Count with three legions, and two thousand horse, both to keep the haven and make provision of victuals, and also to observe the motion of the

*Gallies*, and to doe according as he saw time and occasion, and with five legions: and the like number of horse as he left in the continent, about four setting he put out to sea with a fleet (both winds which continued until midnight; then ceasing he was carried with the tide until the morning; when he perceived that the Island lay on his left hand, and again as the tide changed, he laboured by rowing to reach that part of the Island where he had found good landing the year before. Wherin the souldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of Oars, they made their great ships as burthen to keep way with the *Gallies*. About high noon they arrived in *Britany* with all their ships; neither was there any Enemy seen in that place: but as afterward *Cæsar* understood by the Captives, the *Britans* had been there with a great power, but being terrified by the infinite number of shipping which they discovered from the shore (for with the ships of provision, and private vessels which several persons had for their own conveniences, there were in all above eight hundred) they forsook the shore, and hid themselves in the inland country. *Cæsar* having landed his men and chosen a convenient place to encamp, as soon as he understood by the captives where the enemy lay, in the third watch of the night he marched towards them, leaving ten cohorts and three thousand horse under *Quintus Atrius* for a garrison to his shipping: which he the less feared, because it lay at anchor in a safe and open shore. He marched that night about twelve miles before he found the Enemy. The *Britans* sending out their horse and chariots to arrive between them and the *Romans*, and having the advantage of the upper grounds, began to hinder the *Romans* and to give them battle; but being beaten back with our horsemen, they conveyed themselves into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by Art and Nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their civil wars: for all the entrances were shut up with great trees layd overbrow the passages. And the *Britans* shewed themselves out of the wood but here and there, not suffering the *Romans* to enter the fortification. But the souldiers of the seventh legion, with a *Tessudo* which they made, and a mount which they raised, took the place, and drove them all out of the woods without any losse at all, saving some few wounds which they received. But *Cæsar* forbade his men to follow after them with any long pursuit, because he was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that day being spent he would employ the rest thereof in the fortification of his Camp.

## OBSERVATION.

**C**æsar having taken what assurance of peace he could with the *Gallies*, both by carrying the



is so frequent in *Britany*, tempereth the air with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warm; or whether it be from other unknown cause, our Philosophers rest unsatisfied. But as touching *Gallia* it may be said, that forasmuch as it breatheth more to the South than this Island doth, the air thereof (by reason of the continual heat) is of a far purer disposition; and so pierceth more than this grosser air of *Britany*; and careth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper, and of a far colder disposition.

This land which *Cæsar* nameth *Mona*, is known at this time by the name of *Man*, and lieth between *Cumberland* and *Ireland*. *Ptolemy* calleth it *Moneda*. *Tacitus* calleth *Anglesey* by the name of *Monagrad*, a venture from the nomination of the *Britans*, who called it *Tyr monthe* land of *Mon*.

Concerning those places where the night continueth in the midst of winter for thirty daies together, they must be sited 6. degrees beyond the circle *Arctic*, and have a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of Astronomy. In that he noted the nights in *Britany* shorter than in the Continent, we must understand it to be only in summer; for the more oblique the horizon is, the more uneven are the portions of the diurnal circles which it cutteth; and the nearer it cometh to a right horizon, the nearer it cometh to an equality of day and night. And hence it happeneth, that in summer time, the nights in *France* are longer then here in *England*; and in winter, shorter. The like we must understand of all Southern and Northern Countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the civility of the *Kentishmen*, and their courteous disposition above the rest of the *Britans*, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought civility unto all other Nations: of whom such as were first seated in their possessions and entertained society, were the first that brought in civil conversation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of civil government. So we find that first the *Affrians* and *Babylonians* (as nearest to the Mountains of *Armenia* where the Ark rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their States into Commonwealths or Monarchies of exquisite government, flourishing with all manner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other Countries lay either waste, or overwhelmed with Barbarism. From thence it flowed into *Egypt*; out of *Egypt* into *Greece*; out of *Greece* into *Italy*; out of *Italy* into *Gallia*; and from thence into *England*: where our *Kentish* men first entertained as bordering upon *France*, and frequented with Merchants of those Countries.

## CHAP. VI.

Directs skirmishes between the *Romans* and the *Britans*.



*He Cavalry of the enemy and their Cavalry; gave a sharp conflict to the Roman horsemen in their march: but so that the Romans got the better every way, driving them with*

great slaughter to the woods and hills, and loosing also some of their own men, being too venemous in the pursuit. The *Britans* after some intermission of time, when the *Romans* had little thought of them, and were busied in fortifying their Camp, came suddenly out of the woods, and charged upon those that kept station before the Camp. *Cæsar* sent out two the chief cohorts of two legions, to second their fellowship. These two cohorts standing with a small alley between them, the other that were first charged being terrified with that strange kind of light, boldly brake through the thickets of the enemy's forest, retired in safety to their fellows. That day *Quintus Labernus Duns*, a Tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The *Britans* were repelled with more cohorts, which *Cæsar* sent to second the former. And forasmuch as the fight happened in the view of all the Camp, it was plainly perceived that the legionary soldiers, being neither able for the weight of their Armour to follow the enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go far from their several Posts, was not a fit adversary to contest this kind of enemy: and that the horsemen likewise (though with no less danger, inasmuch as the enemy would retire back of purposes, and when they had drawn them a little from the legions, they would then light from their chariots, and encounter them with that advantage which is between a footman and a horseman. Furthermore, they never fought thick and close together, but thus, and at great distances, having stations of men to succour one another, to recover the weary, and to send out fresh Supplies.

## OBSERVATION.

Upon this occasion of their heavy Armour, I will describe a Legionary soldier in his compleat furniture, that we may better judge of their manner of warfare, and understand where in their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learn, that their legionary soldiers were called *milites gravissimi*, that is, soldiers wearing heavy Armour, to distinguish them from the Velites, the Archers, Slingers, and other light-armed men. Their offensive Armes were a continued pile, or as some will but one Pile, and a pile of Piles, or as some will but one Pile, and a

*Spanish*

*Spanish* sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defensive Armes were a helmet, a corselet, and boots of brasse, with a large Target, which in some sort was offensive, in regard of that *umbo* which stuck out in the midst thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first book, and the Target in the second. The sword, as *Polybius* witnesseth, was short, two-edged, very sharp, and of a thong-point. And therefore *Livy* in his 22. book saith, that the *Gallies* used very long swords without points; but the *Romans* had short swords, ready for use. These they called *Spanish* swords, because they borrowed that fashion from the *Spaniards*. The old *Romans* were so girt with their swords, as appeareth by *Polybius*, and their monuments in Marble, that from their left shoulder it hung upon their right thigh, contrary to the use of these times; which, as I have noted before, was in regard of their target, which they carried on their left arme. This sword was hung with a belt of leather, beset with studs, as *Varro* noteth. And these were their offensive weapons.

Lib. I.

Plin. lib. 10.

Their Helmet was of brasse, adorned with three Ostrich feathers of a cubit in length; by which the soldier appeared of a larger stature, and more terrible to the Enemy, as *Polybius* saith in his sixth book. Their breast-plate was either of Brasse or Iron, jointed together after the manner of scales, or plated with little rings of Iron: their boots were made of bars of brasse, from the foot up to the knee. And thus were the legionary soldiers armed, to stand firme, rather then to use any nimble motion, and to combine themselves into a body of that strength, which might not easily recoile at the opposition of any confrontation: for agility standeth indifferent to help either a retreat or a pursuit; and nimble-footed soldiers are as ready to lie back, as to march forward; but a weighty body keepeth a more regular counterbuffe, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffe. So that whensoever they came to firme buckling, and felt the enemy stand stiff before them, such was their practice and exercise in continual works, that they never fainted under any such task, but the victory went always clear on their side. But if the enemy gave way to their violence, and came net in but for advantage, and then as speedily retired before the counterbuffe were well discharged, then did their nimbleness much help their weakness, and frustrate the greatest part of the *Roman* discipline. This is also proved in the overthrow of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*, where *Ambiorix* finding the inconvenience of buckling at handy-blows, commanded his men to fight at a far off; and if they were assaulted, to give back, and come on again as they saw occasion: which he wearied out the *Romans* that they all fell under the execution of the *Gallies*. Let this suffice

therefore to shew how unfit the *Romans* were to flie upon any occasion, when their Armour was such that it kept them from all fleeing, motion, and made them futile to the feared and well advised rules of their discipline, which were as certain principles in the execution of a standing battell; and therefore not to fit either for a pursuitor or a flight.

Concerning the unequal combat between a horseman and a footman, it may be thought strange that a footman should have such an advantage against a horseman, being overmatched at least with a Sexuple proportion both of strength and agility: but we must understand that as the horse is much swifter in a long carriage, so in speedy and nimble turning at hand, where in the substance of the combat consisteth, the footman far exceedeth the horseman in advantage, having a larger mark to hit by the Horse, then the other hath. Besides the horseman ingageth both his valour and his fortune in the good speed of his horse, his wounds and his death do consequently pull the rider after, his fear or fury maketh his matter either desperate or slow of performance, and what defect soever ariseth from the horse, must be answered out of the honour of the rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soever draweth us into the society of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible be contained in the compass of our own power.

The sword which we manage with our owne hand affordeth greater assurance then the harquebuse, wherein there are many parts belonging to the action, as the powder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof if the least fail of his parts, we likewise faile of our fortune. But how probable soever this seemeth, this is certain, that in the course of the *Romans* wars the horse were ever defeated by the foot, as is manifestly proved in the first of their books.

## CHAP. VII.

*Cæsar* giveth the *Britans* two several overthrowes.



He next day the Enemy made a stand upon the hills a far off from the camp, and shewed themselves not so often; neither were they so busie with our horsemen as they were the day before. But about noon, when *Cæsar* had sent out three legions, and all his cavalry to get forrage, under the condole of *Caius Trebonius* a Legate, they made a sudden assault upon the forragers, and fell in close with the *Engines* & the legions. The *Romans* charged very fiercely upon them, and beat them back: neither did they make an end of following them, until the horsemen trusting

to them, put them all to flight, with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they give them respite either to make heads to make a stand, or to forsake their chariots.

After this overthrow all their Auxiliary forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great power. *Cæsar* understanding their determinations, carried his Army to the river Thames, and to the confines of *Castellannus*; which river was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly. At his coming he found a great power of the Enemy to be embattled on the other side, and the bank fortified with many sharp stakes, and many other also were planned covertly under the water. These things being discovered to the Romans by the Captives and fugitives, *Cæsar* putting his horse before, caused the legions to follow suddenly after: who notwithstanding they had but their heads clear above the waters, went with this violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the banks, and betook themselves to flight.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS attempt of *Cæsar* seemeth so strange to *Brutus*, that he runneth into strange conclusions concerning this matter: as first, that he that imiteth *Cæsar* may doubt of his good fortunes; for his proceeding in this point was not directed by any order of war: and that a great Commander hath nothing common with other Leaders: but especially he crieth out at the baseness of the Britans, that would suffer themselves so cowardly to be beaten. But if we look into the circumstances of the action, we shall find both Art and good direction therein: for being assured by the fugitives that the river was passable in that place, and in that place only, he knew that he must either adventure over there, or leave *Castellannus* for another Summer, which was a very strong inducement to urge him to that enterprise. The difficulty whereof was much relieved by good direction, which consisted of two points: First, by lending over the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better endure the charge of the enemy than the footmen could, that were up to the neck in water; and withal to shelter the footmen from the fury of the Enemy.

Secondly, he sent them over with such speed, that they were on the other side of the water before the enemy could tell what they attempted: for if he had lingered in the service, and given the enemy leave to find the advantage which he had by experience, his men had never been able to have endured the hazard of so dangerous a service. It is hard to conjecture at the place where this service was performed; for since the building of London bridge, many foords have

been scoured with the current and fall of the water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they do.

## CHAP. VIII.

The conclusion of the British war. *Cæsar* returneth into Gallia.

**C**ASTELLANNUS having no courage to contend any longer, dismissed his greatest forces, and retaining only four thousand chariots, observed our journeys, keeping the wood-countries, and driving men and cattell out of the fields into the woods, where he knew the Romans would come: and as their horse strayed out either for forage or booty, he sent his chariots out of the woods by unknown ways, and put their horsemen to great perill: in regard whereof the horsemen durst never adventure further then the legions, neither was there any more spoil done in the Country, then that which the valient soldiers did of themselves.

In the meantime the Trinobantes, being almost the greatest State of all those Countries (from whom *Mandubratius* had fled to *Cæsar* into Gallia, for that his father *Inuentus* holding the kingdom, was slain by *Castellannus*) sent *Enobaudus* to *Cæsar*, to offer their submissions, and to intreat that *Mandubratius* might be defended from the oppression of *Castellannus*; & sent unto them to take the kingdom. *Cæsar* having received from them forty pledges, & Corn for his Army, sent *Mandubratius* unto them. The Trinobantes being thus kept from the violence of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Ancalici, Bibroci, and Cassi yielded themselves to *Cæsar*. By these he understood that *Castellannus* his town was not far off, fortified with woods & bogs, & well stored with men & cattell. The Britans call a town, a thick wood inclosed about with a ditch and a rampier, made for a place of retreat, when they stood in fear of incursions from their borders. Thither marched *Cæsar* with his Army, & found it well fortified both by Art and Nature: & as he assaulted it in two several places, the enemy unable to keep it, cast himself out of the town by a back way, and so he took it. Where he found great store of cattell, and slew many of the Britans.

While these things were doing, *Castellannus* sent messengers into Kent, which was said to lie upon the sea, and wherein there were four several Kings, *Cingetorix*, *Carvilius*, *Taxmagulus*, and *Segonax*: that he commanded with all the power they could make to set upon the camp where the Navy was kept. The Kings coming to the place were overthrown by a sally which the Romans made out upon them, many of them being slain, and *Lugotrix* a great

a great commander taken prisoner. This battell concurring with the former losses, and especially moved thereunto by the report of the former cities, *Castellannus* invented peace of *Cæsar* by *Comus* of *Aras*. *Cæsar* being determined to winter in the Continent, for fear of sudden commotions in Gallia, and considering that the Summer was now far spent, and might easily be lined out, he commanded pledges to be brought unto him, and set down what yearly tribute the Britans should pay to the Romans; giving withal a strict charge to *Castellannus* to do no injury either to *Mandubratius* or the Trinobantes. The hostages being taken, he carried back his Army to the sea, where he found his shipping repaired: which as soon as he had caused to be set afloat, in regard partly of the great number of prisoners he had, and that some of his ships were cast away, he determined to carry his Army over at twice. And so it happened, that of so great a fleet, at so many voyages, neither this year nor the year before there was not any one ship missing, which carried over our soldiers: one of those which were to be sent back to him after they had landed the first half, and those which *Lugotrix* caused afterwards to be made, three-score in number, few could make to the place, the rest were all kept back. Which *Cæsar* having for some time expected in vain, and fearing that the time of year would not long serve for sailing, for the Equinoxiall was at hand, was forced to dispose his soldiers closer and in lesser room. So taking the opportunity of a calme sea, he set sail about the beginning of the second watch, and came to land by break of day, his whole fleet arriving in safety.

## OBSERVATION.

AND thus ended the war in *Britany*: which afforded little matter of discourses being indeed but a sampling war, as well in regard of the Britans themselves, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman legions would never adventure to buckle with them in any standing battell; as also in regard there were no such towns in *Britany* as are recorded to have been in Gallia, which might have given great honour to the wars if there had been any such to have been besieged and taken in by *Cæsar*.

And although *Tacitus* saith that *Britany* was rather viewed then subdued by *Cæsar*, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law *Agriкола*, yet we find here that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirt or the heart of *Britany* (for our Hillarians do understand them to have inhabited that part which lieth as far as *Yorkshire* and *Lancashire*) were brought under the Roman Empire by *Cæ-*

sar: who was the first that ever laid tribute upon *Britany* in the behalf of the people of Rome; or cast upon them the heavy name of a subdued people.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BUT least I may seem negligent in these occurrences of *Britany*, as not deciming the alteration happening in this Island by the power of Rome worthy due memory: I will briefly set down the state thereof from this Area, during the lives of the twelve Emperours.

*Julius Cæsar*, next successful, first *Augustus* and then *Tiberius*, thought it policy to restrain the infinite desire of enlarging the Roman Empire, & so left this entrance into *Britany* unexplored. *Claudius* is said to have had a meaning to invade it, but did nothing. *Claudius* transported legions and aids, and first sent *Aulus Plautius* Governor, and after him *Ostorius*, who overthrew king *Caradocus* in battell, and shewed him at Rome to *Cladius*; to *Agrippina*, and the Lords of the Senate: who affirmed the fight to be no less honourable then *Annal*. *Perseus*. Him *D. Iunius Gallus* succeeded, who being old and full of honour, thought it sufficient to keep that which his predecessors had gotten. Next unto *D. Iunius* came *Perennis*, a lonely memorable in dying the first year of his Proprietorship. But *Suetonius Paulinus* following, got a great name, first by invading *Anglesey*, & strong with inhabitants, and a receptacle for fugitives; secondly, by overthrowing *Boadicea* Queen of the *Iceni*, in a battell comparable to the victories of old times: wherein four score thousand Britans were slain, with the loss of four hundred Roman soldiers. But being thought to be over-severe, he left his charge to *Perennius Turpilianus*; who compiling former troubles with a milder carriage, was succeeded by *Trebellius Maximus*; whose easy course of government taught the Britans good manners and made the firsts first wanton with ease, and then misinuous: which by his gentle severity being ended without blood-shed, he left his place to *Vettius Bolanus*, of like loose sense of discipline, but in stead of obedience got much good will. The errors of these three soft Proprietors were holpen by *Patricius Cerialis*, a great Commander, and worthy his place: he subdued the Brigantes, and left the place to *Julius Frontinus*, who with no less happineffe vanquished the *Silures*. The last was *Agriкола*, fortunate in divers battells against the Britans, and as unhappy in his reward; for *Dominian* maligning his honour, first discharged him of his place, and then, as it is thought, poisoned him. And this was the state of *Britany* under the twelve Emperours.

## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their wintering Camps, and quicketh the Carnutes.

Cæsar.

\* Titius  
Camberley,  
Ambrosius, or  
S. Quintus.

**A**fter he had put his ships in harbour, and held a Council of the Gallæ at Samarobrina; forasmuch as that year by reason of the drought, there was some scarcity of corn in Gallia, he was constrained to garrison his Army, and to disperse them into more cities than he had done the years before. And first he gave one legion to Caus Fabius to be led among the Morini; another to Quintus Cicero to be carried to the Nervii; another to L. Rotulus, to be conducted to the Eburones; a fourth he commanded to winter amongst the men of Rheims, in the marches of the Treviri, under T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgium, with whom he sent Marc. Cælius his Quæstor, L. Munatius Plancus, and C. Trebonius Legates; he sent one legion, that which he had last enrolled beyond the river Po in Italy, with five cohorts, unto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose country lyeth between the Maë and the Rhene, and was under the command of Ambiorix and Cativulcus; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeus Cotta. By distributing his legions in this manner, he thought to remedy the scarcity of corn; and yet the garrisons of all these legions, excepting that which Rotulus carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of one hundred miles. And until his legions were settled, and their wintering camps fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

There was amongst the Carnutes a man of great birth called Talgeus, whose ancestors had born the chief rule in their State. This man for his singular prowess and good will towards his country, he had done him very good service in all his wars. Cæsar restored to the dignity of his forefathers. Before he had reigned three years, his enemies with the complicity of divers of his citizens kill'd him in the open streets; which thing was complained of to Cæsar. Who fearing in regard so many men had a hand in it, lest that the city should by their insurrection revolt, commanded L. Plancus immediately to march with his legion thither from his quarters in Belgium; and there to winter; and whomsoever he could leave to be the ring-leaders in the death of Talgeus, he should take hold of them, and send them to him. Meant while Cæsar had notice from his Legates and Quæstors to whom he had delivered his legions, that they were settled in winter garrisons, and their garrisons fortified.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Have heard it oftentimes contradicted by some that understand not the weight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Army keeping head continually in one part of a kingdom, was more burthen some to the Commonwealth in regard of the expence of victuals, than when it was dispersed into particular Cities and Families, before the time of the mutiny and insurrection; for say they, in the general account of the publick weale it differeth not, whether a multitude of 30000. men be maintained with necessary provisions in one intire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout every part of the Countreys; forasmuch as every man hath but a competent quantity allotted unto him, which he cannot want in what sort or condition of life soever he be ranged: neither doth the place of a multitude grow in regard they are united together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude where soever. But such as look into the difference with judgement, shall find a marvellous inequality, both in regard of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the means whereby it is provided: for first we must understand, that an Army lying continually in one place, falleth to heavy upon that part that it quickly consumeth both the fat and the felle, (as they say) and leaveth nothing unspent; which that part can afford them, and without further supply of provisions would in a small time come to utter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plenty of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude; wherein there cannot be observed that proportion of moderate taking, to victual the Army with a sufficient competency, but the partial respect which the purveyors and victuallers will have to their private commodity, will quickly make an inconvenience either in the countrey from whence it is taken, or in the Army for which it is provided, according as the error may best advantage their particular; what discipline soever be established in that behalf. Whereas on the contrary party, when every particular man of that multitude did befall in a severall family, throughout all parts of the kingdom, the charge will be so insensible to the regard of the expence of the said families, that the countrey will never feel any inconvenience. And if every household that had received into his house one of the said Army, should give a true account of that which needs above his ordinary expence by the addition of one man, it would fall far short of that treasure which is necessarily required to maintain the said number of men united together into one body.

Neither doth the difference consist in the quantity of victuals which every man hath for his

## CHAP. X.

Ambiorix attempteth to surpris the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, practiseth to take them by guile.

**F**ifteen daies after the legions were settled in their wintering camps, there began a sudden tumult and rebellion by the means of Ambiorix and Cativulcus, who having received Sabinus and Cotta into their confines, and brought them in corn to the place where they lay, in the inducement of Inducement of Treachery, they stirred up their people to rebellion; and suddenly surpris'd those that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the camp. But when our men had took Arms, and were got up upon the rampiers, and had overmatch'd them in a skirmish of horse, which made a rally out of the camp upon the Gallies; Ambiorix departing of good success, withdrew his men from the assault; and then after their manner they cryed unto us, that some of our company should come and speak with them, for they had somewhat to discover touching the publick State, whereby they hoped all controversies might be ended. Whereupon C. Cæsar a Roman horseman, and one of Titius his familiar friends, and one Q. Junius a Spaniard, who divers times before had been sent by Cæsar to Ambiorix, were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himself much indebted to Cæsar for many courtesies; in that by his means he was freed from a pension which he payed to the Aduatici; and for that both his own son and his brothers sons, whom the Aduatici had held in prison under the name of hostages, were by Cæsar released and sent home again. And touching the assault of the camp, he had done nothing of himself, but by the impulsion of the State; among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authority over him, as he himself had in regard of the people; who were likewise enforced to this way, because they could not wish but the sudden insurrection of the Gallies, whereof his mal means might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to think himself able with so small a power to overthrow the people of Rome; but it was a general appointment throughout all Gallia, upon this day to assault all Cæsar's garrisons; to the end that one legion might not give relief unto another. Gallies could not easily deny the request of Gallies, especially when it concerned their publick liberty. Now having satisfied that duty which he owed to his Country, he had respect to Cæsar & his benefits, in regard whereof he admonish'd them, and prayed



prayed Titinius for the hospitality that had been between them, that he would look to the safety of himself and his soldiers. There was a great number of Germans that had already passed the Rhene, and would be here within two days; and therefore let them advise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borders perceived it, to depart with their soldiers out of their wintering-places either to Cicero or Labienus, of whom the one was not past fifty mile off, and the other a little further. For his own part he promised them thus much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should have safe passage through his territories; for so he should hold to a pleasure to his country in discharging it of garriisons, and shew himself thankful to Cæsar for his benefits. This speech being ended Ambiorix departed, and Carpius and Junius made report thereof to the Legates.

## OBSERVATION.

**L** Eander his counsell, to use the Foxes skin where the Lions saileth, doth shew that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, then the powers of our body are overcome with force. For oftentimes the mind is so disquieted with the extremity of perturbations, that neither the apprehension can take sound instructions, nor the judgement determine of that which is most for our good; but according as any passion shall happen to reigne in our disposition, so are we carried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of error, or mistrust of well-succeeding: whereas the body continueth firme in his own strength, and is subject onely to a greater weight of power by which it may be subdued and overthrowen. It behoveth us therefore to take good heed, that our furest hold be not unaltaird by the subtilty of the Fox, when it hath continued firm against the force of the Lion: and that the treachery of the spirit do not disadvantage those means, which either our own power or opportunity hath gained in our actions? Wherein a Counsellor cannot have a better rule for his direction, then to beware that violence of passion do not hinder the course of sound deliberation: and withall to be jealous of whatsoever an Enemy shall, either by speech or action, seem to thrust upon him, how colourable soever the reasons may be which are alledged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the mind be not confirmed by the vertue of her better faculties to resist the motion of fustile apprehensions, it may easily be seduced (either by fear or vain imaginations, diffident conceptions or over-easie credulity, with many other such disturbing powers) from that way which a good discretion, and an understanding free from passion would have taken.

First therefore I hold it necessary to have the

consultery of our judgement well settled with a firme resolution, and with the presence of the minds, before we enter into deliberation of such things as are made happy unto us by good discretion. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will give some help to a good conclusion, when we consider how improbable it is that an Enemy whose chiefest care is to weaken his adversary, and bring him to ruine, should advise him of any thing that may concern his good; unless the profit which he himself shall thereby gather, do far exceed that which the contrary part may expect.

I grant that in civile wars, where there are many friends on either party, and have the adverse cause as dear unto them as their own, there are oftentimes many advertisements given which proceed from a true and sincere affection, and may advantage the party whom it concerneth, as well in preventing any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be weighed by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof we have many pregnant examples in the civile wars of France. & particularly in Monsieur La Nou's discourse: but where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humours contending for that which peculiarly belongeth unto one of them, where care to keep that which is dearest unto them possesseth the one, and hope of gain thrusteth up the other, there is commonly such an universall hatred between them, that they are to look for small advantage by advertisements from the enemy. Which if the Romans had well considered, this subtle Gall had not disposed them of their strength, nor brought them to ruine.

## CHAP. XI.

The Romans call a council upon this advertisement, and resolve to depart, and joy themselves to leave other of the Legions.

**T** HE Romans being troubled at the suddainesse of the matter, albeit the things were spoken by an Enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moved them for that it was incredible that the Eburones, being base and of no reputation amongst themselves make war against the people of Rome. And therefore they propounded the matter in a council; wherein there grew a great controversy among them. L. Atrunculeus, and most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashly, nor to depart out of their wintering-camps without expresse commandment from Cæsar; forasmuch as they

they were able to resist never so great a power, yea even of the Germans, having their garriisons well fortified: an argument whereof was that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the Enemy, and given them many wounds. Neither wanted they any vittalls; and before that provision which they had made spent, there would come succour from either garriison, and from Cæsar. And thus concludes what was more dishonourable, for fear of greater necessity, then to consult of their weighty affairs by the advertisement of an Enemy? Titinius urged vehemently to the contrary, that it then would be too late for them to seek a remedy, when a greater power of the Enemy accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when any blow were given to any of the next wintering-camps. He took Cæsar to be gone into Italy; for otherwise the Carnutes would not have adventured to kill Talgetius; neither durst the Eburones have come so proudly to the camp. Let them not respect the honour, but the thing it self: the Rhene was not far off, and he knew well that the overthrow of Ariovistus and their former vittories were grievous to the Germans. The Gallies were vexed by the commodities they had received being brought in subjection to the Roman Empire, and having lost their former reputation in deeds of Arms.

And to conclusion who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprise such a matter without any ground or certainty thereof? but howsoever things stood his counsell was sure and could bring no harm: for if there were no worse thing intended, they should but go safely to the next garriison; or otherwise if the Gallies conspired with the Germans, their only safety consisted in celerity. As for the counsell of Cotta and such as were of the contrary opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if he had been here were not present danger, yet assuredly the same was to be feared by long siege. The wintering-camp being thus continued on either party, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders earnestly repugning it, Do as please you, said Ambiorix, for you will needs have it so; I will Sabinus (and that he spake with a loud voice, that a great part of the soldiers might well hear him) for I am not he that most feareth death amongst you, let these be wise; and if any mischance happen unto them, they shall account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldst let them, they might join themselves within two daies to the next garriison, and with them sustain what chance soever their common destiny should allot them, and not perishe with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellows. After these words they began to rise out of the council; but he laid upon them both:

encreasy was made that they would not by their disension and obstinacy bring all unto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or staid; for that they all agreed upon one thing, whereas in disagreeing there was no likelihood of well doing. The disposition was prolonged until midnight; at length Cotta yielded, and the sentence of Sabinus took place. And thereupon it was proclaimed that they should set forth by the break of day. The rest of the night was spent in watching. Every soldier sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leave behind him of such necessities as he had prepared for winter. All things were disposed in such sort, to make the soldiers believe that they could not stay without danger, and that the danger might be augmented by wearying the soldiers with watching.

## OBSERVATION.

**B**Y the resolution in this disposition it appeareth how little a grave and wise deliberation avails, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former observation: for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded upon things certain, and well known to the whole Councell; and yet the fear of Sabinus was such, that it carried the conclusion by such supposed assertions as the quality of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether upon that which the Enemy had suggested, and not upon any certain knowledge of the truth. Neither is it often seen when a Councell disputeth upon matters of such consequences, that their deliberations are altogether clear from such troublesome motions; but that it will somewhat incline to the partiality of a strong affection, so powerful is passion in the government of the soules, and so interrelated in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the uncertainty of mans judgment, from whence all contrary & different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a council of war should so much vary in case of deliberation, when as many especial points of military discipline remain yet undecided, having the authority of the great Commanders of all ages to testify the truth on either part; whereof I could alledge many examples. But concerning the issue and event of our deliberations, what can be more truly said then that of the Poet

Et male consultis primum est prudentia fallax  
Nec fortuna probat causas sequiturque merces;  
Sed vagaper cunctos nullo discrimine ferretur.

Scilicet

*Scilicet aliud quod nos cogitque regat;  
Majus, et in propriis ducit mortalia leges.*

Notwithstanding, so far as our wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it the good direction of most of the occurrences which fall within the circle of our business, or if we must needs miscarry, yet it is some what helpeth our ill fortune to think that we went upon best probabilities; it shall not be amiss to set down some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to understand that as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend only particularities, which being carried unto the apprehension are disposed into formes and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their several properties; from whence there arise intellectual notions, and rules of Arts, wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so he that intendeth to debate a matter with found deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions and a knowledge in general, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the material substance of the action. He therefore that can give best direction, either by experience or judicious discourse, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can best advise which is the safest way to avoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will allege two examples: the one modern in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seeme not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meer Apology: yet forasmuch as it freely censured the quality of particular circumstances, it may give great light to that which we seek after.

The modern example is taken out of *Guiccardinus*, from the wars which *Lewis the French King* had with the *Pope* and the *Venetians* concerning the State of *Ferrara* and the Duchy of *Modena*: wherein there arose a controversy among the *French Captains* whether it were better to go directly to seek the Enemy, who albeit they were lodged in a strong and secure place yet there was hope that with the virtue of Arms and impetuosity of artillery they might be dislodged, and driven to retreat; or otherwise to take the way either of *Modena* or *Bologna*, that is to the Enemy for fear of losing either of those towns might quit their hold, and by that means *Ferrara* should be freed from the war. Monsieur *Chaumont* the General of the *French* inclined to the former advice: But *Trivulce*, a man of great authority and experience, having been an executioner in 18. battells, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seek the Enemy to fight with him; and I have always heard great Captains hold this as a firm principle. Not to attempt the

fortune of a battell, unless there be either an offer of an especial advantage, or otherwise compulsion by necessity. The rules of war give it to the enemy that is the invader, and hath undertaken the conquest of *Ferrara* to seek to assail and charge us; but to us, to whom it is sufficient to defend our selves, it cannot be but impertinent to undertake an action contrary to all direction and discipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by evident reason, that there is no possibility to execute that devise but to our harm and disadvantage: for we cannot go to their camp but by the side of a hill, a straight and narrow way, where all our forces cannot be employed; and yet they with small numbers will make resistance, having the opportunity of the place favourable to their virtues. We must march by the rising of a hill, one horse after another, neither have we any other way to draw our Artillery, our baggage, our carts and ladders, but by the freight of the hill: and who doubteth not the freight of the hill a whole hour at the least? By which impediments every contrary accident may pursue to disorder. The Enemy is lodged in covert, provided of victuals and forrage; and we must incamp all bare and naked, not carrying with us that which should serve for our necessary nouriture, but expect the things to come after, which in reason ought to go with us. To attempt new enterprises, whereof the victory is little certain then the perill, is contrary to the gravity and reputation of a Leader; and in actions of the warlike enterprises are put to adventure that are done by will and not by reason. Many difficulties may compell us to make our abode there two or three dayes; yea the snows and rains, joined with the extremity of the season, do may suffice to detain us: how shall we then do for victuals and forrage? What shall we be able to do in the wars, wanting the things that should give us strength and defence? what is he that considereth not how dangerous it is to go seek the Enemy in a strong camp, and to be driven at one time to fight against them, & against the discomfort of the place? If we compell them not to abandon their camp, we cannot but be enforced to retire; a matter of great difficulty in a country so wholly against us, and where every little disavantage will turn to our great disadvantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that grave discourse, in the discovery of the particular occurrences incident to that enterprise; which being laid open to their consulted judgements, did manifestly point at the great disadvantages which were to be undergone by that attempt.

The other example is of more antiquity, taken out of *Lactius*, and concerneth the arraignment of certain Senators for the friendship that had pass

past between *Sejanus* and them. Amongst whom *M. Terentius* thus answered for himself, according as it hath of late been published by translation.

It would be peradventure less behovefull for my estate to acknowledge, then to deny the crime I am charged with: but hap what hap may, I will confesse that I have been *Sejanus*'s friend, and that I desired so to be, and that after I had obtained his friendship I was glad of it. I had then him joint-officer with my father in the government of the praetorian cohort, and not long after in managing the City affairs, and matters of war: his kinsmen and allies were advanced to honour: as every man was inward with *Sejanus*, so he was graced by *Cæsar*: and contrariwise such as were not in his favour lived in fear, and distressed with poverty. Neither do I allege any man for an example of this; all of us who were not privy to his last attempts, with the danger of my only estate I will defend: not *Sejanus* the *Pulchriensis*, but a part of the *Clandian* and *Julian* family, which by alliance he had entered into. Thy son in law, *Cæsar*, thy companion in the Consulship, and him who took upon him thy charge of administering the Commonwealth, we did reverence and honour. It is not our part to judge of him whom thou dost exalt above the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest judgement of things the gods have given, and to us the glory of obedience is left. We look into those things which we see before our eyes, whom thou dost enrich, whom thou dost advance to honours, who have great power of hurting or helping; which *Sejanus* have had no man will deny. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift it is not lawful to found, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the end reach unto them. Think not only, Lords of the Senate, of *Sejanus* last day; but of sixteen years, in which we did likewise fawn upon and court *Sabinus* and *Pompeius*; and to be known unto his freed men and partners was reckoned for a high favour. What then? Shall this defence be general, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past and his later actions? No: but let it by just bounds and terms be divided: let the traitors against the Commonwealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour be punished; but as for the friendships, duties, pleasures and good turns, the fame and shall discharge and quit thee, O *Cæsar*, and us.

The constancy of this Oration prevailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus we see how particularities decide the controversy, and make the way plain to good direction.

## CHAP. XII.

The Romans take their journey towards the next legion; and are set upon by the Galles.

AS soon as the day-light appeared, as they set forth of their Camp (like men persuaded that the counsel had been given them not by an Enemy, but by Ambiorix an especial friend) with a long-tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carry. The Galles understanding of their journey by their noise and watching in the night, secretly in the woods some two miles off layed an Ambuscado in two severall places of advantage, and there attended the coming of the Romans: and as soon as the greatest part of the troops were entered into a valley, suddenly they showed themselves on both sides the vale, pressing hard upon the rearmost, and binding the foremost from going up the hill, and to began to charge upon the Romans in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could be. Then at length *Tuturius*, as one that had provided for nothing beforehand, began to tremble, ran up and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearfully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him; as it happeneth for the most part to such as are forced to consult in the instant of execution.

## OBSERVATION.

It now plainly appears by this negligent and ill-ordered march, and the unlucky for encounter which the Galles gave them, that fear had ratified in the judgement of *Sabinus* the smooth suggestion of *Ambiorix*, with an approbation of a certain truth; and layd that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would have dicterated to be but weak, and of no probability: which so much the more amazed *Tuturius*, by how much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betrayed good counsel to a course full of danger; which as *Cæsar* noteth, must needs fall upon such as are then to seek for direction when the business requireth execution. I have handled already the inconveniences of disappointments, and therefore at this time will but bring it only into remembrance, that we may take the greater care to prevent an accident of that nature; wherein as the best remedy for an evil is to foresee it, according to the saying, *Previsa perent mala, evils foreseen fall of themselves*: so the greatest mischief in an evil is when it cometh unthought of, and besides our expectation, for then it falleth upon us with a supernaturall weight, and affrighteth the mind with a superstitious astonishment, as though the divine powers had prevented our designsments with

with an irremediable calamity, and cut off our appointment with a contrary decree: although peradventure the thing it felt carry no such importance, but might be remedied, if we were but prepared with an opinion that such a thing might happen.

It were no ill counsel therefore, what resolution forever be taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to cross our intentions, as that which is likely to happen from the direction of our chiefest projects; and so we shall be sure to have a present mind in the midst of our occasions, and feel no further danger than that which the nature of the thing inforceeth.

## CHAP. XIII.

The Romans cast themselves into an Orbe, and are much discomfited.

Cæsar.

**B** M. Cotta, who had before thought that these things might happen by the ways, and for this cause would not be the author of the journey, was not wanting in any thing that concerned their common safety: for both in calling upon the soldiers, and incouraging them, he executed the place of a Commander; and in fighting, the duty of a soldier. And when they found thereby reason of the length of their troupe, they were not able in their own persons to see all things done, and to give direction in every place; they caused it to be proclaimed, that they should all forsake their baggage, and cast themselves into an Orbe, which direction although in such case it be not to be reproved, yet it fell out favourably: for it both abated the courage of the Romans; and gave the Enemy greater incouragement, in as much as it seemed that that course was not taken but upon a great fear and in extremity of peril. Moreover it happened, as it could not otherwise chuse, that the soldiers went from their Ensignes, to take from the carriages such things as were most dear unto them; and there was nothing heard amongst them but clamours and weepings. But the Barbarous Gallies were not to learn how to carry themselves. For their Commanders caused it to be proclaimed, that no man should stir out of his place; for the prey was theirs, and all that the Romans had laid upon was reserved for them: and therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the victory. The Romans were equal to the Gallies both in number of men and valour; and albeit they were destitute of good Captains and of good fortune, yet they reposed in their mutual hope of their safety; and as often as any cohort suffered any, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the Enemy on that part.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled the nature of an Orbe, with such properties as are incident to a Circle; wherein I shewed the convenience of this figure, in regard of safe and strong imbatellling. I will now add thus much concerning the use thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbatellling for a defensive strength, and therefore never used but in extremity; so we must be very careful that the sudden betaking of our selves to such a refuge do not more dismay the soldiers, than the advantage of that imbatellling can benefit them. For unless a Leader be careful to keep his men in courage, that their hearts may be free from despair and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or body forever, when the particular members shall be senseless of that duty which belongeth unto them? For order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giving means to manage our valour with advantage. In the war of Africa we read, that Cæsar's legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quickly turned it to a better use, by advancing the two Cornets two contrary ways; and so divided the Enemy into two parts; and then beat them back, to their great disadvantage.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I Need not stand upon this order which the Gallies here took concerning pillage, that no soldier should forsake his station, or dislark himself in hope of spoil; which is a thing that from the very infancy of wars hath often changed the fortune of the days, and sold the honour of a publick victory for private lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, let that which Guicciardine reporteth of the battle of Libra. Two suffice to warn a well-directed Army, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name King of France received at that time, as by the loss which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seek after pillage until the victory be obtained.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

The insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Cæsar now complaineth as the only want which these Romans had to clear themselves of this danger, bringeth to our consideration that which former times have made a question; which is, Whether it were the virtue of the Roman Leaders, or the valour of their soldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatness, and made their people and Senate Lords of the world. Polybius weighing the causes of a victo-

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ry which the Carthaginians gained of the Romans, by the counsel and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, having before that time received divers overthrowes during the time of those wars in Africa; concludeth that it was more in the worthiness of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary virtue of the soldiers, that the Romans achieved so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hannibal; who from the beginning of the second Punic war, till gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and strengthening the jurisdiction of mighty Rome, until it had got a Leader matchable to that subtle Carthaginian, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that famous battle between the old Romans and the last Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballanced, both in number and quality of their soldiers, having both the same Armes, the same use of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had been in a Civile war. Neither could Fortune tell by the presence of their Armies where to bestow her favour, or where to shew her disdain; but that the worthiness of the Roman Leaders brought the odds in the tryalls, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Whereby it appeareth how much it importeth the whole fortune of the Army, to have a Leader worthy of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequality between two equal Armies, then the wilddome and experience of a grave Commander, or the disability of an unskillfull Leader; which are so powerful in their severall effects, that there is greater hope of a herd of Harts led by a Lion, then of so many Lions conducted by a Hart.

## CHAP. XIV.

Ambiorix directed the Gallies how they might best fight with advantage, and frustrate the weapons of the Roman soldiers.

Cæsar.

**I** He which thing when Ambiorix perceived, he commanded his men to throw their casting weapons afar off, and keep themselves from coming near at hands, and where the Romans charged them to give way, for that by reason of the lightness of their armes and their daily exercise the Romans could do them no harm: and again, as they saw them retire to their Ensignes, then to pursue them. Which commandment was so diligently observed by the Gallies, that as oft as any cohort sallied out of the Orbe to give an assault, the Enemy gave back, as fast as they could; and in the mean time there was no help but that part must be left naked and open to the inconvenience of casting weapons: and again, as they retired to

their places, they were circumvented, as well by them that had given place unto them, as by such as stood next about them. And if they went about to keep their grounds, they could neither help themselves by their manhood, nor standing thick together avoid the darts that such a multitude cast upon them. A day notwithstanding these inconveniences, besides the wounds which they had received, they stood still at their defence, and having so spent the greatest part of the day (for they had fought eight houres together) they committed nothing disonourable, nor unworthy of themselves.

## THE OBSERVATION.

I Have spoken already of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbatellling, and in firm standing, and buckling at handy-blows: as may appear by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to give back and follow on again, as the lightness of their Armes gave them opportunity. In like manner in the first book of the Civile wars in the battle between Cæsar and Afranius, it appeareth that Cæsar his soldiers were bound to keep their arrays, not to leave their Ensignes; nor without a weighty occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Afranius fought thin and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laid unto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and give back, as they had learned of the Portuguese and other Barbarous Nations.

## CHAP. XV.

The Romans are overthrown.

**I** Hen T. Baluentius, who the year before had been prince of that legions, a valiant man and of great authority, had both his thighs dived through with a javelin, and Q. Lucanian, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his son was slain, and L. Cotta the Legatus he busily incouraged all the cohorts and centuries was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moved with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix afar off incouraging his men, sent Cn. Pompeius unto him to intreat him that he would spare him and his soldiers. Ambiorix answered that if he were desirous to treat, he might: for he hoped to obtain so much of the people to save the soldiers; but for himself, he should have no harm at all for the assurance whereof he gave him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, and that if he liked that they two should go out of the battell, and have conference with Ambiorix, he doubted not but to obtain of him the safety of themselves, and their

Cæsar.

their soldiers. *Cotta* absolutely denied to go to an armed enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. *Titus* commanded such Tribunes and Centurions as were present to follow him; and when he came near to *Ambiorix*, being commanded to cast away his arms, he obeyed, and willed those that were with him to do the same. In the mean time while they treated of the conditions, and *Ambiorix* began a solemn proposition of purpose, *Titus* was by little and little incensed about and slain. Then, according to their custom, they cried victory; and taking up a howling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault; and routed their troops. There *L. Cotta* fighting valiantly was slain; and the most part of the soldiers with him. The remnant retired into their camp, amongst whom *L. Petulidius* the Eagle-bearer, when he saw himself overcharged with enemies, threw the Eagle with the rampiers, and fighting with great courage before the Camp was slain. The rest with much ado induced the assault until night; and in the night, being in despair of all succour, slew themselves every man. A few that escaped from the battle came by unknown ways through the woods to *Labienus*, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

## OBSERVATION.

And thus have we heard of the greatest loss that ever fell at any one time upon *Cæsar* his Army, from the time that he was slain. Proculus in *Gallia*, unto the end of his Dictatorship. For in the two overthrowes at *Durnalum* he lost not above 1000 men; and in that at *Gergetia* not so many; but here fifteen cohorts were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men or thereabout. Which maketh cowardice and ill direction the more hateful; in regard that the great victory, which his valour obtained in *Pharsalia* cost him but the lives of two hundred men.

The resolution of such as returned to the Camp witnessed the exceeding valour of the Roman soldiers; if a valiant Leader had had the managing thereof; or if *Cotta* alone had been absolute Commanders there had been great hope of better fortune in the success. But here it happened as it commonly doth; that where there are many that are equal sharers in the chief authority, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion than the rest; which being a property rather of passion than of judicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperate opposition of a true discerning understanding. And so consequently it fell out, that one coward having place and authority in the Council, and doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the

Leaders: for his timorousness he lieth alwayes to extremities, making him rash in consultation, pemptory in opinion, and bafe in case of peril; all which are enemies to good directions, and the onely instruments of multichecking fortune.

## CHAP. XVI.

*Ambiorix* halseth to besiege *Cicero*, and stretch up the *Aduatici*, the *Nervi*, and so vasteth a great power.

*Ambiorix* took such spirits unto him upon this victory, that with his horsemen he went immediately unto the *Aduatici*, being the next borderers upon his kingdom, without intermission of night or day, commanding his footmen to follow him. The *Aduatici* upon his opening the matter being stirred up to commotion, the next day after he came to the *Nervi*, exhorting them not to let slip this occasion of recovering to themselves perpetual liberty, and recovering them of the Romans for the wrongs they had received. He told them that two legions were already slain, and a great part of the Army overthrowen: it was now no great matter suddenly to surprise the legion that wintered with *Cicero*; to the performance whereof he offered himself to be their assistant. These remonstrances easily persuaded the *Nervi*; and therefore they dispatched speedy messengers to the *Centrones*, *Grudii*, *Leuci*, *Pleumolii* and *Gorduni*, who were all under their dominion, and raised very great forces; and with them they hastened to the camp where *Cicero* wintered before any inkling of the death of *Titus* was brought unto him.

## OBSERVATION.

The ambitious and working spirit of *Ambiorix*, that could attempt to raise the baseness of a small and ignoble State to so high a point of resolution, that they durst adventure upon the Roman legions, being led in the strength of their Empire by the memory of so many victories in *Gallia*, wanted now no means to make an overture to a universal commotion, propounding liberty and revenge to the *Gallies* (two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdug people) if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course which his example had proved sure and easy. Which may serve to shew, that he that will attempt upon doubtful and unsafe Principles, will take great advantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient means for his greatest designs.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Cicero* defendeth his Camp from the surprisall of the *Nervi*, and prepareth himself against a siege.

It happened to *Cicero* also (as it could not otherwise chuse) that many of the soldiers that were gone into the woods for timber and munitions, were cut off by the sudden approach of the Enemies horsemen. These being incircumvented, the *Eburones*, *Nervi*, and *Aduatici*, with all their confederates and clients began to assault the Camp. The Romans betook them speedily to their weapons, and got upon the rampier. With much ado they held out that day: for the *Gallies* trusted much upon their victory; hoping if they sped well in their actions, to be victors ever after.

*Cicero* dispatched letters unto all speed to *Cæsar* promising great rewards to him that would carry them; but all the ways were so fore-laid that the Messengers were taken. In one place there was a built in the camp one hundred and twenty towers of such timber as was brought in for fortification; and whatsoever wanted of the rest of the work was perfected.

The evening next day with a far greater power assaulted the Camp, and filled up the ditch. The Romans made the like defence as they had done the day before; the like was continued divers dayes after. The Romans made no intermission of their work at any part of the night; they gave any rest either to the sick or the wounded. Whatsoever was needfull for the next dayes assault was provided in readiness the night before: a great number of stakes harden in the fire were prepared, and many mural piles were made; the towers were stowed in their stories; *Pincetes* and *Parapets* were set up of hurdles; and *Cicero* himself being sick and of a weak constitution, took up such measure as to rest himself in the night time; so that the soldiers of their own accord compelled him by intreaty to spare himself.

## OBSERVATION.

The *Cicero* is said to be the brother of *Marcius Cicero* the famous Orator; and to him were the letters sent which are found in his Epistles directed *Quinto fratri*. In this action his carriage deserved as great reputation in the true estimate of honours as ever his brother did for his eloquence *pro Roscio*. And if it had been the others fortune to have performed the like service, he had made it the greatest exploit that ever was had achieved by arms. Wherein partly may be commended the diligence and industry which was used in raising to many uses in so small a time; for providing the needful things as were necessary for

the next dayes defence; for making so many stakes hardened in the end with fire for the defence of the rampier; and for the store of these mural piles, which resembled the form of the ordinary pile, but were far greater and weightier, in regard they were to be cast from the rampier; which gave them such advantage by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arm they were very effectual and of great terror.

## CHAP. XVIII.

The *Nervi* propound the same things to *Cicero* which *Ambiorix* had done to *Sabinus*; but are rejected.

Then the Princes and chief Commanders of the *Nervi*, which had any entrance of speech and cause of acquaintance with *Cicero*, signified their desire to speak with him, which being granted, they propounded the same things which *Ambiorix* had used to deceive *Sabinus*; all *Gallia* were in Arms; the Germans were come over the Rhene; *Cæsar* and the rest were besieged in their wintering camps; *Sabinus* and his men were cut in pieces; and for the more credit to it they shew him *Ambiorix*. They said they were much deceived if they expected any help from those who were at present scarce able to help themselves. Notwithstanding they carried this mind to *Cicero* and the people of Rome, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them, which they would not suffer to be made a common practise. They might depart in safety whither they would, without disturbance or fear of danger. *Cicero* only made this answer; That it was not the custom of the people of Rome to take any article or condition from an armed Enemy; but if they would try their Arms aside, let them use this furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiate it with *Cæsar*: there was great hope in regard of his justice and equity, that they should not return unsatisfied.

## OBSERVATION.

The first attempt which *Ambiorix* made upon the Camp of *Sabinus* and *Cotta* was but short; but here, what with the pride of the former victory, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carry it by assault. For the first assault of a place, especially when it cometh by way of surprisall, is of greater hope to the assailants and of greater danger to the defendants, then such as afterward are brought in the sequel of the war: for after the first burnt the heat of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which

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is most violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth cold and remisse, as also with the harms and perill which they meet with in the encounter; and on the contrary side, the defendants having withstood the first fury, wherein there is most terror and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firm against any charge whatsoever.

## CHAP. XIX.

The *Nervii* besiege *Cicero* with a ditch and a rampier, and work means to set fire on their tents.

Cæs.

**T**He *Nervii* disappointed of it is hopes carried a ditch and a rampier round about the camp; the rampier was eleven foot high, and the ditch fifteen foot deep: which they had learned of the Romans, partly by being conversant among them certain years before, and partly by the prisoners and captives which they had taken. But they had no iron tools fit for that purpose, but were driven to cut up turf with their swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carry it away with their *Montes* and *Gabernes*. whereby may be gathered what a multitude of men there were at the siege; for in less than three hours they finished the fortification of fifteen miles in circuit. The dayes following the enemies built towers to the height of the rampier, prepared great hooks and strong poulbeuses or safeguards of boards and timber, according as the captives had given them instruction. The seventh day of the siege being a very windy day, they cast hot bullets of clay out of sling, and burning darts upon the cabins of the Romans, which after the manner of the Gallies were thatched with straw. These cabins were quickly set on fire, whereby the violence of the wind was carried over all the camp. The enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, although the victory were already gotten, began to bring their Towers and Ladders to the rampier, and to scale it with ladders. But such was the valour of the Roman soldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fires, and overcharged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their face; yet no man forsook the rampier, or scarce looked back at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly and with unexcused courage. This was the first day the Romans had, and yet it had this issue, that a very great number of the enemies were slain and wounded; for they had so thronged themselves under the rampier, that the hindmost hindered the foremost from retiring back. The flame at length abating, and the enemies having brought on one of

their towers to the very works, the Centurions of the third cohort drew back themselves, and their men from the place where they stood, and with signs and voices called to the enemies to enter if they thought good: but none of them durst approach. Then did they by casting stones from all parts beat them from the works, and set their tower on fire.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**His one example may serve to shew the excellency of the Roman discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Art. For they perceiving that the fortune of wars consisted chiefly in the mauling of particular occurrences, trained their soldiers in that form of discipline as might struggle with inconveniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and to overcome all difficulties and hinderances with a constant perseverance and a courage invincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious Commander, that seeketh to overtop the trophies of honour with the memory of his exploits, will quickly perish by his own direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker than the means will lead him to his designments. For where the weight is greater than the strength, the engine will sooner break than lift it up. Let a discreet Leader therefore so level his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceed the ability of his particular means, but first let him be well assured what his soldiers can do, before he resolve what he will do: or otherwise let him be enabled them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth may answer the height of his desires, and follow his aspiring mind with a resolution grounded upon knowledge and valour; and so making their ability the ground of his designs, he shall never fail of means to perform what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath within these late years repaired our Commanders in many parts of Christendome with loose and dishonour, when as they have measured the humour of their poor needy and undisciplined soldier by the garb of their ambitious thoughts, and so laid such projects of difficulty, as were very unlivable in the particularity of occurrences to that which their soldiers were fit to execute.

## CHAP. XX.

The emulation between *XX* Centurions, *Pulpio* and *Varenus*, with their fortunes in the encounter.

**T**Here were in that legion two valiant men, *Titus Pulpio* and *L. Varenus* Centurions, coming on apace to the dignity of the first orders. These two were at continual debate, which of them should be preferred one before another, and

and every year contended for place of preferment with much strife and emulation. *Pulpio*, at a time that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to *Varenus*, and asked him why he now stood doubtfull; or what other place he did look for to make retreat of his manhood. This is the day, said he, that shall decide our controversies. And when he had spoken these words, he went on of the fortification; and where he saw the Enemy the thickest, he fiercely set upon them. Then could not *Varenus* hold himself within the rampier, but for his credit sake followed after in a reasonable distance. *Pulpio* cast his pile at the enemy, and struck one of the multitude through that came running out against him. He being slain, the enemies cover him with their shields, and all cast their weapons at *Pulpio*, giving him no respite or time of retreat. *Pulpio* had his target struck through, and the dart stuck fast in his girdle. This chance turned aside his scabbards and hindered his right hand from pulling out his sword; in which disadvantage the enemy pressed hard upon him. *Varenus* came and rescued him, slaying the whole multitude, thinking *Pulpio* to be slain with the darts, turned to *Varenus*: who speedily betook him to his sword, and came so handily stroak, and having slain one, he put the rest somewhat back, but as he followed over hastily upon them, he fell down. Him did *Pulpio* rescue being circumvented and in danger: so both of them, having slain many of the enemy, retired to their Camp in safety, to their great honour. Thus Fortune carried away the contention, as the encounter of them both, that being Enemies, they nevertheless gave help to save each others life, in such sort as it was not to be judged which of them deserved greatest honour.

## OBSERVATION.

**C**Æsar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthy to be related amongst the deeds of Armes contained in these Commentaries. Wherein we are first to observe the grounds of this quarrel, which was their continual strife for place of preferment, which they sought after, by shewing their valour in time of danger, and approving their worth by the greatness of their desert: a contention worthy the Roman discipline, & may serve for a pattern of true honour full of courage, accomplished with virtue. For these Similitudes which desire of honour had cast between them, brought forth emulations, which is the spur of virtue, far from enmity or hatefull contention: for the difference between these two qualities is, that enmity hunteth after destruction, & only rejoiceth in that which bringeth to our adversary utter ruine, dis-

honour, or ill achievement; but emulation contendeth only by well deserving to gain the advantage of another mans fame, that useth the same means to attain to the like end; and is always mixed with love, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the sympathy of their desires, not seeking the overthrow of their Competitors, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foul and unfortunate calamity, that he may still continue to shew the greatness of his worth, by the opposition of inferior actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A virtue rare and unknown in these dayes, and would hardly find subjects to be resident in, if it should offer her help in the course of our affairs, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositions of our times: For we can no sooner conceive the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the uttermost of our malice, and reth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed parties, then with thousand of Tropies deservely excited to our honour. Which maketh me wonder, when I look into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time which brought forth such honest effects of virtues, to their glory and our ignominy, having learned better rules then were known unto them; or whether the world weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection as it did in those dayes; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remisse and negligent, that virtue hath no part in us but words of praise, our whole practice being consecrated to actions of reproach. The injuries, murders, scandalous carriages of one towards another, which in these dayes are so readily offered and so impatiently conlaid, will admit no satisfaction but private combats; which in the first Monarchies was granted only against strangers & foreign enemies, as the only objects of Armes and wrath, and capable of that justice which the private sword should execute: for they well perceived that their single battels were as sparkles of civile discord, and intestine wars; although not to apparent in the general view of their States, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good government. And if there were a true record of such as have been either slain or wounded within these fourty years, either in this kingdom, or in *France* or in *Germany*, by this licentious and brutish customs, I make no question but they would amount to a number capable of that fearful title which is attributed to Civile wars.

Neither is there any law, how rigorous or hard soever, that can give relief to this disorder;

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disorders, but the restraint will draw on as great enormities, and as intolerable in a good government. *Rome's* King of the *Lambards* forbade his subjects this manner of combat: but shortly after, he was constrained to recall the Edict for the avoiding of greater evils; although he protected the thing to be both humane and baneful. The like Edict was published in *France* by *Philip the Fair*; but was within two years revoked again at the instant request of his Subjects, in regard of the murders and assassinations committed in that kingdom.

The only remedy that I find to take effect in this case, was that of late time which the Prince of *Melphe* in *Pi-moon* invented to prevent this evil: for perceiving how ordinary quarrels and blood-shed were in his camp, he assigned a place between two bridges for the performance of the *Duel*, with this charge, that he that had the worst should always be slain; & called from that ridge into the water. The danger caused with dishonour (which by this Decree attended such as undertook private combat) made the soldiers venter in their carriage, and put an end to their sedition and civile discords. But that which is yet worst of all is, that custom hath now made it so familiar, that every trifle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a private combat: a crosse look calleth another mans honour in question; but the word *Lye* is of as great consequence as any stab or villany whatsoever. Whereat we may well wonder, how it happeneth that we feel our selves so much exasperated at the reproach of that vice which we so ordinarily commit: for in the outcome of these times, to cast upon the *Lye* is the greatest injury that words can do unto us; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a property in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption unto which we are most subject.

I speak not this to qualify the foulness of this vice; for I hold a *Lye* to be a monster in nature, one that countermeth *GOD's*, and feareth man, as an ancient Father saith: but to shew the crookedness of our disposition, in disdaining to acknowledge that fault which we so commonly commit. But I would fain learn when honour itself came to be measured with words: for from the beginning it was not so. *Cæsar* was often called to his face drunk and drunkard, without any further matter; and the liberty of invectives which great personages used one against another, as it begins, so it ended with words. And so I think our *Lie* might too, for I take him that counteth the *Lie*, and so let it rest until further proof, to have as great advantage in the reputation of honour as the former that first gave the disgrace.

## CHAP. XXI.

As to findeth means to advertise Cæsar of this Accident; who halting, smother the siege, and putteth the Enemy to a great slaughter.

As the siege grew daily hotter and fiercer, and specially for that a great part of the soldiers were laid up with wounds, the matter brought into a few mens hands that were able to make any defence; so they sent out Letters and Messengers to the more often to Cæsar: of whom some were taken, and in the sight of our soldiers tormented to death. There was one within the place besieged of the Nation of the Nervii, called *Vetico*, of honest parentage, who in the beginning of the siege had fled to Cæsar, and carried himself faithfully in that service. This man did Cæsar chuse, perswading him with hopes of Liberty, and other great rewards, to carry Letters to Cæsar: which he took, and brought ed him up in his *Dart*, travelled as a Gall amongst the *Gallies*, without any suspicions, and so came to Cæsar. Of whom he understood was best, dangerously Cæsar received these Letters about the eleventh hour of the day, & speech-ed presently a Messenger to *M. Cælius* the Treasurer in the country of the *Bellovac*, twenty five miles off, commanding the legion to sit out at midnight, and secretly to come unto him. *Cælius* set out and came along with the Messenger. He sent another Post to *Caius Fabius the Legate*, to bring that legion to the confines of the *Atrebates*, through which he was to pass. And wrote in like manner to *Labienus*, that if it stood with the convenience of the State, he should bring his legion to the territories of the Nervii: for the rest of the Army that were further off he thought good not to expect. He drew four hundred horse, or thereabouts from the nearest wintering-Camps. And being advertised about the third hour (by the fore-runners) of *Cælius* coming, he marched that day twenty miles.

He made *Crassus* Governor of *Samorobri-nas*, & gave him one legion for the defence thereof; in regard that the baggage of the whole Army, the hostages of the *Provinciæ*, the publick transactions and Letters together with all the Corn which he had got for the provision of the Winter, was left in that place. *Fabius* according to his directions, without any delay met him with his legion.

*Labienus* understanding of the death of *Sabinus*, and the slaughter of the *Colobris*, & knowing also that the whole forces of the *Treviri* were marching toward him, doubt-

Cumbay.

ed that if his setting forward out of his winter station should seem as a fleeing away, he should not be able to undergo the charge of the enemy, whom a late victory had made insolent: and therefore informed Cæsar by his Letters, what danger it would be to draw the legion from their wintering-Camp; relating what had happened amongst the *Eburones*; & how that all the forces of the *Treviri*, both horse and foot, lay but three miles distant from his Camp.

Cæsar allowing of these reasons, howsoever his hope of three legions was fallen unto two yet his whole trust was in celerity, as the only means of all their safety: and so by great journeys came into the confines of the *Nervi*; where he understood by the Captives how matters passed with Cæsar, and what danger he was in. At what time he perswaded a certain horseman of the *Gallies*, by great rewards offered unto him, to carry a Letter unto Cæsar, which he sent writ in Greek Characters, least his purposes should be discovered, if the Letter had been intercepted: advising, that if he could not come to his presence, he should try it to the King of a *Dart*, and so cast it into the fortifications. He advertised them by his Letter that he was on the way with the legions, and would be there instantly to raise the siege, exhorting him to persevere in his wonted gallantry. The Gall fearing some danger, followed the directions and cast it into the works by a *Dart*; which fell by chance upon a turret; and there stuck, two dayes before it was perceived: the third day a soldier finding it took it down, and he brought over all his forces, and imbrated them in an unequal and disadvantageous place. Our men being drawn from the rampier (to make the matter more apparent) they were imboldened to come nearer, and to cast weapons from all parts into our works: sending *Heralds* round about with Proclamations, That if any Gall or Roman would come over unto them before the third hour, he should be taken into their safe protection; but after that time there was no hope of any such reception. And they did so concern our party, that whereas the Ports were shut up for a while with a single row of turfs, to the end they might appear to be made up in such manner that they could not be broken open, some of them began to break down the rampier with their hands, and others to fill up the ditch.

Which Cæsar perceiving, sallied out at all the Ports at once, and sending out the Cavalry, put the enemy so suddenly to flight, that not one of them resisted by way of fighting: in so much as he slew a great number of them, and put them all besides their Arms. But because he feared to follow them far, in regard of the woods and bogs that lay in their passage, (being unwilling to hazard himself upon the least occasion

such haste; and thereupon sat down, and in an indifferent place as he could chuse fortified his Camp. Which being of itself very little, as not having scarce even then (and men, and beasts without any carriages; yet he lessened it as much as he could by narrowing the small Streets thereof; to the end he might the better defend it, if happily the enemy might be drawn to engage himself seriously in any attempt upon the same. In the mean time having sent out Discoverers into all parts, he informed himself which way he might most conveniently pass over the valley.

The same days, after small encounters of the Cavalry at the waters, either party contained themselves within their fortifications: the *Gallies*, as expelling greater forces, which were not yet come; and Cæsar, that by a counterfeited fear he might draw the Enemy to the place where he was lodged on this side the valley, and so strike the buttell before his Camp; and if he could not bring it to about, then upon discovery of the wayes, to pass the valley and the river without lesse danger. As it began to be day-light the Cavalry of the enemy came near unto the Camp, and began to skirmish with our horsemen. Cæsar of set purpose commanded the horsemen to fall back, and to betake themselves into the Camp: and withall to fortify their camp on all sides with a higher rampier, to stop up the Gates; and in doing of these things to carry themselves quietly, and without any feigned show of great fear. With which inducement the enemy was so drawn on, that he brought over all his forces, and imbrated them in an unequal and disadvantageous place. Our men being drawn from the rampier (to make the matter more apparent) they were imboldened to come nearer, and to cast weapons from all parts into our works: sending *Heralds* round about with Proclamations, That if any Gall or Roman would come over unto them before the third hour, he should be taken into their safe protection; but after that time there was no hope of any such reception. And they did so concern our party, that whereas the Ports were shut up for a while with a single row of turfs, to the end they might appear to be made up in such manner that they could not be broken open, some of them began to break down the rampier with their hands, and others to fill up the ditch.

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caution of danger) he returned with all his forces in safety, and the self-same day came to Cicero; where he admired the towers, the minarets and works which were begun and prepared by the enemy; and drawing out the legion he found that the tenth man had not escaped without wounds. By all which circumstances he understood, with what danger and valour the business had been carried. He commended Cicero and the legion according to their merit; called out by name such Centurions and Tribunes of the soldiers, as by testimony of Cicero were found to have deserved extraordinary in their service; informed himself by the captives of the certainty of Sabinus & Cotta's misfortune. The next day he spoke publicly to the soldiers, opened the particulars of that matter, and then seasoned them with comfort and encouragement, shewing that the loss which happened through the fault and temerity of a Legion, was to be born with better patience; and the rather so much as by the assistance of the immortal Gods, and by their own virtue, the loss was redeemed: in such a fashion, as neither the enemy did long joy in, nor themselves were long afflicted with grief for the same.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**he passages in this Chapter are of great variety, and do give occasion of much discourse. But that which is most remarkable is, that to exceed in forces and troops of men, may be a means to bring a party to an overthrow; for an extraordinary power doth always beget an opinion tottering to their own desires, and can hardly think of any other end than that which seemeth with security and victorious success; which being crossed in any material circumstance, and besides the course of their intentions, whereby they fail of what they expected, doth consequently draw all the other way, and change hope into despair: as it fared here with the Galles upon Cæsar's sudden falling out of the Camp.

## CHAP. XXII.

The commotions of the States of Gallia, Induciomarus attempting great matters, is slain, and the Country quieted.

Cæsar.

**I**N the meantime the report of Cæsar's victory was carried to Labienus with incredible speed; through the country of those of Rheims; inasmuch as being fifty miles distant from that place where Cicero wintered, and that the overthrow was given about three of the clock in the afternoon, there was a shout at the Camp-gate before midnight; whereby

the men of Rheims congratulated Labienus for that victory. The same whereof being carried to the Treviri, Induciomarus, but persuaded the next day to besiege Labienus, fled in the night time, and carried all his forces back to the Treviri. Cæsar remanded Fabius with his legion into their winter stations: He himself with three legions determined to winter about Samarobrina. And forasmuch as there were such commotions throughout all Gallia, he resolved to abide with the Army all the winter. For upon the news of the overthrow of Sabinus, almost all the States of Gallia did enter into a consultation of war; sent Messengers and Ambassadors into all parts, to make overtures for future resolutions, and to understand in what place the war might best be set on foot; holding their conventicles by night in secret and desert places: in such manner as there passed not a day during all that winter which brought not some new cure or trouble to Cæsar, whilst he was daily advertised of new meetings and conferences amongst the Galles. Amongst others he had intelligence from L. Roscius the Legate, whom he had set over the thirteenth legion, that great forces of those States and Cities of the Galles that were called Attonica were assembled together to fight against him; and were come within eight miles of his camp; and understanding of Cæsar's victory, they fell back in such a fashion as though they meant to fly away. But Cæsar having called unto him the Princes and chief men of every State, terrifying some, as seeming to understand their compliments, and persuading others, kept a great part of Gallia in obedience. Howbeit the Senones (a strong people, and of great authority amongst the Galles) went about by a public decree to kill Cæsar, whom Cæsar had set to be king over them, (whose brother Montagus at Cæsar's coming into Gallia, and whose ancestors formerly were possessed of that kingdom) which he perceiving fled away, and was persecuted to the very borders, and so driven as well out of his private house as of his kingdom. And having sent Ambassadors to Cæsar to satisfy him herein; whereunto he commanded the whole Senate to come unto him, they refused to obey his warrant. So much it prevailed amongst barbarous peoples, that there were some found that durst avouch the undertaking of a war. Which made such an alteration in the minds of all men, that besides the Hedui and the State of Rheims, whom Cæsar had in great favour and respect (the one for their ancient and perpetual fidelity to the people of Rome, and the other for their late services in the war of Gallia) there was almost no State free from suspicion. Inasmuch as I know not well whether it may not be wondered at or no, as well for many other reasons, as specially

cially for that they greatly grieved, that they who excelled all other nations in deeds of arms, had now lost their reputation so far, as they were forced to bear the yoke of the people of Rome.

The Treviri and Induciomarus lost no time of all that winter, but sent Commissioners beyond the Rhene, following the cities, and promising money, with confident assurance that the greatest part of their Army was already cut off, and that what was left was but a small remainder of the same: and yet for all that no people of the Germans could be persuaded to pass the Rhene. For having twice made trial to their cost in the war of Ariovistus, and in the passage of the Tunchlith, they would tempt Fortune no further.

Francfort.

Induciomarus cast down from his hope, did notwithstanding train and gather forces, got horses from the bordering States, and with great rewards drew unto him banished and condemned men from all parts of Gallia; and did thereby get such an opinion throughout all that Country, that Ambassadors came flocking unto him from all quarters, and sought his favour both in public and private. When he understood that men made to him of their own accord, and that on the one side the Senones and Carnutes were instigated with a remembrance of their offences, and on the other side the Nervii and Attonica made provision of war against the Romans, and that he should not want voluntary forces, if he did but once go out of his confines; he gave order to call a Council of Arms: which according to the manner of the Galles, was always the beginning of a war, being such as constrained all the men that were of years, by the common law of the lands, to assemble together in Arms: and he that came last, was in the fight of all the rest put to death with exquisite torture. In that Council he took order to proclaim Cingetorix the chief of the other faction, and his son in law, (whom as we have before declared had followed Cæsar, and not left him in any of those services) a Traitor to the State, and that his goods should be confiscated.

That being done, he published in the Council, that he was sent for by the Senones and the Carnutes, and many other States of Gallia: whether he meant to go through the territories of the inhabitants of Rheims; and that he would hurry and waste their country. But first his purpose was to take the camp of Labienus, and accordingly gave order what he would have done. Labienus being in a camp exceedingly fortified, as well by Nature as by Arts, did not fear any danger that might happen to himself or the legion; but rather studied not to let pass any occasion to carry the matter handily and to purpose. And there-

fore being advertised by Cingetorix and his allies, what speech Induciomarus had delivered in the Council, he sent Messengers to all the confining cities, and commanded his men to be sent unto him by a certain day.

In the mean time Induciomarus rid up and down almost every day with all his cavalry under his camp; sometimes to view the face thereof, otherwise to parties, or else to terrify the soldiers; and his horsemen for the most part would cast their weapons within the rampier. Labienus kept all his men within the fortifications, and did what he could to make the enemy believe that he was fore afraid. And as Induciomarus came daily with greater contempt to the campe, night having taken into the cavalry of the bordering cities, which he had formerly sent for, he kept all his party (by good guarding with in his camp with such diligence, that their reception could not possibly be bribed abroad, or carried to the Treviri. In the mean time Induciomarus, according to his wonted custom, approached near the camp, and there spent a great part of the day: the horsemen cast their weapons, and with words of high reproach called out their men to fight; without any word given in answer by them. And a little before the evening, as they dispersed themselves and departed upon a sudden, Labienus let out all the cavalry at two Ports commanding them that after the Enemy was put to flight (which he saw would necessarily happen) that every one should make after Induciomarus; and that no man should so much as wound any other enemy before they saw him slain; being very unwilling to give him time to escape, while the soldiers were engaged with the rest: and propounded great rewards to them that slew him. He sent out also several cohorts to assist the horse. Fortune made good that direction: for as all made after one, Induciomarus was surprised in the ford of a River, and slain, and his head was brought back into the camp. The horsemen returning, flew as many of the rest as they could take, (his thing being known, all the forces of the Eburones and Nervii which were met together departed home; and after that time Cæsar had Gallia better seated in quietness).

## OBSERVATION.

**A**S the misfortune which befell Sabinus and Cotta put all Gallia into troubles and commotions; so the head of Induciomarus reduced all into peace. According as it is said of the Spaniards that in some cases one man is worth a thousand.

And thus endeth the fifth Commentary.

The sixth Commentary of the wars in  
GALLIA.

## The Argument.

**T**His Summers Commentary setteth forth the malice of an enemy that refuseth open encounter, but keeping himself in the fastness of his holds, forceth the adverse party either to leave him untouched, or to seek him out upon disadvantage: together with such casualties annexed to the matter, as the power of fortune doth commonly intermingle with such occurrences: as also the manners and fashions of life then in use amongst the *Germanis* and *Galles*.

## CHAP. I.

*Cæsar* fearing a greater commotion in *Gallia*, musters more forces.

Cæsar.

**C**ÆSAR for many reasons expecting greater troubles in *Gallia*, appointed M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, Legates in his army, to make a new choice, and muster up more soldiers; and withall he intreated Cnæus Pompeius, Proconsul, forasmuch as he continued at the city about publick businesse, that he would recall to their ensignes, and send unto him such soldiers as were before discharged of the Consuls oath: for he thought it very materiall for the future time to the opinion of the *Galles*, when they should see Italy so mighty, that if they had received any losse by the casualties of wars, they could not only in a short time make a supply thereof, but augment their army with greater forces, which when Pompey had granted, both for the good of the commonwealth and Cæsar's friendship, the choice being speedily by his ministers performed, before the winter was ended three legions were involl'd and brought unto him, whereby the number of cohorts were doubled which were lost with Q. Taurinus: and withall he made experience both by the speed and by the forces, what the youth and discipline of the people of Rome could do.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**N**otwithstanding any former purpose, I will begin this Commentary with the manner of

the choice which the *Romans* used when they mustred souldiers for an intended war: and will lay it first down as the basis and ground of all military architecture, and carried by them with such a ceremonious and grave respect, as might best expresse the seriousness of the action, and make the souldiers understand what consequence the sequele imported. Polybius, who only remaineth of them that have written of the ancient fashion of the *Roman* war, amongst other parts of their discipline, hath left unto posterity a compendious relation of their musters and enrollments, which with the help of other histories may be thus understood.

Upon the choice of their Consuls in the beginning of every years their custom was to enroll four legions, two for either Consul. At which enrollment they first chose fourteen Tribunes out of the body of their Gentlemen, whom they called *Equites*. These fourteen were such as had served five years in the wars, whereby they became eligible of that dignity. And amongst they chose ten other Tribunes out of the Commonalty, being such as had ten years service: grounding this custom upon another law, which commanded the *Equites* to serve ten, and the *Pedites* or Commons twenty whole years before they could be freed and discharged from the wars. And therefore according to the proportion of their stipendary time, as the *Equites* were admitted Tribunes at five years, so were the legionary footmen at ten, as at half their complet time of serving in the wars. The generall respect which the *Romans* had in the choice of every particular man, from the height to the lowest, was included in the circumstances of their age, and of their wealth. The ages which they deemed fit to endure the labours of wars,

war, was from seventeen to six and forty, for so said *Tiberus* concerning the first limit of military age, that *Servius* did enroll souldiers from the age of seventeen years, adjudging such to be fit for the service of the Common-wealth. And *Censorinus* expresth the second within a cynology of the names, where he saith, that men were called *Juvenes* unto the age of forty six years, *Quædæ publicæ in re militari possum jure*, because till then they were able to help and save their country in war. In this ability of years we are to understand that the law required every man to perfect the complete number of twenty years stipend; at three were occasion of so many wars in that space of nine and twenty years, which is comprehended between seventeen and forty six. The wealth,

Thirteen pounds stipend, or three bores.

which is the second circumstance that made men capable of military dignity, was necessarily required to amount to the value of *Drachmas quatuorcentis*, as *Polybius* saith, which by the *Latine* phrase was termed *quaterna milliaris*: such as were not worth so much, were neglected in this choice, and reserved for sea-service: neither was it lawful for any man to attain to any office of magistracy within the city, until he had mired ten years stipend. Upon a resolution to make an involment, which was almost every year, the Consuls did proclaim a day when all men of military age were to present themselves. Upon which day the *Roman* youth being assembled in the city, and then in the Capitol, the fourteen Tribunes elected out of the body of the *Equites*, divided themselves according as they were chosen by the people into four parts; forasmuch as in former time the whole forces of their Empire consisted of four legions or regiments, whereof I have discoursed at large in the former book. And the four Tribunes first chosen were allotted to the first legions, the three next to the second legions, the four other to the third, and the three last to the fourth. In like manner the ten Tribunes which were taken out of the common body of the people divided themselves into four parts: and the two first chosen were involl'd in the first legion, the three next in the second legions, the two following in the third legions, and the three last in the fourth. By which ingenious and discreet allotment it came to passe that the commonalty were intermingled in the government of their Armies with the Gentlemen, in such an excellent mixture, that the *Equites* were either superior or equal to the *Plebeis*: notwithstanding that every legion had an equal number of Tribunes. The election being thus far carried, the Tribunes of every legion lay them down by themselves: the people being divided first into their Tribes, and then into their classes and centuries, casting lots which Tribe should be taken; and out of that Tribe whercon the lot fell they drew four men, as

equall as they could both in age and habitude, who being brought forth, the Tribunes of the first legion made the first choice of one of those four; then the Tribunes of the second legion had their choice, they of the third legion took the next, and the fourth had the last man. And again out of the same Tribe were other four chosen; and then the Tribunes of the second legion began first to make their choice, and so consequently the first legion had the last man. A gain four other being chosen, the Tribunes of the third legion had the first election, and in that course the second legion had the last man. And by this alternate and successive election it came to passe, that every legion was equally compounded both in quality and in number. The involment proceeding in this manner until their numbers were full; the Tribunes of every legion assembled their severall troops together, and took one out of every regiment, and gave an oath unto him that he should execute and obey according to his powers, whatsoever was commanded him by his General: the rest being particularly called, were sworn to keep the same oath which the fore-man had taken. And thus we see both who were the electors, who were eligible, and the manner of their choice. Whereto we may observe what means they used to engage every particular man with an interest in the generall cause: for they thought it not sufficient to force men out by publick authority, and to bind them fitly to that service by the mandates of their Empire, considering the labours and difficulties of wars, which oftentimes are able to dull the edge of the gentlest spirits, and to cause omissions of duty in the most honest and obedient minds; but they tyed them likewise with such particular respects, as did both concern the possessions of their fortune, and the religion of their soul. For it is observed concerning mans actions that unless the mind do faithfully affect the execution, it may be carried with such a perfidious service as shall betray the true intent to no effect, and deceive the end of that which was promised by designation. And therefore they refused to enroll any man that had not a convenient proportion of wealth, to maintain a steadfast and well-resolved courage, and to settle the motions of a staggering mind, when they behought themselves that the publick duties wherein they were engaged, were the defensive powers of their Empire, and the means whereby the publick weale continued happy: and so by consequence their private fortunes were assured from violence, and preserved only by an effectual observance of their military discipline. I grant that it is not altogether wealth that doth grace & formalize the actions of men; for in some cases penury and want makes men more valourous, according to the answer which a souldier once made to *Lutullus*:



Observations upon *Cæsars*

*Ita eo quovis, qui comam perdidit, inquit.*  
Whither you will hee'll go who's lost his purple.

Notwithstanding, so far as the publick cause is either misprofited or well affected, according as it doth concern every man in particular; as who will doubt of the utmost diligence of those Mariners, that have their vessels fraught with their own goods? or contrariwise, who will blame a mercenary Pilot for making peace with death, with the losse of other mens merchandise? for *Parvitas ubique bene est*, That's a mans country where he is well, as one truly saith; and the estimation we have of this life is entertained onely by the benefits we hold by our life: therefore it much importeth a State to have such Agents to negotiate the publick business, as are engaged in the same by the interest of their own particular. Neither was it sufficient in that government to chuse men of ability both in their body and in their substance, but they found it necessary to bind their conscience with a religious consecration, and to swear a faithful obedience to their General, which with the reverence of the place, being the Capitoll, and other ceremonies of majesty attending the enrolment, doth manifestly shew how much the *Romans* imputed to this part of their discipline, being the foundation of the sequel of that action.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, I observe the benefit which an obedient and able State may make of any losse or misfortune received by an enemy: which consisteth chiefly in the reinforcing of it, may be, in the redoubling of such troops as the casualties of war have consumed. For it much abate the spirit of a people, and turneth the pride of a victory into discouragement and faintness of heart, when they see their best and most fortunate indevours achieve nothing but a reiteration of their labours, and are driven to begin again that work which with much difficulty and hazard they had once overcome. For it is the end that maketh any labour to be undertaken, being a otherwise nothing but a pain of the body & vexation of the spirit. And therefore when it shall be found either circular, or of many confrontments, before it can answer the designs of our mind, we chuse rather to forgo that contentment which the accomplishment of our desires would afford us, then to live it with such a measure of trouble, as exceedeth that which the proportion of our means seemeth able to effect. In regard whereof the ancient sages of the world made a task of this quality to be one

of *Heracles* labours, by faining the serpent *Hydra* to be of this nature, that when one head was cutten off, two other heads grew out presently from the same stump; and so his labour multiplied his travell, and his valour increased the difficulty of his work. It was *Cæsars* custom in other cases to have such a beginning of strength at his first entrance into a war, as by continuance might be augmented, and rather increase then decay upon the resistance of an enemy. So he began the war in *Gallia* with six legions; continued it with eight; and with one legion; he began the civil war with six; he followed *Pompey* into *Greece* with fifteen thousand foot and five thousand horse; and ended that war with two and twenty thousand foot and a thousand horse. He began the war at *Alexandria* with three thousand two hundred foot and ended it with six legions. He began the war in *Africa* with six, and ended it with eight legions. And thus he imitated naturall motions, being stronger in the end then in the beginning, and made his army as a plant like to grow great, and spout out into many branches, rather then to die or decay for want of strength or fresh reinforcing.

## CHAP. II.

The *Treviri* solicite the *German* and some of the *States* of *Gallia*. *Cæsar* carrieth four legions into the territories of the *Nervi*.



*U*nduciomarus being slain, as is related in the former book, the *Treviri* gave the government unto his *Kinsfolk*; who intermitted no time to sollicite their borders with the *German*, and to procure them new for their wars. When they could not prevail with their neighbours, they tried those that were further off: and having sent some that bequeathed to their designs, they considered their league with a mutual oath, giving pledges for assurance of their society and confederacy. *Which things being known*, *Cæsar* perceived the preparations which in every part were made for war, the *Nervi*, *Adiatici*, and the *Menapii*, with all the *German* allies, and the *Senones* to be in arms on the other side of the *Rhene* to be in arms, the *Senones* not to come being summoned, but to be in counsell with the *Carnutes* and their bordering States, the *German* to be solicited with often Embassages from the *Treviri*; he held it best to think of war sooner then heretofore he was accustomed. And therefore before the winter was ended, with four legions that lay next together, he entered suddenly upon the confines of the *Nervi*, and having taken great

great number of men and cattell, before they could either make head or fly away, he distributed the booty to the soldiers, washed the country, caused the people to come in, and to give pledges unto him. That business being speedily ended, he brought the legions back again into their wintering camps.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Example, no justice.

This exemplary course of proceeding in punishing some one for the offences of many, hath ever been hold the best means to repress rebellious and factious motions, as well amongst particular subjects which do conspire against the common Policy of a State, as also of such inferior Cities and States as shall entertain a confederacy prejudicial to the sovereignty of an Empire: for in all such combinations the undertakers are ever more confident in the assistance and mutual encouragement of each others affiance and forwardness, then in the strength of their own particular means. For the mind propounding a course contrary to a virtuous direction, is always suspicious and mistrustfull of the issue: for as honest motions and conceptions of the heart are attended with assurance to doth diffidence wait upon indirect and perfidious designs: And thence it happeneth that when the inward thoughts can afford no means of emboldening, they commonly rely upon each others example, and do make the action to appear honest unto themselves, so far as so many associates do approve it. For the prevention whereof a heavy hand upon the *Nervi*, being well assured, that as rebellious motions are strengthened and drawn on by the mutual example of conspiring members, so they may be weakened and extinguished by the exemplary ruine and subversion of some one or more of the said members, which is as forcible to disswade as the other to encourage: suing right with the tenour of Justice, which ought to be carried in such fort against offenders, that by the punishment of some few the fear may touch all. According as the Poet describeth the nature and effect of thunder:

*Ipsæ Mater media nimborum in nocte coarctat*  
*Fulmina molitur dextra, quo maxima moris*  
*Terra tremit, fugere feræ, & mortalia corda*  
*Per gentes humilis spūnit pavor; ille flagrant*  
*Ant Athion, ant Rhodope, ant alta Germania dextra*  
*Deijcit.*  
The whole earth trembled, but one hill only smoked for it.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, I observe the respect which *Cæsar* had to the extraordinary labour of his soldiers: for whereas they were drawn out of their wintering-camps before winter was ended, and were carried unseasonably upon a service, he rewarded them with the booty and spoil of the enemy, contrary to the ordinary course of the *Roman* warfare, which reserved either all or the most part thereof for the publick Treasury, and left the soldier to his stipendary entertainment. Which is a point very observable in the carriage of a war: wherein are required as well eminent and extraordinary attempts, as common and usuall duties, and in the judgement of a wife Commander are thought worthy their answerable rewards. At the siege of *Gergovia*, as it followeth in the seventh Commentary, *L. Fabius* a Centurion told his companions, that the booty and pillage which he had got at the taking of *Avinion* would not suffer any man to get up upon the wall before himself. And so for the most part it falleth out, that honourable attempts being honourably rewarded, do as feed fowls in good ground, multiply the increase of like virtuous actions. And this was one principal means which he used to give courage and valour to his soldiers; as when he went to get *Spain* from *Pompey* and his faction, he borrowed money of the *Tribunes* & Centurions, & gave it in largesse to the soldiers, whereby he gained, as he saith, two advantages, quod pignus animos Centurionum devinxit, & largitione redemit militum voluntates, for he engaged the Centurions to him whilst he had this pledge from them, and by his largesse purchased the good will of the soldiers.

## CHAP. III.

*Cæsar* summoneth a generall Councell, and carrieth his army against the *Senones*.



A Generall Councell or meeting of all the States of *Gallia* being summoned according to his first resolutions, in the beginning of the Spring, whereas all the rest saving the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Treviri* made their appearance; he conceived of it as the beginning of war and defection; and thereupon setting all other things aside, he transferred the Councell to the city of *Paris* in the confines of the *Senones*, which in the time of their fathers had united their State unto them, but were held clear of this confederacy. This thing being published from the *Tribunalls*, the same day he carried the Legions against the *Senones*, and by great journeys came into their

## Observations upon Cæsars

country. His coming being known, Acco the chiefest anibour of that rebellion commended the multitude to go into the cities and towns of defence: but as they endeavoured, before it could be accomplished, news was brought that the Romans were already come; whereby they necessarily left off their purposes, and sent Ambassadors to Cæsar to invest for favour. They used the mediation of the Hedui whose State had old time been in faith and league with the Romans. Cæsar at the suit of the Hedui willingly afforded them pardons, and accepted their excuses, forasmuch as he judged the summer time fitter to be spent in the war which was coming on him, rather than in matter of question and judgement: and having commanded an hundred pledges, he delivered them to be kept by the Hedui. The Carnutes likewise sent messengers and pledges, and by the intreaty of the men of Rheims, whose clientsthey were, received the same answers. Cæsar ended the Councils, and commanded horsemen to be sent him from all the States of Gallia.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT shall not seem impertinent to the Reader, that I take occasion here to say somewhat touching the use and benefit of this Parliament or Council-generall, wherein all the states of Gallia, or at the least such as did acknowledge the Roman sovereignty, presented their fealty, and were mutual witnesses of each others allegiance. Concerning which we are to understand, that as all naturall bodies have a transitory being, depending upon motion and function of parts; so specially States and Commonweals, as sympathizing with naturall causes, have no certain continuance in one and the same being, but are subject to the alteration of time and fortune, and do passe the ages of a naturall life, from infancy growing to better strength, until it come to the best perfection which years can afford it, and then decaying again by like degrees, even to the period and death of that policy. For remedy whereof, and for the prevention of any weakening disease which might infect either the whole powers of the body, or so possesse any part thereof, as it might thereby prove either dangerous or unprofitable, amongst other helps, these councils and meetings have been thought necessary; wherein every particular State and city had some of their society present, as well to open their grievances, if any were, and to seek ease and relief by way of treaty and dispute, as also to receive such directions and mandates as the wisdom of the Prince should think need for their government. For as this common council or generall assembly may well be termed the pulse of a polinick body, whereby the true state and

temperature thereof is discerned: so is it also as a treaty or parties, and a renewing of the conditions of peace between the head and the members; where sovereignty and obedience being mutually propounded, do concur in the establishing of true and perfect government. And this is that which the Politicians of later time do in their writings call the reducing of a commonwealth to the first beginning: for the noisome and superfluous humours being by this means purged and abated, the body of the publick weal is refined into such true and naturall elements, and settled in that disposition of health as may give great hope of long continuance. Besides this use and benefit of these assemblies, there were many necessary businesses concluded, and many things agreed unto, serving to the maintaining of war against parties and factions; as namely the levies and supplies of horse and foot, granted by this Council as a subsidy, which in the Roman army received stipend and pay by the name of Auxiliary or associate forces, whereof we read in many places of their Commentaries, and particularly in this book. But the Romans used specially the service of their horsemen, as the flower of their strength, and far exceeding their foot companies in execution of aims and use of war, wherein the Gallies have ever challenged a preeminence before other their neighbour nations, and have continued the same reputation even unto this time. Whether it be in regard of the nimble and quick motions of their spirits, which are better suited with the swift and speedy execution of horse, then with any readiness which their own strength can afford them, or what other cause it hath, I know not: but this I am sure of, that as the world taketh notice of their hot phantasies, so would the French be reckoned the best horsemen of any other nation. The last saying, which I observe concerning this council is, the time wherein it was summoned, which was the beginning of the Spring, rather than any other part of the year, whereof there is this reason; that if any State neglected the summons, and refused to make their appearance according to customs, the summer time coming on, gave good means to the Roman legions to punish the infolency of such a contumacy: as it happened in this place to the Senones, Carnutes and Treveri, whose alliance from this meeting was a sufficient argument to Cæsar of their rebellions, and deserved the reward of open revolt.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE second thing which I will briefly observe in this Chapter, is the pardon which Cæsar gave in willingly gave the Senones at the mediation of the Hedui; not so much for the respect he bare unto the Hedui, although they had of long time performed good service to the Roman Empire, and

and were found more faithful then all the States of Gallia; (howbeit I doubt not but that he was glad of that occasion to gratify the Hedui;) but as a matter in that faculty, well knowing what best suited with the publick profit in all times and seasons, he would not mispend the summer in questions and dispute concerning former errors, which might better be remedied upon other occasions, but rather in prosecuting war against other speciall revoltors, as a matter more behovfull to the advancement of the Empires, and best fitting the time of summer. For in following a business, there is nothing more available to a fortunate issue, then to be able to distinguish of the validity of the parties, and to discern which hath most interest in the bulk of the matters, that to we may not be mistaken in our designs, but follow that course as shall most advantage our purpose. And here a Generall is to take speciall care, that no humorous respect do hinder that resolution which true judgement approveth: for oftentimes it falleth out that either particular profits, delight in pleasures, desire of revenge, or some other unseasonable affection doth to intangle them in their proceedings, as they never attain to the main drift of the action: and this is called stumbling by the way.

### CHAP. IV. Cæsar intendeth the war of the Treveri.

His part of Gallia being quieted, he bent his whole mind to make war against the Treveri and Ambiorix, commanding Cavarinus with the cavalry of the Senones to go along with him, lest any tumult should happen in his subjects, either through his discontentment, or the malice of the State. These things being thus determined, forasmuch as he well knew, that Ambiorix would not come to blows in open fights, he ended assured by what means he could understand his other purposes. The Treveri were neighbour-borders upon the confines of the Romanes, included about with a desert of boggs and woods; and only they of all the States of Gallia had never sent to Cæsar touching any contract of peace: of them Ambiorix was received, and had familiar conversation. And further, he understood that by the means of the Treveri he Germans were brought to a contract of friendship with him also. These helps he thought he were fit to be taken from Ambiorix, before he set upon him with open war; lest desiring of his safety, he should either hide himself, amongst the Menapii, or be compelled to fly over the Rhene to the Germans. In this resolution he sent the baggage of the whole army with a convoy of two Legions to Labienus, who was then in the territories of the

Treveri, and he himself with five expedite and unburthened Legions made towards the Menapii. They having made no heads, but trusting to the strength of the place, fled into the woods and boggs, and carried all they had with them. Cæsar dividing his forces to C. Fabius a legate, and M. Crassus the treasurer, having made speedy provision of bridghead, set upon them in three parts, and burnt their houses and villages, and took great numbers of men and cattle, whereby the Menapii were constrained to send to Cæsar for peace. He having taken pledges of them, assured them that he would esteem them as enemies, if they did ever receive Ambiorix into their country, or any messengers from him. The matter being thus compounded, he left among them Commius of Arras with certain horse, as a garrison to that place, and he himself made towards the Treveri.

### OBSERVATIONS.

Hence we may observe, that as it falleth out in other things, for the most part, so specially in matter of war there is such a medley and interlacing of naturall circumstances with the body of the action, that commonly one business begets another. Cæsar's chief design at this time was the war against Ambiorix and the Treveri; but considering the contract and league between them and the Menapii, he would not prosecute the war of the Treveri, until he had taken away that assistance, and left them in the nakedness of their own strength. Wherein we may first observe what opinion Cæsar held of allies and associates, or any other that gave help or assistance to an enemy: for besides this particular, we may read in the fourth Commentary, that the chiefest cause that moved him to take the voyage into Britain was, for that the Britains had undelighted given succour and assistance to the Gallies: a matter not to be neglected in his judgements, whether it were in regard of any friendship or good respect which they bare unto the Gallies, or otherwise to keep the Romans occupied there, that they in the mean time might live quietly at home, which I need not here dispute: but the matter proveth it self plainly by Cæsar's own confessions, that the continuall supplies sent from Britain were a sufficient cause to move him to that war. And as it followeth in this Commentary concerning the self same matter, the only cause that drew him to passe the Rhene the second time into Germany, was the succours which the Germans had formerly sent to the Treveri; according to reason in cases of other naunces, that he that will extinguish a lamp, must not suffer an addition of oyle, nor admit the influence of lesser rivers when he goeth about to dry up the greater river. But that which was the occasion of this business,

## Observations upon Cæsar

finelles and might have, challenged the fifth place in this discourse, was, for that Cæsar was almost assured that *Ambrivus* would not be brought to a tyall of battle; and therefore he laboured to understand his other projects. From whence a Commander may receive direction what course to hold in a refusal of open encounter: for as the art and sleight of war is to mislead the enemy, so are there more ways and means to effect that purpose, than by waging battle; as I have discoursed at large in the third Commentary: whereunto I may add this much, which is generally observed in the carriage of great and eminent Commanders, that such as failed in matters of negotiation, and wanted dexterity in managing the course of their inequalities ( notwithstanding any fortune or singularity in striking a blow, ) did nevertheless to firm and permanent honour. If any man be desirous to descend into particulars, let him look into the lives of King *Pyrrhus*, *Demetrius*, *Antiochus*, and *Cæsar* *Antiochus* whole later ends, or shutting up their lives, were not answerable to their excellency in deeds of arms; for want of that judicious disposition of their business which Cæsar might boast of; of whom it may be truly said that ( notwithstanding the many battles which he fought, yet ) he did *plura confilio quam vi gerere*, do more by his head than his hand.

## CHAP. V.

*Labienus* overthrew the *Tecini* by a guile.

**W**HILE Cæsar was about these things, the *Tecini* having raised great forces both of horse & foot had a purpose to assault *Labienus* wintering in their confines without legion. And as they were within two days journey of him, they had intelligence of two legions more which Cæsar had sent unto him; whereupon they encamped themselves some fifteen miles distant from him, and resolved therein to stand the Germans forces. *Labienus* being advertised of their resolution, hoping through the y confusion to find some good opportunity of encounter, beset five cohorts for the service of the carriage, and with five and twenty other cohorts; besides great forces of horse he marched towards the enemy, and encamped himself within a mile of them. Between *Labienus* and the enemy there was a river, the passage whereof by reason of the broken banks was very hard and difficult; this river had a purpose to pass his posts, and desired the enemy would not be drawn to do it. For had every day more hopes of fresh aid, but now he and his cohorts of horse he gave out, that for much as the Germans were divided at hand, he would never

they hazzard himself nor the fortunes of the army, but he would rather remove his camp the next day very early in the morning. This was quickly carried to the enemy, as amongst many of the Galles that were with him, some of them did naturally favour the proceedings of their own nation. *Labienus* having in the night time called unto him the Tribunes of the soldiers, and the Centurions of the first Orders, acquainted them with his purpose; and to the end he might give greater suspicion of fear to the enemy, because the camp was so distanced with more noise and tumult than the Roman discipline had usually observed; and thereby made them yet not unlike a flight or escape, which before day (that the two camps being so near one to the other) was by the difference brought to the enemy. The first troops of the Romans were scarce gone out of the camp, but the Galles, imagining another way to take so hopefull a prey, thinking it long (seeing the Romans being thus distressed,) to expect the German forces, and that it stood not with their duty, being so late, and so near to *Ambrivus*, not to succour him upon a handful of money, fled from them, and troubled beside with fatigue and disorder, and therefore they desired not to pass the river, and so gave them battle in a place of disadvantage. *Labienus* suspecting that which now had happened, to the end he might draw them all over the river, he made as though he would go on forward. At length sending the carriages a little before, and placing them upon a hill, he have now, (said he) fellow soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, the enemy in a number some and unequal place, only afford me your Leader in this time that ye have such oftentimes before you have seemed to your Generals, might him to be present, and so for this service with his own eyes. And yet shall he command the Enemies to be carried towards the woods, and the army to be disbanded, and leaving a few troops of foot with the carriages, he did pass the rest to the wings of the army. The Romans ran up a cry, and a shout, and speedily cast their pieces at the enemy: when when they saw the Romans ready to assault them, when they had thought had fled from them for fear, they were so dismayed, that even in the first close they broke their selves, and fled towards the next woods. *Labienus* pursuing them with his horsemen killed many of them, and took more prisoners, and within a few days took in the whole Race of the *Tecini*: for the Germans which came to their succour, understanding of their overthrow, returned home again; and with them went also the *Kinsmen* of *Inducimarus*, the authors of that defection. The power of the government was given to *Cingetorix* who from

the beginning had ever been true and loyal to the Romans.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I** HAVE already handled this practice of a pretended fear, which the History doth so often recommend to our considerations, and have showed the inconvenience of over-light credulity, leading such easy widders to a disappointment of their hopes, and consequently to the hazzard of their fortune. I will now proceed to that which is further implied in this relation, and respected the chiefest duty of a chief commander: and that is what specially is required of a General in the carriage and direction of a battle. Concerning which point, as there is nothing more material to the effecting of any business than opportunity of time, convenience of place, and an orderly disposition of the means according to time and place: so in question of encounter or waging battle, the duty of a Leader may be included in these three circumstances. Concerning the quality of the place, as the chiefest and first respected in the choice of a judicial direction, the whole scope of the Roman discipline, from the time of their first Kings even to the last of their Emperours did always aim at the advantage of places, as necessary help for the obtaining of victory; which I have already noted in the *Helvetian* action. Yet forasmuch as the wisdom and experience of those times did deem it a circumstance of such importances, give me leave once again to enforce the utter root by these examples. *Habentis militibus*, (said *Labienus* in this place) *quam petitis faciliatem. hostem in quo acri impedit loco tenetis, præstare eundem nobis debitis oportet, quam speramus Imperatoris præstitis*. Ye have, fellow-soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, &c. Whereby he cleared himself of all imputation of ill directions, as having performed the utmost duty of a Commander, and given such helps by the advantage of the places as requisite to an easy victory, leaving the rest to the execution of the soldiers. Cæsar at the loss he received at *Dyrachum* cleared himself to his soldiers in this sort: *Quod esset acceptum detrimentum, curis potius quam fux culpe debere videtur, locum fecimus ad dimicandum desolatum*, &c. the damage that was received was to be attributed to any body rather than him, he had chosen then a safe place of fighting, &c. And as it followed in the seventh Commentary, being imbedded upon the side of a hill right over against the army of the *Galles*, which stood likewise in a readines to entertain the Roman valour, he would not suffer his men to hazzard themselves in the passage of a bogge of fifty foot in breadth lying between both the armies, but rather persuaded his soldiers, disdaining the confront-

ment of the enemy, to endure their contumely, rather than to buy a victory with the danger of so many worthy men, and patiently to attend some further opportunity. Which passage of *Cæsar*, even to good purpose, by *Sir Francis Vere* in the year one thousand six hundred at the battle of *Nymport*. For the army of the *Netherlanders* being possessed of the Downes, which are small swelling hills rising unevenly along the sea shore upon the coast of *Flanders*, and the enemy making a stand upon the lands at the foot of those hills, and so cutting off the passage to *Offens*, it was disputed by the Commanders, whether they should leave the Downes, and go charge the enemy where he stood imbedded upon the lands, or attend him in the battell of the Downes, whereof they were possessed. The whole Council of war were earnestly bent to forsake the Downes, and to hazard the fight on equal terms as impatient that their passage and retreat to *Offens* should be cut off. But *Sir Francis Vere* well knowing how much it imported the business of that day to hold a place of such gain and advantage, persuaded Count *Maurice* by many reasons, and especially by this of *Cæsar* which I last alleged, not to forgo the help of those hills, but to expect the enemy in that place, and to make use of that benefit upon the first encounter, rather than to adventure the success of the battle in worse terms, in hope of clearing the passage; and shewing also many probable conjectures, so that the enemy would not continue long in that gaze. Wherein as his opinion then prevailed, so all that were present were eye-witnesses both of the truth of his conjecture, and the soundness of his judgement. For the enemy within a while after coming on to charge the troops of the States, was received with such a counterbuffe from the hills, and were violently beaten back from the hills, and were violently beaten back in such rude manner, as our men had the execution of them for the space of a quarter of a mile or more, which was no small advantage to the fortune of that day. Touching the opportunity of time, which *Pindarus* calleth the Mother of worth exploits, and oftentimes dependeth upon the circumstance of places, a General ought carefully to advise that he neither precipitate nor foredo the occasion, which is well expressed in this particular service of *Labienus*. For where his purpose was to draw the enemy over a river that had steep and uneasy banks, and thereby of a hard and difficult passage, he would not shew his resolution until he had drawn them all over the river: for he was well assured that the Roman legions would to charge the enemy upon their first encounter with the unresistible weight of their pikes, that in their giving back they could not escape the danger of the river. And therefore to make the victory more absolute and

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complex, he suffered them all to come over the water, that all might be endangered in their passage back again. And this is the benefit which opportunity bringeth, which is the rather to be attended with all carefulness, forasmuch as *Non sepe, et dicitur, eadem occasio est*, a man hath neither often nor long the same opportunity.

Concerning the last circumstance, of the apt and fit disposition of the forces according to time and places, which is necessarily required in the duty of a General, it is referred to this end only, that they may be ranged in such manner, that as one man is assailable to another in their several files and ranks, so one troop may be in *subsidio*, assailable to another, to the end, that no part may stand naked, or fall in the negligence of its own strength, but that one may succour another from the first to the last. *C. Scipio* was a *Roman* Consul having fought unadvisedly, and received an overthrow, *Julius* the Tribune of the people caused *Temporius* a horseman that was present at the battle to be called, and as *Liue* reporteth *Coram eis*, *Sexte* *Temporius*, *inquit*, *adhibere ne C. Scipionem Consulē, aut in tempore pugnam inisset, aut firmasse subsidium*, *scietis*? he said thus before them *Sextus Temporius*, do you believe that *C. Scipio* in the Consul chose a good time to fight, or that he took order for assailable supplies to his army? for *Liue* saith he fought *incante inconfutūque, non subsidio firmata acie, non equis apte locatos*, heedlessly and without good advice, neither strengthening his army with supplies nor well placing his cavalry. And of these three circumstances consisteth the duty and office of a General, touching the direction of a battle; wherein whoever faileth, doth hazard the prerogative of his command over that army which he leadeth, according to that of *Cæsar* in the first of his Commentaries, *Se scire, quibusque exercitus dicto audienti non fuerit, aut male regesta fortunam defuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperio, avaritia esse consilium*, that he knew well, whensoever an army refused to be obedient to their Commander, it was either because upon some ill success he saw he was unfortunate, or that by the discovery of some notorious matter they found him convicted of avarice. Which *Cæsar* himself needed not to fear, if we may believe *Plutarch*, who wretch that he was, was induced by nature with an excellent promptitude and agility to take opportunity in any business.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

It may not omit to insist a little upon this noise or shout which the soldiers took up in the instant of the charge, and is related in this place as a material point in their carriage at this service. A matter ancient and usual in the Ro-

man armies, as well in the time of their first Kings, as their first Consuls. *Primo imperio & clamore hostes*, the enemies were overthrown at the first onset and shouts forth *Liue* concerning *Romulus*. And not long after, *Lib. 1.* *Consul nec promovebat aciem, nec clamorem reddi passus*, the Consul neither marched his army forward, nor suffered them at all to shout. *Cæsar* in the century which he gave concerning *Pompey* his direction for the battle at *Pharsalia*, *Lib. 1.* doth expresse a double use of this clamour or shouting; first the terror of the enemy, and secondly the encouragement or assurance of themselves. *Est quodum animi incitatio* (saith he) *aque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, que studo & pugna incenditur; hanc non reprimere sed augere imperatores debent; neque sensura aut qui suis institutis est in signa, und que concurrent, clamorem universi tolerant, quibus rebus & hostes terrent & suorum incitant. Et hanc vim*. There is a certain raising and cheerfulness of the mind imbibed naturally in all which is stirred up by an eagerness to fight: this a General should not crush but cherish. So that it was not without cause that in old times they had a custom that the whole army should make a noise and raise a general shout, whereby they terrified as the enemies were frightened, so their own men were encouraged. Two contrary effects proceeding from a cause, which to common sense carrieth no show of any such efficacy: *Fox & præterea nihil*, a bare voice and nothing more; as one said of the Nightingale in another sense. But such as do seriously look into the reasons thereof, shall find the saying true which is ascribed to the elder and wiser *Cato*, *Verba plus quam gladium & voces quam munus bellis terretur*, & in *ingui vertere*; Words will do more then Swords, and Voices looser then Hands may fright the enemy and put him to flight. The ears, as I have already noted, will *Lib. 1.* sooner betray the soul to the dislike of fear, than any other of the five senses. Which *J. J. Lib. 1.* thus well understood, although peradventure *ap. 14.* he applied not to fit a remedy, when he commanded his men to stop their ears at the acclamations of the *Roman* legions, lest they might be daunted and amazed thereat. The reason may be, for that our discourse diligently attending upon a matter of that consequence which calleth the lives of both parties in questions, and valuing every circumstance at the utmost, doth always presuppose a cause answerable to such an effect of joy and assurance. For these shouts and acclamations are properly the consequences of joy, and are so available that they deceive both parties: for such as take up the shout by way of anticipation, do seem to conclude of that which is yet in question; and the enemy thereupon apprehendeth danger when there is none

## Lib. VI.

none at all, whereby it happeneth, *Hostes terreri & sui incitari*, that the enemies are affrighted, and our own men encouraged, as *Cæsar* noteth. Besides these examples I might alledge the authority of Holy Writ, but that it might seem both unfavourable and unreasonable to make a commixture of such diversities. I will therefore content my self with a practice of our time at the battle of *Newport*, where after divers retreats and pursuits, either side chasing the other as it were by turn and mutual apparition, and as it often falleth out in such confrontments; at last commandment was given to the *English* to make head again, and after some pause to charge the enemy with a shout: which being accordingly performed, a man might have seen the enemy flustered before they came to the stroke; and being charged they were routed, that they made not head again that day. For the prevention of such a disadvantage, there can be no better president then that which *Plutarch* noteth, touching the battle between the *Romans* and the *Ambrosii* a part of that deluge of people which came down into *Italy* with the *Cimbri* and *Tenues*; for these *Ambrosii* coming out to give battle, to the end they might strike fear into the *Romans*, made an often repetition of their own name with a loud sounding voice, *Ambrosii, Ambrosii, Ambrosii*. The *Italians* on the other side that first came down to fight were the *Ligurii*, inhabiting the coast of *Genoa*, who hearing this noise, and plainly understanding them, made answer with the like cry, founding out their own name, *Ligurii, Liguri, Liguri*. Whereupon the Captains of both sides made their soldiers cry out altogether, contending for envy one against another who should cry it loudest: and so both sides were encouraged, and neither of them disadvantaged, *Gloriose utrinque sublato*, whilst both sides continued the cry.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

This *Labienus* was a great soldier, and well acquainted with *Cæsar*'s manner in leading an army, and made many good fights while he continued under his command: but after he betook himself to *Pompey*'s party, and joyned with a faction against his first master, he never achieved any thing but loss and dishonour.

----- *Dux sortis in armis Cæsar* *Labienus* *erit, nunc transiit* *Lib. 1.* *ad.*

Once *Labienus* was a Captain stout On *Cæsar*'s side now a bale Turn-about. And upon that occasion he is often mentioned as a memorial of his disloyalty, to prove that good success in matter of war doth follow the General rather then any inferior Captain. For it is observed of divers whose fortune hath

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been great under the conduction of some commanders, and as unluckily under other leaders like plants or trees that thrive well in some grounds, and bear store of fruit, but being transplanted do either dye or become barren. And doubtlesse there may be observed the like sympathy or contrariety in the particular courses of mans life, wherein they are carried upon the stream of their fortunes, according to the course of their first imarking. And therefore such as happen in a way that leadeth to successfull ends, shall much wrong themselves either to turn back again, or to seek by-paths, whose ends are both unknown and uncertain: and herein the French saying may serve to some purpose,

*Si vous esseyez bien, tenez vous la.*

If you find your self well, hold your self there.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar* carrieth his army over the *Rhine* into Germany.

**C**æsar being come from the *Menapii* *Cap. 1.* to the *Treviri* did resolve to passe the *Rhene* for two causes: the one was, for that the Germans had sent *in* court, and supplies to the *Treviri*; the other that *Ambiorix* might have no reception or entertainment among them. Upon this resolution, a little above that place where he carried his army over before, he commanded a bridge to be made after the known and appointed fashion, which by the great industry of the soldiers was ended in a few dayes: and leaving a sufficient strength at the bridge, least any sudden motion should rise among the *Treviri* he carried over the rest of his forces both horse and foot. The *Ubii* which before time had given hostages, and were taken into obedience, sent *Ambassadors* unto him to clear themselves from imputation of disloyalty, and that the *Treviri* had recovered no supplies from their State: they pray and desire him to spare them, lest the general dislike of the Germans should cause him to punish the innocent for the guilty: and if he would ask more hostages they would willingly give them. *Cæsar* upon examination of the matters found that the supplies were sent by the *Suevi*: and thereupon he accepted the satisfaction of the *Ubii*, and inquired the way and the passages to the *Suevi*. Some few dayes after he understood by the *Ubii* that the *Suevi* had brought all their forces to one place, and had commanded such nations as were under their dominions that they should send them forces of horse and foot. Upon this intelligence he made provision of corn, & chose a fit place to encamp in. He commanded the *Ubii* to take their cattle, and all their other goods from beyond one of the fields



to their superiors, as belongeth to such high callings; these factions and bandies were ordained: whereby the Nobles were restrained from oppressing the poor; and the poor compelled to obey the Nobility, which is the best end that may be made of any faction.

Concerning the advantage which the *Gallies* received by these factions against forraign enemies, it was rather in regard of the multiplicitie of States and Common-wealths which were in the continent of *Gallia*; then otherwise: for it manifestly appeareth, that their factions and contentions for soveraign authority, caused one party to bring in *Arviustus* and the *Germans*; and the other party the *Romans*, to make good their bandy. But forasmuch as *Gallia* had many divisions, and contained many severall States, relying chiefly upon their own strength, and esteeming the subjection of their neighbour cities as a calamity befalling their neighbours, from which the rest stood as yet free; it was not to easily conquered as it had been all but one kingdom. The battell which *Cæsar* had with the *Nervij*, which was fought so hard, that of threethousand men there were left but five hundred, nor of six hundred Senators above three; nor again the felling of three and fifty thousand *Gallies* for bond-slaves at one time, did not so much advantage the conquest of *Gallia*; as the battell of *Edurne* the third, or that of *Henry* the fifth, our two English *Cæsars*: in the former whereof were slain at *Cresle* thirty thousand of the *French*, and in the latter at *Agincourt* butten thousand. The reason was for that the former losses, though far greater, concerned but particular States; whereas these latter overthrowes extended to the members and branches of the whole kingdoms.

## CHAP. VIII.

Two sorts of men in *Gallia*, *Druides* and *Equites*.



In *France* all *Gallia* there are but two sorts of men that are of any reckoning or account: for the common people are in the nature of servants, and of no worth of themselves; nor admitted to any Parliament; but being kept under either by debts, or by great tributes, or by the oppression of the mighty, do put themselves in the service of the Nobility, and are subject to the authority which the master hath over his bond-slaves. Of these two sorts the one are *Druides*, and the other *Equites* or Gentlemen. The *Druides*, which are always present at their Holy Duties, do give order for their publick and private sacrifices, and command their Religion. To the *Druides* great numbers of the youth do resort for learnings sake, and have

them in great honour and reputation; for they do determine almost of all controversies both publick and private: for if any offence be committed, as murder or manslaughter, or any controversy arise touching their lands or inheritances, they sentence it; rewarding the virtuous, and punishing the wicked. If any private man or State do not obey their decrees, they interdict him from holy duty, which is the greatest punishment that is amongst them. Such as are thus interdicted, are reputed in the number of impious and wicked men, every man leaves their company, and doth avoid to meet them, or speak with them, lest they should receive any hurt by their contagion: neither have they law or justice when they require it, nor any respect or honour that doth belong unto them. Over all the *Druides* there is one *Primus*, that hath authority of the rest. At his death if any one do exceed the rest in dignity, he succeedeth if any equals are found, they go in election, and sometimes they contend about the primacy with force and arms. They meet at certain time of the year in the confines of the Carnutes, which is the middle part of all *Gallia*, and there they sit in a sacred place: thither they resort from all parts that have controversies, and do obey their orders and judgements. The art and learning of the *Druides* was first found in *Britany*, and from thence is thought to be brought into *Gallia*: and at this time such as will attain to the perfect knowledge of that discipline, do for the most part travell thither to learn it. The *Druides* are exempt from warfare and payment, and have an immunity from all other duties: whereby it falleth out that many do betake themselves to that profession of their own free will, and divers others are sent to that school by their parents and friends. They are said to learn many verses, and that some do study therein twenty years. Neither is it lawful for them to commit any thing in writing, beside that in other publick and private businesses they only use the Greek tongue: and as for as I take it for two causes; first, for that their learning may not become common and vulgar; secondly, that scholars might not trust to much to their writings, as to their memory, as it happeneth for the most parts that men rely upon the trust of books and papers, and in the mean time omit the benefit of good remembrance. They endeavour chiefly to teach men that their souls do not die, but that they do remove out of one body into another after death; and this they think to be very important to stir men up to vertuous living, the fear of death. They if spend much time, and give many traditions in the womb touching the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the earth and the worlds, the nature of things, and the might and power of the Gods.

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## OBSERVATIONS.

Brades.

The quality and condition of the *Druides* is in this place very particularly described by *Cæsars*, and may be reduced to these heads. First, their Office, extending both to things Divine and things temporall, whereby they executed the place both of Priests and of Judges. And for that purpose there was one known place appointed where they sat in judgement: and as I understand it, there was but one Terme in the year, which both began and ended their suits in law. The second thing is their Authority, having power to reward vertue and to punish vice. Thirdly, their privileges and immunities, being free from contributions, from warfare, and from other burthens of the State. Fourthly, their doctrine and learnings, which was partly Theological, concerning the might and power of the gods, the immortality of the Soul; and partly philosophical, touching the stars and their motions, the earth and the magnitude thereof. And lastly, their manner of learning, which was altogether Pythagorically, refusing the help of letters and books, and committing their doctrine to the tradition of their Elders. But that which is especially to be observed is, that this learning was not only found out here in *Britany*, but such as would perfectly attain to the knowledge thereof, came into *England* to study the same, contrary to the experience which heretofore hath been observed of the Northern and Southern parts of the world: for as the South giveth a temper to the body fit for the science and contemplation of Arts, whereby the mind being enlarged and purified in her faculties, doth dive into the secret depths of all learning, and censure the hidden mysteries thereof; so the Northern climate doth bind in the powers of the soul, and restrain all her vertues to the use of the body, whereby they are said to have *animam* in digits, that is, to hold in their fingers, not affording her that delight and contentment which is usually received by speculation. And thence it happeneth that all speculative arts and sciences, and what else doever concerneth the inward contemplation of the mind, was found out and perfected by such as border upon the South, and from them it was brought by litle and litle into the Northern regions: and such as would be masters in the Arts they professed, went always Southward for the attaining thereof. But here the South was beholding to the North, as well for their principles of Divinity, as for their Philosophie and morall learnings, being as pure, as that which an heathen people ever drank of. Which proved an ancient singularity in the inhabitants of this land, touching the studie of Arts and matter of learnings; and may with like evidence be proved from age to age even to this time. In

By reason of the various and artificiall works.

whereof I appeal to the two Universities of this land, as a demonstration of the love which our Nation hath ever born to learning, being two such Magazines of arts and sciences, to beautified with curious buildings, and supplied with indowments for the liberrall maintenance of the Muses, enriched with Libraries of learned Works, adorned with pleasant places for the refreshing of wearied spirits, gardens, groves, walks, rivers, and arborets, as the like such *Atheni* are not to be found in any part of the world.

## CHAP. IX.

The second sort of men in *Gallia*, called the *Equites* in *Cæsar's* time.

Neither sort of people are *Equites* or Gentlemen. These were there is occasions, or when any war happened, as before *Cæsar* his coming was usual every year, that either they did suffer injuries, or resist injuries, are always parties therein: and as every man esteemeth either in birth or wealth, so he attendeth with clients, and followers, and this they take to be the only note of Nobility and greatness. The whole nation of the *Gallies* are much addicted to religion; and for that cause such as are either givenally defiled, or convert themselves continually in the dangers of warre, do either sacrifice men for an oblation, or vow the oblation of themselves, using in such sacrifices the ministry of the *Druides*, forasmuch as they are persuaded that the immortal Deity cannot be pleased but by giving the life of one man for the life of another: and to that purpose they have publick sacrifices appointed. Others have Images of a monstrous magnitude, whose limbs and parts being made of Officers, are filled with living men, and being set one fire, the men are burned to death. The execution of such as are taken in the fire or robbery, or any other crime, they think to be best pleasing to the gods; but they worship chiefly the god *Mercure*, and have many of his images amongst them; him they adore as the inventor of all Arts, the conductor and guide in all voyages and journeys, and they think him to have great power in all merchandise and gain of moneys. Next unto him they prefer *Apollo*, *Mars*, *Jove* and *Minerva*; and of these they carry the same opinion as other nations: so *Apollo* to be powerful in healing diseases, *Minerva* in finding out artificiall works, *Jove* ruling the celestiall Empire, and *Mars* for Warre. When they are to encounter with an enemy, they vow all the spoil unto him; and such beasts as are taken by sacrifices, other things they lay up in some one place: and many such heaps of things so taken

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are to be seen in the holy places of diverse of their cities. Neither doth it often happen, that any man neglecting his religion in that point, dare either keep back any thing so taken or take away ought laid up in their Repositories; for they incur a heave punishment and torture for that offence. The Gallies do all boast themselves in the flock from whence they are descended, under standing by the Divides, but they come of the god Dis. And therefore they end the space of all their times by the number of nights rather than by the number of dayes, observing the dayes of their nativity, the beginning of their months and their years, in such sort as the day doth always follow the night. And herein they differ from other nations, that they suffer not their children to come openly into them, but when they are grown fit for war: thinking it shameful and dishonest, that a son in his childhood should in publick places stand in the sight of his father. To the portions which they have with their wives, they add as much more of their own goods; and the use of this money thus added together, is kept apart, and the longer liver hath both the principall and the interest for all the former time. The men have power of life and death, both over their wives and their children. And when a man of great place and parentage shall happen to decease, his kinsfolke assemble themselves together, to enquire of his death: if there be any occasion of suspicion, they put his wife to torture after the manner of a servant; and if it be found she dies tainted with five and all other tortures as may be imagined. Their funerals (according to the rest of their life) are magnificent and sumptuous, burying with the dead corpe all that he took delight in while he lived, not sparing living creatures: and not long out of memory, the custome was to bury with the body such clients and servants as were favoured by him in his lifetime. Such States as are careful in the government of their common-weals, do prohibit by a speciall law, that no man shall communicate a rumour or report touching the State to any man having a Magistrature; forasmuch as it had been often found that such and unskillfull men were terrified with false reports, and moved to such desperate attempts, that they entered into resolutions touching the main points of State. The Magistrates do keep secret such things as they think fit, and in which they think expedient they publish: but it is not lawfull to speak of matters of State, but in assemblies of State.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Concerning the beginning of dayes and times, which Cæsar noteth in this place to be observed by the Gallies after Sun-setting;

(whereby it happened that in the naturall day of four and twenty hours, the night always preceded the day times, contrary to the use of Italy, where the day began at Sun-rising, and the night followed the artificiall day as the second part of the day naturall;) we are to understand, that as all times, and the distinction of the parts thereof, dependeth upon the two motions of the Sunne: the one as it moveth in its own orb from West to East, begetting the revolution of years, and the seasons of Sommer and Winter, the Spring and the Autumne with the measure of months as it passeth through the signes of the Zodiac; and the other, as it is carried from East to West by the first moving sphere, making the distinction of nights and dayes, hours and minutes: so the beginnings of these times and seasons are diversely taken amongst diverse people and nations of the earth. The *Greeks* had the same computation touching the beginning of the day as the *Gallies* had, but on other grounds and reasons: thus could be alleged for this custome in *Gallia*, for they began their day in the evening at Sunne-setting, as appeareth by many places of the Scripture: and *Moses* in the repetition of the first seven dayes work, upon the accomplishment of a dayes, faith, The evening and the morning were one day, giving the evening precedence before the morning, as though the day had begun in the evening. The *Polemi-ans* in like manner do observe the beginning of their day in the evening, and do herein follow the use of the *Iews*. Other nations do begin at Sun-rising, and take the computation of their day naturall from the first appearing of the Sun in the East. The *Greeks* begin and end their day at midnight, observing the certainty of that time, and the correspondence between the equall and planetary hours in the meridian Circle: whereas otherwise by reason of the inequality of the dayes and the nights, out of a right sphere there is always some difference between the said hours. And thus we also is observed by us in England.

This god *Dis*, whom he nameth for the father of that nation, is the same whom the heathen called *Pluto*, the god of hell and darknes; and for that cause they put darknes before light, touching the beginning of their naturall day.

But forasmuch as this circumstance giveth occasion to speak of dayes and times, give me leave to insert the reformation of the years, which Cæsar lo happily established, that succeeding times have had no cause to alter the same.

And although it neither concerneth the art of war nor happened within the compass of the seven formers; yet forasmuch as it was done by Cæsars, and delivereth as often memory as any other of his noble acts, it shall not seem unpertinent to the reader to take thus much by the way concerning that matter. There is no nation

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of any civil government, but observeth a course or revolution differenced with times and seasons in such manner as may be answerable to the motion of the Sun, in the circuit which it maketh through the signes and degrees of the Zodiac. But forasmuch as the government of a civil year doth not well admit any other composition of parts, to make it absolute and complete, then by naturall dayes, and on the other side, the Sun requireth odde houres and minutes to finish his race, and return again to the goal from whence it came; there hath always been found a difference between the civil and the Solar year. Before Cæsars time, the *Romans* using the ancient computation of the years, had not onely such uncertainty and alteration in months and times, that the sacrifices and yearly feasts came by little and little to seasons contrary for the purpose they were ordained: but also in the revolution of the Sun or Solar years no other nation agreed with them in account, and of the *Romans* themselves, only the Priests understood it: and therefore when they pleased (no man being able to controule them) they would upon the foddain thrust in a month above the ordinary number, which as *Plutarch* noteth, was in old time called *Mercedonius*, or *Menfis intercalaris*. To remedy this inconvenience, Cæsar calling together the best and most expert Astronomers of that time, made a Kalender more exactly calculated than any other: that was before: and yet such a one as by long continuance of time had bred a difference for the matter (standeth thus).

It is found by certain observation of Mathematicians of all ages, that the Sun being carried from the West to the East by the motion of his own Sphere, finisheth his yearly course in the space of 365. dayes, five houres, nine and forty minutes, and some odd seconds: whereupon it was then concluded that their civil year must necessarily contain three hundred threescore and five dayes, which maketh two and fifty weeks and one day. And forasmuch as those five odd hours, nine and forty minutes, and some seconds, did in four years space amount unto a naturall day (wanting two and forty minutes and six and fifty seconds, which was thought nothing in comparison they devised every fourth year to add a day more then ordinary, to answer that time which is usually added to February: whereby it happeneth that in every fourth year February hath nine and twenty dayes. And to they made an order to reform their year without any sensible error for a long time. But since that time, being one thousand six hundred years and more, those two and forty minutes and six and fifty seconds, which as I said do want of the naturall day of four and twenty hours which is inserted in every fourth year, have bred a manifest and an apparent error: for whereas the civil year is by that means made greater then the so-

lar years, the Sun ending his task before we can end our times, it happeneth that such feasts as have relation to seasonable times, do as it were foretell the opportunity, and fall out further in the years as though they had a motion towards the former solstice. And as these go forwards, so doth the Equinoctiall return backwards towards the beginning of the month. For Cæsar by the help of the Astronomers observed the *Æquinoctium* the five and twentieth of *March*. *Ptolemy* in his time observed the *Æquinoctium* the two and twentieth of *March*, and it was observed the one and twentieth of *March* in the year from the incarnation 322, what time was holden the first generall Council at *Nice* a city of *Pontus*, in respect whereof the Paschall tables and other rules were established for the celebration of Easter. But since that time there are passed 1281. years, and the *Æquinoctium* cometh before the one and twentieth of *March* ten dayes.

As this error is reformed amongst other nations, and reduced to that state as it was at the *Nicens* Council: so there might many reasons be alleged to prove the reformation convenient of a greater number of dayes then ten. For if the Kalender were so ordered, that every month might begin when the Sun entrencheth that Sign which is for the month; and end when the Sun goeth out of that signe, it would avoid much confusion, and be very easy to all sorts of people as have occasion to observe the same: which doubtlesse was the purport of the first institution of months; and was observed (as it seemeth) by the old *Romans*, who began the year at the winter solstice, as *Ovid* noteth:

*Bruma novæ prima est, veterisque novissima solis.*

*Principium capium Phæbus & annus inde.*

And therefore they called that month *January* of *Janus* that had two faces, and saw both the old and the new year. Such therefore as would go about to reform the year to this courst, must not cut off ten dayes onely, but one and twenty; and for one year make *December* to continue but ten dayes, and then *January* to begin, and to successively to the rest of the months. But it may be said, that although we help our selves and put off the inconvenience which is fallen upon us, yet in tract of time the like error will fall again upon succeeding ages, and put their year. Feasts besides the dayes appointed for them. For remedy whereof it may be answered; That whereas this error hath happened by adding every fourth year a naturall day, which in true calculation wanted two and forty minutes and six and fifty seconds of four and twenty hours, and in every 136. years hath accrued within one minute to a day more then needed: the onely way is every 136. years to omit the

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addition of that day, and to make that year to contain but 365. days, which by the order of *Cæsars* Kalender is a leap year and hath one day more, which hath brought this error. And I there would not happen the error of a day in the space of 111086 years, if the world should continue so long.

But lest we should seem more curious in reforming the course of our civil years, than the manners of our civil life, I will proceed to that which followeth.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**He second thing which I observe in their manner of life, is the respect they had to matter of State, and the care which they took that no man should dispute of the Common-weal, but in assemblies appointed for the service of the common-weal. Whereby they gained two special points for the maintenance of good government. The first, that no man might speak of points of State, but the governors of State: for such I understand to be admitted to their Councils and Parliaments. Secondly, that such matters of consequence as touched them to nearly, might not be handled, but in such places and at such times as might best advantage the State. Concerning the former we are to note, that Government is defined, to be an establishing of order best fitting the maintenance of a people in a peaceable and happy life. Order requirith degrees and distinctions invettling severall parts in severall functions and duties: to these duties they belongeth a due observance, according to the motion and place which every part holdeth in the general order. Of these degrees and distinctions, Sovereignty and Obedience are two main relatives, the one invettling in the Prince or Magistrate, the other in the people, and subjects incommunicable in regard of their terms and full faculties, yet concurring in the main duty of government, intending the benefit of a happy life. And therefore the *Gallies* did carefully provide, that no man should exceed the limits of his own rank, but that such as late at the helm might flapske the course: and for the rest whole lot it was to be directed, they would have taken that notice of their mandates by obedience, and not by dispute.

Touching the second point, we are to consider the danger which may happen to a State, by common and ordinary discourse of the Principles of that Government, or of such circumstances as are incident to the same, (without respect of time or place, or any other due regard) which the wisdom of a well-ordered policy, doth hold requisite thereunto: for whatsoever is delivered by speech, without such helpful attendances, is both unseasonable and unprofitable, and the Common-weal is always a sufferer when

it falleth into such rash considerations; for our most serious cogitations afflicted with the best circumstances, can but speak to purpose. And as the execution falleth forth of the purpose intended by discourse, so is our speech and discourse lame and wanting to our inward concord. And therefore as religious actions stand in need of *hœc* ages, so may politick consultations use the help of the same remembrance.

### CHAP. X.

The manner and life of the *Germanis*.

**T**He *Germanis* do much differ from the *Gallies* in their course of life, for they have neither Priests nor sacrifices. They worship no gods, but such as are subject to senses, and from whom they derive profits and helps, as the Sun, the Fire, and the Moon; for they have not so much as heard of. Their life is only spent in hunting, or in use and practice of war. They turn themselves to labour and hardnes even from their childhood, and such as continue longest beards, are most commended amongst them: for some think to be very available to their flattery, others to their strength and sinew. They hold it a most dishonour for one to touch a woman before he be twenty years of age: neither can any such matter be hid or dissembled, forasmuch as they have themselves together in rivers, and use skins and other small coverings on the reins of their backs, the rest of their body being all naked. They use no tillage, the greatest part of their food is milk, or cheese, or flesh: neither hath any man any certain quantity of land to his own use; but their Magistrates and Princes do every year allow a certain portion of land to kindreds, and to them that inhabit together, as much and in such places as they think fit, and the next year appoint them in a new place. Hereof they give many reasons: lest they should be led away by their custom from the practice of war to the use of husbandry, or lest they should endeavour to get themselves great possessions, and so the weaker should be thrust out and dispossessed of their living, by the mightier, or lest they should build too delicately for the avoiding of cold or heat, or lest they should wax covetous and thirst after money, which is the beginning of all factions and dissensions, and lastly, that they might keep the Commons in good contentment, considering the parity between their revenues and the possessions of the great ones. It is the greatest honour to their States to have their confines lie waste and desolate far and near alike: for that they take to be an argument of valour, when their borderers are driven to forsake

their country, and dare not abide near them; and withall they think themselves by that much much sfer from any sodain incursion. When a State maketh war, either by way of attempt, or defence, they chuse Magistrates to command that way having power of life and death: but in time of peace they have no common Magistrates, but the chiefeest men in the country and the villages do interpret the Law and determine of Controversies. Their committed one of the confines of their State is not injurious or dishonest, but commended as an exercise of the youths, and a keeping them from sloth. When any one of the Princes and chief men shall in an assembly or council publish himself for a leader upon some exploit, and desire to know who will follow him upon the times, they that have a good opinion of the man and the matter, and do promise him their help and assistance, are commended by the multitude: the rest that refuse to accompany him, are held in the number of traitors, and never have any credit afterwards. They hold it not lawful to hurt a stranger that shall come within them upon any occasion, but do protest him from injuries; to such every mans house is open, and his table common. The time was when the *Gallies* excelled the *Germanis* in prowes and valour, and made war upon them of their own accord, and by reason of the multitude of their people and want of ground for habitation, they sent many colonies over the Rhene into Germany. And so those fertile places of Germany, which are near unto the wood Hercynia, (which *Pyraosthenes* and other Grecians took notice of by the name of *Orcinia*) were possessed by the *Volca* *Tedolages*, who dwelt there at this time, and keep their ancient opinion of justice and warlike praise. Now the *Germanis* still continue in the same poverty, want, and patience, as in former time; do use the same diet and apparel for their bodies: but the neighbourhood and knowledge of other nations hath made the *Gallies* live in a more plentiful manner, who by little and little have been weakened and overtaken in divers battels, so that now they stand not in comparison with the *Germanis*, the breadth of the wood Hercynia is nine dayes journey over, for they have no other differences of space but by means of day journey. It beginneth by the confines of the *Helveti*, *Nemetes*, and *Rauraci*, and runs along the river *Danubius* to the territories of the *Daci*; then it declineth to the left side from the said river, and by reason of the large extension thereof, it bordereth the confines of many other countries. Neither is there any *German* that can say, that either he hath overcome or did to, or had heard of the beginning of the journey, although he hath travelled therein before he does journey. In this wood are many sorts of wild beasts,

which are not to be seen in any other places: amongst the rest, the most unusual and remarkable are, An Ox like unto a *Hare*, that in the middle of his forehead between his eyes carrieth a horn longer and straighter then usually divided at the end into many large branches, the female is in all respects like unto the male, and beareth a horn of the same magnitude and fashion. There is likewise another sort of beasts called *Alces*, not unlike unto a Goat, but somewhat bigger, and without horns; their legs are without joints, that when they take their rest they neither sit nor lie upon the ground, and if they chance to fall they cannot rise again. When they take their rest in the night, they lean against trees. The Hunters having found out their footstep, and their haunts, do either undermine the roots of such trees, or so cut them asunder that a small matter will overthrow them; so that when they come according to their sit to rest themselves against those trees, they overthrow them with their weight, and fall with themselves, and so are taken. The 3-kind of beasts are those which are called *Uris*, somewhat lesser then an Elephant, and in colour, kind and shape, not unlike unto a Bull. They are both strong and swift, and spare neither man nor beast that cometh in their sight: these they catch with greater labour and diligence in pits and ditches, and so kill them. The youth do hunt and exercise themselves in this kind of hunting, and such as kill many of these beasts, and shew most horns, are highly commended: but to make them tame, or any their life ones, was never yet seen. The largeness of their horns, as also the fashion and kind thereof, doth much differ from the horns of the Oxen, and are much sought after for cups to be used in their great banquets, being first bound about the brim and rimmed with silver.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**C**æsar in this Chapter describeth the course of life which the *Germanis* in his time held throughout the whole policy of their government, the scope whereof was to make them warlike: to which he faith, That in times past the *Gallies* were as valiant and as warlike people as the *Germanis*; but the neighbourhood and knowledge of other nations had taught them a more plentiful manner of life, which by little and little had weakened their strength, and made them far inferior to the *Germanis*. Which bringeth to our consideration that which is often attributed to a civil life, that such as taste of the sweetness of ease, and are qualified with the complements of civilities, have always an indisposition to warlike practices. Thereupon is grounded up a use and custom: for discontinuance doth always



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always cause a strangeness and alienation, benumbing the softest parts with unready and painful gestures; and is so powerful, that it doth not only steal away natural affection; but like a tyrant it is able to force us to those things which naturally we are unfit for; as though the decrees of nature were subject to the contrivances of custom. Much more then, the things got by use and practice, are as easily forgot by discontinuance, as they were obtained by studious exercise. On the other side, there is nothing so horrible or dreadful, but we make it easy. The first time the Fox saw the Lion, he swooned for fear, the next time he trembled, but the third time he was so far from fear, that he was ready to put a trick of craft upon him: whereby it appears, that the Germans had no further interest in deeds of arms above the Gallies, than what the use of war had gained them: for as usage conveys the property of a tenure, so non-usage implies a forfeiture. *Cato* was wont to say, that the Romans would loose their Empire, when they suffered the Greek tongue to be taught amongst them: for by that means they would easily be drawn from the study and practice of war, to the bewitching delight of speculative thoughts. And *Marcellus* was blamed for being the first that corrupted Rome with the delicate and curious works of Greece: for before that he brought from the sacking of *Syracusa* the well-wrought tables of pictures and imagery, Rome never knew any such delicacy, but stood full fraught with armour and weapons of barbarous peoples, of the bloody spoils and monuments of victories and triumphs; which were rather fearful shews to inure their eyes to the horror of war, than pleasant sights to allure their minds to affections of peace. Whence it appears, that such as suffer themselves to be guided by the easy rain of civil governments, or take a disposition to that course of life, can hardly endure the yoke of war, or undergo the tediousness of martial labours.

### CHAP. XI.

*Basilus his surpris upon Ambiorix.*

Cæsar.



*Cæsar finding by the discovery which the Ubi sent out, that the Suevi had all broken themselves to the woods, and doubting want of corn, forasmuch as the Germans of all other nations do least care for tillage; he determined to go no further. But that his return might not altogether free the barbarous people from fear, but hinder the help and succours which they were wont to send into Gallia, having brought back his army he cut off so much of the furthest part of the bridge next*

*unto the Ubi, as came in measure to two hundred foot, and in the end of that which remained he built a tower of four stories, making other works for the strengthening of that place, wherein he left a garrison of twelve cohorts under the command of young C. Volcanus Tullus: he himself as corn waxed ripe, went forward to the war of Ambiorix by the way of the wood of Arduenna; which is the greatest in all Gallia, and extendeth it self from the banks of Rheine, and the confines of the Trevis, to the feet of the Nevis, carrying a breadth of five hundred miles. He sent L. Minucius Basilus before with all the horse, to see if he could effect any thing either by prevention, and speedy arrival, or by opportunity, commanding him not to suffer any fires to be made in his camp, lest his coming might be discovered, promising to follow him at his heels. Basilus followed his directions, and coming upon them contrary to their expectation, took many of the enemy abroad in the fields, and by their conduct made towards Ambiorix, where he remained in a place with a few horsemen. As fortune is very powerful in all things, so the challenge of a special interest in matter of war: for as it happened by great luck, that he should fight upon him unwares and unprovoked, and that his coming should sooner be seen than heard of, so was it great hap, that all the arms which he had about him should be surprised by his horse, and his chariots taken, and that he himself should escape death. But this happened by reason of the wood that was about his horse, according to the manner of the Gallies who for avoiding of woods do commonly build near unto woods and rivers: his followers and friends following awhile the charge of the horsemen in a narrow place, while he himself escaped in the mean time on horseback, and in flying was protected and sheltered by the woods: whereby Fortune seemed very powerful both in drawing on a danger, and in avoiding it.*

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*The prerogative which Fortune hath always challenged in the accidents of war, and the special interest which she hath in that course of life more then in other mens actions, hath made the best foulders oftentimes to sing a long of complaints, the burden whereof yet remitted, and served as a reason of all such misadventures. Fortune doth laguerre. The Fortune of the war. Such as have observed the course of things, and have found one and the same man continuing the same means, this day happy and the next day unfortunate; and again, two other men able one advised and respective, and the other violent and rash, and yet both attain the like good fortune by two contrary courses, or otherwise, as often-*

Fortune.

oftentimes it falleth out, the more heedless, the more happy; have been persuaded that all things are so governed by fortune, that the wildome of man can neither alter nor amend them: and therefore to spend much time or tedious labour, either in careful circumspection, or heedfull prevention of that which is unchangeable, they hold as vain as the washing of an *Aethiopian* to make him white. Of this opinion *Sylla* seemed to be; professing himself better born to fortune then to the wars, and acknowledging his happiest victories to have proceeded from his most heedless and unadvised resolutions. And the great *Alexander* he carried himself, as though he had been of the same opinions, of whom *Curtius* saith, *Quoties illius fortuna à morte revocata! quoties in pericula vestrum perpetua selescit! proxit!* How many a time did Fortune call him back from the brink of death! how often did she happily defend and save him, when he had by his rashness brought himself into dangers! And *Plutarch* saith, that he had power of time and place.

In the life of Alex. m. dier.

Othes are not willing to ascribe so much to Fortune, as to make themselves the Tennis-ball to her Racket: and yet they are content to allow her half of every thing they go about, referring the other moiety to their own discretions. And so like partners in an adventure, they labour to improve their share far their best advantage.

Some other there are that will allow Fortune no part at all in their actions, but do confront her with a goddess of greater power, and make industry the means to annul her Deity. Of this opinion was *Timoleon* the *Athenians*, who having attained many notable victories, would not allow of the concept of the painter, that had made a table wherein Fortune was taking in those cities, (which he had won) with a net whilst he himself slept: but protested against her in that behalf, and would not give her any part in that business.

And thus the heathen world varied much in their opinions touching Fortune, as Fortune her self did in her events to themward: which were so divers and changeable, as were able to entangle the deepest wits, and confound the wildome of the greatest judgements: whereby the word Fortune usurped a Deity, and got an opinion of extraordinary power in the regiment of humane actions. But our Christian times have a reader lesson, wherein is taught a sovereign Providence, guiding and directing the thoughts of mens hearts, with the faculties and powers of the Soul, together with their externall actions, to such ends as shall seem best to that omnipotent wildome, to whom all our abilities serve as instruments and means to effect his purposes, notwithstanding our particular intendments, or what the heart of man may otherwise determine. And therefore such as will make their

Plutarch in the life of Sylla.

ways prosperous unto themselves, and receive that contentment which their hope expecteth, or their labours would deliver, must use those helps which the rules of Christianity do teach in that behalf: may better be learned from a Divine, then from him that writeth Treatises of War.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Quintus Curtius speaking of Alexander, saith, Nullum virum Regis istius max. ceteris expeditio. Quis celeritatem laudaverim, I can commend no virtue in this King before his speed & celerity: whereof this might be a ground, that he followed Darius with such speed after the second battell he gave him; that in eleven dayes he marched with his army six hundred miles, which was a chafe well fitting Alexander the Great, and might reit unexampled: notwithstanding Suetonius giveth this general report of Cæsars, that in matter military, aut equavit, praefur-tissimum gloriam, aut excedit, he either equaled or exceeded the glory of the best: and for this particular he saith, quod sepe sentit de se praecipue, that he was very often the messenger of his own success. And to speak truly, he seemed to challenge to himself expedition and speed as his peculiar commendation, grounding himself upon the danger which lingering and postponing of time doth usually bring to well advised resolutions: according to that of *Lucan* the Poet,*

*Nocuit semper differre parati.*  
Delay did always hurt those that were ready.

For by this speedy execution of well-digested directions, he gained two main advantages. First, the prevention of such helps and means as the enemy would otherwise have had, to make the war dangerous and the event doubtful. And secondly, the confusion and fears, which doth consequently follow such main disappointments, being the most dangerous accidents that can happen to any party, and the chiefest points to be endeavour'd to be cast upon an enemy by him that would make an easie conquest.

For proof whereof, amongst many other examples, I will only alledge his expedition to Rome, when he first came against *Pompey*, according to *Plutarch's* relation. In the mean time (saith he) news came to Rome, that *Cæsar* had won *Ariminum*, a great city in Italy, and that he came directly to Rome with a great power, which was not true: for he came but with 3000, horse and 5000, foot, and would not tarry for the rest of his army, being on the other side of the *Alpes* in Gallia, but made half rather to surprize his enemies upon the sudden, being afraid and in garboles, not looking for him so soon, then to give them time to be provided, and so to fight with them in the best of their strength,

Plutarch in the life of Pompey.

which

which fell out accordingly. For this sudden and unexpected approach of his, put all Italy and Rome itself into such a tumult and confusion, that no man knew what way to take for his safety: for such as were out of Rome came flying thither from all parts, and those on the other side that were in Rome, went out as fast, and forsook the city. And the amazement was such, that Pompey and the Senate fled into Greece, whereby it happened that Cæsar in threelcore days was Lord of all Italy without any bloodshed.

Veni,  
Vultu,  
Vici.

Besides this manner of prevention by sudden surprizes, we may see the like expedition in the very carriage and form of his wars. For if the enemy had taken the field, he laboured by all means to bring him to fight; or otherwise if he refused to take the field, he then endeavoured with the like speed to besiege him, or block him up in some hold, to the end he might bring the matter to a speedy upshot, as he did with Perseus at Alesia. But that which is most unseasonable touching this point, at the first taking in of Spain in the garb of the civil wars, he defeated two armies, overthrew two Generals, and took in two Provinces in the space of fourty days. Neither did he make use of expedition only in his carriage of a war, but also in the action and execution of battel: for he never forsook an enemy overthrown and discomfited, untill he had taken their camp, and defeated them of their cheifest helps, which Pompey felt to his utter overthrow; for the same day he routed him at Pharsalia, he took his camp, and inclosed it with a ditch and a rampier, where 25000 Romans were led for their safety, and brought them to yield themselves unto him: and to making use (as he saith) of the benefit of fortune, and the terror and amazement of the enemy, he performed three notable services in one day.

And this he used with such dexterity and depth of wisdom, that commonly the first victory ended the war: as by this at Pharsalia he made himself Commander of the East, and by that at Tapso he made himself Lord of Africa, and by the battel at Munda he got all Spain.

To conclude this point, I may not forget the like speed and expedition in his works. In fifteen days he cast a ditch and a rampier of fifteen foot in height, between the lake at Geneva and St. Claude, hills containing nineteen miles. He made his bridge over the Rhene in ten days. At the siege of Masfeller he made twelve galleys, and furnished them out to sea within thirty days after the timber was cut down. And the rest of his works with the like expedition.

Lib. 8. bell.  
civil.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsarulæ poysoneth himself, Cæsar divideth his army into three parts.

**N**ow whether Ambiorix did not make head and assemble his forces of purposes for that he determined not to fight, or whether he were hindered by the stormes of the

time, and the sudden coming of the horsemen, thinking the rest of the army had followed after; it remaineth doubtfull: but certain it is, that he sent privie messengers about the country, commanding every man to shift for himself; and so some fled into the Forrest Ardennas, others into fens and boggs, and such as were near the Ocean, did take themselves in such Islands as the tide conveniently made: many forsook their Country, and committed themselves to their fortunes to mere strangers and unknown people. Catvulus the King of the one half of the Eburones who was a party with Ambiorix in this matter, he now groweth unable to undergo the labours, either of war or of flying, despatch Ambiorix with all manner of exhortations, as the authors of this matter, drake the juice of Teu's (whereof there is great store in Gallia and Germany,) and so died. The Segni and Condru's, of the nation and number of the Germans that dwell between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat him not to take them in the number of the enemy, and that he would not adjudge all the Germans dwelling on this side of the Rhene to have one and the same cause: for their part, they never so much as thought of warres nor gave any aid to Ambiorix. Cæsar, having examined the matter by the turnure of the captives, commanded them, that if any of the Eburones should see unto them, to bring them unto him, and in so doing he would spare their country. Then dividing his power into three parts, he left the baggage of the whole army at Vaucas, a castle in the midst of the Eburones, where Titurus and Auriaculus were lodged. He made choice of this place the rather, for that the fortifications made there, or before continued perfect and good, to the end he might ease the souldier of some labour; and therelike the fourteenth legion for a guard to the carriages being one of the three which he had last enrolled in Italy, making Q. Tullius Cicero their Commander, and with him he left two hundred horse.

The army being thus divided, he commended Titus Labienus to carry three legions towards that part of the sea coast which bordereth upon the Menapij, and sent Trebonius with the like

number

number of legions to wit, and hurry that country which confineth the Aduatic: he himself with the other three determined to go to the river Scaldis, which runneth into the Mæse, and to the furthest parts of the wood Ardennas; for that he understood that Ambiorix with a few horsemen was fled to these parts. At his departure he assured them that he would return after the seventh days absence: for as that day he knew that corn was to be given to that legion which he had therelike left in garrison. He counselled Labienus and Trebonius to return likewise by that day, if they conveniently could: to the end that after communication of the projects of the enemy, they might think upon a new beginning of war.

## OBSERVATIONS.

This sudden surprize upon Ambiorix and the Treviri, prevented (as I have already noted) their making head together, and put the enemy to such shifts for their safety; as occasion or opportunity would afford them in particular. And albeit the Treviri were by this means disperfed, yet they were not overthrow, nor utterly vanquished, but continued still in the nature and quality of an enemy, although they were by this occasion defeated of their cheifest means. And therefore the better to prosecute them in their particular flights, and to keep them disjoynted, he divided his army into three parts, and made three severall inroads upon their country, hoping thereby to meet with some new occasion, which might give an overthrow to a more absolute conquest: for diversity of motions do breed diversity of occasions, whereof some may happily be such, as being well managed, may bring a man to the end of his desires. But herein let us not forget to observe the manner he used in this service: for still he left a Rendez-vous where all the carriages of the army were bestowed, with a competent garrison for the safe keeping thereof, to the end the souldiers might be assured of a retreat, with difficulty to ever might befall them in that action, according to that of Sertorius, that a good captain should rather look behind him then before him; and appointed withall a certain day when all the troops should meet there again; *It rursus* (as he saith) *communio consilio, exploratque hostium rationibus, aliud in vnum belli capere possint*. That after communication of their councels, &c.

Plato: in  
the 1<sup>st</sup> of  
Sertorius.

## CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar sendeth messengers to the bordering States, to come out and ask the Eburones.

Cæsar.

**H**ereupon (as I have already declared) no certain band or troop of the enemy no garrison or town to stand out in arms; but the multitude was disperfed into all

parts, and every man lay hid either in some secret and unknown valley, or in some rough and woody place, or in some boggy or in such other places as gave them hope of shelter or safety: which places were well known to the States of that country. And the matter required great diligence and circumspection, not so much in regard of the general safety of the army, (for there could no danger befall persons them, the enemy being all terrified and fled,) as in preserving every particular souldier; which notwithstanding a in part concern the safety of the whole army: for hope of booty did draw many far off out of their ranks, and the woods through uncertain and unknown passages would not suffer the souldiers to go in troops. If he would have the business take an end, and the very race of those wicked people rooted out, the army must be divided, and many small bands must be made for that purpose: but to keep the Mænapes at their ensigns, according to the custome and use of the Roman army, the place itself was a sufficient guard for the Eburones people, who did not want courage. In particular, both to lay in wait for them, and circumvent them as they were severed from their companies. For in extremities of that nature what diligence could attain unto was provided, but in such manner, that somewhat was omitted in the offensive part, though the souldiers minds were bent upon revenge, rather then it should be done with any detriment or losse to the souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the next bordering States, calling them out to sack the Eburones, in hope of booty and pillage, to the end the Gallies should rather hazard their lives in the wood, then the legionary souldiers; as also that there might be many spoilers and destroyers, to the end that both the name and race of that State might be taken away. Hereupon a great multitude speedily assembled from all quarters. The things were alled in all parts and quarters of the Eburones, and the seventh day drew near which he had appointed for his return to the carriages.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is a commoditie which a Generall hath, when the enemy doth not refuse open encounters, for so he may be sure that the weight of the buline will rest upon military virtue and prowess of arms, as ready way-makes to a speedy victory: but when it shall happen that the country doth afford covert and protection to him that is more malicious than the valourous, and that the faithfulness of the place refuseth to shew himself unless it be upon advantage, the war doubtless is like to prove tedious, and the victory lesse honourable. In such case there is

The benefit  
of open  
encounter.

V 2

no

no other way, then to harry and waste a country, that the enemy may be famished out of his holds, and brought to subjection by scarcity and necessity. Which is a means so powerfull, as well to implant the greatest strength, as to meet with subterfuge and delay, that of it self it subdueth all opposition, and needeth no other help for achieving of victory, as may appear by the sequel of this summers action. And herein let us further observe the particular care which Cæsar had of his souldiers, adjudging the whole army to be interessed in every private mans safety. A matter strange in these times, and of small consequence in the judgement of our commanders, to whom particular fortunes are esteemed nonentities, and men in several of no value; forasmuch as conquests are made with multitudes. Concerning which point, I grant it to be as true as it is often spoken in places besieged, that the loss of one man is not the loss of a town; nor the defeating of twenty the overthrow of a thousand: and yet it cannot be denied but the lesser is payd for the lawfull wreath, the more precious is the victory; and it fitteth then at a hard rate, when it maketh the buyer bankrupt, or enforced him to confesse that such another victory would overthrow him. And therefore he that will buy much honour with little blood, must endeavour by diligent and careful labour to provide for the particular safety of his souldiers. Wherein albeit he cannot value an unity at an equal rate with a number; yet he must consider that without a unity there can be no multitude: and not to only, but the life and strength of a multitude consisteth in unities; for otherwise, neither had *Nero* needed to have withed the people of *Rome* to have had but one head, that he might have cut it off at a stroke, nor *Scorvius* device had carried any grace, making a silly fellow fall in plucking off the thim of an old lean jades, and a little wearish man leave the flump bare of a great-cold horse, and that in a short time by plucking hairy hair.

## CHAP. XIII.

The *Sicambri* send out two thousand horse against the *Eburones*, and by fortune they fall upon *Cicero* at *Vatua*.

Cæsar.

Here you shall perceive the power that fortune hath, and what chances happen in the carriage of a war. There was (as I have already said) the enemy being scattered and terrified, no troop or band which might give the least cause of fear: the report came to the Germans on the other side of the Rhene, that the *Eburones* were to be sacked, and that all men had liberty to make spoil of them. The *Sicambri* dwelling next to the Rhene, who

formerly received the *Tenchbri* and *Uspices* in their flight, set out two thousand horses, and sent them over the river some thirty miles below that place where Cæsar had left the half bridge with a garrison. These horse made directly towards the confines of the *Eburones*, took many prisoners and much cattle, neither bog nor wood hindered their passages, being bred and born in war and theft. They inquire of the prisoners in what part Cæsar was, and found him to be gone far off, and that all the army was departed from thence. But one of the prisoners speaking to them, said, Why do ye seek after so poor and so slender a booty, whilst otherwise you may make your selves most fortunate? in three hours space you may go to *Vatua*, where the Roman army hath left all their fortunes; the garrison in that place is no greater then can hardly furnish the walls about, neither drive any man go out of the trenches. The Germans in this hope did bid the pillage which they had already taken, and went directly to *Vatua*, taking him for their guide that gave them first notice thereof.

## OBSERVATIONS.

IT were as great a madness to believe that a man were able to give directions to meet with all chances, as to think no foresight can prevent any casualty. For as the soul of man is ended with a power of discourse, whereby it conclude either according to the certainty of reason, or the learning of experience, bringing these directions as faulty and inconvenient, and approving others as safe and to be followed: so we are to understand that this power of discourse is limited to a certain measure or proportion of strength, and inscribed in a circle of lesser capacity then the compass of possibility, or the large extension of what may happen; for otherwise the course of destiny were subject to our contrivances, and our knowledge were equal to universal entities, whereas the infinite of accidents do far exceed the reach of our shallow senses, and our greatest apprehension is a small an unperfected experience. And therefore as such as through the occasion of publick employment, are driven to forsake the shore of minute and particular courtesies, and to float in the Ocean of casualties and adventures, may doubtless receive strong directions both from the loadstone of reason, and transmontane of experience, to shape an easy and successful course: so notwithstanding they shall find themselves subject to the contrariety of winds and extremity of tempests, besides many other less and impediments beyond the compass of their direction, to interrupt their course and divert them from their haven, which made the *Carthaginians* that was more

Harnabul.

more happy in conquering then in keeping to cry out; *Nisquam minus quam in bello evenerunt verum respondent*, the event of things doth no where answer expectation. I tell then in war, as it happened in this accident.

## CHAP. XV.

The *Sicambri* come to *Vatua*, and offer to take the camp.

Cæsar.

**C**icero having all the dayes before observed Cæsar's direction with great diligence, and kept the souldiers within the camp, not suffering so much as a boy to go out of the trenches; the seventh day dissembling of Cæsar's return according to his promises, for thus he understood he was gone further into the country, and heard nothing of his return; and withal being moved with the speeches of the souldiers, who termed their patient abiding within their trenches, a siege, forasmuch as no man was suffered to go out of them, and expecting no such chance within the compass of three miles: which was the furthest; he was purposed to send them for corn: especially considering that nine legions were abroad, besides great forces of horse, the enemy being already dispersed and almost extinguished. Accordingly he sent five cohorts to gather corn in the next fields, which were separated from the garrison only with a little hill lying between the camp and the corn. There were many left in the camp of the other legions that were sick, of whom such as were recovered to the number of three hundred, were sent with them all under one ensign: besides a great company of souldiers, boys, and great store of cattle which they had in the camp. In the mean time came these German Ritters, and with the same gallop As they came thither, they sought to enter in at the Decumane gate; neither were they discovered by reason of a wood which kept them out of sight, until they were almost at the trenches; inasmuch as such riddlers-men and merchants as kept their booths and shops under the rampiers, had no time to be received into the camp. Our men were much troubled in the unexpectedness of the thing; and the cohorts that kept watch did hardly sustain the first assault. The enemy was quickly spread about the works, to see if they could find entrance in any other part. Our men did hardly keep the gates: the rest was defended by the fortification and the place itself. The whole camp was in a great fear, and one inquired of another the reason of the tumult: neither could they tell which way to carry their ensigns, or how any man should dispose of himself. One gave out that the

camp was taken; and another that the army and General was overthrown, and that the barbarous people came thither as conquerors: many took occasion from the place to imagine new and superstitious Religions, recalling to mind the fatal calamity of *Cotta* and *Turcius* that died in that place. Through this fear and confusion that had possessed the whole camp, the Germans were confirmed in their opinion which they had received from the prisoners, that there was no garrison at all in the works. They therefore did break in, and encouraged one another not to suffer so great a fortune to escape them. *Publius Sextus Baculus*, that had been *Præcipuus* under *Cæsar* (of whom mention had been made in the former battels) was there left sick, and had taken no sustenance of five dayes before. He hearing the danger they were in, went unarmed out of his cabins, and seeing the enemy ready to force the gates, and the matter to be in great haste, taking arms from one that stood next him, he went and stood in the port. The Centurions of the Cohort that kept watch followed him, and they for a while engaged the enemy. *Sextus* having received many great wounds, fainted at length, and was hardly saved by those that stood next him. Upon this respect the rest did so far assure themselves, that they durst stand upon the works, and make a few of defence.

## OBSERVATIONS.

IN the former observation I dispersed the interest which the whole army hath in one particular man, which out of *Cæsar's* opinion I concluded to be such as was not to be neglected: but if we suppose a party extraordinary, and tie him to such singular worth as was in *Sextus*, I then doubt by this example, whether I may not equal him to the multitude, or put him alone in the fallance to counterpoise the rest of his fellows. For doubtless if his valour had not exceeded any height of courage, elsewhere then to be found within those walls the whole garrison had been utterly slaughtered, and the place had been made fatal to the Romans by two disastrous calamities. In consideration whereof, I will refer my self to the judgement of the wise, not only in it importeth a great Commander, not only in honour as a reward of virtue, but in wisdom and good discretion, to make much of so gallant a spirit, and to give that respect unto him, as may both witness his valiant carriage, and the thankfull acceptance thereof on the behalf of the Commonwealth, wherein we need not the doubt of *Cæsar's* requital to this *Sextus*, having by divers honourable relations in these wars, touching his valiantnesse and prowess in arms,



Observations upon *Cæsar*s

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Cæsar* returneth to spoil the enemy: and pursueth *Acco*.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar returning again to trouble and vex the enemy, having called a great number of people from the bordering cities, he sent them out into all parts. All the villages and houses which were any where to be seen, were burned to the ground; pillage and booty was taken in every place; the corn was not only consumed by so great a multitude of men and cattle, but beaten down also by the unseasonableness of the year and continuall rain: in so much that albeit divers did hide themselves for the present, yet the army being withdrawn, they must necessarily perish through want and scarcity. And oftentimes they besieged the place (the horsemen being divided into many quarters,) where they did not only see *Ambiorix*, but kept him for the most part in sight: and in hoping still to take him, some that thought to merit *Cæsar*s highest favour, took such infinite pains, as were almost beyond the power of nature: and ever there seemed but a little between them and the thing they most desired. But he conveyed himself away through dens and woods and dales, and in the night time sought other countries, and quarters, with no greater a guard of horse then four, to whom only he durst commit the safety of his life. The country being in this manner harried and depopulated, *Cæsar*, with the loss of two Cohorts, brought back his army to *Durocortorum* in the State of the men of *Rhemes*; where a Parliament being summoned, he determined to call in question the conspiracy of the *Senones*

and *Carnutes*, and especially *Acco*, the principal Author of that Concell: who being condemned, was put to death more *majorum*. Some others saving the like judgements saved themselves by flight. These he interdicted fire and water. So leaving two legions to winter in the confines of the *Trevirs*, and two other amongst the *Limoges*, and the other six at *Agendicum* in the borders of the *Senones*, having made provision of corn for the Army, he went into Italy, ad conventus agendos.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**He conclusion of this Sommers work was shut up with the sack and depopulation of the *Eburones*, as the extremity of hostile fury, when the enemy lieth in the fastness of the country, and refuse to make open warre. That being done, *Cæsar* proceeded in a course of civill judgement with such principal offenders as were of the conspiracy: and namely with *Acco*, whom he punished in such manner as the old *Romans* were accustomed to do with such offenders as had forfeited their loyalty to their country: a kind of death which *Nero* knew not, although he had been Emperor of *Rome* thirteen years, and put to death many thousand people. The party condemned was to have his neck locked in a fork, and to be whipped naked to death: and he that was put to death after that manner, was punished more *majorum*. Such others as feared to undergo the judgements, and fled before they came to trial, were banished out of the country, and made incapable of the benefit of fire and water in that Empire.

And thus endeth the sixth Commentary.

The

## The seventh Commentarie, of the warres in GALLIA.

## The Argument.

**T**His last Commentarie containeth the specialities of the war which *Cæsar* made against all the States of *Gallia* united into one confederacy, for the expelling of the *Roman* government out of that Continent, whom *Cæsar* overthrew in the end, *Horribili vigilantiâ, & prodigiis operibus*, by his horrible vigilancy and prodigious actions.

## CHAP. I.

The *Gallies* enter into new deliberations of revolt.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar being in quiet *Cælia*, according to his determination, went into Italy to keep Courts and Sessions. There he understood that *P. Clodius* was slain, and of a Decree which the Senate had made touching the assembly of all the youth of Italy, and thereupon he purposed to invade new limits throughout the whole Province. These news were quickly carried over the Alpes into *Gallia*, & the *Gallies* themselves added such murmurs to it, as the matter seemed well to bear; that *Cæsar* was now detained by the troubles at *Rome*, and in such dissensions could not return to his army. Being stirred up by this occasions such as before were inwardly grieved, that they were subject to the Empire of the people of *Rome*, did now more freely and boldly enter into the consideration of warre. The Princes and chieftain of *Gallia* having appointed councils and meetings in remote and woody places, complained of the death of *Acco*, and shewed it to be a fortune which might concern themselves. They pity the common misery of *Gallia*, and do propound all manner of promise and rewards to such as will begin the warre, and with the danger of their lives redeem the liberty of their country: wherein they are to be very careful not to forelose any time, to the end that *Cæsar* may be kept from coming to his army before their secret conferences be discovered. Which might easily be done, for as much as neither the Legions durst go out of their wintering camps in the absence of their Generalls, nor the Generall come to the Legions without a convoy. To conclude, they held it better to die in fight, then to lose their ancient honour in matter of war, and the liberty left them by their predecessors.

**T**His Chapter discovereth such sparkles of revolts, rising from the discontentment of the conquered *Gallies*, as were like to break out into an universall burning: and within a while proved such a fire, as the like hath not been seen in the continent of *Gallia*. For this Sommers work verified the saying of the *Samites*, *Quod Livie lib. 1.* *pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum esset*. That peace is more grievous to those that are in vassalage, then warre is to freemen: and was carried on either part with such a resolution, as in respect of this service, neither the *Gallies* did before that time engage themselves seriously in their countries cause, nor did the *Romans* know the difficulty of their task. But as *Epaminondas* called the fields of *Bacotis*, *Mors* his scaffold where he kept his games; so as *Xenophon* nameth the city of *Ephejus* the *Anniversaries* shop: so might *Gallia* for this year be called the Theatre of war. The chieftain encouragement of the *Gallies* at this time, was the trouble and dissension at *Rome* about the death of *Clodius*, and the accusation of *Milo* for killing *Clodius*.

This *Clodius* (as *Plutarch* reporteth) was a young man of a noble house, but wild and insolent, and much condemned for profaning a secret sacrifice, which the Ladies of *Rome* did celebrate in *Cæsar*s house, by coming amongst them disguised in the habit of a young singing wench, which he did for the love of *Pompeius Cæsar*s wife: whereof being openly accused, he was quitted by secret means which he made to the Judges; and afterwards obtained the Tribuneship of the people, and caused *Cicero* to be banished, and did many outrages and insolencies in his Tribuneship: which caused *Milo* to kill him, for which he was also accused. And the Senate fearing that this accusation of *Milo* being

*Plutarch in the life of Marcellus.*

*Plutarch in the life of Cicero.*

X

being a bold-spirited man and of good quality, would move some uproar or sedition in the city, they gave commission to Pompey to see justice executed, as well in this cause, as for other offences that the city might be quiet, and the commonwealth suffer no detriment. Whereupon Pompey pollict the market-place, where the cause was to be heard with bands of soldiery and troops of armed men. And there were the troubles in Rome upon the death of *Cicero*, which the *Gallies* did take as an occasion of revoly, having thereby that *Cæsar* (being in *Gallia Cisalpinia*, whose province was allotted to his government) as well as that *Gallia* Northward the *Alpes*) would have been detained from his army.

## CHAP. II.

The men of *Chartres* take upon them the beginning of a revolt, under the conduct of *Cottus* and *Conetodinus*.

Cæsar.

**I**n these things being thus disputed, the men of *Chartres* did make themselves the chief of the common safety, so no danger for the common safety of their country. As for *Chartres*, as it is a prison they could not give caution by hostages, lest the matter should be discovered; they desire to have their enemies brought head by oath, and by mutual collusion of their military engines, which was the most religious ceremony they could use to bind the rest not to forsake them, having made an entrance and beginning to that war. The men of *Chartres* be now committed by the rest, and the oaths of all them that were present being taken, and a time appointed to begin, they brake up the assembly. When the day came, they of *Chartres* under the conduct of *Cottus* and *Conetodinus*, two desperate fellows upon a watchword, went very speedily to *Genabum*; and such Roman citizens as were there upon business, namely *C. Fulvius Cottus* knight of Rome, whom *Cæsar* had left governor of the province of corn, they slew, and took their goods. The report thereof was quickly spread over all the *Stanes* of *Gallia*, for when any such great or extraordinary matter happeneth, they signify it through the country by an outcry and shouts, which is taken by others, and delivered to the next, and so goeth from hand to hand, as it happened at this time; for that which was done at *Genabum* at Sun-rising, was before the first watch of the night was ended border in the confines of the *Arvern*, which is above a hundred and threescore miles distant.

## OBSERVATIONS.

This manner of outcry here mentioned to be usual in *Gallia*, was the same which re-

maineth in use at this present in *Wales*, although not so frequent as in former times. For the custom is there, as often as any robbery happeneth to be committed, or any man to be slain, or what other outrage or riot is done, the next at hand do go to some convenient place where they may be best heard, and there they make an outcry or howling, which they call a *Hobnob*, signifying the fact to the next inhabitants, who take it as passionately, and deliver it further, and so from hand to hand it quickly spreadeth over all the country. It is a very ready way to put the country in arms, and was first devised (as it seemeth) for the slay and apprehension of robbers and outlaws, who kept in strong holds, and lived upon the spoil of the bordering inhabitants: but otherwise it favoureth of Barbarians, rather than of any civile government.

## CHAP. III.

*Vercingetorix* stirreth up the *Arverni* to the like commotion and revolt.

**I**n like manner *Vercingetorix* the son of *Citellus*, of the nation of the *Arverni*, a young man of great power and authority, (whose father was the Commander of all *Gallia*, and because he sought a kingdom was slain by those of his own State,) calling together his followers and clients, did deeply incense them to rebellion. His purpose being known, every man took arms; and so he was driven out of the town of *Gerogonia* by *Gobannio* his uncle & other Princes, who thought it not safe to make trial of that fortune. And yet he desisted not, but enrolled needy and desperate people; and with such troops, whomsoever he met withal of the State, he did easily draw them to his party, persuading them to take arms for the defence of common liberty. And during at length great forces together, he expelled his adversaries out of the towns, by whom he was himself before thrusted out. He was called of his men by the title of King, and sent Embassages into all parts, advising them to continue constant and faithful. The *Senones*, the *Parisii*, the *Pictones*, the *Cadurci*, the *Turones*, the *Aulerci*, the *Lenomni*, the *Andes*, and all the rest that border upon the Ocean were quickly made of his party; and by all their consents the chief command was conferred upon him. Which authority being offered him, he commanded hostages to be brought in unto him from all those States, and a certain number of soldiers to be sent him with all speed. He rated every city what proportion of arms they should have ready, and specially he laboured to raise great force of horse. In extraordinary diligence he added extraordinary severity, compelling

selling such as stood doubtful by hard and severe punishment: for such as had committed great offences, he put to death by fire and torture; lesser faults he punished with the loss of their nose or their eyes, and so sent them home, that by their example others might be terrified. By these practices and severity having speedily raised a great army, he sent *Lucius* of *Calors*, a man of great spirit and boldness, with part of the forces, towards the *Rutheni*, and he himself made towards the *Bituriges*. Upon his coming the *Bituriges* sent to the *Hedui*, in whose protection they were, to require aid against *Vercingetorix*. The *Hedui*, by the advice of the *Legates* which *Cæsar* had left with the army, sent forces of horse and foot to the aid of the *Bituriges*; who coming to the river *Loire*, which divideth the *Bituriges* from the *Hedui*, after a few days stay, not daring to pass over the river, returned home again, bringing word to our *Legates*, that they durst not commit themselves to the *Bituriges*, and so returned. For they knew that if they had passed over the river, the *Bituriges* had inclosed them in on the one side, and the *Arverni* on the other. But whether they did return upon that occasion or through perfidious treachery, it remaineth doubtful. The *Bituriges* upon their departure did presently join themselves with the *Arverni*.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is observed by such as are acquainted with the matter of Government, that there ought to be always a proportion of quality between him that commandeth and them that obey: for if a man of *Sardanapalus* condition should take upon him the charge of *Marius* army, it were like to take no better effect, then if *Manlius* had the leading of lascivious *Cinades*. And as we may observe in economical policy, a disolute matter may as soon command hair to grow out the palm of his hands, as to make a virtuous servant; but the respect of duty between such relatives doth likewise inferre the like respect of quality: so in all sorts and conditions of commands, there must be sympathizing means, to unite the diversity of the parts in the happy end of perfect Government. In this new Empire which befell *Vercingetorix*, we may observe a double proportion between him and his people. The first, of strength and ability; and the others of quality and resemblance of affection: upon the assurance of which proportion he grounded the authority of his command. For it appeareth that his first beginning was by perfwation and intreaty, and would induce no directions, but that which was guided by a loose and easy reine; hold-

ing it neither safe nor seemly, but rather a strain of extreme madnesse, first to punish or threaten, and then to want power to make good his judgements: but being strengthened by authority from themselves, and backed with an army able to controll their disobedience, he then added punishment as the enigma of Magistracy, and confirmed his power by rigorous commands; which is as necessary a demonstration of a well-terried government, as any circumstance belonging thereunto.

Touching the resemblance and proportion of their qualities, it is manifestly shewed by the sequel of this history, that every man desired to redeem the common liberty of their country, in that measure of endeavour as was fitting to great a cause. Amongst whom *Vercingetorix* being their chief Commander, *summa diligentia* (as the story saith) added *summam severitatem*, to great diligence great severity; as well assured, that the greater part would approve his justice, and condemn the unaccountable of doubtful resolutions, desiring no further service at their hands, then that wherein himself would use the former. In imitation of *Valerius Corvinus*: *Fatis mea, non dila, vos milites sequi solo; nec disciplinam modos, sed exemplum eriam a me petere*; I would have you O my Soldiers, do as I do, and not so much mind what I say; and to take not so much discipline only, but your pattern also from me. And therefore the party was like to be well upheld; forasmuch as both the Prince and the people were so far engaged in the matter intended, as by the resemblance of an earnest desire might answer the measure of due proportion.

## CHAP. IV.

*Cæsar* cometh into *Gallia*, and by a device getteth to his army.

**I**n these things being told *Cæsar* in Italy, as soon as he understood that the matters in the city were by the wisdom of Pompey brought into better state, he took his journey into *Gallia*, and being come thither he was much troubled how to get to his army. For if he should send for the *Legions* into the Provinces, he understood that they should be easily fought withal by the way in his absence. If he himself should go unto them, he doubted how he might safely commit his person to any, although they were such as were yet in peace. In the mean time *Lucius* of *Calors* being sent against the *Rutheni*, did easily unite that State to the *Arverni*; and proceeding further against the *Nitiobriges* and the *Gambis* he received hostages of both of them, and having raised a great power he laboured

to break into the Province, and to make towards Narbo, which being known, Cæsar resolved by all means to put him by this purpose, and went himself to Narbo. At his coming he encouraged such as stood doubtful or inconstant, and placed garrisons amongst the Ruteni, the Volci, and about Narbo, which were frontier places and near unto the enemy, and commanded part of the forces which were in the Province, together with those supplies which he had brought out of Italy, to go against the Helvi, which are adjoining upon the Arverni. Things being thus ordered, Lucernus being now suppressed and removed holding it to be dangerous to enter among the garrisons, he himself went towards the Helvi. And albeit the hill Gebenna, which divideth the Arverni from the Helvi, by reason of the hardness of winter, and the depth of the snows did hinder their passages, yet by the industry of the soldier making way through snow of six foot deep, they came into the confines of the Arverni: who being suddenly and unawares suppressed, little mistrusting any danger over the hill Gebenna, which in itself they in as a wall, and at that time of the year doth not afford a path to a single man alone, he commanded the horsemen to scatter themselves far and near to make the enemy the more afraid. These things being speedily carried to Vercingetorix, all the Arverni full of fear and amazement flocked about him, beseeching him to have a care of their States, and not to suffer themselves to be sacked by the enemy, especially now at this time when as all the war was transferred upon them. Upon their instant intreaty he removed his camp out of the territories of the Bituriges, and marched towards the country of the Arverni. But Cæsar having continued two days in these places, forasmuch as he under stood both by sight and opinion, what course Vercingetorix was like to take, he left the army, providing some supplies of horse, which he went to raise, and appointed young Brutus to command those forces, admonishing him to send out the horsemen into all quarters, and that he himself would not be absent from the camp above three days. These things being thus settled, none of his followers knowing his determination, by great journeys he came to Vienna; where taking fresh horse, which he had laid there many days before, he ceased neither night nor day, until he came through the confines of the Helvi to the Lingones, where two legions wintered: to the end if the Helvi should undertake any thing against him, he might with speed prevent it. Being there, he sent to the rest of the Legions, and brought them all to one place, before the Arverni could possibly have notice of it.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Cæsar upon his first entrance into Gallia, was perplexed how to get to his army; and the matter stood in such terms, as brought either the legions or his own person into hazard. For (as he saith) if he should send for the legions to come unto him, they should doubtless be fought withal by the way, which he was loath to adventure, unless himself had been present: or otherwise if he himself had gone unto them, he doubted of the entertainment of the revolting Gallæ, and might have overthrown his army, by the loss of his own person. In this extremity of choice, he resolved upon his own passage to the army, as less dangerous and more honourable, rather than to call the legions out of their wintering camps, where they stood as a check to bridle the insolency of the mutinous Gallæ, and to bring them to the hazard of battle in fetching their General into the field: whereby he might have lost the victory before he had begun the wars. And for his better safety in this passage, he used this cunning. Having assured the Roman Province by strong and frequent garrisons on the frontiers, and removed Lucernus from those parts; gathering together such supplies as he had brought with him out of Italy, with other forces which he found in the Province, he went speedily into the territories of the Arverni, making a way over the hill Gebenna, at such a time of the year as made it unpassable for any forces, had they not been led by Cæsar; only for this purpose to have it noised abroad, that whereas Vercingetorix and the Arverni had principally undertook the quarrel against the Romans, and made the beginning of a new war, Cæsar would first deal with them, and lay the weight thereof upon their shoulders, by calling their fortunes first in question, to the end he might persuade the world with an opinion of his presence in that country, and draw Vercingetorix back again to defend his state, whilst he in the mean time did slip to his army without suspicion or fear of perill: for slaying there no longer than might serve to give a sufficient colour to that pretence, and leaving those forces to execute the rest, and to make good the secret of the project, he conveyed himself to his army with such speed and celerity, as doth verify the saying of Sæneticus; *quod præcipuo minus de se se præcavet*, that he often outwent the ordinary messengers.

These blinds and false intendments are of special use in matter of wars, and serve as well to get advantages upon an enemy, as to clear a difficulty by cleanly evasion: neither is a Commander the less valued for fine conveyance in military projects, but deserveth rather greater honour

To abuse an enemy by way of stratagem, is counted a lie in a Commander.

Arverni, a nation of the Gæles.

honour for adding art unto valour, and supplanting the strength of opposition with the sleight of wit.

—*Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit?*

Who looks at fraud or valour in a foe? hath always been held a principle amongst men of war. And Lysander his council is the same in effect, that where the Lions skin will not serve the turn, there take the Foxes. Cæsar spake it to the commendation of Sylla, but he had to do both with a Lion and a Fox; but he feared more his Foxes than his Lions skin. It is reported that Anniball excelled all others of his time for abusing the enemy in matters of stratagem, for he never made fight but with an addition of assistants, supporting force with arts, and the fury of armies with the subtiltie of wit.

Of late time amongst other practices of this nature, the treaty at Offend is most memorable, entertained onely to gain time: that while speech of parlee was continued, and pledges delivered to the Archduke Albertus, for the safety of such as were sent into the town to capitulate with the Generall, there might be time gained for the sending in of such supplies of men and munition as were wanting, to make good the defence thereof: which were no sooner taken in, but the Treaty proved a stratagem of warre.

In these foiles and tricks of wit, which at all times and in all ages have been highly esteemed in men of warre, as speciall vertues becomming the condition of a great Commander, if it be demanded how far a Generall may proceed in abusing an enemy by deeds or words; I cannot speak distinctly to the question: but sure I am, that Surenas, Lieutenant generall of the Parthian army, did his master good service, in abusing Crassus the Roman Generall by fair promises; and as Plutarch saith, by foul perjury, till in the end he brought his head to be an actor in a Tragedy: albeit Surenas never deceived well of good report since that time. Howsoever, men of civill society ought not to draw this into use from the example of soldiers, forasmuch as it is a part of the profession of cutting of throats, and hath no prescription but in extremities of warre.

## CHAP. V.

Vercingetorix besieged Gergovia, Cæsar taketh in Vellandunum and Genabum.

Cæsar.



His being known, Vercingetorix brought back his army again into the country of the Bituriges, and thence marched to besiege Gergovia, a town held by the Boii whom Cæsar had left there after the Helvetian warre, and given the jurisdiction of the

town to the Helvi, which brought Cæsar into great perplexities whether he should keep the Legions in one place for that time of winter which remained, and so suffer the stipendiaries of the Helvi to be taken and spoiled, whereby all Gallia might take occasion to revolt, forasmuch as the Romans should seem to afford no protection or countenance to their friends; or otherwise draw his army out of their wintering-camps sooner than was usual, and thereby become subject to the difficulties of provision and carriage of corn. Notwithstanding it seemed better, and so he resolved, rather to undergo all difficulties, then by taking such a scorn to lose the good will of all his followers. And therefore perswading the Helvi diligently to make supply of necessary provisions, he sent to the Boii to advertise them of his coming, to encourage them to continue loyal, and nobly to resist the assaults of the enemy: and leaving two Legions with the civillies of the whole army at Augustodunum, he marched towards the Boii. The next day coming to a Town of the Senones called Vellandunum, he determined to take it in the end, he might leave an enemy behind him, which might hinder a speedy supply of victuals: and in two dayes he inclosed it about with a ditch and a rampier. The third day some being sent out touching the giving up of the town, he commanded all their arms and their cattell to be brought out, and six hundred pledges to be delivered. Leaving C. Trebonius a Legate to see it performed, he himself made all speed towards Genabum in the territories of the men of Chauras; who as they heard of the taking in of Vellandunum, perswading themselves the stronger would resist, they resolved to put a strong garrison into Genabum. Thither came Cæsar within two dayes, and incamping himself before the Town, the evening drawing on, he put the assault unto the next day, commanding the soldiers to prepare in a readinesse such things as should be necessary for that service. And forasmuch as the town of Genabum had a bridge leading over the river Loire, he feared least they of the town would steal away in the night: for prevention whereof he commanded two Legions to watch all night in arms. The townsmen a little before midnight went out quietly, and began to pass over the river. Which being discovered by the Scouts, Cæsar with the Legions which he had ready in arms, burnt the gates, and entering the Town took it; the greatest number of the enemy he was taken, and a very few escaping by reason of the narrowness of the bridge and the way which had in the multitude. The town being sacked and burned, and given for a booty to the soldiers, he carried his army over the river Loire, into the territories of the Bituriges.

## Observations upon Cæsars

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is a known and an approved saying, *E multo minus est eligendum*, of evils the least is to be chosen: but in a pretentment of evils to be able to discern the difference, and to chuse the least, *Hic labor, hoc opus*, here's all the least and work, *Vercingetor*.x besieging *Gergovia* (a legendary town belonging to the *Romans*, that of long time had served the *Roman Empire*), at such a time of the year as would not afford provision of victuall for the maintenance of an army, but with great difficulty and inconvenience of carriage and convey; *Cæsar* was much perplexed, whether he should forbear to succour the town, and raise the siege, or undergo the hazard of long and tedious convoys. A matter often falling into dispute, although it be in other terms, whether honesty or honourable respect ought to be preferred before private ease and particular commodity. *Cæsar* had declared himself touching this point, preferring the honour of the people of *Rome*, as the majesty of their Empire, and the reputation which they desired to hold, touching assistance and protection of their friends before their army. And not without good reason, which may be drawn as well from the worthiness of the cause, as from the danger of the effect: for duties of virtue and respects of honesty, as the noblest parts of the mind, do not onely challenge the service of the inferior faculties of the soul; but do also command the body and the casualties thereof, in such sort as is fitting the excellency of their prerogative: for otherwise virtue would find but bare attendance, and might leave herceptor want of lawful authority. And therefore *Cæsar* chose rather to adventure the army upon the casualties of hard provision, then to blenish the *Roman* name with the imputation of disloyalty. Which was less dangerous also in regard of the effect: for where the bond is of value, therethe forswear is great and if that he had been broken, and their opinion deceived touching the expectation of assistance and help, all *Gallia* might have had just cause of revolt, and disclaimed the *Roman* government for non-protection. To conclude then, let no man deceive himself in the present benefit, which private respect may bring upon the refusal of honest regard, for the end will be a witness of the errors, and prove honestly to be better policie.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT is observed by some writers, that *Cæsar* never undertook any action, or at the least brought it not to triall, but he first assured himself of these four things.

The first was provision of victuals, as the very foundation of warlike expeditions, whereof I have already treated in the first Commentary: the difficulty whereof made him so doubtful to undertake the relief of *Gergovia*. And doubtless whosoever goeth about any enterprise of warres without certain means of victuall and provisions, must either carry an army of Camellions that may live by the aire, or intend nothing but to build castles in the aire, or otherwise shall be sure to find his enemy either in his bolson, or as the Proverb is in *Plutarch*, to leap on his belly with both his feet.

The second thing was provision of all necessities, which might be of use in that service: wherewith he always so abounded, that there might rather want occasion to use them, then he wanting to answer occasion. And there were the instruments whereby he made such admirable works, such bridges, such mounts, such trenches, such huge armados, as appeareth by the description which the maritime cities of *Gallia*: according to which his former custom, forasmuch as the day was far spent before he came to *Gerdanum*, he commanded such things to be fitted and had in a readyness, as might serve for the siege the next day.

The third thing was an army for the most part of old soldiers, whom the *Romans* called *Veterans*, whereof he was likewise at this time provided: for the two legions which were fresh and lately inrolled, he left at *Argentum* with the carriages, taking onely the old soldiers for this service, as knowing that in *pugna usum amplius prædesse quam virescuntulius* is more serviceable in warre then numbers.

The fourth thing was a trial and experience of the enemies forces, which the former victories assured him to be intemperate to the *Romans*; it being always a rule in the *Roman* discipline, (as I have already noted,) by light and calm skirmishes, to acquaint the soldiers with the manner of the enemies fight, *Ne eos novum bellum, utrens hostis terret*, least a new kinde of fight, or enemy might affright them: as *Livy* saith.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar* taketh in *Noviodunum*, and beareth the enemy coming to rescue the Town.

*Vercingetorix* understanding of *Cæsar's* coming, left the siege, and went to meet him. *Cæsar* resolved to take a town lying in his way in the territories of the Bituriges, called *Noviodunum*. Which they of the town perceiving, sent him to beseech him to spare them, and to give order for their safety. For the end therefore that he might speed this business

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business with as much celerity as he had accomplished former services, he commanded them to bring out their arms, their horses, and to deliver pledges. Part of the hostages being given, while the rest were in delivering over, *Centurions* and a few soldiers were admitted into the town, to seek out their weapons and their horses, the horsemen of the enemy which marched before *Vercingetorix's* army, were discovered a farre off: which the townsmen had no sooner perceived, and thereby conceived some hope of relief, but they presently took up a shout, and betook themselves to their arms, shut the gates, and began to make good the walls. The *Centurions* that were in the town perceiving some new resolution of the Gallies, with their swords drawn possessed themselves of the gates, and saved both themselves and their men that were in the town. *Cæsar* commanded the horsemen to be drawn out of the camp, and to begin the charge. And as they began to give ground, he sent four hundred German horsemen second them, whom he had reserved to keep with him from the first: who charged the enemy with such fury that the Gallies could no way endure the assault, but were presently put to flight, and many of them being slain, the rest retired back to the army. Upon their overthrow, the townsmen were worse affrighted then they were before; and having apprehended such as were thought to have stirred up the people, they brought them to *Cæsar*, and yielded themselves unto him. Which being ended, *Cæsar* marched towards the town of *Avaticum*, which was the greatest and best fortified of all the towns in the territories of the Bituriges, and situate in the most fertile part of the country; for that being taken, he doubted not to bring the whole state of the Bituriges easily into his subjection.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Forasmuch as nothing is more changeable then the mind of man, which (notwithstanding the low degree of balences wherein it often stiech,) will as occasion giveth way to revenge, readily amount to the height of tyranny, and spare no labour to eric quittance with an enemy: it hath been thought expedient in the wisdom of foregoing ages, to pluck the wings of so mountaine a bird, and to deprive an enemy of such means, as may give hope of liberty by mixture and revolt.

The means which the Romans used to weaken an enemy.

The practice of the *Romans* in taking in any towns was to leave them forceless, that howsoever they might stand affected, their nails should be fully pared for scratching, and their power confined to the circuit of their mind. For as it appeareth by this and many other places of *Cæ-*

sar, no rendry of any town was accepted, untill they had delivered all their arms, both offensive and defensive, with such engines and instruments of warre as might any way make for the defence of the same. Neither that onely, but such beasts also, whether Horle or Elephant, or any other whatsoever, as might any way advantage the use of those weapons. Which as it was a great dismay and weakening to the enemy; so was it short of the third condition, commanding the delivery of so many hostages or pledges as were thought convenient; being the prime of their youth, and the flower of their manhood, and were as the marrow to their bones, and the sinewes to that body. Whereby it came to pass, that the remnant was much disabled in strength, concerning their number of fighting men; and such as were left had neither arms nor means to make resistance.

The Turke observeth the same course with the Christians, but in a more cruell and barbarous manner: for he cometh duly at a certain time, nor regarding any former demeanour and leadeth away the flower of their youth to be invelted in impurity and infidelity, and to be made vassals of heathenish impurity.

Ofentimes we read, that a conquered people were not onely interdicted arms, but the matter also and the art whereby such arms are great, and metall and master plenty, it is a chance if artificers be wanting to repair their loss, and to furnish their armoury. At the siege of *Carthage* the *Romans* having taken away their armies, they notwithstanding finding store of metall within the town, caused workmen to make every day a hundred targets and three hundred swords, besides arrows and casting slings, using womens hair for want of hemp, and pulling down their houses for timber to build shipping. Whereby we may perceive, that a Generall cannot be too careful to deprive an enemy of all such helps as may any way strengthen his hands, or make way to resistance.

## CHAP. VII.

*Vercingetorix* perswaded the Gallies to a new course of warre.

*Vercingetorix* having received so *Cæsar's* many losses one in the neck of another, *Vellianodunum*, *Genabum* & *Noviodunum* being taken, he called his men to council. *Noyon*.

and tell them that the war must be carried in another course then it hath been heretofore; for they must endeavour by all means to keep the Romans from foraging, and convey of *Genabum*, which would easily be brought to pass, inasmuch as they themselves did abound in horse-



## Observations upon Cæsars

horsemen: and for that the time of the year did not yet leave to get forage in the fields, the enemy must necessarily seek it in houses and barns, whereby the foragers would easily be cut off by their horsemen. Moreover, for their safety and defence they were to neglect their private commoditie: their houses and their villages were to be burnt up round about as far as Boia, wherefore the Romans might go to fetch their forage. For themselves they thought it reason that they should make supply of vittual and provision, in whose possession they were, and for whom they fought. By this means the Rom. would never be able to endure that want as would befall them, or at the least be constrained to fetch their provisions farre off, with great danger and perill to themselves: neither did it make any matter whether they killed them or put them besides their carriages; for without necessary supplies they were never able to hold war. And to conclude, such towns were likewise to be set on fire, as by the strength of the situation were not safe from dangers, lest they should prove receptacles to linger and detain the warres, and serve the Romans for booty and supplies of provision. And albeit these things might seem heave and bitter; yet they ought to esse more grievous to have their wives and their children led away into servitudes, and themselves to be slain by the sword of the enemy: which doth necessarily fall upon a conquered people. This opinion was generally approved by the consent of all men, and more then twenty cities of the Bituriges were burnt in one day: the like was done in other States, great fires were to be seen in all parts. And although all men took it very grievous, yet they propounded this comfort unto themselves, that the enemy being by this means defended, they should quickly recover their losses. Touching Avaticum, which is situated in a common counceyl, whether it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges do prostitute themselves at the feet of all the Gallies, that they might not be forced to set on fire with their own hands, the fairest citie in all Gallia, being both an ornament and a strength to their State: they would easily descend it by the fire of the place, being incircled round about with a river and a bog, and being accessible by one narrow passage onely. At length leave being granted them to keep it, Veingetorix at first dissuading them from it, and afterwards yielding unto it, moved by the importunity of the Gallies, and the commiseration of the common multitude, and so it was chosen to defend the town.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is a hand I have seen an Impetue with a circle, and a hand with a sharp stile pointing towards the

centre with this motto, *Ille Labor, hoc opus*, following a this is a thing of work and labour; signifying hereby that albeit the Area thereof were plainly and distinctly bounded, and the Diameter of no great length, yet it was not an ealie matter to find the Centre, which is the heart and chiefe part of that figure. In like manner, there is no business or other course for ealie or plain, but the centre may be mistaken, and the difficulty commonly resteth in hitting that point, which governeth the circumference an eual and regular motion.

The Gallies were relolued to undertake the defence of their country, and to redeem their liberty with the hazard of their lives: but it seemeth they were mistaken in the means, and ran a course farre short of the centre. For Veingetorix perceiving the Romans daily to get upon the Gallies, first by taking in one town, secondly another, and lastly of a third, he advised them to set on fire all the country houses, villages and towns for a great circuit round about, and so force the Romans to fetch their forage and provisions farre off, and undergo the difficulties of long convoies, whereby the Gallies might make use of their multitude of horse, and keep the Romans without supplies of provision: and so they doubted not but to give a speedy end to that warre. And this he took to be the centre of that business, and the true use of their advantage.

Polybius writeth that M. Regulus having divers times overthrowen the Carthaginians in battell, one Xanthippus a Lacedemonian, clearly perceiving the cause of their often routs, began openly to say, that the Carthaginians were not overthrowen by the valour of the Romans, but by their own ignorance: for they exceeding the Romans in horse and Elephants, had neglected to fight in the champaigns where their Cavalry might shew it self, but in hills and woody places, where the foot troops were of more forces, and so the Romans had the advantage. Whereby the manner of the warre being changed, and by the counsell of the peregrine Greek, brought from the hills into the level of the plain, the Carthaginians recovered all their former losses by one absolute victory. In like manner Anibal finding himself to exceed the Romans in strength of cavalries, did always endeavour to affront them in open and champaign countries; and as often as the Romans durst meet him, he put them to the worke: but Fabius perceiving the disadvantage, kept himself always upon the hills, and in covert and uneven places, and so made the advantage of the place equal the multitude of the enemies horsemen.

There is no greater scorn can touch a man of reputation and place, then to be thought not to understand his own business. For as wisdom is the excellency of humane nature, so doth want of judgement defect men to the condition

## Lib. VII.

## Commentaries.

diction of such a *Aristotle* called servants by nature: whose wit being too weak to support any weight, do recompence that want with the service of their body, and are wholly employed in a Porters occupation. Which *Homer* layeth upon *Diomedes* shoulders, with as fine conveyance as he doth the rest of his inventions. For *Myfser* and he going out on a party to do some exploit upon the *Trojans*, they carried themselves so gallantly, that they fell to share King *Rhesus* chariot and horses. *Myfser* presently seized upon the horses, being of a delicate *Thracian* breed, and *Diomedes* seemed well contented with the chariot. But being to carry it away, *Pylas* advised him to let it alone, lest he might prove his strength to be greater then his wit, and yet not find so much neither as would carry it away.

But for these directions which *Veingetorix* gave unto the Gallies, I referre the Reader to the sequel of the History, wherein he shall find how they prevailed.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar besiegeth Avaticum, and is distressed for want of corn.

**V**eingetorix followed Cæsar by small and easy journeyes, and chose a place to encamp fortified about with bogs and woods, fifteen miles distant from Avaticum: where he understood what was done at Avaticum every hour of the day, and commanded likewise what he would have done. He observed all our foraging and harvesting, and did set upon such as went far off upon any such occasions, and incumbered them with great inconveniences: altho they took what course they could to meet with it, as to go out at uncertain times, and by unknown and unusuall ways. Cæsar incamping himself before that part of the town which was not shut in with the river nor the bog, and afforded but a narrow and straight passages, began to make a mound, to drive water, and to raise two towers: (for the nature of the place would not suffer him to inclose it round about with a ditch and rampers,) and never rested to admonish the *Hedui* and the *Boii* to bring in supplies of corn: of whom the ones by reason of the small care, and pains they took, did little help him; the others, of no great ability, being a small and a weak State, did quickly consume all that they had. The army was distressed for want of corn, by reason of the poverty of the *Boii*, and the indigence of the *Hedui*, together with the burning of the houses in the country, in such manner as they wanted corn for many dayes together, and suffered their lives with beasts and cattell which they had fetched a great way off: and yet no

one voice at all was heard to come from them, unworthy the majesty of the Roman Empire, and their former victories. And when Cæsar did speak unto the legions severally as they were in the works, that if their wants were heavy and bitter unto them, he would leave off the siege; all of them with one voice desired him not to do so, for since they had so served many years, under his commands, as they never had received any dissonance, neither had they at any time departed and left the business undone; it would be imputed unto them as an ignominy and disgrace to leave the siege; and that they had rather undergo all difficulties, then not to revenge the death of the citizens of Rome that by treachery were slain at Genabum. The same speeches they delivered to the Centurions and Tribunes, to be told Cæsar.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**he worth of a Souldier consisteth in a disposition of mind and body, which maketh him apt to suffer and to undergo the difficulties of war. For let his resolution otherwise be never so great, yet if he faint under the burden of such tediousness as is usually attendeth upon warlike designments, he is no way fit for any great enterprise. *Pindarus* saith, that he understood not the war, that knoweth not that the achieving of one piece of service, is always accompanied with the sufferance of another difficulty as great as that which was first intended. *Esuacres*, & *pai fortis Romanum* est. It was the peculiar commendation of the Roman people, patiently to endure the extremities of warfare: which made the *Poſſet* to cry out, That either they must forwarke arms and forget to make war, and receive the yoke of thraldome and bondage; or, *autis quibussem de imperio certare, nec virtus, nec patientia, nec disciplina vestra cadendum*; or else they must shew themselves no waies inferior to their antagonists either in valour, or sufferance, or military discipline. *Appian* forgetteth not to say, that the Roman Empire was raised to such greatness, not by fortune or good lucks, but by mere valour, and patient enduring of hardnesse and want. Which is the self-same which *Craſſus* in his sorrow uttered to his souldiers, who neither did nor spake many things well: for as *Plutarch* touch rightly censurh him out of the *Comellian* fas.

A goodmans any way else but in wars.

The Empire of Rome (saith he) came not to that greatness which it now possideth by good fortune only, but by patient and constant suffering of trouble and adversity; never yielding or giving place to any danger.

Some

## Observations upon Cæsar

Some Italian writers are of an opinion, that the two chiefest parts of a soldier, Valour and Sufferance, are in these times divided unto two Nations; the French and the Spaniards: the Spaniards making war rather by sufferance then by violence of assaults; and the French impatient of delay, and furious in assaults: so that according to his opinion, a Spaniard & a Frenchman will make one good soldier. Touching the Spaniards, I cannot deny but that he hath the name of one of the best soldiers in Christendom, and I do gladly allow all that virtue can challenge; for truth will prevail against all affection: yet I may say thus much on the behalf of our own people, that we have seldom lost honour in confronting any nation. Concerning the sufferance, and patient enduring of hardships, which is said to bein the Spaniards being able to live long with a little, it may be adventure not unjustly be attributed to the property of their country; and the nature of their climate, which will not bear nor digest such plenty of food, as is required in colder countries; and therefore being born to weak a digestion, they are as well satisfied with a victual a little, as others with better plenty of food; and therein they goe beyond other Nations. Of the French I say nothing; but leave them to make good the opinion of the Italian Writer.

Scævius witnesseth of Cæsar, that he himself was laboris ultra fidem patiens, one that endured toil beyond belief, whereby he might the better move his army to endure with patience the difficulties of the siege: and yet so artificially, as he seemed rather willing to leave it un-effected, then to impose any burden upon them, which they themselves should be unwilling to bear; the rather to draw the Legions to engage themselves therein; by denying to forsake it; then to call that upon them, which their unwillingness might easily have put off.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

WE may further observe, the means the soldiers used to acquaint Cæsar with their desires, which was by the Tribunes and Centurions. For as these were mediators between the Generall and them, and delivered the mandates and directions of the Emperour to the soldier; so did the soldiers use their help to make known unto him their requests: as besides this place may appear in his Commentaries where they desired to give him satisfaction touching the fear they had conceived of Ariovistus and the Germans, which they likewise did by the Centurions and Tribunes.

## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar leaveth the siege, and goeth to take the enemy upon advantage; but returneth again without fighting.

When the towers began to approach near unto the walls, Cæsar understood by the captives, that Vercingetorix having consumed all his provision of forrage, had removed his camp nearer to Avancum, and that he himself was gone with the cavalry, and such ready foramen as were accustomed to fight among the horsemen, to be in ambush in that place where he thought our men would come a foraging the next day. Which being known, setting forward about midnight in silence, in the morning he came to the enemies camp. They having speedy advertisement by their scouts of Cæsar's coming, d'ld be their carriages in the woods, and imbrated all their forges in an eminent and open place. Which being told Cæsar, he commanded the baggage to be speedily laid together, and their arms to be made ready. There was a bill of a gentle rising from the bottom to the top, encompassed round about with a difficult and troublesome bog of fifty foot in breadth. Upon this hill the bridge being broken, the Gallies kept themselves, trusting to the strength of the place, and being distributed into companies according to their severall States, they kept all the ford and passages of the bog with watches, with this resolution; that if the Romans did pass over the bog, they might easily from the higher ground keep them under, as they stuck in the mire, who little reckoning of so small a distance, would deem the sight to be upon equal terms, whereas they themselves well knowing the unequalty of the conditions, did make him a vain and idle ostentation. The soldiers d'ldaining that the enemy could endure their presence so near at hand, and requiring the sign of battle, Cæsar acquainted them with what determination and loss of many valiant men, the victory must be that time he bought, who being so resolute, that they refused no danger to purchase him honour, he might well be condemned of great ingratitude and villany, if their lives were not dearer unto him then his own safety: and so comforting the soldiers he brought them back again the same day into the camp, and gave order for such things as were requisite for the siege of the town.

## OBSERVATIONS.

This Chapter hath divers speciall particulars worthy observation. The first is, the opportunity

tunity which Cæsar took to visit the army of the Gallies, when Vercingetorix was absent and gone to lie in ambush for the Roman foragers: which was a caveat to Vercingetorix, not to be too busie with the Roman convoys, lest his absence might draw on such an inconvenience, as might make him repent for going a bidding.

The second is the inequality which the advantage of the place given to a party: which I have already so often spoken of, as I am almost weary to repeat it; and the readers for that I have produced this passage in the former books, to signify the benefit of such an advantage. Yet as much as it is so pregnant to that effect, as may well deserve a double consideration, and was also produced by Cæsar himself upon occasion at Germania, give me leave to note how much it swayed to counterpoise the want of the adverse party. Wherein as it cannot be denied, but that it may give such help as may make a small number equal a farre greater proportion of men; so in Cæsar's judgement it countervailed the absence of the Generall, and maketh the body perfect without the head. Neither were they weakened only with the absence of their Generall; but their cavalry wherein they so much trusted was absent likewise; and yet more then that too, by his own manner the Romans Legions excelled the Gallies in valour and prowess of arms: which being all put together is no small advantage. For doubtless if the matter had stood upon equal terms touching the place, neither the presence of Vercingetorix, nor the addition of their cavalry to assist them, had hindered the battle, or turned the Romans back to their camp.

The third thing is, the moderation which he shewed, forbearing to fight the Gallies insolently vaunting, and the Roman soldiers fretting and disdaining the enemies pride: whereby he testified such a confidence of his directions in the minds of his men, by shunning the peril of apparent danger which might fall upon them in particular, as afterwards they would make no question of his commands, but take them as the only means of their safety, being never better assured then in performing what he commanded. The practice of later times hath not so well delivered of that virtue, but hath often shewed it self more prodigal of blood, as though men were made only to fill up ditches, and to be the wofull executioners of other mens rashness.

The last thing is the making ready of their weapons, arma expediti iussit. Concerning which points we must understand that the Romans always carried their targets in cales, and did hang their helmets at their backs, and fixed their piles as might be most convenient with the rest of their carriages. And therefore whenever they were to give battle, they were first to put on their helmets, to uncask their targets

to fit their piles, and to make them ready for the charge: and this was called *Arma expediti*.

## CHAP. X.

Vercingetorix excuseth himself to the Gallies for his absence.

Vercingetorix returning back to the Cæsar's army, was accused of treason: in that he had removed his camp near unto the Romans; and further that he had gone away from it, and took all the cavalry with him; that he had left so great an army without any one to command it; that upon his departure the Romans should come so opportunely and so speedily: for all these things could not fall out by chance without counsel and d'rection: it seemed he had rather have the kingdom of Gallia by a grant from Cæsar, then by their means and gift. Being thus charged, he answered, That he removed the camp for want of forrage; that himselfe desiring it. He came near unto the Romans, being led thereto by the opportunity of the place, which was such as might defend it self by its own strength; the cavalry was of no use in a boggy place, but might do good service there where it went. He left no man to command the army of purpose, left by the persuasion of the multitude he should be forced to fight, which he knew they all desired, as not able long to endure any labour. If the Romans came by chance, they were to thank fortune; if by any mans d'rection, they were beholding unto him that had brought them, where they might from the higher ground, both see how small a number they were, and content their valour; who not daring to fight, d'd shamefully return unto their camp. He desired to receive no imperial dignity by treachery from Cæsar, which he might otherwise have by lawfull victory, which was now most certain and sure, but to himselfe and the rest of the Gallies. And for that authority which he had received from them, he was ready to give it up into their hands again, if they thought the honour which they gave him to be greater then the help and safety which they received from him. And the end you may understand these things to be truly delivered by me, (saith he) hear the Roman soldiers. And they will be brought forth servants which were taken foraging a few dayes before, miserably tormented with famine and iron. They being taught beforehand what to answer, said they were legionary soldiers, and had stole out of the camp, so if they could meet with any corn or cattle in the fields: the whole army suffered the like penury, and mens strength began to fail them, in so much

The advantage of the place doth countervail the absence of the Generall.

much that they were not able to undergo any labour: and therefore their General had resolved, that if he prevailed not against the Town, he would withdraw his army within three days. These benefits (saith Vercingetorix) you have of me, whom you accuse of treason: for by my means without shedding of your bloods, you see so great a conquering army almost consumed with hunger; and by me it is provided, that when they fly from hence, no State shall receive them into their territories. The whole multitude applauded his speech by shaking and striking their hands together, as their manner is in such cases, commending Vercingetorix for a great souldier, whose loyalty as it was not to be distrustful, so the way could not have been carried with better directions. They agreed further to send a choice of men out of all their forces into the towns, as not thinking it fit to commit the common safety of Gallia only to the Bruiages, for they were persuaded that the summe of all the victory consisted in making good that town against the Romans.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Horace.

**A** Multitude is *Bellus multorum capium* (as one saith) an unreasonable beaf of many heads, apt to receive forward and perversic incitements, and hard to be drawn to better understanding, jealous, impatient, treacherous, unconstant, an instrument for a wicked spirit, and sooner moved to mischief by *Thersites*, then reclaimed to virtue by the authority of *Agamemnon*, or the eloquence of *Ulysses*, or the wisdom of *Nestor*, more turbulent then the raging either of the sea, or of a devouring fire. And therefore they may well go together to make a triplicity of evils, according to the saying, *Ignis, mare, populus, tria mala*: Fire, the Sea, and the rabble multitude are three evils.

Vercingetorix had both his hands full in this service, for his care was no lefs to keep the Gallies from being distressed, then to make his party good against *Cæsar*. It is disputed touching the government of a multitude, whether it be fitter to be severe or obsequious. *Tacitus* saith peremptorily, that *In multitudine regenda plus parva quam obsequium valet*; foul means does more then fair to the governing of a multitude. But he understandeth such a multitude as are subject to their Commanders, either by ancient service, or the interest of regall authority, whereby they are tied to obedience by hereditary duty, and cannot refuse that which custometh preferment. For otherwise where the people stand free from such bonds, and have submitted themselves to government for some special service, there, clemency or obsequious smoothing prevailed more then the severity of command: according to

the saying, *Hominis ducei volunt, non cogi*; Men will be led by fair means, not compelled. Upon a diffention which happened at Rome between the people and the Senate, the people were patiently sent into the field under the leading of two Senators, *Quintius* and *Appius Claudius*. *Appius* by reason of his cruelty and severity, was not obeyed by his souldiers, he forsok his Province and returned non proficiens, they will do nothing: *Quintius* being courteous and benigne, had an obedient army, and came home a Conquerour. In the like terms did Vercingetorix stand with the Gallies, who not long before were all of equal authority, and by the defence of the common cause had submitted themselves to order and government, and therefore he carried himself accordingly, but with some cunning too; for he made no scruple to abuse the beast, and to present them with a lesson of deceit, taught to servants and Roman slaves, as the confission of legionarie souldiers, which is a liberty that hath ever been allowed to such as had the managing of an unruly multitude, who have made as much use of the talfe rime, as the bit or the spur, or any other help belonging to that art.

## CHAP. XI.

*Cæsar* continueth the siege at *Avenion*, and describeth the walls of the town in Gallia.

**B**Y the singular valour of our souldiers all the counsels and devices of the Gallies were made void and of none effect. For they are a Nation of great dexterity, apt to imitate and make any thing which they see other men do before them: for they invad a side the hooks with ropes, and drew them into the town with engines: they withdrew the earth from the Mount with *Aloes* which their great skills by reason of their iron mines whereunto they are much professed, they set up towers upon every part of the walls, and covered them with raw hides: they sallied out of the town night and day, and either set fire to the Mount, or assaulted the souldiers as they were at work: they did every day make their towers equal to their height of our towers, which the daily increase of the Mount had added to their height: they hindered the open trenches, and kept them from approaching the walls with sharp burn'd flukes, cast into them with hot pitch, and with great stones. All their walls are almost of this fashion: Long straight beams are placed upon the grounds, with an equal distance of two foot one from another, and bound together on the inside of the walls, and fastned with great store of earth: the distances between the beams are filled and fitted with great

great stones in the front of the wall. These being thus placed and fastned with mortar, another fluke is laid upon that, keeping always the same distance, so as one beam be not laid upon another, but in the second rank placing them upon the distances filled up with stones, and so forward until the wall be raised to the due height. This fashion as it is a work not deformed either in show or variety, observing alternate courses of beams and stones which keep their order by even lines, so is it profitable also and very much advantaging the defence of the town: for as the stone keeps it from burning, so doth the wood from the violence of the ramme, so far much as the beams are for the most part forty foot long, and can neither be broken nor pull'd out.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**His Chapter doth in some part express the manner of their siege in ancient time, and the means which the defendant had to frustrate the assaults and approaches of the enemy. Besides the Ram which the Romans used to shake and overthrow the walls (whereof I have already spoken) they had commonly great hooks of iron to catch hold of a turret, and to pull it over the wall, or to pull down the parapet, or to disturb any work which was to be made upon the wall. These hooks were used by the legionary souldiers being covered with vines in the same manner as they handled the Ram: and were averted and put off by the ingenious practices of the Gallies, with ropes cast and intangled about them, and then by force of engines drawn into the town. In like manner the open trenches, by which the Romans made their approaches to the walls, were answered from the town with flukes or piles, sharded at the end with fire, and then call out to them to hinder such as were at work, together with seething pitch and great stones. Furthermore, as the Romans raised their Mount, and brought matter unto it to enlarge it in breadth and height, so did the Gallies undermine it and drew the earth away, or let it on fire to burn it: for as I have already noted in the description of a mount it was made as well with wood and timber, as with earth and stones. They strengthened their walls with towers and towers, and covered them with raw hides to keep them from burning: and as the Romans mounted in height with their towers and engines, so the Gallies raised their towers the town they might fight with equal advantage.

And thus they proceeded both in the offensive and defensive part, as far as either valour or wit could improve those means which were then in use in besieging a town.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**T was the use of all nations to fortify their strong towns with such walls as might make best defence against the practice of those times wherein they lived, touching the taking and besieging of towns. So the Gallies, as it appeareth by *Cæsar*, raised their walls of wood and stone, laid in mutual counter one with another, that the wood might not void the violence of the Rams, and the stone keep it from burning with fire, which in those days were the means to assault and overthrow a wall. In thieftimes the walls of strong and fortified towns, are raised in use only made and raised of earth, as the best defence against the fury of the artillery. But for as much as the old manner of fortification is here in part delivered by *Cæsar*, give me leave to have a word or two touching the fortifications of these times.

And first touching the art itself, in respect of the matter and the manner, it is a member of architecture, but the end is military: for to fortify is nothing else but to make a building answerable to necessity and the occurrences of war. Neither is the end of fortification to make a place inexpugnable, or unpossessible to be taken, for so it were *Arx arrium*, but to reduce it to a good and reasonable defence. Whosoever then any such defence is required, the mystery of fortification is to raise such a fort, and to apply such a figure, answering the quality and site of that place, as may give great strength thereunto: for as all places are not capable in the disposition of their best strength of all sorts of figures, so there is a difference of strength between this and that figure. And as the place wanteth the advantage of motion and agility for its own defence, so is it requisite it should be furnished with the best means and commodities both to annoy the enemy, and to defend its own people. And as that respect all Circular forts. as the nature of parts of one and the same nature, as compounds of parts of one and the same nature, are unfit for fortification: for where a fort ought to be disposed that it may have many hands to strike as *Briars*, and as *Hydra* never to want a head, it is necessary that the figure thereof be of different and unlike parts, as apt to work divers effects. For unless it be able to discover far off to command the country about as far as the artillery will play, to stop the passages, to hinder approaches and assaults, to dammy the enemy at hand and far off, sometimes with the artillery, sometimes with small shot, sometimes with fire-works, and other times by sallies, it hath not that perfection as is requisite.

Admitting therefore composition of parts next unto the circle the triangular fort is the most imperfect; first in regard it is a figure of

## CHAP. XII.

The siege of *Avancum* continued.Quadrangle  
for a.Five-sided  
and six-sided  
fortresses.Fort in a  
plain level.  
Advantage.Disadvan-  
tages.Forts upon  
a hill.  
Advantages.Disadvan-  
tages.The hands  
of all forts.

leffe capacity than any other of equall bounds, which is a great inconvenience in a hold, when the souldiers shall bein'd up for want of room; and through the straightness of the place, not to be able to avoid confusion. Secondly, the bulwarks of all such triangular fortresses, have always such sharp capons as are easily subject to breakings, which giveth the enemy means to approach them without disturbance from the fort.

The quadrangle fortresse hath almost the same imperfection of angles as the triangle hath, but is more spacious within, and of greater capacity.

And therefore Pentagons or Hexagons, or any other that hath more angles, is fittest for fortifications, (understanding the place to be capable of them,) as being of a greater content, and having their angles more obtuse; and by consequence more solid and strong.

A plain champain level doth admit all sorts of figures, and may take the best; having these advantages: it easily hindereth an enemy from approaching near unto it, or incamping before it, and is not subject to mines, by reason of the water rising in such levels. But on the other side, a small troupe will besiege it, and battery may be laid to divers places of it: it is always subject to mounts of earth, and needeth many bulwarks, ditches, and much coit to keep it.

A fortresse upon a hill hath these advantages: an enemy can hardly lodge near unto it, or lay battery against it, it requireth more men to besiege it, and is not subject to mounts. The disadvantages are, that it is not in our choice to make it in the best form of strength, but must give it such a figure as may best fit the place, being sometimes too large and spacious, and sometimes too strait. The enemies artillery hath greater force against it playing upwards, and the artillery of the fort playeth not so sure downwards.

The hands of all forts are the bulwarks from whence the artillery playeth; the supplements to the bulwarks are the ravelins, the platforms, the casemates, and the cavaliers. The walls are made in (circuiting inwards, the better to bear the weight of the earth, with this proportion, that to every five foot and half, or six foot in height, there be one foot allowed in (circuit. The counter-scarp is another wall outward to the first, and sloped inward in the same manner as the former.

And thus much touching the generall view of fortification, which is as much as may well be comprehended in these short observations, reserving the further consideration thereof to a particular treatise by it self.

**T**he siege being hindered by so many Calas, disturbances, and the souldiers afflicted all the time with cold and continuall rains, yet they overcame all these let with continuall labour,

and in five and twenty dayes they raised a mount of three hundred and thirty foot in breadth, and four score in height. When it came almost to touch the wall, Cæsar himself attending the work, as his custom was, and encouraging the souldiers to omit no time from the same: a little before the third watch of the night, the mount was seen to smok, the enemy having set it on fire with a mine. And at the same instant of time, a shot being taken up by them that stood upon the wall, they made a salient out at two gates on both sides the towers. Some cast firebrands and dry matter from the wall onto the mount, pouring pitch and other things to nourish the fire; thus no man knew whether to run first, or where to give help. Notwithstanding forasmuch as Cæsar had appointed two legions by turn to watch before the camp, and two other to follow the works, it happened, and that quickly, that some were ready to confront the sallies, and others to draw back the towers from the front of the mount, and to cut the mount asunder, the whole multitude coming out of the camp to quench the fire. The rest of the night being now spent, the fight continued every where, and over the enemy took new spirits, and had hopes of victory, the rather because they saw the beds or hovels belonging to the towers burnt, and that the souldiers could not come near the said towers to manage them as was fitting, without belter and covers, and that they ever felt fresh men to take the rooms which as were weary and over-laboured: supposing the safety of all Gallia to consist in that instant of time. There happened, our selves beholding this accident worthily memory, which I think not fit to omit.

A certain Gall before the gate of the town, casting with his hands balls of tallow and pitch to increase the fire, right over against the towers, was shot through the right side with a cross-bow, and fell down dead. One that stood next him stepped over him, and began to do the like service: he likewise was slain with a shot out of a cross-bow. Him a third man succeeded, and he thras a fourth. Neither was the place forsaken, until the mount was quenched, the enemy removed, and the fight ceased.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Whether there need  
not as many  
men to defend a  
town, as to  
besiege it.

**I**T were a matter worthy observation to consider, whether there need not as many men to defend a town as to besiege it. Which at the first sight may peradventure seem frivolous: forasmuch as the defendants are but to make good the place which they hold, and to stand only upon their defensive guard, having the advantage of the place, the shelter of the walls, the strength of the ditch, and many other like helps for their defence and safety; whereas the assailant is to strive against all these advantages, and to oppose himself to the danger of so many difficulties. But if we look a little nearer into the matter, and consider the service to be performed on either part, we shall find, that to lay, As many men are necessary to defend a town as to besiege it, is no Paradox.

For the better understanding thereof, we are to know, that the defence of a town touching matter of fight, consisteth chiefly in three four points. First, in manning and making good all parts of the wall. For if the defendant be not able to strengthen all parts with a competent force, then he hath not men enough to defend the town; forasmuch as all parts are subject to assaults, and what part soever is not made good, that lieth open to an enemy: or otherwise if the assault be only to be made at a breach, the rest of the wall being strong enough to defend it self, there is required a competent strength within the town to defend that breach. In this point there is little difference touching a competent number of men between the assailant and the defendant: for if he that layeth siege to a town hath men enough to assault all parts at one instant, the enemy must have an answerable proportion to defend all; or if he have no use of more men than may serve to give an assault at a breach, the defendant must have the like proportion for the defence of the breach.

The second point is, in relieving wearied men either fighting or working, with fresh supplies to continue that business, as oftentimes it falleth out in the siege of a town. Wherein likewise there is small or no difference touching an equality between both parties. For if the defendant be not as well able to relieve his wearied souldiers with fresh supplies, as the enemy is to continue the assault, the town may quickly have a new master.

The third point is, in defeating and making void such works as the enemy shall make against the town, as mounts, mines, approaches, and suchlike inconveniences; which being suffered to go on without opposition and prevention, the town cannot hold out long. In this point the defendant hath the disadvantages having need of more men to overthrow and pre-

vent the works, then the assailant hath to make them good. For there he that besiegeth the place fighteth with the advantage, and hath the same helps as the defendant hath in the faintness of his hold; which caused this extraordinary accident, which Cæsar noteth, touching the successeful slaughter of so many Gallies, who labouring to burn the Roman works with balls of tallow and pitch, were all slain with the blow of one man's bow.

The last point is in sallies, which is as necessary for the defence of a town as any thing else whatsoever. For if the defendant be not able to fall out, the enemy will quickly coop him up, and tread upon his heels. And herein the defendant needeth more men than the assailant. For he that is in the ditch, lyeth in the strength of his trenches; whereas the other cometh out naked upon him.

And thus much touching this question in particular. Concerning the generally, if he demanded whether there have been more men lost in the defence of *Offensæ*, than in besieging it; I answer, That neither side can much vaunt of a small loss.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N the second place there are two observable points. The one, Cæsars continual attendance upon the works, being present night and day, without any long intermission, which did much advantage their proceeding at that time, and was as important to a fortunate issue, as any other thing whatsoever. For while an enemy is extraordinary, either in valour or diligence, there must needs be extraordinary means to countervail the height of so great a resolution: which Cæsar overtopped with monstrous and huge works, and speeded those works with his continuall attendance.

The second point is the successeful task of the Roman army, being eight legions present at that siege; (for the other two were left at *Argentoratum* with the carriages of the army;) in such sort as half the army was always at rest, and the other half employed: two legions at work, and two legions in the watch: and thus they eased each others, and still continued the work. For otherwise they had not been able to have undergone the burden, as the saying is; *Quod caret alterna reguè durabile non est.* It cannot hold that rests not now and then.

## CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar on an assault taketh *Avancum*.

**T**he Gallies having tried all means, Cæsar and none taking effect, the next day they continued touching the burning of the town. Wherein the two legions commanding and perswading them to it, which they hoped they might do in the night.

Observations upon *Casars*

night time, upon any great loss, unto themselves, forasmuch as *Vercingetorix* was not far off with his camp, and all the way thither was a continual bellow, which would hinder the Romans from following after them. And for that purpose they prepared themselves against the next night, which the women perceiving, did run suddenly out into the streets and other public places, and cast themselves at the feet of their husbands; and by all means intreated them, not to leave them and their children to the cruelty of the enemy, whom nature and infirmity of body would not suffer to sit away. But finding them to continue resolute in their purpose, forasmuch as in extreme perils, fear for the most part hath no commiseration, they cried out, and signified their flight unto the Romans. Whereupon the Gallies being feared, they departed from their purpose, lest the wives should be forsailed and led by the Roman horsemen. The next day *Cæsar* having advanced forward the towers, and perfected those works which he had determined to make, they happened to fall a great rainy which he thought to be a fit occasion for his purpose. And forasmuch as he saw the guard upon the wall to be somewhat negligently disposed, he commanded his men to work fair and softly, and showed them what he would have done. And encouraging the Legions which were hid in a readiness under the Vines at length to enjoy the sweetness of victory for their manifold labours, he provided a reward for such as were seen first upon the walls, and gave them the signal to begin. The soldiers flying suddenly out of all parts, did quickly possess themselves of the walls. The enemy being frightened with so sudden an accident, and put from the towers and walls, imbrued themselves in the market-places, and in other spacious places of the city, with this resort on that if they were assaulted in any part, they would resist in form of battell. But when they saw no man to descend on even grounds, but to receive them round about upon the walls, fearing lest there would be no way to escape, they call their armies away, and fled all to the furthest part of the town. Part of them flew in a throng at the gate, where there stood by the soldiers; and part being got out of the gates, were slain by the horsemen. Neither was there any man that looked after pillage, but being moved to anger with the slaughter of our men at *Genabum*, and with the travail and labour of those great works, they neither spared old men, women nor children. In the end of all that number, which was about forty thousand, scarce eight hundred (that upon the first noise for took the town) came safe to *Vercingetorix*. Those he received with

great silence, being now farre in the night, lest any sedition should have grown in the camp, through the pity and commiseration of the young people, and sent out his familiar friends and chiefest men of each State to meet such as had escaped away, and to bring them to their own people as they lay quartered in the camp.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

WE may see here the saying verified touching the disposition of the *Gallies* for matter of valour: which in the beginning seemed to great that it needed no further strain to countervail the worth of *Cæsar's* army, and was espoused with such industry and resolutions, both in spoiling and disappointing the Roman works as also by ingenious torturing and making good their own labours; that a man would have deemed them to be *virtute paræ*, equal in valour. But being a little spent in the action, like a pot that hath a mouth as big as the belly, and powere out all the liquor at an instant, they fell at length to that baseness, as shewed less spirit then the women did, who chose rather to betray their husbands purposes to the enemy, then to hazard their lives by escaping to *Vercingetorix*. And this is that which is so often noted by Historiographers; *Quod multa bella imperi valida per tactu & moris evanescere*: That many wars which are hot at the first, slacken and vanish upon a tedious continuance. The first thing that I observe is, that which *Cæsar* himself notes: *Quod plerumque in summo periculo mori miser cordium non recipit*; That usually in case of extreme danger, fear hath no mercy. Which was true on either side. For the *Gallies* were loth upon flying to *Vercingetorix*, that they regarded not the wofull laments of the women and children, whom they were well content to hazard, whilst they themselves might escape in safety. And on the other side, the women did forget to be pitifull to their husbands, whom they would not suffer to escape, and leave them in their weakness behind as a prey to appease the wrath of the bloody soldiery, which would consequently follow in that escape. Which sheweth, that there is notice comparable to the bond of nature, specially when it concerneth the preservation of life. For as in other things, respect and affection may easily work a communication of good things unto others, as also a participation of their evils for their relief: so herein we are altogether senseless, and the love we owe to our lives is so great, that it admitteth no respect. *Agellus* to his friend was without respect a friend; and yet notwithstanding being driven one day to remove upon the fuddens, and to leave one sick behind him whom he loved dearly; the sick man calling him by his name came as he was going away, besought him that he would

would not forsake him. *Agellus* turning back again, answered; O how hard it is both to love and to be wile! according to the saying, *Sapere & amare vix Deo conceditur*. To be wise and to love, God himself can scarce do it.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT is a principle among men of warre, not to put necessity upon an enemy, nor make him valiant whether he will or no; (as I have already noted in the former Commentaries,) which the Romans well observed in this particular service at *Avaricum* for being possit of the walls, they did not suddenly assault them in the market-places, where they had made head for their defence, but gave them a breathing time, the better to understand what they did, and resolve to behead themselves of a harting hole for the safety of their lives. Which as it was quickly apprehended by the *Gallies*, so it made an easie exitation to the Roman soldiery.

And as it seemeth to be the more carefully handled in respect of the condition of the enemy being revolvers: for such Provinces as have rebelled, are harder to be recovered after their revolution they were at first to be subdued. For at the first, they have no occasion to fear any hard condition, but yielding to sedition do look for favour: whereas rebels and revoltors, besides the condition of an enemy, are in the nature of offenders, which maketh them more obstinate then otherwise they would be. And therefore it behoveth a General to impose any further necessity upon an enemy, then the quality of the warre doth lay upon him: which oftentimes is more then can be well avoided.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Vercingetorix* doth comfort the *Gallies* for the loss of *Avaricum*.



He next day calling a Councell, he comforted the *Gallies*, and exhorted them not to be utterly distressed with that loss; for the Romans had not overthrowen them with advantage, nor in a set battell, but with a kind of art, and skill in besieging a town, whereof they themselves were ignorant. He craved much that looked for all the evils of warre to fall out prosperously. It was never his opinions that *Avaricum* should be kept; whereof they themselves were witnesses. But it fell out by the imprudence of the *Burgesses*; over great indulgence of the loss, that this loss happened unto them: which notwithstanding he would speedily heal with greater help. For by his diligence he would unite such States unto them,

as were not yet of the confederacy, and make one purpose of all *Gallia*, which the whole world was not able to resist: and that he had almost effected it already. In the mean time he thought it fit that they should yield unto one thing for their safety's sake, which was to forsake their camp; to the end they might better sustain the sudden assaults of the enemy. This speech was not displeasing to the *Gallies*; and the rather, that he himself was not dejected in spirit upon so great a loss; nor did he himself, or the presence of the multitude: being the more esteemed, forasmuch as when the matter was in question, he first thought it fit that *Avaricum* should be burned, and afterwards he persuaded them to forsake it: wherein as misfortune and adversity do impair the authority of other Commanders; so contrariwise his honour daily increased by the loss which he received. And whithall they were in great hope upon his assurance, to winne the rest of the States unto them. And that was the first time that the *Gallies* began to forsake their camp, being so appalled in spirit that where they ever were unaccustomed to labour, yet they thought it their part to suffer and undergoe all that was commanded them.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

NEXT to the knowledge and experience of warre, there is nothing more requisite in a great Commander, then greatness of spirit: for where his employment consisteth in managing the great businesses of the world, such as are the slaughter of many thousands in an hour, the sacking of cities, the fighting of battells, the alteration of Commonwealths, victories, triumphs and the conquest of kingdoms, which like the constellations in the eighth sphere are left to succeeding ages in such characters as cannot be defaced, and make an impression of the greatest measure of joy, or the greatest heap of sorrow; it is necessary that his courage be answerable to such a fortune, neither to be crushed with the weight of adversity, nor puffed up with the pride of victory; but in all times to shew the same constancy of mind, and to temper extremities with a settled resolution.

Of this metal and temper, is the Philosopher *homo quadratus* made of such as *Cæsar* was in Rome. For never speech doth better become a great personage then that of his, having known both the favour and the disgrace of fortune: *Nec mihi dictatur animos facit necesse*. *Umi admihi*. Neither did my Dictatorship puff me up, nor my banishment sink my spirits, laith me up. Whereas weak spirits do either vanish away in the smoke of folly, being drunk with the joys of pleasing fortune; or otherwise upon a change of good times, do become more base and abject,

A General must not put necessity upon an enemy.

The Gallies in the beginning are more then men, and in the end less men.

Revoltors are in the condition both of an enemy and of an offender.

Cæsar.

A great Commander must have a great courage.

Homo quadratus.

## Observations upon Cæsars

then the thief that is taken in the fact: such as *Perseus* the last *Macedonian* King was, who besides his ill fortune for losing his kingdom in the space of one hour, hath ever since stood attainted of a base and abject mind, unworthy the throne of *Alexander the Great*.

The wife *Romanus* used all means to give courage and spirit to their leaders, and to fire their minds from such external respects, which loffe minds or dishonour might upon them. And therefore when *Varro* had fought so rashly at *Cannæ*, that he had like to have lost the *Roman* Empire to *Annibals*, upon his return to *Rome* the whole Senate went out to meet him: and although they could not thank him for the battell yet they gave him thanks that he was returned home again: whereby he learned not to despair of the State of *Rome*.

In like manner did the *Gallies* congratulate *Vercingetorix* that notwithstanding great a loss, he was neither dejected in spirit, nor did he hide himself from the multitude: but as a Commander of high reputation, had found out means to heal those harms, and to recompence the loss of *Alexandria*, with the uniting of all the States of *Gallia* into one confederacy.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly we may observe, how dangerous it is to be the author of a counsel touching any important or grave deliberation, or to lay down any project for the service of a State: for all men are blind in this point, that they judge of good or ill counsel by the success, and look no further then the end which it taketh, which proving disastrous or unfortunate, doth either bring the author to destruction, or into danger both of life and state.

In the occurrences of this kingdom, it appeared that *Henry* the fifth being solicited by the Commons touching the Abbeys in *England*, and moved by *Petition* exhibited in Parliament, to that which was afterwards accomplished by *Henry* the eighth, was diverted from those thoughts by an eloquent oration made in Parliament by *Henry Chicheley* Archbishop of *Canterbury*: a grave and learned Prelate, perswading the King by many convincing reasons, to carry a great power into *France*, and there to make his claim for that kingdom, according to the right derived unto him from his noble Progenitors. Whereupon the King was perswaded to undertake that war; which at first went out most happily yet the Bishop to loose the King and the people for his former counsel, whereby many men were lost, built a College in *Oxford* dedicated to *All Saints*, wherein he placed forty Scholars, to make supplications for all souls, and specially for such as had been butchered in *France* in the time of that war.

*Vercingetorix* was happy in this point, for he perswaded the *Gallies* not to keep *Avaricum*, but to suffer it to be burned as an enemy to their safety: and thereupon he did not lie to put them in mind of his opinions as he did not lie to put them which happened to a great man near unto *Perseus* whom *Thall* spoke of, who after his overthrow by *Pulvis*, *Emilius* being told by that party of many errors which he had committed in the carnage of that war, turned himself suddenly saying, Traitor, halt thou relieved thy counsel until now, when there is no remedy? and therewithall (as some report) slue him with his own hand. And this was it that gave *Vercingetorix* that happiness: *Ut vel quorum imperitum res adverses, autoritatem minuit: sic hujus ex contrario, dignitatem commodo accepit indies augeatur*: As misfortune and adversity, &c. as before.

## CHAP. XV.

*Vercingetorix* laboureth to unite all *Gallia* into one league for the upholding of his war.

**N**either did *Vercingetorix* omit any *Cæsar* endeavour for the accomplishment of his promise, to draw the rest of the States unto him: and to that purpose he dealt with their chieft men both by rewards and promises, and chose out his men, that either by subtle speeches, or friendships, or some other means might win them unto him. He took order that such as had escaped from *Avaricum*, should be both clothed and armed: and with all, that he might reinforce his troops which were weakened, he commanded every State to furnish out certain supplies, and to be brought by a day to the camp. He commanded likewise all the Archers, of whom there is great store in *Gallia*, to be sought out, and sent unto him. And by this means he speedily repaired his losses at *Avaricum*. In the mean time *Tentatus* the son of *Ollowicos* King of the *Nidiorum* gens, whose father had the title of a Friend from our *Senates*, came to him with a great number of horsemen, which he had brought out of *Aquitain*.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It seemeth by this place, that *France* in those days did favour archery: for (as the story faith) they had great flocks of Archers amongst them, but of what value they were is not here delivered. The use they made of them followeth after in this Commentary, which was to intermingle them amongst the horse, and to they fought as light-armed men.

In the times that our *English* nation carried a flourishing hand in *France*, the matter between

us and them touching archery, stood in such terms as gave *England* great advantage: for I have not heard of any bow-men at all amongst them; whereas our Nation hath heretofore excelled all others, as well in number of bow-men, as in excellent good shooting, and hath made it good proof thereof against the *French* as it needeth not any long dispute.

Concerning Archery I find: these things considerable.

First, that every man be so fixed with bow and arrows, as he may be apt for stroig and quick shooting: wherein I cannot so much commend these lively bows, being for the most part heavy flugs, and of greater weight than strength, and of more show then service.

Secondly, that in a day of service, the bowmen endeavour to deliver their quivers, that the whole hand or sleeve of foot may lay go all at once into the hand of the thrower of arrows will be more sure and terrible, and more available against an enemy.

Thirdly, the best form of imbatrelling for bow-men is, which must not at any hand be deep in flanks, for so much as are in the hindmost ranks, will either shot short or to purpose. And therefore the best form of imbatrelling for Archery, hath ever been accounted a long-fled square, resembling a heart, broad in front, and narrow in flank.

Fourthly, their defence in a day of battell, which must either be a covert woody place, where the horse of the enemy cannot come at them, or a trench cast before them, or the place must be fortified with gadrops and stakes, such as were devised by *Henry* the fifth at *Agincourt* field, or some other means to avoid the cavalry.

The last thing is the effects which the bowmen work: which are two: first the galling of the enemy, and secondly destruction. Touching the galling of the enemy, there cannot be a better description then that which *Plutarch* maketh of the overthrow of the *Romans* by the *Parthian* arrows. The *Roman* soldiers hands (saith he) were nailed to their targets, and their feet to the ground, or otherwise were sore wounded in their bodies, and died of a cruel lingering death, crying out for anguish and pain they felt, and turning themselves upon the ground, against they broke the arrows sticking in them. Against striving by force to pluck out the barbed heads, that had pierced farre into their bodies through their veins and sinews, they opened the wounds wider, and so cast themselves away.

The disorder or routing of an enemy which is caused by the bow-men, cometh from the fearful spectacle of a drift of arrows: for a shower of arrows well delivered and well seconded, for a while is so terrible to the eyes, and so dreadful in the success, that it is almost un-

possible to keep the enemy from routing.

The two great victories which our Nation had in *France* at *Cressie* and *Agincourt*, next to the valour of the *English* are attributed to our archery: and the effect of our archery at those times, was first disorder, and consequently slaughter. In the battell of *Cressie* the King of the *Bohemians* fighting for the *French*, caused his horsemen to tie the bridles of their horses together in ranks, that they might keep order, notwithstanding the galling which he feared from our *English* archery: but it fell out as ill as if he had tied their heads and their tails together in file; for the drift of arrows fell so terribly amongst them, that they ran together on heaps with such confusion, as made the slaughter great, and their particular deaths most miserably foretold. At *Agincourt* the number of prisoners which every soldier had, was admirable to speak of; for some report that many of our *English* had ten prisoners apiece: which hapned chiefly from the disorder which fell amongst the *French*, and that disorder came by our archery.

And doubtless if ever we should have occasion to go against an enemy that so aboundeth in horse as the *French* do, there could be no better means against such horse then our *English* bowmen. I know it hath been said, that now the times are altered, and the harquebuse and musket are so generally received, and of good reputation in the course of our modern wars, that in comparison of them bow-men are not worth the naming. Whereto I will not go about to extenuate the use of either of these weapons, as knowing them to be both very serviceable upon fit and convenient occasions, nor take upon me to determine which of them is most effectual in a day of service; but only deliver my conceit touching their effects, and leave it to the consideration of wise and discreet Commanders.

And first touching shot. A wing of musketeers is available against an enemy, only in such bullets as do hit; for such as do not hit pass by, and away insensibly without any further fear, and the crack is but as the life of the bow. Of such bullets as do hit the enemy, are great part do not strike to death, but are oftentimes carried into the skirmish, before the party do feel himself hurt: so that an enemy receiveth no further hurt by a charge of shot, then happeneth to such particular men as shall chance to be slain outright: or fore hurt. But a fledge of Archers is available against an enemy, as well in such arrows as do not hit, as in such as do hit: for Archers are available against an enemy, whereas the cloud of arrows is subject to our fight, and every arrow is both suspected and able to bring deathful on the head of an enemy, as is much troubled at such arrows as come fast; upon him and do not hit as at those that do hit; for no man is willing to expose his flesh to an open and eminent danger, when he lieth in his

Z power

It is dangerous to be the author of a counsel in a battle.

Holinshed.

Ut felicitatem geramus ex hoc voluntatem imperatoris bene sit res adversa conciliant. Lib. 3. bel. 150.

It is no great advantage to intermingle men with other sorts of weapons, as to put them in one body.

At the battell of Cressie the black Prince laid them, or a trench cast before them, or the place must be fortified with gadrops and stakes, such as were devised by Henry the fifth at Agincourt field, or some other means to avoid the cavalry.

Harquebuse and musket.

How far a wing of musketeers is available against an enemy, only in such bullets as do hit.

How far a fledge of Archers is available against an enemy, as well in such arrows as do not hit, as in such as do hit.

power to avoid it. And therefore whilst every man seeketh to avoid hurt, they fall into such confusion, as besides the loss of particular men, the enemy doth hardly escape disorder, which is the greatest disadvantage that can befall him. Moreover, the arrows having barbed heads, although they make but a light hurt, yet they are not easily pulled out, which maketh the soldiers to be entangled in the fight until they be delivered of them; and the horse to be so flung and chafed, that it is impossible they should either keep their rank or be otherwise managed for any service.

And thus much touching bow-men and archery, which is a weapon as ancient as the list and trust History, and is of the number of such weapons as men use to fight with afar off. The use whereof is too much neglected by the English of these times, considering the honour they have achieved by it in former ages.

## CHAP. XVI.

A controversy fell in the state of the Helai touching the choice of their chief Magistrate.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar staid many dayes at Avaticum: for finding there great store of corn and of other provisions, he refreshed his army of their former labour and want. The winter now being almost ended, and the time of the year being fit for wars, he determined to follow the enemy to see whether he could draw him out of the woods and bogs, or besiege him in some place. Being thus resolved, divers of the principall men of the Helai came unto him, beseeching him that he would stand to them, and assist their State in a time of great need, the matter being in extreme danger: forasmuch as their ancient usage was for one to be created their annual Magistrate, having regal authority for that year; whereas now two had taken upon them the said offices, both of them affirming themselves to be lawfully created; the one was Convictolitanus, a famous and flourishing young man, the other Catus, of an ancient family, and he himself of great power and kindred, whose brother Vedellus had born the said office the year before. All their State was in arms, their Senate and their people divided, together with their clients and followers: if the controversy continued for any time, it would come to a battle; the prevention whereof consisted in his diligence and authority. Cæsar, though he knew it would be disadvantageous unto him to leave the wars, and to forsake the enemy: yet knowing what inconveniences do usually arise of such disorders and dissensions, lest so great a State, and so near to the people of Rome, which he himself had always favoured, and by all means honoured, should fall to war amongst

themselves; and that faction which distressed their own strength, should seek help of Vercingetorix: he thought it most necessary to be prevented. And forasmuch as such as were created chief Magistrates among the Helai, were by their laws forbidden to go out of their confines to the end he might not seem to derogate any thing from their laws, he himself determined to go unto them. At his coming he called before him to Decetia all the Senate, and those also that were in controversy for the office. And finding in an assembly almost of the whole State, that one of them was chosen by a few privately called together in another place, and at another time then was accustomed, the brother pronouncing the brother: whereas their laws did not only forbid two of one family, both being allies to be created Magistrates, but also to give over his interest in the magistracy, and confirmed Convictolitanus being created by their Priests, and according to the custom of their State. This decree being ratified, he exhorted the Helai to forget their private controversies and dissensions, and to give their best help to the war in hand, wherein they might challenge and expect (the Gallies being subdued) such rewards as they deserved; commanding all their horse and foot to be dispatched into garrisons for the better provision of corn. And then dividing his army into two parts, he sent four Legions towards the Senones, & the Parisians under the leading of Labienus; & the other four he led himself against the Veruani to the town of Gergovia, along the river Elaver, sending part of the horse with him, and keeping part with himself.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**O loose the least jot of that which a man hath in possession, is more difficult than, then to all wars, fail of getting what he hath not. And therefore Cæsar chose rather to forgo the advantages which a speedy pursuit of the enemy might have afforded him to the ending of that war, than to hazard the loss of so great a State, & so well affected to the laws of Rome as were the Helai; a hand, that he carried to equal and indifferent a hand, that he would do nothing but what the laws of that State directed him unto, as most assured that such directions were without exception.

## CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar passed his army over the river Elaver, and encamped himself before Gergovia.

**N**ext morning being known Vercingetorix having broken down all the bridges of that river, took his journey on the other side of Elaver's; either his army being in view each of others,

hers, and incamping almost over against one another: & sencers being sent out to watch, lest the Romans should make a bridge in any place, and carry over their forces. Cæsar was much troubled, lest he should be hindered by the river the greatest part of that Summer, forasmuch as Elaver is not passable as any ford until towards the Autumne. And therefore to prevent that, he encamped himself in a woody place, right over against one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had commanded to be broken. The next day he kept himself there secretly with two legions, and sent forward the rest of the forces, with all the carriages, as were accustomed, taking away the fourth part of each cohort, that the number of legions might appear to be the same; commanding them to go on as far as they could, and making conjecture by the time of the day, that they were come to their camping-places, upon the same place, (the lower part whereof remained there whole) he began to reedify the bridge; and having speedily ended the works, and carried over the Legions, and chosen a fit place to encamp in, he called back the rest of his forces. Vercingetorix having notice thereof, lest he should be forced to fight against his will, went before by great journeys. Cæsar with five incampings went from that place to Gergovia, and after a light skirmish between the horse the same day he came, having taken a view of the situation of the town, which was built upon a very high hill, and had very hard and difficult approaches on all sides, he despaired of taking it by assault, neither would he determine to besiege it, until he had made provision of corn. But Vercingetorix having set his camp on a hill before the town, had placed the several forces of the States by themselves, in small distances round about him, and hissing pistol him of all the tops of that hill, made a very terrible show unto all parts where he might be seen: he commanded likewise the chief men of the States, whom he had chosen out to be of the Council of war, to meet always together with him at the dawning of the day, to know if any thing were to be communicated unto them, or what else was to be done. Neither did he omit any day to the visit with his horsemen, with archers intermingled amongst them: to the end he might try what courage and valour was in his people. Right over against the town at the foot of the hill, there was a knowl exceedingly fortified, and hard to come unto on all sides, which four men could get, they were in hope to hinder the enemy's path of a great part of the river, and also from free foraging: but the place was kept with a strong garrison. Nevertheless Cæsar went out of his camp in the silence of the night, and before any help could come out of the town, he

put by the garrisons, possessed himself of the place, left two legions there to defend it, and drew a double trench of twelve foot in breadth from the greater camp to the less, that fugitive men might go safe to and fro from any sudden incur sion of the enemy.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**F**irst we may observe his manner of passing over the river Elaver, without any impediment from the enemy, notwithstanding the care which Vercingetorix had to hinder his passage, which was placed with as great dexterity as Elaver could be devised in such a matter: and to shadow his purpose the better, that the number of legions marching up the river might appear to be the same, he took the fourth part of every cohort, which in the whole amounted to two legions. For as I have already delivered in my former Observations, a legion consisted of ten cohorts; and every cohort contained three maniples, and every manipule had two companies which they called orders: so that every cohort having six companies, the fourth part of a cohort was a company and a half, and in a legion came to fifteen companies, and in eight legions came to one hundred and twenty companies; which being reduced made threcore maniples, which were equal to two legions: and provideth that I have already noted, the fit and convenient disposition of their troops to take out at all times competent forces for any service without seeming to lessen any part. Secondly, I observe the phrase which he useth in this place, *Quinque castris Gergoviam pervenit*, he came to Gergovia at five incampings; which implyeth their infallible custom of encamping every night within a ditch and a rampier: for as we usually say, that to such a place is so many dayes journey, because an ordinary traveller maketh so many journeys before he come thither; so the Romans reckoned their journeys, with their army by their incampings, which were as duty kept by their journeys, and were the most signal part of their dayes journey.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Convictolitanus moveth the Helai to a revolt.

**N**ext day these things were a doing at Gergovia, Convictolitanus the Helai, to whom the magistracy was adjudged by Cæsar, being wrought upon by the Arverni with money, brake the matter to certain young men, amongst whom Laticivus was chief, and his brethren being youths of a great house: with them he treated at first, and wished them to remember, that they were not only born free men, but also to empire and government. The Helai were

The nears which Cæsar used to pass over the river Elaver.

Dempis, quarta qui, lartibus.

Cæsar.

the

Observations upon *Cæsar*

the only State which kept Gallia from a most assured vitorie: for by their authority and example, the rest would be concluded, which being let over, there would be no place in Gallia for the Romans to abide in. Touching himself, he had received a good turn from *Cæsar*, but in such sort, as he had but his right; but he owed more to the common liberty. For why should the *Hedui* rather dispute of their customs and laws before *Cæsar*, than the Romans come before the *Hedui*? These young men were quickly persuaded, as well by the speech of the Magistrate, as by rewards; in so much as they offered themselves to be the authors of that Council. But now the means was to be thought on, forasmuch as they were persuaded that the State would not easily be drawn to undertake that war. They determined at last, that *Litavius* should have the lead of those ten thousand men that were to be sent to *Cæsar*, and that his brethren should be sent before to *Cæsar*, and concluded likewise in what sort they would have other things carried.

*Litavius* having received the army, when he was about thirty miles from *Gergovia*, calling the soldiers suddenly together, and weeping: whether do we go (saith he) fellow soldiers? all our brethren and our Nobility are slain; the Princes of our State, *Eporodorus* and *Vindomarus*, being falsely accused of treason, are put to death by the Romans without calling them to their answer. I therefore and these things from them that are escaped from the slaughter: for I myself (my brethren and kinsmen being slain) am hindered with grief from telling you what hath happened. Presently those were brought forth whom he had taught before hand what he would have said: who verified to the multitude those things which *Litavius* had spoken: that all the horsemen of the *Hedui* were slain, forasmuch as they were said to have had speech with the *Arverni*: for themselves they were hid amongst the multitude of soldiers, and were escaped out of the midst of the slaughter. The *Hedui* cry on all together, and do beseech *Litavius* to look to himself, and to them also. Although (saith he) the matter needeth any advice or council, and that it were now necessary for us to go directly to *Gergovia*, and to cry out selves with the *Arverni*. For do we doubt, but that the Romans, having begun so wickedly, will now presently upon us take away our lives? And therefore if there be any courage at all in us, let us persecute their death that have perished so undeservedly, and let us kill these thieves. He showed them divers Roman citizens that were in the troops for safety of convoy: and forthwith he seized upon a great quantity of corn and other provisions, and tortured them cruelly to death. He sent

out messengers throughout all the State of the *Hedui*, continuing the same false suggestion touching the slaughter of the horsemen, and the Princes; persuading them to revenge their injuries in like manner as he had done.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

His treacherous practise of *Convittolitanis*, who a little before (as we may remember) had received so great a benefit from *Cæsar*, proveth true the saying of *Cornel. Tacitus*. That men are readier to revenge an injury then to requite a good turn; forasmuch as *Gratia* or *Gratiæ* *onus*, *ulio* in *questu* habetur. A good turn is as it were a burden and a debt to a man, whereas revenge is reckoned a gain. The debt of loyalty and good affections, wherein *Convittolitanis* stood engaged to *Cæsar*, for confirming that right unto him which civil diffension had made doubtfully, together with the respect of the general cause, made him so willing to revolt from the Romans, and in lieu of thankfull acknowledgement to requite him with hostility. A part so odious and detestable, that verue grieveth to think that a man should be capable of any such wickedness, or be tainted with the infamy of so horrible a crime. Other vices are faults in speciall, and are branded with the severall marks of ignominy: but ingratitude is equal to the body of evil, and doth contravert the whole nature of hatefull affections; according to that of the Philosophers *Ingratum si dixeris omnia dixeris*; ingratitude is culpable of all sorts of wickedness, and deserveth the greatest measure of revenge. And the rather for that it taketh away the use of virtue, and maketh men forget to do good. For whereas the nature of goodness is specially keen in communicating, it felt to the relief of other mens wants, we ought to give all diligence not to hinder this enlargement, nor by a froward and crooked example to prejudice others that stand in need of the like favour.

I have often heard it spoken, but I know not how true it is, and am loath to believe it, that in the exchange of a good turn, the party that receiveth it hath more assurance of his benefactors, touching a faithfull and friendly disposition for the future time, then he that sheweth the kindness can have of the receiver: for men are loath to loose both the fruit and the seed, and will rather bestow more cost and labour, then forgoe the hope of their fruit endeavours, expecting both in reason and nature, fruit answerable to their seed: whereas the badness of our nature is such of itself, *Ut gratia oneri, ulio in questu habetur*.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

There is no means so ready to abuse a multitude as false suggestion, which like a lying spirit

spirit seduceth the minds of men from the truth conceived, and fashioned their hearts to such purposes, as seemeth best to the adulter: and the rather when it is delivered by a man of place and authority, and such a one as pretendeth carefulness for the safety of a people; for then it flieth as fast as the lightning in the eyes, and deludeth the wildest and best experienced of the multitude. A mischief that can hardly be prevented, as long as there is a tongue to speak or an ear to hear. But as *Socrates* said of pain and ease, that they are always tied together: so men must endeavour to redress the hurts of such an evil, by the benefit which thereby is consequently implied: for it were hard if wise men could not make the like use of a multitude to good purposes, as these deceivers do for their own advantage.

*Numerus Pompeius* (to whom the Roman Empire did owe as much for lawes and civil government, as to *Romulus* for their martial discipline) the better to establish such ordinances and decrees as he made in his kingdom, signed familiar acquaintance with a goddette of that name called *Egeria*, and by her he said he was assured, that the Statues which the Romans were both equal and just, and good for the Romans to observe: and the people should no hurt in believing it.

In like manner *Eurygurg* having given many lawes to the *Spartans*, repaired to the cite of *Delphos*, and there he got a pleasing Oracle, which he sent to *Sparta*, affirming them that his lawes were very good, and that city keeping them should be the most renowned of the world.

And *Sextorius* for want of other means used the service of a white Hind, as a gift sent him from *Diana*, to make the *Lusitanians* believe whatsoever might best advantage his business. And thus a multitude lieth open to good and ill purposes, and is either happy or unfortunate in the counsel of their Leader.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Cæsar* hindereth the revolt of the *Hedui*.

*Eporodorus* the *Heduan*, a young man of great parentage, and of great power in his country, together with *Vindomarus*, of like age and authority, but not so nobly born, was by him advanced from mean estate to great dignity, came both to *Cæsar* with the *Heduan* horsemen being called out by name to that war by him. Between these two there was abject contention who should be the chiefe, and in that controversy for magistracies, the one found for *Convittolitanis*, and the other for *Cotus*. Of these two *Eporodorus* under standing the resolution of *Litavius* opened the matter to *Cæ-*

far almost about midnight. He prayed him not to suffer their State to fall away from the friendship of the people of Rome: by the wicked counsel of young men, which would necessarily fall out, if he suffered so many thousand men to sympathize to the enemy, whose safety as much as their kindness would neglect, so the State could not lightly esteem of. *Cæsar* being much perplexed at this message, forasmuch as he had always cherished the State of the *Hedui*, without any further doubt or dispute, he took four expedite and unburthened Legions, and all the horse out of the camp: neither was there space at such a time to make the camp less, forasmuch as the matter seemed to consist in expedition. He left behind him *C. Fabius* a Legate with two legions for a guard to the camp. And having given order for the apprehending of *Litavius* brethren, he found that a little before they were fled to the enemy. Thereupon adhorting the soldiers not to think much of their labour in so necessary a time, every man being most willing, went five and twenty miles, and then met with the force of the *Hedui*. The horsemen being sent to stay their march, he commanded us to slay any one of them, and gave order to *Eporodorus* and *Vindomarus* (whom they thought to be slain) to ride up, and down amongst the horsemen, and to call to their countrymen. They being once known, and the fraud of *Litavius* discovered, the *Hedui* stretched out their hands making signs of submission, and casting away their weapons, desired to be spared from death. *Litavius*, with his clients and followers, who by the custome of Gallia must not forsake their patrons in the extreme danger, fled to *Gergovia*. *Cæsar* having dispatched messengers to the State of the *Hedui* to acquaint them that he had saved their people, which by the law of arms he might have slain, gave the army three honours rest that night, and then returned toward *Gergovia*. In the mid-way certain horsemen sent by *Fabius* made known unto *Cæsar* in what danger the matter stood: that the camp was assaulted with all the enemies forces; and forasmuch as such as were warded were still relieved with fresh men, it came to passe that our men fatigued with continual labours, for the camp was so great, that they were always to flume upon the rampier to make it good; and that many were wounded with the multitude of arrows and other sorts of weapons; wherein their engines had served them to good purpose for their defence. *Fabius* when these messengers came, awaked, had shut up two gates, and left other two open, and bad made sheds and bowels for the better defence of the walls and prepared himself for the like fortune the next day. These things being known by the exceeding travail of the soldiers, *Cæsar* came into the camp before Sun-rising.



## OBSERVATIONS.

Evocati,  
who they  
were.

As often as the people of Rome had occasion to make war, betwixt the body of the army enrolled for that service, in such sort and with such ceremonies as I have formerly delivered: the Consul or Generall had authority to call out such others, either of the Community or the Equites, as for their long service were freed by the laws from giving in their names at a muster: and these they called *Evocati*, as a man would say, called out, being all men of speciall note and service, and such as were able to give sound advice for matter of war. These *Evocati* went all for the most part under an ensigne, and were lodged together in the camp behind the pavilion of the Generall, near unto the gate which they called *Porta Pretoris*, and were always free from ordinary duties, as watching, incamping and fighting, unless it came to such a passe, that every man would put to his helping hand: but in all services they had their place appointed them according to their former experience and worth. And thus the Romans strengthened their army with the wildome and experience of such as for many years together had been acquainted with the difficulties and casualties of war, and oftentimes were able to afford such helps, both by example and otherwise by good directions, as the wildome of the Generall did gladly embrace. Concerning these two young nobles *Eporodorus* and *Viridomarus* whom the march in this place *Evocati*, we are to understand that they were called out for that war under the same title, but to another end: for being men of great place and authority, he feared least in his absence they might be so wrought to favour *Vercingetorix*, as neither himself nor the *Hedui* should have any cause to commend them, according as it happened to *L. Lucius*.

## CHAP. XX.

The *Hedui* rob and kill divers Roman Citizens.

Cæsar.

While these things were a doing at Gergovia, the *Hedui* being received the first messengers from *Lativicus*, gave themselves no time to understand the truth: some being led on by covetousness, others by anger and rancour, as it is naturally inclined in that nation to take a little hurt for a certain truth, spoiled the Roman citizens of their goods, and flew them betwixt, or drew them into bondage: Convictioli thus stirring up the common people to madness, that when they had done somewhat, they might be advanced to be good again. They drew *Marcus Atilius* a Tribune of the soldiers, as he went to the Legion, out of the town *Cavillonum*, notwithstanding their faith

and promise before given, causing the rest to do the like, which were there for matter of trade: they they set upon forthwith as they travelled, robbed them of their carriages, and beleeved such as made resistance day and night: many were slain on both sides, and a greater number were driven up to take arms. In the mean time news being come that all their soldiers were under *Cæsar*'s power, they run *Speidylus Atilius*, they tell him that nothing was done by publick authority, they called such as robbed the Romans of their goods to answer the matters they confiscate the goods of *Lativicus* and his brethren, they send Ambassadors unto *Cæsar* to clear themselves of these disorders: and this they do for the better recovery of their people that were now with *Cæsar*. But being contaminated with a wicked faith, and taken with the shame of robbing the Roman citizens, many of them being touched in the fault, and much perplexed for fear of punishment; they privately caused into consultations of war, and solicited other States to that purpose by their Ambassadors, which although *Cæsar* understood very he entertained them as courtesy as he could, telling them that for the ignorance and levity of the common people he would not think hardly of the State, nor about any thing of his good will and favour to the *Hedui*.

## OBSERVATIONS.

A Wicked act is not onely hurtfull in it self, and of its own condition, but is like that box of evils, which the Poets feign to have been given by *Pandora* to be kept always shut: for when the way is once made, and the gap opened, one mischief draweth on another, and the tail that followeth is more viperous then the head. There was never any one that stained himself with any detestable crime, but was moved to commit a second evil that had relation to the first: for wicked deeds are justified by themselves, and one crime is upheld by another. When the hand is dipped in blood, it seemeth no great matter to imbrue the arm: and the loyalty of a people being once shaken by the indirect practices of a few, it is no strange matter if the whole body of that State do immediately enter into treasonable consultations, as it happened in this place with the *Hedui*, who from that time which disclosed the treachery of their heart, carried no faithful regard to the Roman government, until the latter end of that war which happened shortly after had made them know their error.

It shall be necessary, therefore, as much as lyeth in the possibility of our means, to keep the body of virtue safe from wounding: for albeit the wound be never so little, yet it is always wide enough to let out both the blood and the spirits,

Orrell and  
begueth  
maist.

Orrell and  
begueth  
maist.

spirits, even to the evacuation of the vitall breath of morall honesty.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The proce-  
dure of peo-  
ple do com-  
bine all  
means of  
innovation.

CONVICTIOLI thus stirring up the common people to madness (saith the story) as the fittest instruments to trouble the State, and to leaven the rest of the people with the fury of madness. For the poorer and meaner people, that have no interest in the Common-weal but the use of breath, nor any other substance but a Flie in the commons, are always dangerous to the peace of that kingdom: for having nothing to lose, they willingly embrace all means of innovation, it being of gaining something by other means, such as beleving along with in the Powers, which are wretched the filling to be good which is in troubled waters.

Stall in  
the conspi-  
cacy of Ci-  
vilians.

Against conspiring against the Roman Empire, made choice of such to accompany him wholeborne was disperate. And thereupon *Salust* saith; *Hominum potentiam querens, egeni ssumus quæ spe oportunitas immixta neq; sua charas, quæ ppe quæ nulla sunt, & omnia cum prelo bonesta videntur*. Indigent fellows are the fittest instruments for ambitious men, who regard not their own because they have nothing, esteeming all actions honest that they gain by.

I will watch, that upon the rumour in Greece of warre betwixt *Perseus* and the Romans the poorer sort did put themselves in pay under *Perseus*, with these resolutions: that if there happened no alteration upon this occasion, they would then cleave to the Romans, and assist them to put the State of Greece into a garbail. *Seneca* in *Julius* (saith *Salust*) *quibus opes nulla sunt, bonis invidiam, in vobis extollunt; vtrius adest, nova exoptant, odia sarrum rerum mutari nudent*.

There are these two means left for a State to ease itself of this sort of people: either to employ them abroad in warres, or to intercell them in the quiet of the Common-weale by learning them such trades and occupations as may give them a taste of the sweetnets of peace, & the benefit of a civil life.

## CHAP. XXI.

Cæsar seeth an occasion to advance the service at Gergovia.

Cæsar.

After suspecting a greater revolt of the Gallies, lest he might be hemmed in with the strength of the Gauls, he caused his de- liberation boy be in the legion, *Gergovia*, and get all his army together again, that his deprive might not seem to rise from the fear of their revolt, and thereby be thought

being away. And as he thought upon these things, he seemed to spy an occasion of doing somewhat to purpose: for coming into the lesser camp to view the works, he observed a knoll which was kept by the enemy to be bare of men, which the day before could scarce be discovered by reason of the multitude of people: and wondering at it, he enquired the cause of the revolt, which came daily in great numbers unto him. They all agreed that which *Cæsar* had before understood by the discoveries, that the back of it was almost levelled, but narrow and woody where it gave passage to the other part of the town. The Gallies did much fear that places for the Romans having took one knoll, if they should possess themselves of another, the Gallies were about to block in round about, and cut off from foraging, or any other issuing out of the town, and therefore *Vercingetorix* had called them all to forsake that place.

It being known, *Cæsar* sent many troops of horse to that place about midnight, commanding them to ride up and down all thereabout somewhat tumultuously. And early in the morning he caused many horses and mules for carriage to be taken out of the camp with horse-lepers upon them, having casks upon their heads the better to resemble horsemen, and to be carried round about the hills. And to them he added a few horsemen, to the end they might spur out the more freely, and so make a better show, commanding them also to go to the same place by a long circuit about. These things were done to view of the town; for *Gergovia* so stood, that they might from thence see into the camp; but yet in so great a distance they could not certainly perceive what was done. He sent likewise one Legion to the same hills, and appointed them to go a little way, and then to make a stand in a dale, and to hide themselves in the woods. The Gallies began more to suspect that place, and all their forces were drawn thither for the strengthening of it. *Cæsar* perceiving the enemies camps to be void of men, having his ensignes and colours, he drew the soldiers by little and little out of the greater into the lesser camp, and acquainted the legates to whom he had given the severall legions in charge, what he would have done; warning them especially to keep in the soldiers, lest they should be carried out either with a desire of fighting, or in hope of booty. He proposed unto them the inconveniences of the disadvantage of places, which must only be avoided by expedition, the matter consisting rather in occasion and opportunity, then in fighting.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

It is an easy matter to begin a business, and to make work for many hands; but to put it off again, and to quit it without prejudice of o-

It is an ea-  
sily matter  
to begin a  
work, then  
to quit it  
gain with  
credit.

A

other

thier important respects, is no small labour. *Caesar* being engaged in the siege of *Gerconis*, and fearing a general revolt throughout all *Gallicia*, was not a little troubled how he might clear himself of this business, without suspending his force of light, and gather all his forces into one body again, which he had before divided into two armies: for as *Marcellus* said to *Fabius* touching the siege of *Cassellum*, *Multa magnis ducibus fuit non aggrediendo, ut scilicet aggressus non dimittenda esset, quia magna summa momenta in utraque pariem sunt*; Many things as they are not to be attempted by great Captains; so when they are once attempted they must not be left unachieved: for in either their reputation is much concerned. An enemy will conceive greater hopes from such a retreat, than from a greater advantage. And therefore a General ought to have as special a regard to the opinion which he desireth to be held of his proceedings, as of any part belonging to his change: for same is the spirit of great actions, and maketh them memorable or unworthy by report. *Ceteris mortalibus in eo stare confisus quid sibi conducere putet*; *Principum* (saith *Lucretius*) *deserunt esse sortem, quibus precipua rerum ad finem dirigenda*; Other mens consultations tend only to what may most advantage themselves: Princes have more to do; to look in their management of things principally at their honour and reputation. Wherein they cannot be a better rule for the avoiding of that inconvenience, than that which *Lucretius* observed, of whom *L. vie* saith; *Id prudenter in temere susceperit Romulus fecit, quod circumspicitur difficultatibus, ut Crissus tempus teneret, celeriter abstinere incepit*: He did thus far prudently in a business rashly undertaken; that when he saw what difficulties attended the enterprise, rather then spend time vainly, he forthwith desisted from his purpose. For the speedy leaving of any such enterprise, doth excite the rashness which might be imputed to the beginning; and men are not so much blamed for making triall of an ill-digested project, as they are for obstinate continuing in the same.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*SOME* services (saith *Caesar*) are *Res occasione non praeiis*, businesses of opportunity, not of war: whereof I have already disputed. Notwithstanding give me leave to add the mistake, which often falleth out in matter of opportunity. For in viewing the occurrences of the wars of these last times, we may find, that some hot-temper commanders, having tasted of the good success which occasion offers, have thought of nothing but of services afforded with opportunity, in such manner as at length they forgot that occasion carries but seldom, and carried their men up

on such desperate attempts, as proved the business to be a matter scarce affording means to fight for their lives, but were often swallowed up with devouring danger: whereof they did mistake the condition of the service, and fell short of *Caesar*'s example. For albeit he sent out his men to struggle with the height of the hill, and the disadvantage of well-fortified camps; yet he knew they should find little resistance by the enemy, being drawn away upon other occasions; if they made that expedition as was requisite in this service; whereby he left them not without means to overthrow those difficulties, and so made it *Rem occasione non praeiis*, a business of opportunity, not of war.

## CHAP. XXII.

The Romans make an assault upon *Gerconis*.

**I**F these things being delivered by *Caesar*, the soldiers the signy begins, and at the same time beset on the Head by another ascent on the right side. The wall of the town was distant by a right line from the plain and the feet of the hill (if it lay even without any dale or valley) a thousand and two hundred paces: what soever more was added in fetching a circuit about to climb the steep of the hill, was over and besides that distance. From the middle of the hill in length, as the nature of the place would bear, the Gales had with great strokes raised a wall of a foot in height, to hinder the assault of our men; and the lower part being left good and empty, they filled the upper part of the hill even to the wall of the town with thick and frequent camps. The soldiers upon the signy given were quickly come to the works, and as they were then they passed themselves of three camps with such speed, and expedition, that *Vitumnus* the king of the *Nidivges*, being surprised in his tent as he rested about noon times, the upper part of his body being waked and his horse wounded, did hardly escape the hands of soldiers occupied in booty. *Caesar* having got that which he propounded to himself, commanded a retreat to be sounded; and the English of the tenth Legion stayed. But the soldiers of the other Legions not hearing the sound of the trumpet, forasmuch as a great valley was between them, were still standing at first by the Tribunes of the soldiers and the Legates, according as *Caesar* had given in charge. But being stirred away as well with a hope of speedy victory, as by the sight of the enemy, and the fortunate battles of former times, they thought nothing so difficult but they could overcome it by their valour, inasmuch as they desisted not from following, until they came to the wall and the gates of the town. Then a great outcry being took up in all

all parts of the town, such as were further off being terrified with the suddenness of the tumult, thinking the enemy had been within the gates, did cast themselves out of the town: and the women cast down their apparel and their silver from the walls; and holding out their naked breasts with their hands spread abroad, advised the Romans to save them, and that they would not (as they had done at *Avaticum*) do any harm to women and children: and some women flung down by their hands from the wall, and gave themselves freely to the soldiers. *L. Fabius* a consular of the eighth legion, who was heard to say that day, that the booty which he had got at *Avaticum* so stirred him up, that he would suffer no man to get up upon the wall before himself; having got three of his manipular soldiers, with their help he climbed up to the top of the wall, and then he himself did help up his fellows. In the mean time such as were on the other side of the town, busied in fortifying that place (as we have already delivered) first the noise being heard, and then stirred up by often messengers, that the Romans had took the town, sending their horsemen before, they hastened thither in great numbers, and still as they came, they stood under the walls, and increased the number of such as they found fighting. A great multitude being at length come together, the women that a little before had reached out their hands from the wall to the Romans, began now to admire their own people, and as the manner of the Gallies is, to show their hair loose about their ears, and to bring out their children.

## OBSERVATIONS.

IT is both safe and honourable for Souldiers and inferior Commanders to keep their directions: for whensoever they go about to enlarge their business according to their own fantasy, howsoever occasion may seem to further their desires, they invert the whole course of discipline, and do arrogate more to themselves, then they do attribute to their General.

The Romans were strict in this point, as may appear by that of *Manlius*, who put his own son to death for making a happy fight against the enemy contrary to his directions: for although it fortune to fall out well at that time, yet the example was so dangerous in a well-ordered war, that he chose rather to bring a mischief upon his own son, then an inconvenience to their military government. *Insuper tuo* (saith one in *Livie* to the Consul) *manum pugnas, non si certam villoriam videam*; unless thou biddest, I will never fight, nor though

I see the victory clear before me; making profession of true obedience, and ranging himself in the order of such parts, as have no other office but observance. For an army is a body, and the souldiers are as particular parts, every man according to his place: the General is as the life and soul, and giveth motion to every part according to reason. And as in a natural body no part can move without directions from the life; so in the body of an army, when any part moveth without the consent of the head, the motion is either monstrous or exorbitant, and such with such an effect as condemneth the instruments of unadvised rashness.

*Polybius* saith, that men have two ways to come by wildom; either by their own harms or by other mens misfortunes. Such wisdom as is got through correction happening by their own errors, is dearly bought; but sitting near them is not easily forgotten: that which is obtained by other mens misfortunes, is well come by, and at an easy rate; but for the most part it is soon forgotten: but such as can retain it to a good use, are most happy men. This precept to souldiers touching obedience, and the precise keeping of their directions, hath by other mens harms so often been urged, as a man would think that later ages should beware of this disorder. And yet it falleth out almost in every small service. For the greatest loss which the English received at any one time at *Offend*, was in a fall; wherein captain *Woodward* having possessed himself of some of the enemies works, when by his directions he should have stayed, thinking to improve his reputation by some further service, deeming it easy peradventure to go forward, he went on beyond the compass of his command: whereby it happened, that both the enemy had greater scope to revenge their former dishonours, and the rest of our English troops that had their part in that project by way of second helps, could not proceed according to their directions; and so they all returned with loss.

That which *Xenophon* reporteth touching one *Talliscion Chrysantas*, is notable to this purpose; who being of Cyrus, in the heat of a conflict, and having his sword lifted up to strike one of the adverse party, he chance to hear a retreat sounded, whereupon he presently withdrew his hand, and did forbear to smite him. Which howsoever to some may seem ridiculous, and unfitting the temper of a souldier in time of battel; yet let them know that *Xenophon* a great Commander, and an excellent historiographer did allege that example to the eternal memory of the forenamed party, for the knowledge and instruction of *Cyrus*, whom he propoundeth to the world as an absolute pattern both of military and civile verue.

## CHAP. XXIII.

The Romans continue the assault, and are beaten off with loss.

**T**he contention was not indifferent to the Romans, neither in place nor in number of combatants being wearied with the long race which they had run, and with the continuance of their fight, whereby they did not easily bear the enemy being whole and fresh. *Cæsar* seeing the fight to be in an unequal place, and the enemy still to increase their force, fearing his people, he sent to T. Sextius the legate, whom he had left to command the lesser camp, to bring out the cohorts speedily, and to place them at the foot of the hill on the right side of the enemy; to the end that if our men were forced to forsake their place, yet the enemy might be terrified from following them over freely, he himself removing a little out of that place where he stood with the legions attended the event of the battle. And as they fought at hand very fiercely, the enemy trusting in the place and in the multitude, and our men in their valour, the *Hedui* suddenly appeared on the open side of our men, whom *Cæsar* had sent up by another ascent on the right hand, to keep off part of the enemy. These by the likelihood of their armour did wonderfully astonish our men: who although they saw their right arms showed or put forth, which was a sign of peace, yet they doubted lest the enemy had used that policy to deceive them. At the same instant L. Fabius the Centurion, and those that climbed up upon the wall with him, being slain, were cast down from the wall again, and M. Petreus a Centurion of the same legions, as he was bent to cut down the gates being oppressed in the multitude, and despairing of his own life, bravely received in our wounds; Forasmuch (saith he to his soldiers that followed him) as I cannot save my self and you too, I will certainly provide for your safety, whom I have brought into danger whilst I thought after honour. You, while you may, shift for your selves. And without he broke through the thickess of the enemy, and with the slaughter of a couple he removed the rest from the gate. And as his soldiers went about to help him, he vainly saith he do you endeavour to save my life, which blood and strength have already forsaken; and therefore get you hence while you have means, and brave your selves to the legion, and so fighting fell down dead, but saved his men. Our men being overcharged on all sides with the loss of six and forty Centurions, were beaten down from the place: but the tenth legion, which stood for a rescue in a more equal place, hindered the *Gallies* from following

over eagerly. And again, the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, which Sextius had brought out of the camp, seconded that legion, having got the advantage of the upper ground. The legions almost as they came into the plain, stood still, and turned heads to the enemy. Vercingetorix drew back his men from the foot of the hill, and brought them into their camp. That day few less than seven hundred soldiers were wanting.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**A**nd this is the end of presumptuous rashness, when men are become so pregnant, as to take upon them more than is required. But as they say of fair weather, that it is pity it should do hurt: so is it great pity that valour and resolution should prove disadvantageous. For this overdoing of a service, is but the spirit of valiant carriage, and the very motion of prowess and courage, memorable in the offenders themselves; as we may see by this particular report of *Cæsar* and Petreus: and much to be pitied, that virtue should at any time be overruled with a greater strength.

At this service the Romans stood in these terms; they were overmatched in numbers, they had spent their strength in speedy running to the place which in itself was not favourable unto them, but almost as great an enemy as the *Gallies*, only they trusted in their valour, and thought by virtue to clear all difficulties. The *Gallies* had the favour of the place, a far greater number of fighting men, they came fresh to the battle, and were always seconded with fresh supplies. *Cæsar* seeing the two armies engaged one with another, could neither part them nor recall his soldiers, but let such forces as might rescue his people in the retreat, and keep the *Gallies* from following the chase, or making any great slaughter of the Roman soldier. Whereby it happened, that in to great an inequality, where there were so many swords drawn to make way to death, there were not even hundred men lost of the Roman army. And yet it happened to be the greatest loss that ever he received in those wars in his own presence, when the issue of the conflict gave the enemy the better of the day.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Cæsar* rebuketh the rashness of his soldiers; and maketh light, but successful skirmishes upon the enemy.

**C**æsar the next day calling the army before him, rebuked the temerity and cupidity of the soldiers, forasmuch as they had taken upon them to judge how far they were to go, or what they were to do; neither would they stay upon

upon the founding of a retreat, nor hearken to the Tribunes nor the Legates that would have kept them back. He laid open unto them how available the inequality of the place was, and what he himself thought of it, when at *Avaticum* he took the enemy without a General, and without cavalry, yet did forgo a most assured victory, left in the bucking he might have received a small loss through the inequity of the place. How admirable was the greatness of their spirit, whom neither the fortifications of the camp, the height of the hill, nor the wall of the town could stop or hinder! wherein he blamed their licentious arrogance the more, forasmuch as they had taken upon them to judge better of the victory and the success of that service, than the General himself: neither did he so much desire to find courage and virtue in his soldiers, as modesty and sobriety. This speech being delivered, and in the end confirming their minds that they might not be discouraged at the matter, nor attribute that to the worth of the enemy, which indeed was in the nature of the place; keeping his former purpose of departure, he brought the legions out of the camp, imbristled them in a convenient place, and finding that Vercingetorix would not be drawn into an indifferent place after a light skirmish of horse, wherein the Romans had the better, he carried his army back again into the camp: and doing the like the next day, thinking it sufficient to abate the pride of the *Gallies*, and to strengthen the courage of his soldiers, he removed his camp into the State of the *Hedui*, the enemy refusing to make after him.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Reparation of honour, what it is.

Plutarch in the life of Marcellus.

**R**eparation of honour is a chief point in the carriage of an army: for he that leaveth an enemy upon a loss received, when his soldiers are either awed or well beaten, must look to find the same spirit and courage in them, when they shall come again to confront the enemies they had when they last left him with a disadvantage; which is nothing else but an unskillful continuance of the same loss, and a preparation to a second overthrow. In the war the Romans had with *Annibals* in all the fights they made, they continued their suit loss unto the battle at *Nola*: at what time by *Marcellus* good directions, they gave him an overthrow; which was the first time that ever *Annibals* soldiers began to give place to the Romans, and repaired the Romans gave place again, after so many battles the Romans gave place again, after so many battles they were lost. For then they were persuaded that they fought not with an enemy altogether invincible, but that he was subject to loss and overthrow. And in respect of this so happy a fortune, restoring the Roman soldier to their ancient valour and good fortunes, it is that *Livius*

saith, *Ingenio et diere, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*. A great piece of service was performed that day, & I think I may say, the greatest that was done in that war. *Cæsar* did well understand this Philosophy: and therefore he laboured to repair the breach which the enemy had made in the valour of his soldiers, by light and small skirmishes, before he would adventure to the main drift of the business in any militia, see conflict. And the rather for that he had a purpose to leave the enemy for a time, whereby he seemed to end the former services; wherein he had a special care not to depart with the last down blow, having always before that time had the better: for the condition of the end doth challenge much of the former proceedings, and doth draw the opinion of men to deem of all as the conclusion importeth. According as *Claudius Nero* told his soldiers: *Semper quod præsimo adiectionem sit, id rem totam videri transisse*. As the end of the service is, so the whole seems to have been.

## CHAP. XXV.

The *Hedui* revolt: *Cæsar* paceth his army over the river Loire.

**T**he third day he repaired the bridge at the river *Eleva*, and carried over his army. There he understood by *Viridomarus* and *Eporodorus*, that *Litavicus* was gone with all the enemies horse to sollicite the State of the *Hedui*, and therefore it was requisite that *Cæsar* should send them before to confirm the State, and keep them in loyalty. And although *Cæsar* did mistrust the State of the *Hedui* for many causes, and did think that the departure of these two Nobles would hasten their revolt; yet he did not think it fit to detain them, lest he should either seem to them wrong, or to give any suspicion of distrust. At their departure he proposed unto them briefly, how low and weak they had deserved of their State, how low and weak they were when he received them, confined within their towns, their lands extended all their associates, taken from them, a tribute laid upon them, pledges extorted from them with great continuity; and into what fortune and greatness he had brought them again, that not only they had recovered their former state, but did exceed the dignity and favour of all former times; and with these mandates he let them go. *Noviodunum* was a town of the *Hedui*, situate in a convenient place, upon the bank of the river Loire. Thither had *Cæsar* sent all the hostages of Gallia; the corn, the public treasures, and the greatest part of the baggage of his army; and thither he had likewise sent great store of horse, which he had bought in Spain and Italy for the service of this war. *Eporodorus*

rix and Viridomarus coming thither, and under-  
standing touching the affairs of their State,  
that Livianus was received into Bibract by the  
Hedui, who this the Metropolitan City of their  
State, and the Convictolitanis their chief Ma-  
gistrates, and a great part of the Senate were  
come unto him, and that public messengers  
were sent to Vercingetorix touching a league of  
peace and amity; they did not think it fit to  
omit so great an opportunity. And thereupon  
having slain the Guard at Noviodunum, with  
such others as were there either by way of  
trade or travelling, they divided the money and the  
horses between them, and took order that the  
horses of the other States should safely be con-  
veyed to Bibract. For the town, forasmuch  
as they thought they were not able to keep it,  
left the Romans might make any use of it, they  
burned it; such corn as they could carry on the  
sleds they conveyed away in boats, the rest  
they either burned or cast it into the river. They  
began to raise forces in the country, next ad-  
joining; to dispose of watches and garri-  
sons on the bank of the river Loire; to show the Ci-  
vilians in all places, to strike fear into the Ro-  
mans, in the end they might exclude them from  
provision of corn, or drive them through ne-  
cessity of want to forsake the Province. Where-  
of they were the rather assured, forasmuch as  
the Loire was much swelled by a fall of snow,  
whereby it was not passable at any ford. These  
things being known, Cæsar thought it necessary  
for him to make haste, especially if he must  
make up by the day, to the end he might give  
them battle before they had gathered a greater  
head: for touching his purpose for returning  
into the Province, he did not think it fit by any  
means, both in respect of the shame and injury  
thereof, as also forasmuch as the opposition of  
the bill, Gervenna, and the difficulty of the  
passage did hinder him; but especially for that  
he did exceedingly desire to join himself with  
Labienus and the Legions that were with him.  
And therefore making great journeys both by  
day and night beyond all men's expectation,  
he came to the river Loire, where the horsemen  
having found a convenient ford for the ne-  
cessity of the times, that the soldiers might pass  
over with their arms and shoulders above  
the water, to build up their weapons, disposing  
the horse in the river to break the force of the  
stream, and the enemy being affrighted upon  
their first view, he carried over his Army in  
safety. And having satisfied his soldiers  
with corn which he found in the fields, and  
good store of cattell, he determined to march  
towards the Senones.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The charge  
which the  
revolt of

The greatest difficulty that ever Cæsar found  
in the course of these wars, was at this

instant upon the revolt of the Hedui. For  
whereas that State after Cæsar's coming into  
Gallia, was ever reputed the favourite of the  
Roman Empire, having received such special  
privileges and prerogatives above the rest,  
as might tie them with an inviolable bond of  
amity to the people of Rome: it was not to be  
expected that they should forsake so great a City,  
or favour any thing that might tend to the weak-  
ning of that authority, which preferred them in  
dignity before all other States of that Continent:  
and was as a Remora to divers other Nations of  
Gallia from shewing the defection by plain  
and open revolt, which they had so long before  
conceived in their minds.

But when it appeared (notwithstanding any  
precedent benefit, or the merit of imperial fa-  
vours) that the Hedui did affect the common  
cause of their Countries liberty, and were con-  
tent to ingage themselves therein, as far as their  
lives or fortunes could any way be valued: it was  
not to be doubted, but that such other Common-  
wealths, as before that time had remained neutral,  
and had less cause than the Hedui to keep back  
their hands from a work of that piety, would ap-  
prehend the matter as a business importing the  
safety of their Country, whereunto Cæsar and  
the Legions were common enemies. The consi-  
deration whereof made Cæsar to think of re-  
turning back into the Province, had not the  
dishonour of such a retreat, and the desire he had  
to join with Labienus, hindered that purpose.

## CHAP. XXVI.

Labienus cometh to Lutetia with four Legions.

While these things were done by Cæsar,  
Labienus having left those sup-  
plies which came last out of Italy,  
at Agendicum for the safety  
of the carriages, went himself with  
four Legions towards Lutetia, a town of the Pa-  
ritians, built in an Island in the river Sequana.  
The enemy understanding of his coming, great  
forces were speedily brought together out of the  
countries near about. The chiefest command  
was given to Camulogenus of the nation of the  
Aulerci, who notwithstanding his great age,  
was called to that honour for his singular know-  
ledge in matter of warre. He finding it to be  
a continued bog that ran into Sequana, and  
much hindered all that places, did stay there  
with his army, and purposed to hinder the pas-  
sage of the Romans. Labienus did first endeavour  
to drive the vines, to fill up the bog with hurdles  
and earth, and so to make the passage firm:  
but after that he perceived it to be very hard to  
effect, in the third watch of the night he went  
out of the camp with silence, and in the way  
that he came, he went to Melodunum, a town of  
the Senones, situate in an Island of Sequana, as  
Lutetia

the de-  
made in  
Gallia.

Cæsar.

Lutetia is: and having surprised some fiftie  
ships and boats, and manned them with  
soldiers, the townsmen being affrighted with  
the novelty of the matter, of whom a great part  
were called out to that warre, he possessed himself  
of the town without any resistance. The bridge  
being repaired which the enemy had cut down  
a few dayes before, he transported over the ar-  
mie, and went down along the river towards  
Lutetia. The enemy having notice thereof by  
such as escaped from Melodunum, commencing  
Lutetia to be burned, and the bridges of the town  
to be broken: they themselves, forfeying the  
bogs, set down upon the banks of Sequana, right  
over against the camp of Labienus. By this time  
Cæsar's departure from Gergovia was known  
abroad, with the revolt of the Hedui: and ru-  
mours were brought of a second rising and mo-  
tion in Gallia. It was certainly confirmed that  
the Gallies were in consultation, that Cæsar  
was kept back both by the difficulties of the pas-  
sage and the river Loire, and for want of corn  
was constrained to return into the Province.  
The Bellouacii also understanding of the revolt  
of the Hedui, whereas they were before treache-  
rons and disloyal of themselves, did now begin  
to raise forces and prepare for open warre. La-  
bienus upon so great a change of things, under-  
stood that it was necessary for him to take ano-  
ther manner of course than was before intended.  
For now he thought not of making any conquest,  
or moving the enemy to battle, but to bring the  
army back in safety to Agendicum. For on the  
one side, the Bellouacii stood ready to charge  
him, being a people that had the name for deeds  
of arms of all the nations in Gallia; the other  
side was kept by Camulogenus with an army  
ready in the field: and last of all, the Legions  
were kept from their garrison, and their carriages  
with a great river that ran between them  
and it.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The great alteration which the revolt of the  
Hedui made in Gallia, caused Labienus to  
let fall his former resolutions, and to shape such  
a countenance might best answer the extremity  
of the tempest. For he that will attain the end of  
his desires, or make peace with the affections of  
his mind, must not think at all times to carry  
away contentments with the strength of his  
means, or subdue resistance with force of arms,  
but must be well pleased to be driven with the  
stream, until he meet with a tide of better oppor-  
tunity: for oftentimes it falleth out, that the opposi-  
tion of resisting power is more available then  
such options commanded by Cæsar, or what the  
Roman Empire could add besides, to so great an  
army. For therein no quantitie is great, but  
there may be found a greater; nor none so little

but there may be a less: which may teach a man  
neither to conceit himself in a matchless ingu-  
larly, nor to despair of a weak condition. And  
this is that which is so often recommended to the  
consideration of discreet Governours; whether  
they be Magistrates in peace, or Commanders  
in warre, to put them in mind of the condition  
of times, and to carry themselves answerable  
thereunto: forasmuch as so fortunate and happy  
success, respect for the most part from such means  
as have respect to the occurrences of the time,  
nor running always upon one bias, nor  
sailing at all times with a fore-wind; but  
sometimes to prels forward, and sometimes  
to give back, according as the circumstances  
of the time shall make way to good for-  
tune.

Fabius the great Roman thought it no scorn  
to be called towards, or to undergo the duplici-  
ture of the people of Rome, while he gave place  
to the fury of the Carthaginians, and refused to  
receive a third overthrow. And thus he altered  
the course of the Roman warre, according to  
the times and overthrow that enemy by flunning  
to encounter him, which in a battell would  
have hazarded the conquest of Rome. In like  
manner Cn. Sulpitius the Dictator did imitate  
this wisdom of Fabius against the Gallies, by  
lingering out the warre: Nolens se fortune  
committere adversus hostem (as Livy saith)  
quem tempus deteretorem indies & locus alienus  
fuerat. Not willing to put the trial to Fortune,  
whenas he dealt with an enemy, which time and  
ignorance of the place rendered every day weaker  
and weaker. And to conclude this point, Cæsar  
upon the tols which he received at Dyrrachium,  
Omens sibi commendantam bellationem exi-  
stimavit, thought it his best way to alter the  
first course of the warre, as the Story saith:  
which was nothing else but varying with the  
time, and helping a bad Fortune with new di-  
rections.

Plutarch is  
the life of  
Fabius.

## CHAP. XXVII.

Labienus passeth the river Sequana, and fighteth with  
the Gallies.

Or the avoiding of these great diffi-  
culties which came so suddenly upon  
him, he knew there was no  
help to be had, but that which the  
virtue of his mind would afford him: and  
therefore calling a councill a little before such  
evening, he adjoined them to execute such  
things as he commanded both with diligence  
and industry, and for taking the ships which he  
had brought from Melodunum, he divided  
them into five parts, and commanded them to go  
down the river in silence, and there to wait  
for him. He left five cohorts, which he brought  
with him.

Cæsar.

to be too weak for any fight, as a garrison to the camp, and sent the other five cohorts of the same legion about midnight with all the carriages up the river, commanding them to make a great noise and tumult as they went. He sought out all barges and boats, and sent them up the river with much noise and beating of oars: and a little while after he himself went quietly with three legions to the place where he had commanded the ships to abide him. At his coming thither, the enemies discovered which were disposed on all parts of the river, were suddenly and at unawares surprised by our men by reason of a sudden tempest that did rise in the mean time: and the army and the horse were by the diligence of the Roman Knights (to whom he had committed that business) carried over. At the same time a little before day-light, the enemy had intelligence that there was an extraordinary noise and tumult in the Roman camp, and a great troop went up the river, and the beating of oars was heard that way, and a little below the soldiers were carried over. Which being known, foras-much as they judged that the legions were carried over in three places, and that they were so perplexed at the report of the tidings that they fled away; they divided their forces also into three parts: for a garrison being left right over against the Roman camp, and a small band flew towards Glottendium, which was to go to sea; as the boats went, they carried the rest of their army to meet Labienus. By the dawn-ing of the day all our men were carried over, and the enemy was discovered ranged in bat-tel. Labienus adorning the soldiers to be-think themselves of their ancient virtues, and to recall the memory of their fortunate battles, and to suppose that Cæsar himself was present, under whose leading they had oftentimes over-thrown the enemy: he gave the sign of bat-tel. Upon the first assault, on the right wing, where the seventh legion stood, the enemy was beaten back, and put to flight; in the left corner where the twelfth legion was the former ranks of the enemy being pierced through and beaten dead down with the pikes, the rest notwithstanding did stoutly resist, neither did any man give sus-picion of flying. Camulogenus the General was present with his men, and encouraged them to fight, the victory being uncertain. When the tribunes of the seventh legion under flood what was done in the left wing, they showed the legion behind on the back of the enemy, and there began to charge them: and yet none of them forsook his place, but were all inclosed and slain. Camulogenus ending his dayes by the same fortune. Such of the enemy as were left over against the Roman camp, understanding that the battle was begun, came to second their fel-lowes, and took a hill, but were not able to abide

our conquering soldiers; but joining them-selves to the rest that fled, were neither pro-tected by the woods nor the mountains, but were all slain by the horsemen. This business being ended, Labienus returned to Agendicum, where the carriages of the whole army were left: and from thence came to Cæsar with all the forces.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Labienus being to passe the river of Seine, which was strongly guarded by the Gallies, was forced to seek a means out of the virtue of his mind, (as Cæsar saith,) and to lay such a project as might amuse the enemy, and keep him in sus-pence what way to take to prevent his passage, until he had effected that which he desired. Which bringeth to our consideration the saying of Epaminondas the Theban, that there is no-thing more necessary or behovefull for a Gene-rall, then to understand the purposes of the En-emy. A point to much the more commendable by how much it is in itself difficult, and hard to be discovered, for the hard to understand their secret deliberations, which for the most part are only known to the General, or to such chief Commanders as are near about him, when they very actions which every man knoweth, and such things as are done in the open view of the world, are oftentimes doubtfull to an enemy.

Living hath a notable story to this purpose. Sempronius the Roman Consul giving bat-tel to the Æqui, the fight continued until the night parted them, not without alteration of fortunes, sometimes the Romans prevailing, and some-times the Æqui: the night coming on, both sides being weary and half out of their sleep, they forsook their camps, and for their better safety took each of them a hill. The Roman army divided it self into two parts: the one part followed the Consul, and the other a Centurion, named Tem-purinus, a fellow of great spirits and had shewed much worth in the bat-tel. The next morning the Consul without further inquiry, made towards Rome; and so did the Æqui withdraw their army back into their country: either of them deeming themselves overthrow, and casting victory upon each others shoulders. It hap-pened that Tempurinus with that part of the army that kept with him, inquiring after the en-emy, found him to be overthrow and fled: whereupon he first went to the Roman camp and made that good, and then marched to the camp of the Æqui, which he took and rilled, and so returned victor to Rome.

The morning following the bat-tel of Agin-cours, Montjoy the French Herald coming to enquire for prisoners, King Henry asked him who had won the field: To which he answered, That the French had lost it: which was un-known

Necessary for a General to understand the purposes of the enemy

known to that worthy Conquerour. Plutarch writeth, that Cæsar killed himself upon the like error, not knowing the fortune of the right wing of his army. And therefore it must needs be a commendable matter, to understand the delib-erations of an enemy, when the issue of a bat-tel is oftentimes so uncertain.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Camulogenus hath the report in this place of singular knowledge and experience in mat-ter of war, and being of a great age he fought as resolutely as the youngest gallant of them all, which may bring to our consideration the fittest age of life to be wished in a General, for the at-taining of noble and worthy exploits. Wherein we are to consider, that the youth and former years of a mans age, are plentifully stored with hot blood and nimble spirits, which quickly ap-prehend the conceptions of the mind, and carry them with such violence to execution, that they beare the judgement of her prerogative, and give it no reprieve to confute them; whereby it cometh to pass, that young men are for the most part headless, inconsiderate, rash and resolute, putting more upon hazard then upon good ad-vise.

On the other side, old age is cold in blood, and not so quick of spirits, but being beaten with the rod of long experience, it learneth to be flow and limping, full of doubts and consideration, inclining rather to a feminine fear, then to a for-ward resolution.

Neither of these attributes are simply in them-selves the best attendants of noble enterprises: for a hot, or gallant may run apace, but not so far; and what young man forever is advanced to command, had need of an old mans wit to discharge it. And if authority did at any time fall into the hands of youth in the Roman go-vernments, which was very seldom, it was Pre-mium virtutis, non ætatis; for his virtues sake, not his age. Pompey was extraordinary happy in that behalf, for he attained the fumane of great, because he had deserved the honour of tri-umph before his beard was grown.

And yet Scitorius took such advantage at Pompey, youth coming against him in Spain, that he laid he would have whipped the young boy to Rome again with rods, had not that old woman (mean-ing Metellus) come to help him.

Again, where old age heareth doubt upon doubts, and falleth into the danger of unprofit-able lingering, Nec ausus est satis nec providit, he wanteth boldness to steel the enterprise, & fal-leth also short of good providence, as Tacitus speaketh of F. Vellens. Augustus Cæsar purpo-sing to commend Tiberius his succellor with an extraordinary praise, said he was a man that never put one thing to be twice consulted of.

The fittest age of life for a General.

Lib. 1.

Holinfied, Henry times.

And it is said of Marins, that being come to the age of threecore and five years or thereabouts, he shewed himself very cold and slow in all his enterprises, forasmuch as age had mortified his active heat, and killed that ready disposition of body that was wont to be in him. The Romans finding Fabius Maximus to be full of doubts and delay, good to defend but not to offend, and Metellus of a stirring spirit, neither quick with good nor ill fortune, (as Annibal truly said of him,) they thought to join Metellus youthfull courage with Fabius fear and wisdom, and to make a temperate fit for a General: where-upon they called Metellus the sword, and Fa-bius the buckler: wherein Cæsar of himself was excellent of whom Suetonius reporteth, Dubium tantior, an audacior; It is uncertain whether he was more wary or daring.

The best state of years then to this business, is that which tempereth the heat of youth with the coldness of age, and quickeneth the flow and dull proceedings of double advice, with the rashness of youthfull resolution: and falleth out between the years of five and thirty and five and fifty. Scipio Africanus commanded the Roman army in Spain at four and twenty years of age, and died at four and fifty. Annibal was chosen General to Asdrubal at fix and twenty years, and poineered himself at threecore and ten. Pompey was slain at nine and fifty, and Cæsar at fix and fifty. Metellus kept his youthfull resolu-tion to his old dayes: for being threecore years of age, he never longed for any thing more then to fight with Annibal hand to hand.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

The Gallie consul of the carriage of that war.

He revolt of the Hedui being known, Gallie the warre waxed greater. Ambassadors were sent out into all parts, and they laboured to draw the rest of the States to their party, as far as either favours authority, or money could pre-vail: having got the pledge into their hands which Cæsar had left with them, they terrified such as stood doubtful, by threatening to kill them. The Hedui do desire Vercingetorix to come unto them, and to acquaint them with the course of that war, which being yielded un-to, they labour to have the chief command transferred v. on them. The matter growing into a controversy, a generall Council of all Gallia was summoned at Bibract. Thither they repaired in great multitudes: and the matter being put to voices, they all with one consent made allowance of Vercingetorix for their General. The men of Rhemes, with the Lingones and Treveri, were absent from this Council: the two first continuing their af-fection to the Roman party: the Treveri were

Plutarch in the life of Marins.

Gallie.

B b

survive off, and were annoyed by the Germans; in respect they were absent from that war, and remained near-ill. The Helvii were much grieved that they were put by the principalities, they complain of the change of their fortunes, and wished for Cæsars former indulgence; neither yet did they disjoin themselves again from the rest of the war, being already undertaken, but Eporedorix and Vindomarus, two young men of great hopes, were constrained, though unwilling, to obey Vercingetorix. He commanded pledges to be delivered by the rest of the States, and appointed a day for that business. He commanded fifteen thousand horse to be speedily brought together: touching foot forces, he would content himself with those which he had; for his purpose was not to wage battell, but whereas he was very strong in horses, he made no doubt to keep the Romans from corn and forrage: only by himself patiently endure to have their corn spoiled, and their houses burnt; which particular loss would quickly be recompensed with liberty and perpetual sovereignty. These things being ordered, he commanded ten thousand horse to be raised by the Helvii and Seguntii bordering upon the Province; and to them he added eight hundred horse, and sent them under the command of Eporedorix his brother, to make war against the Allobroges. And on the other side he caused the Gabali and the nearest villages of the Averni to set upon the Helvii, the Rutieni, and the Caduci, and to depopulate their country. Notwithstanding by secret messages he dealt with the Allobroges, whose minds he thought to be scarce settled from the former war: he promised money to their chief men, and to give the government of all the Roman Province to their State. To answer all these chances, there were provided but two and twenty cohorts, which being raised out of the Provinces were disposed by L. Cæsar a Legate to prevent these mischiefes. The Helvii of their own accord giving battell to their borderers, were beaten out of the field, and were driven into their towns with the slaughter of C. Valerius Donatourus, the sonne of Cæabus the chief man of their State, and of many other. The Allobroges having for many watches and garrisons upon the river Rheus, did with great care and diligence defend their borders. Cæsar understanding the enemy to be stronger in horse than he himself was, and the passages being such that he could not send either into the Province or into Italy for any supplies, he sent over the Rhene into Germany, and got horse from such States as he had quieted the year before, with such light-armed footmen as were accustomed to fight amongst the horse. At their arrivall, so far as much as they were not well fitted with horses, he took the horses from the Tribunes, the Roman Knights,

and the Evocati, and distributed them amongst the Germans.

## OBSERVATIONS.

There are three principall means to draw a State into a party, which is itself standeth neutrally, or to win the minds of men, when they carrie equal or indifferent affections. The first is, by favour or friendship; the second, by authority; and the third, by money.

Friendship relieth upon former respects, and the exchange of precedent courtesies. Authority concludeth from future dangers, and the inconveniences which may follow the refusal. Money doth govern the present occasions, and is more generally then either favour or authority. The Galles were not wanting to make their party good in any of these three perwading motives; but as Cæsar saith, *Quantum gratias, autoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas civitates nuntium*: they solicited the neighbour States as farre as friendships, authority, and money would go.

Wherein as they went about to lay the flock upon us, to let themselves be one trial for the right of their cause, and joynd issue for all upon the fortune of that action: for when they should see their best possibilities too weak, and their utmost endeavours profit nothing against a mighty prevailing enemy, the greater their hopes were which they had in the means, the greater would be their despair when such means were spent; for it is a throwd thing for men to be out of means, and not to drive a hope before them.

It is usual upon such main occasions to employ the chiefest man in a State, in whom the foildiers may have most assurance, and to accompany him with such means as the strength of the Commonwealth may afford him; but if their great hopes die in his ill success, or are faint through cold fortune, the kingdom receiveth losses, and the enemy getteth advantage, as may appear by the sequel of this great preparation.

## CHAP. XXIX.

The Cavalie of the Galles do set upon the Roman army, and are beaten.

While these things were a doing, the enemies forces and the horsemen that were commanded to beleaguer all Gallia, met together, and came out of the territories of the Averni. A great number of these being gathered together, as Cæsar marched against the Sequani by the borders of the Lingones, to the end he might the easier relieve the Province, Vercingetorix sawe down about ten miles from the Romans in three severall camps, and calling the Captain and Colonels of horse to counsell, he told them that

Three chief means to draw a State into a party, are, 1. Favour or friendship. 2. Authority. 3. Money.

Cæsar.

that the time of victory was now come; for the Romans left Gallia and fled into the Province: which was sufficient for the obtaining of their present liberties, but availed little for the peace and quiet of future times, forasmuch as the Romans did not purpose to make an end of the warre, but to return again with greater forces. And therefore it was necessary to set upon them in their march laden with carriages. If the foot did assist their horse, then they were not able to make any way or proceed in their journey. But if (which he hoped would rather happen) forsaking their carriages every man hissted for himself, they would depart both robbed of their necessities and of their honour: for they need not doubt of the enemies horse, of whom he was most assured that they durst not go out from amongst the foot forces. And to the end they might be the better encouraged, he would draw all the forces in a readinesse out of the camp, and place them so as they might be a terror to the enemy. The horsemen crad out all together, that this resolution might be strengthened with an holy oath: Let him never be received under any roof, or have access to his wife, children, or parents, that did not twice run me through the army of the enemy. The thing being well liked of, and every man forced to take that oath, the next day he divided his cavalrie into three parts: two armies shewed themselves on each side, and the third began to make stay of the rearward. Which being known, Cæsar divided his horses likewise into three parts, and sent them to make head against the enemy. At the same time they fought in all parts, the army stood still, the carriages were received within the Legion: if our men were overcharged any where, Cæsar bent the Legion that way, which did both hinder the enemy from following, and secure our men of any sort of rescue. At length the Germans having spent themselves of a bill on the right side, did put the enemy from their place, and followed them as they fled even to the river, where Vercingetorix stayed with the foot companies, and flew many of them. Whereupon the rest fearing lest they should be encompassed about, betook themselves to flight: execution was done in all places. Three of the Nobilitie of the Helvii were taken and brought to Cæsar: Consus the Generall of the horse, who at the last election of Magistrates stood in controversy with Convictolitanus; and Cavarillus, who after the revolt of Litavicus, commanded the foot troops; and Eporedorix, under whose command, before Cæsars coming into Gallia, the Helvii made warre with the Sequani. All the cavalrie being put to flight, Vercingetorix drew in his forces which he had imbrutled before his camp, and immediately after began to march towards Aleia a town of the Mandubii, com-

manding the baggage robe speedily brought out of the camp, and follow him. Cæsar having employed his carriages to the next hills under the custody of two Legions, he followed the enemy as long as the day would give him leave: and having slain three thousand of the reverend, the next day following he encamped at Aleia.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The Galles were much stronger then the Romans in Cavalry, both according to quantitie and qualitie: but the Roman Infanterie was greater in vertue and worth then any foot forces of the Galles, notwithstanding their inequality in number. Which sheweth that the Romans did and use to more rely upon their legiary foildiers, then a warre. Wherein first it cannot be denied, but that foot companies are serviceable to more purposes then troops of horse: for the horsemen are of no use, but in open and champaign places; whereas footmen are not only of importance in fielden countries, but are necessary also in mountainous or woodie places, in valleys, in ditches, in sieges, and in all other parts of what fixe or nature soever, where the horsemen cannot shew themselves. Whereby it appeareth, that the infanterie extendeth service to more purposes then the cavalrie, and maketh the warre compleat, which otherwise would prove lame and uneffectuall.

Touching the weight of the business when it cometh to aday of battell, it retheth for the most part upon the foot troops: for the horsemen are profitable to the army wherein they serve by making discoveries, by harrying the enemies country, by giving succour or rescue upon a suddain, by doing execution upon an overthrow, and by confronting the enemies horse; but these are but as second services, and fall short of the main strokes which for the most part is given by the footmen. Neither doth a rout given to the cavalrie relieving an army royally, covern the body of that army further then the services before mentioned; but the armed doth offendings go on notwithstanding, and may well achieve a happy victory: whereas upon the overthrow of the infanterie, the horsemen have nothing to do, but to flit for themselves, and away to their own.

Whether the cavalrie be or is not greater in vertue then a warre.

Footmen more serviceable then horsemen.

The main stroke in a day of battell is given by the footmen. The use of horsemen.

## Observations upon Cæsar

home. So that it appears that the foot companies are the bulk and body of the army, and the horse, as the arms and outward parts, having expeditious and necessary offices, but always subordinate to the main broke given by the foot.

The Dictator forbids the use of a horse in the cavalry, and why.

If any man look for proof hereof by example, he shall not need to seek further than the Romans, being masters of the art military, who by an ancient law interdicting the Dictator to have the use of a horse in the warres for his private ease, intimated, as *Plutarch* saith, the strength of their army to consist in their footmen, which the General in a day of battell should assist with his presence, and in no wise forsake them if he would. But touching the use of warre amongst themselves, *Equites* were to farre short of the service performed by their foot troops, that when they would stand to it indeed, they forsook their horses and fought on foot: as in the battell with the *Lutins* at the lake *Regillus*, which I have already mentioned in my former observations. Neither were the *Romans* good horsemen, as it seemeth by Cæsar: for he took the horses from the Tribunes and the *Roman Equites*, and gave them to the Germans, as better Ritters then any Romans. But howsoever a State that aboundeth in horse, and trusteth more in them then in foot companies, may harrie a champaign countrey, but shall never be able to follow a warre with that strength as is requisite to make it fortunate.

## CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar besiegeth *Alesia*, and fighteth with the enemies cavalry.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar having viewed the site of the town, and knowing the enemy to be much troubled for the overthrow of their horses in whom they put all their hopes, exhorting the souldiers to take a little pains, he determined to inclose the town round about with a ditch and a rampier. *Alesia* was sited on the top of a hill, in a very eminent place, and not to be taken but by a continued siege. At the foot of the hill ran two rivers on each side of the town: before the town there lay a plain of three miles in length: the other sides were inclosed round about in a reasonable distance with hills of equal height with the town. Under the wall on the East side lay all the forces of the Gallies, having drawn a ditch and a drie wall on that part of eight foot in height: the whole circuit of the works which the Romans made to inclose the town about, contained eleven miles. Their camp was sited in a convenient place, where there were made three and twenty castles, which in the day time were kept by garisons, to prevent any suddain attempts of the enemy, and in the night by strong watches. The work being begun, there happened a skirmish between the ca-

valries of both sides in that plain which lay before the town of three miles in length. They fought eagerly on both sides. Our men being overcharged, Cæsar sent the Germans to second them, and left the Legions before the camp, left there might happen any suddain folly by the foot of the enemy. Upon the safeguard of the Legions our men took courage. The enemy was put to flight, and being many in number one hundred another, and stuck in heaps in the freight passage of their gates. The Germans followed them close to their fortifications, and made a great execution amongst them. Many of them forsaking their horses attempted to leape the ditch, and to climb over the drie wall. Cæsar commanded the legions imbatelled before the camp to advance a little farward. The Gallies that were within the fortification were so much troubled, for thinking the enemy would presently have come unto them, they made an alarme: some were so frightened, they brake into the town. Vercingetorix commanded the gaies to be shut, lest the camp should be left naked of defendants. Many of the enemy being slain, and very many horses taken, the Germans fell off and returned to Cæsar.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**F**orasmuch as casualtie and chance have oftentimes the prerogative of a service, and in middeing opinions do carrie away the honour from vertue and valour: the first trial of a fortification is not of that assurance, nor so much to be trusted, as when it is seconded again by the use of a man, as is seconded with another of like condition. For when a matter by often trial faileth out to be of one and the same quality, it sheweth a certainty of a cause, producing ends of like condition. The Gallies (as it seemeth) were much discouraged upon the first overthrow of their horse, in whom they so much believed, and altered the course of their high resolutions to farre, as where before they ware the overthrow of the Romans, they were now content to take the protection of a strong town: but this second fall which they received, did to assure them of a harder confrontation and stronger opposition then they were able to bear, that they never thought of any further trall, but were content to go away losers, rather then to hazard their lives in a third combat. And thus, when a second event backeth a former fortune, it taketh away the suspicion of casualtie, and maketh the winner bold, and the loser desperate. Pompey was so transported with joy for the blow which he gave Cæsar at *Dyracium*, that he sent letters of that daies victory unto all parts of the world, and made his souldiers to secure touching the issue of that warre, *ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse jam sibi viderentur*, that they never thought how the warre was to be carried on, esteeming themselves

One event is not to be trusted, but is seconded with another of like condition.

selves already absolute victors: not remembering, as Cæsar saith, the ordinary changes of warre; where oftentimes a small matter, either of a false suspicion, or of a suddain fright, or some other accident, doth endanger an army, which the enemy taketh to himselfe, perinde ac si virtute visisset, as if he had overcome by his valour.

## CHAP. XXXI.

Vercingetorix sendeth away the horse: Cæsar incloseth *Alesia* with a strong wall.

Cæsar.

**V**ercingetorix thought it best to dismiss all the horse, and send them away in the night, before the fortifications were perfected by the Romans. At their departure he commanded them, that every man should repair unto his own States, and send all to the warre that were able to bear arms. He layeth open his desires towards them, and doth adjure them to have regard to his safety, and not to suffer him to be delivered over to the torture of the enemy, that had so well deserved of the common libertie; wherein if they should prove negligent, souldiers and chosen men would perish with him in that place. And looking into their provisions, he found that they had corn scarce for thirty daies, but by sparing and good husbandry it might be made to serve longer. With these mandares he sent out the horsemen in fleece about the second watch of the night, at that part of the town where the works were not perfected: he commanded all the corn to be brought unto him upon pain of death. The cattle he distributed to the souldiers by pole, whereof there was great store brought out from the Mandubis: the corn he began to measure out very sparingly. All the forces which he had placed before the town, he received within the walls; and so he purposed to attend the supplies of Gallia. Which being known by the runner-messengers and privies, Cæsar appointed to make these fortifications. He drew a ditch of twenty foot in breadth and depth with freight sides, as broad as the body of the Romans might not easily be inclosed about with an army of souldiers, which he thought to prevent by taking in so great a circuit of ground; and secondly, left the enemy salping out upon a suddain, should in the night come to destroy the works, or in the day time trouble the souldiers with darts and casting weapons as they were busied about the works. This space of forty foot being left, he made two ditches of fifteen foot in breadth and depth, the innermost whereof being carried through the fields and the lower ground, he filled with water

drawn out of the river. Behind them he made a ditch and a rampier of twelve foot, and strengthened it with a parapet and pinacles, and with great boughes of trees cut in cags like unto a Haris borne, which he set where the enemy might joyne to the rampier, to hinder the enemy from climbing up, and made towers round about the whole works in the distance of four score foot one from another. At the same time the Roman souldiers were both to get stiffe for the fortifications to go a harvesting for provision of corn, and to make such great works. Our forces being much weakened, and being to seek corn and stiffe forre off from the camp; the Gallies also oftentimes attempting to destroy the works, and to sally out of the town at divers ports: therefore Cæsar thought it fit to add to this much more to the foresaid works, that the fortifications might be made good with the lesse number of men. He made ditches round about the works of five foot deep, and in them he planted either the bodies of trees or great firm boughs sharpened into many pikes and jags, being bound together at the bottomes that they might not be easily plucked up, and spread up them close at the top into very sharp cags. There were of these five ranks, so combined and infolded one in another, that which way soever the enemy should enter upon them, he would necessarily runne himself upon a sharp stake, these they called Cippi. Before these, in oblique courses, after the manner of a quincunce, were digged holes of three foot deep, narrow as the bottom like a finger loaf; these they set with round stakes of the bignesse of a mans thigh, with a sharp barbed point, in such sort that they stuck not above four fingers out of the earth; and for the better fastening of them, they stuck all a foot within the ground: the rest of the hole for the better ordering of the matters, was hid with osters and spread. Of these were eight courses three foot distant one from another: and these they called Lalliers from the resemblance they had to the figure of that flower. Before these were gutshops of a foot long fastened in the earth, and beaded at the top with barbed booke of iron, sowed up and down in all places in a reasonable distance one from another: and these they called Stimuli. The inner fortifications being thus perfected, he followed the even and level ground as much as the nature of the place would give him leave, and took in fourteen miles in circuit, and made the like fortifications in all points against the enemy without, as he had done against the town; to the end that if he were driven upon occasion to depart and leave the works, it might be no danger for him to leave the camp; forasmuch as a few men would defend it. He commanded every man to have forrage and provision of corn for thirty daies.



## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I promised in my former observation to speak somewhat touching the *Roman* works, and to shew the use they made of them in their greatest occasions: but this description of the works at *Alesia* doth to far exceed the enlargement of commenting works; that it hath drowned the eloquence of great Historians, and in stead of explications and inforcements, hath drawn from them speeches expressing greater admiration then belief. *Cicero Alesiam* (saith *Patriculus*) *tantarum gestarum, quantum videre vis hominis, perficere nullius nisi Dei fuerit*: So great things were done at *Alesia*, that they might seem too great for any man to attempt any but a god to effect. To inclose a town with a ditch and a rampier of eleven miles in circuit, was a matter worthy the *Roman* army: but to add such variety of works, and to make such strange traps and oppositions against an enemy, was admirable to the learner; and not that only, but to make the like works without, to keep the *Gallies* from raising the siege, did double the wonder: by which works he did besedge and was besieged, took the town and overthrowed the enemy in the field.

Such as since that time have imitated this industry only by a small ditch and a rampier (for I think no man ever made such works) have wrought wonders in matter of warre. *Castruccio* got the name of renewing the ancient military discipline in *Italy*, chiefly for that he besieged *Pistoia*, and with the help of a double trench, according to the example of *Cæsars*, he kept in the *Pistoians* on the one side, and kept out an army on the other side of three thousand foot and three thousand horse, in such manner as in the end he took the cite and made their succours of no effect. The States army of the united Provinces under the leading of *Grave Matrices*, did the like at the town of *Grave* in the year 1602. But of this at *Alesia* may well be said that which *Livy* speaketh of the battell at *Nola*: *Iugens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*: A great piece of service was done that day, and I think I may call it the greatest in that whole warre.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT is here delivered, that the outward circuit of the works contained fourteen miles, and the circuit of the inward works eleven miles: upon which ground *Tissus Lippus* maketh an unjust conjecture of the space between the outward and the inward works where the *Romans* lay incamped. For according to the proportion between the circumference and the diameter, he maketh the diameter of the greater circle four, and of the lesser three miles: and then he taketh

the lesser diameter out of the greater, and conclude the space to be almost a mile between the inner and the outward rampiers, where the *Romans* lay incamped between the works: and least the matter might be mistaken in cyphers, he doth express it at large in significant words, whereby he maketh the space twice as much as indeed it was. For the two circles having one and the same center, the semidiameter of the one was to be taken out of the semidiameter of the other, and the remainder would amount almost to half a mile; which according to the ground here delivered, was the true distance between the works, if the nature of the place (whereunto they had a respect) would suffer them to keep the same distance in all parts. But *quando bonus dormitat Homerus*, *Homer* himself is out sometimes; and no disgrace neither to the excellency of his learning, nor delivring all honour for the great light which he hath brought to the knowledge of *Histories*, and for redeeming the truth from blots and Barbarisms.

## CHAP. XXXII.

The *Gallies* raise an army of 24000, to raise the siege at *Alesia*.

While these things were doing at *Alesia*, the *Gallies* having *Junius Bruttus* a Council of the Princes and chiefest men of each State, they thought it not convenient to take all that were able to bear arms, according to *Vercingetorix* direction; but to proportion out a certain number for every State, lest that of such a confused multitude there would be no government, being not able to know their soldiers, or to marshall them in any good order, or to make provision of vittall for so great a bodie. The *Hedui* and their clients, the *Segusiavi*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci Brannovices*, and *Biannovii*, were commended to send out five and thirty thousand: the *Arverni* with their clients, the *Helvetii*, *Cadurci*, *Gallii*, *Velatini*, as many as the *Senones*, *Sequani*, *Bituriges*, *Santones*, *Rutheni*, *Carnutes*, twelve thousand: the *Bellovacii*, ten thousand: the *Leuci*, as many as the *Pictones*, the *Ambiani*, *Mediolanenses*, *Suessones*, 8000: the *Morini*, *Nitiadunenses*, *Petrocorani*, *Nervi*, *Morini*, *Nitiadunenses*, 5000: the *Aulerci Cenomani*, as many as the *Arelates*, 4000: the *Belloacii*, *Lexovii*, *Aulerci Eburones*, 3000: the *Rauraci* and *Boii* 30000: the States bordering upon the *Ocean*, whom by the custom of *Gallia* they call *Aremorici*, such as are the *Coriololites*, *Rhedones*, *Ambibarii*, *Cadetes*, *Orsimii*, *Lemovices*, *Venerii*, *Unelli*, six thousand. Of these the *Bellovacii* refused to give their number, saying, that they would make warre with the *Romans* in their own name, and according to their own directions, neither would they serve

serve under *Roman* command. Notwithstanding being incited by *Comus*, for his sake they sent two thousand. *Cæsar* as we have herebefore delivered, had need the help of this *Comus* the years before in Britain, being both faithful and serviceable: in recompence of which service he had freed his State of all duties to the *Roman* Emperors, and restored unto them their ancient laws and customs; and to himself he had given the *Morini*. Notwithstanding *Comus* was the universal consent of all *Gallia*, to redeem their liberty and their ancient honour in matter of warre, as neither friendship, nor the memory of former benefits could any way move them, every man minding that warre as farre as either the power of his mind or the possibility of his means would reach unto: and having drawn together eight thousand horse, and two hundred and forty thousand foot, they mustered their forces in the confines of the *Helvetii*, where they appointed captains, and the chief command was given to *Comus* of *Arctas*, and to *Vindomarus* and *Eporodorus* *Hedui*, and to *Vergastanus* of the *Arverni*, *conjugerunt* in to *Vercingetorix*. To these there were certain chosen out of every State to give assistance in council of warre: and all of them went joyfully and full of hope to *Alesia*. Neither was there any man that did think, that the very sight of such a multitude was able to be endured, especially when the sight would grow doubtful by sallies made out of the town, and so great forces of horse and foot should be seen without.

## OBSERVATIONS.

*Vercingetorix* desired was to have had as many of the *Gallies* sent to his rescue as were able to bear arms, grounding himself upon that maxime; Where the whole State is in question, there the whole forces of that State are to be employed. But the other Princes of *Gallia* thought it not expedient to raise to great a number: for they would have accreted to such a multitude of peoples, as could not have been contained within the rules of government, which may bring to our consideration that which the course of these times doth not often bring into dispute: What number of men well martialled and with good discipline, are a competent proportion for any service. *Xerxes* army which he carried into *Greece*, was famous for two respects: First, in regard of the multitude, which was so great, that when he himself returned back into *Asia* he left behind him three hundred thousand of the best soldiers chosen out of the whole army, under the conduct of one *Mardonius*. Secondly, that of so many fighting men, there were two hundred and three thousand slain in one battell with the losse of one thousand and three hundred *Grecians*. Whereby it appeareth, that the con-

quest of a kingdom doth not necessarily follow the multitude of soldiers in an army; for either *Xerxes* army was too few in number to conquer *Greece*, or too many to be well martialled.

*Marins* with fifty thousand men defeated the *Cimbri* that were so many in number, as they made a battell of thirte furlong squares, and of them he slue a hundred and twenty thousand, and took threecore thousand prisoners. And for that I do remember of, that which I have read, the greatest conquests that ever were made, were achieved with armies under fifty thousand fighting men. The great *Alexander* subdued all *Asia* and set the Monarchy from the *Persian* into *Greece* with thirty thousand men.

The *Romans* had very seldom ten legions in an army, which was about that rate, but commonly their conquering armies were farre under that proportion. *Paulus Aemilius* only had a hundred thousand in his army against *Perseus*, and wonne the battell in an hour. The condition of our times requireth no dispute touching this point, for we seldom see an army of fifty thousand men in the field, unless it be the *Turke* or some such Monarch.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

*Citognatus* his speech at *Alesia*, touching the keeping of the town.

They that were besieged in *Alesia*, the day being past by which they looked for succours, their corn being spent, and not knowing what was done abroad, entered into consultations touching the end of their fortune, and divers opinions being delivered, some of them tending to the yielding up of the town, and others persuading that as long as strength lasted there might be sallies continually made upon the enemies. I will not omit the speech of *Citognatus*, for the singular and wisest counsel which it imported. He was a man of great birth and authority among the *Arverni*. I will say nothing (saith he) of my opinion; that call these servitude by the name of ready: neither do I think them fit to be accounted citizens, or to be admitted to council of State. With them will I deal thus: I will of justest men whose advice and counsells, even by all your consents, the memory of ancient vertue seemeth to consist. It is no vertue, but a weakness of the minds not to be able to bear with a little while. It is an easier matter to find men that will offer themselves willingly to death, then such as will endure labour with patience. For mine own parts, I could like with that opinion, (for honour much prevaileth with me); if I did not see a further loss to be of our lives. But in these our consultations let us look upon all *Gallia*, whom we have called together to succour us, Whom spirits do you think would

Search in the life of *Marins*.

Search in the life of *Paulus Aemilius*.

Gallia.

*Jullius Lipsius* milit. lib. 1. c. 10. *Poliorcetica* lib. 1. c. 10. *Dial. 2.*

What number of men are a competent proportion for any service.



## Observations upon Cæſars

would our friends and kinsmen conceive ſcore thouſand men being ſlain in one place, if they were conſtrained to wage battell upon their dead carcaſes? I would not have you to deſire and them of your ſhips, that do neglect all perill for your ſakes, nor by your fooliſhneſſe and your raſhneſſe, or the weakneſſe of your minds, throw down all Gallia, and caſt it into perpetuall bondage. Do you doubt of their faith and conſtancy, becauſe they came not by a day? What do the Romans then mean in theſe outward works? Do you think they make them for exerciſe, or to paſſe away the time? If you cannot then receive aſſurance by their meſſengers, all paſſage being ſtopt, uſe them for witneſſes that their coming is at hand, for fear whereof they labour night and day. What then? my advice is that we do as our forefathers did in a warre againſt the Cimbræ and Teutones, not equall to this, who being ſhut up within their towns, and brought to the like neceſſity, did ſuſtaine their hunger with the bodies of ſuch as were found neerſt for warre, neither did they yield themſelves unto the enemy: whereof if we had not an example, yet I would judge it an excellent thing to be begun now for liberties ſake, and to be left to poſterity. For what warre was like this? Gallia being waſted and depopled, and the kingdom brought into great miſery, the Cimbræ at length forſook our country, and ſought out other territories, and left unto us our law, cuſtomes, lands & liberties. For the Romans, what is it they deſire? or what would they have? But being drawn on with malice and envy, whom they underſtood to be a noble and a warlike nation, their fields and cities they did deſire to take from them, and to yoke them with eternall bondage; as never making warre with other condition. For if you be ignorant what they do ſuſtaine in other countries, look at home in that part of Gallia which is reduced into a Province. Their lawes and cuſtomes being changed, it is ſubjected to the axe and to perpetuall ſervitude. Their opinions being delivered, they decree, that ſuch as through age or ſickneſſe were unfit for warre, ſhould depart the town; and that they ſhould provide all means, before they yielded to Crigniatus opinion: and yet if the matter ſo required, to conſent unto it, and to attend their ſuccours rather than to yield to any tender and condition of peace.

## OBSERVATIONS.

How long  
a Comman-  
der may  
hold out in  
a ſiege.

IT is oftentimes made queſtionable in the extreme of a ſiege, how farre the Commanders may go in continuing their reſiſtance to the danger and hazard of the people beſieged, whether they may not in honour proceed as farre as

Crigniatus opinion would draw them: or how they may know when to leave it, in the very point of diſcreet and valiant carriage. Which is to be answered according to the qualitye of the enemy that giveth ſiege to die place. For againſt a treacherous and diſloyall enemy, that naked profeſſion of infidelity, and would not tuck after a compoſition to infiniate them in a greater danger then the perill of death, there would be much endured rather then to undergoe ſo hard a fortune. And yet I do not approve the cruell reſolution of this Gall, but do rather commend the example of the Hungarians at the ſiege of Agria. For in the year 1562. *Mulhomus Buſſia* lay beſieged that town with an army of threeſcore thouſand *Turks*, and laid batterre to it with ſixty cannons. There were within the Town two thouſand Hungarians, who endured and put off thirteen moſt terrible aſſaults of the enemy: and for the better ſtrengthening of their high reſolution, they took a mutuall oath that no man upon paine of death ſhould once ſpeak of a treatie, or of giving up the Town, or to make any answer to the enemy but by the harquebuſe or the canon: And if the ſiege ſhould happen to continue long, rather to die for hunger then to put themſelves in the hands of ſo cruell and barbarous an enemy. They determined further, that ſuch amongst them as were not ſerviceable with weapons, ſhould attend continually to reinforce the rampier and repair the turrets. And to avoid treachery, they took order that there might be no aſſemblies in the citie above the number of three companies. They commanded likewiſe that all the victuall as was either publick or private, ſhould be divided into equal portions amongst the ſouldiers, and the beſt of it ſhould be relieved for ſuch as were hurt in fight. It is further reported, that the *Buſſia* having oftentimes offered a treatie, they only ſhewed for an answer to his ſummons a funerall bier covered with black, liſted up above the wall between two pikes, to ſignifie thereby that they would not come out but by death.

As this is a degree ſhort of Crigniatus reſolution, ſo I do not deny but that a Generall may give up a Town before he come to ſuch a manner with true honour and wiſdome. But the matter (as I have ſaid) conſiſteth altogether upon the circumſtances interceded. But that which is further to be obſerved in this place, is the extreme contrariety of opinions, which are uſually delivered upon diſpute of ſuch difficult caſes, wherein *Quantum alteri ſententia deſt animi, tantum alteri ſuperſeſſe ſolet*; one manſopinion ſpeaks too much courage, and another as much too little: as *Curio* ſaid upon the like occaſion. *Medio cuſtiffimus* bid. The mid's the ſafest way, was *Phaſtus* direction to his ſonnie *Phæton* in a matter of difficultie and great hazard, and obſerved in this place by the Gallies.

## CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.  
The Gallies do ſet upon Cæſars camp, both from the town and the field ſide.

Cæſar.

He Mandubii, who had received the army into the town, were themſelves ſtrictly out with their wives and children. They coming to the Roman works, did with weeping tears beſeech them to receive them into bondage, and relieve them with food. Cæſar gave order they ſhould not be received, and ſet a guard on the rampier to keep them out. In the mean time *Cominius*, and the reſt of the Captains, that had the chief command given them, came to Alctia with all their forces, and having taken a hill on the one ſide, they ſate down not above half a mile from our works. The next day bringing their cavalrie out of their camps, they filled all that plain, which, as I have already ſaid, extended three miles in length between the towns, ſetting their foot-ſorces a little diſtant from that place, and hiding them upon higher ground. The proſpect lay open out of the town into the field: and upon the ſight of theſe ſuccours they ran together, and congratulated each other, and all their minds were filled with gladneſſe. And thereupon the next day they brought their forces and placed them before the town, and began to cover the next ditch unto them with hurdles, and to fill it up with earth, and to provide themſelves to ſally on, and to endure all chances. Cæſar having diſpoſed of all his army on each ſide of the works, that if there were occaſion, every man might both know and keep his place, he commanded the cavalrie to be carried out of the camps, and to charge the enemy. There was a fair view out of all the camps, which were ſeated round about upon the ridge of the hill, and all mens minds were bent upon the expectation of the event of the fight. The Gallies had mingled amongst their horſe ſome few archers and light-armed ſouldiers, which might relieve their fellows being overcharged, and ſuſtain the force and aſſault of our horſe. By theſe were many hurt upon a ſuddain, and forſook the fight. The Gallies being perſwaded that their men had the better of the fight, perceiving our men to be overcharged with multitude on all ſides, as well thoſe that were beſieged, as the other that came to relieve them, they took up a ſhout, and a howling to encourage their people. And ſo much as the matter was carried in the ſight of all mens ſo that nothing could be bid whether it were well or ill done, the deſire of honour and the fear of ignominie did ſtirre up both ſides to proweſſe and valour. And having fought with a doubtfull fortune from noon-tide untill almoſt Sun-ſetting, the Germans on the one ſide with thick-thronged troops gave a fierce

charge upon the enemy, and put them to flight whereby it happened that the archers were either unprovoked and ſlain. In like manner on the other ſide, our men finding them to give ground, did follow them even to their camps, and gave them no time to recover themſelves. Such as were come out of Alctia, returned back ſad into the town deſpairing of victory. One day being intermitted, in which time they made provision of great ſtore of burdenes, ladders and hooks, about midnight they marched ſtently out of their camps, and came to the works on the field ſide; and taking up a ſuddain ſhout, to give notice of their coming to them of the town, they caſt their hurdles upon the ditches, and with ſtings, arrows, and ſtones they began to put our men from the rampiers, and to put in praſtiſe ſuch things as belong to a ſiege. At the ſame time the ſhout being heard, *Vercingetorix* ſounded the trumpets, and brought his men out of the town. Our men betook themſelves to the fortifications, according as every mans place was allotted him the day before; and with ſtings and bullets which they had laid ready upon the works, they did beat down the Gallies, their ſight being taken away through the darkneſſe of the night. Many wounds were received on both ſides, and many weapons were caſt out of engines. *M. Antonius*, and *C. Trebonius*, *Legiones*, who had the charge of thoſe parts where our men were moſt laid to, cauſed men to be taken out of the further Caſtles, and to be brought to ſecond them. The Gallies being a good way diſtant from the works, did much hurt with multitude of weapons; but approaching neerer, either they ſtruck themſelves unwittingly upon the galeſtrope, or falling into the holes, were ſtruck through the bodies with the ſharp ſlakes; or died with mural pikes, being caſt from the rampier and the towers. Many wounds being received on all ſides, as the day appeared, the Gallies ſeeming leſt they ſhould be charged on the open ſide by a ſallie from the upper camp, retired back again to their fellows. On the inner ſide, whiſt they brought our ſuch things as were prepared beforehand by *Vercingetorix*, and were filling up the firſt ditches, being ſomewhat long in the execution of theſe things, they underſtood that the other Gallies were departed before they themſelves could come neer the works; and thereupon they returned into the town without doing any thing.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The Gallies committed the command of this great army to four Generalls, contrary to the practice of warlike nations, and the order which nature obſerveth throughout all the ſeverall kinds of creatures: amongst whom there was never body found of many heads, but one *Hydra*, being

One army  
would have  
one Gene-  
ral.

Ergravis  
in gemitum  
caput Aene-  
ph. 10. 10.

ing made as it seemeth, or rather feigned to be made, to the end that *Hercules* might have a task answerable to himself, and make it one of his twelve labours to kill the beast. The serpent *Amphisphota* is said to have two heads, whereby the either loatheth the use of local motions, or at the least moveth to imperfectly, one head taking one way and the other another way, as there is no certain or direct passage in her creeping.

These many-headed armies do resemble these serpents, being carried according to the sense of their severall heads, and distracted by the diversity of their many Leaders. The government of *Rome* consisting of severall magistracies having sovereign authority, gave occasion oftentimes to make two heads to one body, but with such success, as they were forced in the end to create one head for the repairing of that loss, which the multiplicity of leaders had brought upon their State; as it happened in the war against the *Fidene* revolted, which nothing but their recourse to a Dictator could make happy to their Empire. Whereupon *Livie* saith; *Tres Tribuni, potestate consulari, documento fuerunt quam plurimum imperium bello inutile esse; tentando ad sua quisque consilia, cum aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti*. The three Tribunes with consular power, clearly shewed how inconvenient a thing it is to have more than one commander in chief: for while every one adheres to his own advice and judgements, one man thinking this thing convenient, another that they open a way to the enemy to make advantage against him. In the time of their Consuls, *Quintus* and *Agrippa* being left against the *Æquii*, *Agrippa* returned the business wholly to his colleagues, concluding, as *Livie* saith; *Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est summum imperium ad unum esse*. It is the safest way in the managing of great affairs to have one man bear the chief sway. And therefore as one body requirereth but one head, so one business would have but one director, so far as *Æmilius* inter pares; & ex co impedimentum; Amulation, and consequently hinderance, will be amongst equals.

## CHAP. XXXV.

The *Gallies* do chuse out sixty thousand of their best men, and do assault the weakest part of *Cæsar*'s camp.

Cæsar.

**T**he *Gallies* being repelled twice with great losses, do fall into consideration what they were next to do. They call unto them such as were well acquainted with the nature and site of the places, by whom they understand of the situation of the upper camp. On the north side there lay a hill, which by reason of the greatness of

the circuit, our men could not take in within the compass of their works; and thereupon were necessarily constrained to lay their camp in an unequal place somewhat shelving. This part was kept by *Cæsar* Augustus *Rhetimus* and *Cæsar* *Caninius Rebilus* with two Legions. This being known by the discovery, the Captains of the enemy chose out sixty thousand of the best of their forces, which carried the greatest opinion of manhood, and did secretly determine amongst themselves, how and in what sort they would beat the service carried, and do determine to put it in execution when the Sun should be near about the noon meridian, appointing *Vergasilius* to command those forces, being one of the four Captains, and kinsman to *Vercingetorix*. He going out of the camp in the first watch of the night, came to the end of his journey a little before day, and hiding himself behind a hill, commanded his soldiers to give themselves from the former night's travail. And when it began to be towards noon, he made towards that part of the camp which I have before mentioned: and at the same time the forsworn began to approach towards the works, and the rest of the forces showed themselves before the camp. *Vercingetorix* perceiving this out of the watch-tower of *Aletia*, went out of the town, and carried with him long poles, ladders, and such other provisions which he had made ready beforehand for a siege. They fought at one instant in all places, all ways were tried, and where they thought it to be weakest, thither they ran. The Roman forces were discombed by reason of the large extension of their works, so that they could not easily defend many places: and the point which was made behind their backs, did much affright our men, so far as much as they perceived that their danger did consist in other men's valour, for such things as are absent do for the most part greatly perplex and trouble mens minds. *Cæsar* having got a convenient place, doth see what is done in every part: if any were overcharged he left them succour, and was ready to answer all occasions on both sides the camp. He told them that that was the time, wherein it was behoofull for them to fight. The *Gallies* would despair of all good success, unless they broke down the works. The Romans if they obtained their purpose, might expect an end of their labours. The greatest contention was about that place to which *Vergasilius* was sent. A small rising in a place doth give much advantage in a shelving descent. Some cast weapons others put themselves into a Testudo, and came under the works. The wearied and overlaboured were seconded by fresh supplies. Every man cast earth into the works, which raised so high, that the *Gallies* had advantage of ascent: and the pikes and sharp stakes which the Romans had cunningly hid under the earth

to annoy the enemy, were thereby covered. It came at last to that passe that our men wanted both strength and weapons. Which being known, *Cæsar* sent *Labienus* with six cohorts to relieve those that were overcharged, commanding him (if he could not bear out the charge) to fall out upon them, but not unless he were constrained unto it. He himself went about to the rest; forbidding them not to faint under their labours, so far as much as the fruit and benefit of all that former battels consisted in that day and that hour. The enemy within being out of hope of doing any good upon the works made in plain of the fortifications, tried what they could do in steep and broken places, and thither they brought those things which they had prepared. With the multitude of their casting weapons, they cast out such as sought from trees, they filled their passages with hurdles and carths, they broke down the parapets and the rampier with hooks. *Cæsar* sent first young *Brutus* with six cohorts and after him *Fabius* a Legate with seven more, and at length as the fight waxed hot, he went himself with a fresh supply. The fight being renewed and the enemy beaten off he hastened to that place whither he had sent *Labienus* and took four cohorts out of the next Castle. Part of the forsworn he commanded to follow him, and the rest to compass about the outward works, and to set upon the enemy near their ditches were able to keep out the enemy, having got such forces together as were drawn by chance from the works nearest hands, to the number of thirty nine cohorts, he acquainted *Cæsar* by messengers what he thought fit to be done. *Cæsar* made haste to be at the fight. This coming being known by the colour of his garments, which he was accustomed to wear in time of battels, and the troops of horse and the cohorts being discovered which he had commanded to follow him, as the shelving and declining places were subject to the view of higher grounds; the enemy began the fight. A great shout was taken up on both sides. Our men having thrown their pikes betook themselves to their swords. Suddenly the forsworn were discovered behind them, and other cohorts made their approaches towards them. The enemy turned his back and fled: the forsworn met them as they fled, the slaughter was great in that place. *Sedulius*, a Captain and Prince of the *Lenovici*, was slain. *Vergasilius* was taken alive. Three score and forty men engines were brought unto *Cæsar*: and very few of so great a number returned safe into their camp. Those of the town beholding the slaughter and flight of their friends, being out of all hope, drew back their forces from the works. This being known the *Gallies* fled presently out of their camp: and if the soldiers

had not been wearied with that dayes labour, they might easily have destroyed all their enemies. About midnight the horse being sent out to fall upon the rearward, a great number was taken and slain, the rest escaped into their countreys.

## OBSERVATIONS.

IT is an old saying of a hungry man; that it is an easier matter to fill his belly than his eye: which is as true in other cases; wherein our desires are oftentimes so great, that we think no means sufficient to accomplish the same: but when we shall come to put it in trial, and suffer every man to be measured with his own foot, it will appear that our desires are better applied to the infirmity of the mind, than to the necessary occasions of our life. *Vercingetorix* was so farre he interred in the successe of this warre, that he thought all the able men of *Gallia* not enough to make it happy unto him: but the other Princes that were not so deeply touched, and yet stood as well affected to the cause, refused to inrole all that were able to bear arms, but thought two hundred forty and eight thousand men to be a competent force for this service. But coming to the execution of the business, they employed only six thousand: and when they failed of their endeavour, and were routed and overthrow by the Romans, the rest staid no longer to dispute the matter, but fled all away by night. Which sheweth the difference between the affections which are forerunners of a cause, and such as grow and increase with a business, and are not commonly found in one and the same subject in their greatest strength. For their antecedent desires are like womens longings; strong and violent at first, but decaying as fast again before they come to any ripeness: whereas such affections as rise from the carriage of a business, and grow from the occurrences of that proceeding, are not so easily abated, but do hold out longer either for constancy or obstinacy.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

*Vercingetorix* yieldeth himself and the town to *Cæsar*.

**T**he next day *Vercingetorix* having called a Councell, told them, that he had not understood that warre for his own occasions, but for the cause of common liberty: and forasmuch as they were necessarily to yield to fortune, he made offer of himself unto them, either to sacrifice the Romans with his death, or to be delivered unto them alive. Ambassadors were sent to *Cæsar* touching that point. He commanded their arms to be delivered, and the Princes to be brought out. He himself late in the fortifications

Observations upon *Cæsars*

tions before the camp: thither the captains were brought, *Vercingetorix* was delivered; their weapons were cast out. The *Hedui* and the *Arverni* being reserved to the end he might recover the rest of the States by them; of the rest of the captives he gave throughout all the army, to every man a prisoner by the name of a bovie. These things being ended, he went to the *Hedui*, and received in the State. Thither did the *Arverni* send Ambassadors unto him, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded. He demanded a great number of hostages, and sent the Legions into their wintering camps. He sent home twenty thousand captives to the *Hedui* and the *Arverni*. He sent *T. Labienus* with two Legions and the horse into the *Saguntis*, and gave *Bim M. Sempromius Rutilius* to assist him. He lodged *C. Fabius* and *Lucius Minutius Balbus* with two Legions amongst the men of *Rhemes*, lest they should receive any damage by them, bordering *Bellovacis*. He sent *C. Antistius Regimurus* to the *Ambivari*, and *T. Sextius* to the *Bituriges*, and *C. Caninius Rebilus* to the *Rutheni*, with each of them a Legion. He placed *Q. Tullius Cicero* and *P. Sulpicius* at *Cavillonis* and *Maticonis* of the *Hedui* upon the river *Arar*, for provision of corn: he himself determined to winter at *Bibract*. These years service being known at *Rome*, there was a feast of thanksgiving appointed for twenty dayes together.

## OBSERVATIONS.

*Vercingetorix* notwithstanding a hard fortune, entertained a noble resolution: for having first acquainted the *Gallies* that he had not undertook that warre for any respect to himself, but for the cause of *Gallia*, and the ancient libertie of that continent; he made offer to satisfie the angry *Romans* with his body dead or alive.

*Plutarch* reciteth the manner of his deliverie to be in this sort: Being armed at all parts, & mounted on a horse furnished with a rich caparison, he came to *Cæsars*, & rode round about him as he fate in his chair of Estate; then lighting off his horse, he took off his caparison and furniture, and unarmed himself, and laid all on the ground, and went and fate down at *Cæsars* feet, and said never a word. *Cæsar* at length committed him as a prisoner taken in the warres, so he led afterwards

in his triumph at *Rome*; but the civile warres did cut off that solemnitie.

If it be demanded, what became of these great Princes and personages after the triumph: It will appear that they did not stroke their heads, or make more of them then of miserable captives. For *Paulus Æmilius*, after the noble triumph <sup>paraph in the life of Paulus Æmilius.</sup> for king *Perseus*, pitying his fortune and desiring to help him, could never obtain other grace for him, then onely to remove him from the common prison, which they called *Carcers* into a more cleanly and sweeter house: where being thoughtfully guarded, he died, either by abstinence, or being kept from sleep by the souldiers. Two of his sonnes died also, but the third became an excellent Turner or Joyner, and could write the *Roman* tongue so well, that he afterwards became Chancellor to the Magistrates of *Rome*. And thus the *Romans* dealt with their captive Princes, making them examples of Fortunes unconflancy, and turning their diadems into shackles of iron.

And thus farre did *Cæsar* comment himself upon the warres he made against the *Gallies*, being a noble and a worthy people, and bred in a large and fertile Continent; the inhabitants whereof have in all ages, even to these times, challenged an eminency, both for politick government and martiall prowesse, amongst the Western kingdomes of the world: their actions and carriage from time to time deserving as honourable memory, as these warres recorded by *Cæsars* own hand; whereof *Paulus Æmilius*, *Philip Commiens*, and of late *John de Seres* are very pregnant witnesses. They continued under the *Roman* government four hundred twenty and one yeares, according to the computation made by *John Tillius*, reckoning from the last victory in *Cæsars* Proconsulship, to the time of *Marcomerus* a Generall of the *Frenchs*, by whose prowesse and means they denied to pay that homage and tribute to the Emperour *Valentinianus*, which *Vercingetorix* had lost to *Cæsar*.

The next Sommers service compiled by *Hiruntius*, I have purposely omitted, as intending no further matter then what *Cæsar* hath related, who best knew the whole project of that business.

And thus endeth the seventh and last Commentarie, written by *Cæsar* of the warre he made in *Gallia*.

F I N I S.

# OBSERVATIONS

## Upon

# CÆSARS

## COMMENTARIES


### of the

# CIVILE VVARRES

betwixt

HIM and POMPEY.

By CLEMENT EDMUNDS Remembrancer of the  
City of London.



L O N D O N,

Printed by ROGER DANIEL: 1655.



## The first Commentarie of the Civile VVarres.

### The Argument.

**H**is Commentary containeth the Motions and Contentions at Rome, concerning Caesar's giving up his government: The rent in the State, upon the disagreement of the Senate: How either side bestirred themselves, to seize upon the Provinces. Pompey got the East, and Caesar the West part of the Empire; and defeated Afranius and Petreus in Spain.

### CHAP. I.

The Senates affection on Caesar's behalf.

Caesar.

**U**nters being delivered by Fabius to the Consuls from C. Caesar, it was hardly obtained by the extreme importunity of the Tribunes, to get them read in the Senate: but to content thereof, or to bring the Content in question, would not be granted. The Consuls propounded business concerning the state of the City. L. Lentulus, Consul, protested his assistance should not be wanting, neither to the Senate nor to the Commonwealth, if they would speak their minds freely and boldly: but if they respected Caesar and had an eye to his favour (as in former times they usually had) he would then take a course for himself, and not regard the authority of the Senate; neither wanted he means of entrance into Caesar's friendship and good acceptance. To the same effect spake Scipio; That Pompey was resolved to be aiding to the Commonwealth, if the Senate would stand to him: but if they temporized, and dealt coldly, in vain hereafter should they seek aid from him, albeit they instantly desired it. This speech of Scipio's seemed to come from Pompey's own mouth, he himself being present, and the Senate kept within the City. Some others spake more temperately. At first M. Marcellus, who thought it not convenient that the Senate should bring these things in question, untill they had made a levie of souldiers throughout all Italy, and inrolled an Army; by whose protection, they might safely and freely determine what they thought fit. At also M. Calpurnius, who thought it requisite

that Pompey should go to his Provinces and Government, to remove all occasions of taking Arms: For Caesar having two Legions newly taken from him, feared that Pompey kept them near about the city to his prejudice. And likewise M. Rufus, varying some few words, declared himself of Calpurnius opinion. All these were bitterly reprov'd by L. Lentulus the Consul; who utterly denied to publish what Calpurnius had said. Marcellus feared w<sup>h</sup> these menaces, retracted his opinion. And so, what with the clamor of the Consuls, the terror of the present Army, and the threatening used by Pompey's faction, most of the Senators were compelled against their will, to allow that which Scipio thought fit: which was, that by a certain day Caesar should dissolve and dismisse his Army; which if he did refuse to do, that then he openly shewed himself an Enemy to the Commonwealth. M. Antonius and L. Calpurnius, Tribunes of the peoples, did oppose this decree. Their opposition was instantly spoken unto; and many sharp and hard censures were given upon the same: for according as any one spake most bitterly and cruelly, so they were most highly commended by Caesar's Enemies.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**A**S the former Commentaries do carry in their front the ensignes of honour, displaying the military valour of the Roman people, the Continent of Gallia, and other Kingdomes of warlike Nations: so are these Relations branded in the forehead with a note of Infamy, and titled with the dishonourable name of Civile war. An odious and detested cause, ill bestitting the integrity of

*Observations upon Cæsars*

*Quis furor, o Cives? quæ tanta licentia  
ferri?*  
What fury's this? what these licentious  
arms?

b Arma ci  
vilia neque  
parari, ne-  
que haberi,  
per bon. s  
Artes polo-  
funi.  
Tac. t. An.  
c Amicus  
Socrates,  
amicus Pl.  
to : m. g s  
amica veri-

amica vero  
125. Arillo  
I. Ethic.  
Pom. Mag.  
Conlanin  
was to jea-  
lous there-  
of, that he  
published  
an editio,  
that the ho-  
nour of all  
victori  
should be  
attributed  
to him, al-  
though the  
were ac-  
chieved  
100, leagu  
off.  
dit Fonte  
dit medic  
parvifue  
impellens  
undis  
Punkes  
Rubicon,  
Gallica co  
tus Limes  
ab Audi  
dit termin  
arra (colo  
riis. Lucan  
lib. 3.  
e Pa tra  
bus domi  
communi  
Roma.  
Pompeio  
Castra  
Crafo.

a Nam sola  
futuri Cras-  
sus erat be-  
llicus.

b Nulla  
Linda soci-  
etas, nec  
fides regni  
Ennius.  
Nec quere-  
lum jam  
ferre potest,  
Cæsare  
priorum,  
Pompeiusve  
Parem.  
Luc. lib. 1.  
c Ardua res  
hæc est, o-  
pibus non  
tradere  
mors.  
Martial.

d Sæpe ma-  
jori fortunæ  
locum fecit  
injuria.  
Seneca  
Epist. 91.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

S The Tri-  
P bunes of  
K the people.

## Lib. I.

What kind of Commonwealth was this? Rome. a Libera et originem de iugis, quia annu confular Imperium factum est, quum quoque diminuitur, quaequeque ex regia potestate, et mores, L. lib. 3. b His legibus distinctum est imperium confular &c. Liv. lib. 4. c Lictor d. Viator

Cyneas  
terrogat  
Pyrrho  
qualis Re-  
gnet ;  
spondit  
Regum  
ben sit  
deri. J  
lib. 2

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Faction  
Coarseness  
and even  
the public  
good.

*Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.*

the nienfu  
nator ju.  
bat se  
ncipue  
pulo  
nfultu.  
m. De  
ost. cont.  
zarc.  
Philipp.

Art. 7.  
Chap. 17.

Tacit. 1;  
Annal.

## CHAP. II.

**T**He Senate rising a little before night, were all sent for to Pompey. He commended the forward for what they had done, and confirmed them for after resolutions; reprehended such as shewed themselves indifferently, and stirred them up to more forwardness. Many which were of Pompey's former Armies were sent for, upon hope of reward and advancement. Many of the two legions which lately came from Caesar, were commanded to attend.

Dd                      inf-

## Observations upon Cæsar

inimicely as the City swarmed with soldiers against the election of new Magistrates. C. Cæsar called out the Tribunes of the people. All the Consuls friends the Kings and allies of Pompey, and such others as had any former connection with Cæsar, were compelled into the Senate. By the presence and votes of these men the weakness of their party, the doubtful confessions, and the most part were cut off from giving absolute and free voices. L. P. P. the Consuls, and L. R. R. the Tribunes offered themselves to go to Cæsar to advise him of the things; requiring but six days space to return an answer. Others thought it fit that Embassadors should be sent to Cæsar, to give him notice of the pleasure of the Senate. To all these was opposed what the Consuls, Scipio, and Cato thought fit. Cato was incited through former enmity, and specially by the repulse of the Pretorship. L. L. L. out of a consideration of his great debts, hoping to command an Army, to govern Provinces, and to receive the liberal acknowledgements of Cæsar, whom he should thereby promise to be liked with the title of friends to the people of Rome; inasmuch as he would not find it hard in private, than he was likely to see a second Sulla, or whom the sovereignty of the Empire would be conferred. Scipio was drawn on by the same hope of having the government of a Province, or the command of an Army, which by reason of his alliance he thought to share with Pompey; being otherwise afraid to be called into justice, as also through flattery and ostentation, both of himself, and other great friends which were able to sway much, as well in the course of justice as in the Commonwealth.

Pompey in his particular was much provoked by Cæsar's enemies, and specially for that he could endure no man to be his equal. He was greatly alienated, therefore, from Cæsar's friends, and had reconciled himself to their common enemies. Parents in the greatest part of whom were by his means attached to Cæsar in the time of their alliance. He was also moved by the dishonour which he had gotten by taking these men legions from the Roman, to the Acha and Syria, and sending them for the execution of his own partiality, which he thought to draw the matter to Arms. For these respects all things were carried up, and down, and confusedly; neither was there foregone to Cæsar's friends to advertise his authority; nor yet to the Tribunes, to avoid the danger which was falling upon them, or to the right of opposition which L. Sylla left upon them; but with in seven days after they were entered into their offices, they were forced to fight for their safety, notwithstanding that the most turbulent and sedition Tribunes of former times were never put to take into their affairs, or to give account of their actions, before the eighth Month. In the end, they betook

themselves to that extreme and last Aid of Senates, which was never thought upon, but when the city was upon the point of burning; or in the most desperate estate of the Commonwealth: That the Consuls, Prætors, Tribunes of the people, and such as had been Consuls, and were resident near about the city, should endeavour that the Commonwealth might not be endangered. No civil war was made the seventh of the Ides of December, January: so that the five first days, in which Cæsar the Senate might fight, after that Lentulus was entered into the Consulship (excepting only two days for the general assembly of the people) the most heavy and cruel Decees were made against the Tribunes of the people, famous and worthy men; who thereupon fled presently out of the city, and came to Cæsar: who being then at Ravenna, attended in answer to his calls and modest demands, if by any reasonable course matters might be drawn to a peaceable end.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is the condition of humane nature, to make good that which once it hath avouched, although the matter be of small consequence in particular, and tendeth rather to injury than to profit; neither will it easily be reclaimed by notions of reason, but is rather incited thereby (per Antiphrastum) to persist in voluntariness, then to be taken to that which is more convenient; especially when either jealousy or revenge do imply an advantage: for then partiality keeps men in measure; but to justify an error, runnes headlong into all extremities, and thence to the last degree of detestation and deplored calamity, to make dishonoured passions stem good direction, which evidently appears by Pompey's factions, in resolving of that desperate Act of Senate, which was never thought of in so much eminent danger. For as in foul weather at sea, when a ship is in a dangerous road, and through the violence of the tempest, is upon the point of shipwreck, the Mariners are wont to cast out a sheet-anchor at their last refuge: so had Rome anciently recourse to this Decree, as such times as the Commonwealth was in imminent and extreme calamity; whether it were by enemies abroad, or by tyrants in their bowels at home. L. L. L. speaking of the war of the Agrippa faith: The Senators were to be affrighted, that following the form of the Decree which was always reserved for cases of extremity, they ordained that Possession (one of the Consuls) should take care that the Commonwealth might not be endangered. As like was used in civil and intestine seditions: as when Marius' apollonius assumed to a Tyranny, and as likewise in the tumults of the Gracchi, the conspiracy of Catilina, and other times of like danger. For albeit the Consuls had all

forever

## Lib. I.

## Commentaries of the Civ. W.

sovereign authority, as well in war as in peace: yet nevertheless there were certain reserved cases wherein they had no power, without expresse order from the Senate, and assent from the people; as to levie an Army to make war, to take money out of the Treasury: whereas upon such Decrees, they were enabled to dispose of all businesses of State, without further moving of the Senate or people, which further moving of the Senate against Antonie, I think it fit (saith he) that the whole state of the Commonwealth be left unto the Consuls, and that they be suffered to defend the same; and to take care that the Commonwealth be not endangered.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I May not omit (for the better understanding of this noble History) to say somewhat of the Persons here mentioned. And first of Fabius, as descended of the noblest and most ancient Family of the Patrician Order; being able of themselves to maintain war a long time against the Pers, a strong and warlike town, until at length they were all unconformably slain by a default, inambition: which Ovid mentioneth, where he saith:

*Hæc fuit illa dies in qua Vicentibus avris  
Tercentum Fabius ececidere duo.*

This was that black day, when in Veian field Three hundred and six Fabii were killed. Only there remained of that house a child then kept at Rome; which in tract of time multiplied into six great Families, all which had their turn in the highest charges and dignities of the Commonwealth: amongst whom he that supplanted Hannibal by temporizing, and got thereby the surname of Maximus, was most famous, as Ennius witnesseth;

*Non homo nobis cunctis andore situm rem:  
Non pōnebat enim rumores ante situm.*

*Ergo postquam mactat, viri nam gloria claret.*  
One man by wise delay hath saved our State;

Who rumours after publick safety fit. (great)  
For which his fame grows every day more  
But C. Fabius, here mentioned, never attained to any place of Magistracy, other then such commands as he held in the warres under Cæsar.

Lentulus the Consul was of the house of the Cornelii, from whom are said to come sixteen Consuls. He was from the beginning a mortal enemy to Cæsar, and to continued in his death, which fell unto him in Egypt, by commandment of King Ptolemy, after Pompey was slain.

Scipio was father in law to Pompey, after the death of Julia, Cæsar's daughter; and by that means obtained the government of Africa. In the beginning of the Civile warre, he brought good succours to assist his sonne in laws, as it follows in the third Commentary: and upon the over-

throw at Pharsalia he fled into Africa, where he renewed the warre, and became chief Commander of the remaining party against Cæsar; but being in the end defeated, he made towards Spain; and fearing by the way left he should fall into his enemies hands, he slew himself.

Marcellus was of the ancient Family of the Claudii, which came originally from the Sabine: On his behalf there is an Oration extant of Tullius, intitled, *Pro Marcello*. He was afterwards slain by one Clodio.

M. Antonius is famous in all the Roman histories, for attaining in a small time to so great a height that government. For all the wars of Gallia, he was but a Treasurer under Cæsar, which was the least of all publick places of charge. In the beginning of the civile warres he was made Tribune of the people; and within lesse then eight years after, came to be fellow-partner with Octavius Cæsar in the government of the Empire. And if Cleopatra's beauty had not blinded him, he might have easily through the favour of the soldiers supplanted his Competitor, and seized upon the Monarchie.

The name of Cassius was ominous for trouble, to the estate of Rome, and their ends were as unfortunate. This L. Cassius, for his party, after the great troubles he had stirred up in Spain, was drowned in the mouth of the River Eber.

Piso was made Centor in the Consulship of P. L. Paulus and Claudius Marcellus, having himself been Consul eight years before, in the year of Rome 693, succeeding Cæsar and Bibulus; and was the man against whom Tullius penned that Oration which is extant in *Pisonem*. Touching the office of Centor, it is to be understood that about the year of Rome 310, the Consuls being distracted with multiplicity of foreign business, committed the Centure or assessorment of the City for some years together: whereupon it was afterwards thought fit, that there should be a peculiar officer appointed for that service, and to be called Centor; forasmuch as every man was to be taxed, ranked and valued, according to his office and censure. The first part of their office consisted in an account or valuation of the number, ages, order, dignity, and possession of the Roman citizens: for it was very material for the State to know the number of their own strength, and to shape their course accordingly, either in undertaking warres, transplanting Colonies, or in making provision of victuals in time of peace. It was also as requisite to know every mans age, whereby they grew capable of honour and offices, according to that of Ovid;

*----- finitque certis  
Legibus ætas, inde peritur honores.*

----- In certain laws

Age is defined, and thence is honour had.  
M. Antonius commanded that the names of the

D d 2

to know  
the number  
of citizens  
their age  
De P. A.

to know  
the number  
of citizens  
their age  
De P. A.



to collect the Municipal towns: for some had voices  
in the Council of the Municipality in all their elections and  
assemblies; and some others had none at all. For  
*Gallus* in the same place saith, that the *Centes*  
obtained freedom of the City, for preserving  
the holy things of *Rome* in the time of the wars  
with the *Gallies*, but without voice in elections.  
And thence grew the name of *Centes* *Undecim*  
whom the *Centes* enrolled like as were by  
them for some pitie caused desired their voices.  
And the *Undecim* lived at first received into  
the liberties of the City according to the addition  
of the *Centes*. These were afterward, by the fre-  
quency of the people, made capable of giving  
voices.

Livie  
hija, 4.

Livio  
lib. 3

*Cives origi-  
narii.*

Polyder.  
Virg.

An quisquam antiphris-  
tissimus Gallie, cum  
infimo Cive  
Romano  
comparan-  
dus est?  
Cicero pro  
M. Font.  
De capite  
Cic. is nisi  
per maximū  
communi-  
tum, olloq-  
quos censo-  
res in parti-  
bus populi  
locaunt, ne  
ferunt.  
Cic. 3. de  
leib.

for the Privileges of this freedom were great ;  
for the Citizens of *Rome* were held to be *Me-*  
*sejfe et plenes*. Is the best man of *Gallia*, *Itali-*  
*am* only to be compared with the meanest Citizen  
of *Rome* ? And hence came that law, requiring,  
that the life of a Citizen should not be brought in  
question, but by the general assent of the peo-  
ple. *Tiber* having condemned one *offensus*,  
the *Roman* Citizen in *Sicilia*, *Tully* urged it as the capi-  
tal matter unfetterable : *Faciens scilicet (inquit)*  
*vincti* *Civis Romanus*, *scelus verberari*,  
*prope paricidii um necarii quid dicam in cru-*  
*cem atque* ? It is a great crime to bind a *Rom-*  
an Citizen an humane wickedness to beat him, li-  
tle less than paricide to kill him; what then  
shall I call the hanging of him ? with many men  
like asencies, besides the possibility they were  
in, if their sufficiency were answerable accord-  
ing, to become great in the State; and conse-  
quently, Commanders of the Empire.

*Cæsar* tasteth the affection of the Souldiers.

[illegible]

but injuries of pernicious *Lovers* upon the violence of the Tribunes, that the *Senate* and *People* fell off of the people, when the *Temples* and high places of the City were taken, and held against the *Senate*; which *Loyalities* of former ages were expiated and purged by the fortune and distress of *Saturninus*; and he a *Prince*. But at this present there was no such man attempted, so much as in thought; no law published; no practice with the people; no tumult; no departure out of the City. And therefore he advertised them, that *Perseus* might as under his leading and commands for nine yeares together they had must perforce carry the government, fought many prosperous and victorious battails, settled all *Gallia* and *Germany* in peace; and would now in the end of his *Reign* enjoy the peace of his *Adversaries*, and delight in the peace of their predictions, which were foretold of the thirteenth legion, which were present (for them only had he called out at the beginning of the troubles, and the other legions were as yet come) cried out instantly, That they were ready to undertake his defence against such wrongs, and to keep the Tribunes of the people from injury.

S<sup>1</sup> Public-works and Societies are chiefly *ju-*  
 lific'd and maintained by justice: To like-  
 wise, such as live in the civil community of the  
 fam'ly, and enjoy the benefit of a well-qualified  
 government, do take themselves interested in the  
 maintenance of justice, and cannot endure the  
 tyranny of wrongs; unless happily (as every  
 man is partial in his own cause) they be the  
 authors thereof themselves. The first duty of  
 justice, which is, *Ne cui qu's nocet*, That no  
 man hurt another, did *Cesar* make the theme of  
 his Oration to his soldiers; aggravating his  
 particular injuries, by opening and enforcing the  
 malice of his Advantages: and making the State  
 a party in his sufferings, through the oppression  
 and delating of the Tri-umphant; which in times  
 of liberty and just proceeding, was sacred and in-  
 violable

These remonstrances were apprehended by the soldiers, as matters specially concerning their duty; holding themselves either bound to redress them, or else wade to be guilty of betraying their parents, country, companions and friends. Some reports, that of *Calpurnia*, a Pimples of *Caesar's* Army, making answer to this speech, gave assurance of the soldiers' good affection; which was not approved with a general acclamation. However the argument lay couched in a Sophistry, pretending *Caesar's* rights, but concluding the ruin of the State.

*Opulentis* *Secondly*, we may observe, that as discord and  
*civitatibus* *diffension*, rending asunder the bonds of ci-  
*veterum*

CHAP. V.  
Cæsar taketh Ariminum; receiveth and answereth  
messengers from Pompey.

**C**æſar having ſounded the minds of the ſoldiers, ſent directly without legion to Ariminum; & there met with the Tribunes of the people that were ſent unto him; ſent for the reſt of the legions from their wintering Camps, and gave order they ſhould follow him. Thither came young L. Cæſar, whoſe father was a Legate in L. Cæſar's Camp. And after ſome ſpeech of the occaſion of his coming, acquainted Cæſar, that Pompey had given him a meſſage in charge to be delivered unto him: which was, that he deſired to clear himſelf to Cæſar, left he might peradventure take thoſe things that he deſired to be done in ſcorn of him; which were commanded only for the ſervice of the State; & the good whereof he always preferred before his private reſpect; and that Cæſar himſelf muſt in honour to lay ſide his indignation and affection for the Commonwealths ſake; and not to be tranſported with anger, and deſolation of his Adverſaries, as he ſeemed to be, left in hoping to be avenged of them, he ſhould hurt the publick weal of his Country. He added ſomewhat more of the ſame ſubject, together with excoſes on Pompey's behalf. Almoſt the ſelf ſame diſcourſe, and of the ſelf ſame language, Rotundus the Pretor dealt with Cæſar, and ſaid that he had received ſome charge from Pompey. Which altho' they ſeemed unway to juſtifie or remove the injuries and wrongs complained of; yet having got ſufficiently into Pompey, he prayed them both for that they had brought unto him, what Pompey requir'd they would not think it much to re-  
turn



## Observations upon Cæsars

turn his desires to Pompey; if happily with so little labour they might accord so great differences, and free all Italy from fear and danger. That he had ever held the dignity of the Commonwealth in high regard, and dearer than his own life. He grieved much that a benefit given him by the people of Rome, should be unjustly wrested from him by his adversaries; that six months of his government were to be cut off, and so he to be called home to the City: notwithstanding the people had commanded at the last creation of Magistratures, that there should regard be had of him, although absent. Nevertheless, for the Commonwealth sake he could be content to undergo the loss of that honour. And having writ to the Senate that all men might quit their Armies, he was so farre from gaining the same, that contrariwise a levie was thereupon made throughout all Italy; and the two legions which were drawn from him under a pretence of the Pothian warres were still retained about the City, which was likewise in Arms. And what tended all this, but his desolation? And yet notwithstanding he was content to condescend to all things, and to endure all inconveniences for the cause of the Publick weal. Let Pompey go to his government and Provinces; let both the Armies be discharged; let all men in Italy lay down their Arms; let the City be freed of fear; let the assemblies of the people be left to their ancient liberty; and the whole government of the State remitted to the Senate and people of Rome. For the better accomplishment whereof, under well-advised and secure conditions, let an oath be taken for due keeping of the same; or otherwise, let Pompey approach nearer unto him, or suffer Cæsar to come nearer to him; that these controversies might happily receive an end by conference.

Routius having this message, went to Capua, accompanied with L. Cælar; where finding the Consuls and Pompey, he delivered unto them Cæsar's propositions. They having consulted of the matter, made an answer in writing, and returned it by them to Cæsar, whereof this was the effect; That he should return into Gallia, quit Ariminum, and dismisse his Army; which if he did, Pompey would then go into Spain: In the meantime, until assurance were given that Cæsar would perform as much as he promised the Consuls and Pompey would not forbear to levy soldiers. The condition was too unequal to require Cæsar to leave Ariminum, and to return into his Province; and Pompey to hold Provinces and legions belonging to other men: to have Cæsar dismisse his Army, and he to raise new troops: to promise simply to go to his governments, but to assigne no day for his departure: in summe, that if he had not gone until Cæsar's time of government had expired, he could not have been blamed for falsifying his promise. But so far as he was appointed no time for a conference, nor made any shew of coming neerer, there could no hope be conceived of peace.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Cæsar lying at Ravenna, within his government of Gallia, and understanding how matters palt at Rome, according as Plutarch reports, commanded divers of his Centurions to go before to Ariminum, without any other intention, than to possess themselves thereof with as little tumult as they could. And then leaving the troops about him to be commanded by Hortensius, he continued a whole day together in publick sight of all men, to behold the fencing of the Sword-players. At night he bathed his body, and then kept company with such as he had bidden to supper; and after a while rose from the table, willing every man to keep his place, for he would instantly come again. However, having secretly commanded some of his followers to attend him, in such manner as might give least suspition, he himself took a Coach which he had hired; and making shew of going a contrary way, turned suddenly towards Ariminum. When he came to the little river Audonum, which divided his government from the rest of Italy, he stood confounded through remembrance of his desperate designs, and wist not whether it were better to return or go on: but in the end, laying aside all doubtful cogitations, he resolved upon a desperate Adage, importing as much as *Fall back, fall edge*: and passing over the River, he never stayed running with his Coach, until he came within the City of Ariminum; where he met Curius and Antonius, Tribunes of the people, and shewed them to the soldiery, as they were driven to fly out of Rome, disguised like slaves in a Carriers cart.

It is said, that the night before he passed over this River, he dreamed that he lay with his Mother in an unnatural sense, but of that he himself maketh no mention. This City of Ariminum is now called Rimini, and standeth in Romanina, upon the Adriatick seas, in the Popes domain. The River Rubicon was anciently the bounds of Gallia; over which Augustus caused a fair bridge to be built with this inscription;

JUSSU, MANDATU-VE. P. R. COS. IMP. MILTI. TIRO. COMMILITO. MANIPULARIS-VE. CENT. TURMA-VE. LEGIO. NARI-VE. ARMAT. QUISQUIS. ES. HIC. SISTITO. VEXILLUM. SINITO. NEC. CITRA. HINC. AMNEM. RUBICONEM. DUCTUM. COMMATUM. EXERCITUM-VE. TRADUCTO. SI. QUIT. HUIUSCE. JUSSIONIS. ERGO. ADVERSUS. FECIT. FECERIT-VE. ADJUDICATUS. ESTO. HOS.

## Lib. I.

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

HOSTIS. P. R. AC. SI. CONTRA. PATRIAM. ARMA. TULERIT. SACROSQUE. PENATES. E. PENETRALIBUS. ASPORTAVERIT. SANCIO. PLEBISCI. SENATUS-VE. CONSULT. ULTRA. HOS. FINES. ARMA. PROFERRE. LICEAT. NEMINI. S. P. Q. R.

The substance whereof is; That it should be unlawful for any man to come over the said River armed, under penalty of being adjudged an enemy to the Commonwealth, and an invader of his own Country.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IF this manner of proceeding be brought into disuse, and the reason required why Cæsar kept not himself in the province of Gallia, where he might have held his government according to his own desire, or otherwise have drawn his adversaries to buckle with the strength of those conquering Legions, and so brought the business to a short end, with as great probability of good success, as by any hazard of undertaking: It is to be understood, that in cases of this nature, which seldom admit any treaty of accord, he that firster hath, and hath the advantage of the forehead, is well entered into the way of victory. For the rule is of old, That if an enemy hath a design in hand, it is farre more safe to begin first, and by way of prevention to give the onset on him rather than to shew a readinesse of resisting his assaults. For if blows (of necessity) must be way-makes to peace, it were a mistaking to be either wanting or behind-hand therein; besides the gain which attendeth this advantage. For he that stands affected to deny what is just, and of right does, doth nevertheless grant all things which the sword requireth; and will not stick to supply all unjust refusals, with as great an over-plus of what may be demanded. For which cause Cæsar staid not the coming of his whole Army, but began with those forces which were ready at hand; and to preventing all interments, he put his adversaries to such a height, that they quitted Italy for fear, and left Rome (with whatsoever was sacred or precious therein) to the mercy of them whom they had adjudged enemies to their Country.

### CHAP. VI.

Cæsar taketh divers Municipall Towns.

Cæsar. Hill a legion being about 5500 men.

Pisaurum, a Municipall town, about 1000 men.

Or which regards, he sent M. Antonius with five cohorts to Arretium: but he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, and there intended to enroll new troops; and with severall cohorts took Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona. In the mean while, being advertised that Thermus the Pretor did hold Tignum with five cohorts,

and fortified the place, and that all the inhabitants were well inclined towards him; he sent Cæsar thither with three cohorts, which he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum. Upon notice of whose coming, Thermus (doubting of the affection of the town) drew his cohorts forth of the City, and fled. The soldiery by the way went from him, and repaired homeward. Cæsar was there received with the great contentment and satisfaction of all men. Upon notice whereof, Cæsar conceiving hope of the favourable affections of the Municipall towns, brought the cohorts of the thirteenth leg on out of their garisons, and marched towards Auximum; a town held by Actius, with certain cohorts which he Actius Vastus had brought thither with him, who having sent out divers Senators, made a levie of men throughout all the Countrey of Picenum.

Cæsar's coming being known, the Decurions of Auximum repaired to Actius Vastus, accompanied with great troops of people; and told him that the matter concerned not him at all; for neither themselves, nor the rest of the Municipall towns, would hurt their gates against such a Commander as Cæsar was, that by great and worthy service had so well deserved of the Commonwealth; and therefore advised him to consider what might ensue thereof, and the danger which might befall him in particular. Vastus being thoroughly awakened at this warning, drew out the garrison which he had brought in, and so fled away; and being overtaken by a few of Cæsar's first troops, was compelled to make a stand; and there giving batels, was forsaken of his men. Some of the soldiery went home, and the rest came to Cæsar. Amongst them was taken L. Pupius, Centurion of a Primipile order, which place he had formerly held in Pompey's Army. Cæsar commended Actius's soldiery; sent Pupius away; gave thanks to the men of Auximum; and assured them of a mindfull acknowledgement on his behalf for this service.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Amongst other things which serve to enable our judgements, and do make men wise to good fortune, that which is gathered from similitude or likeness of quality, is not the unfert ground of our discourse; but oftentimes giveth more light to guide our passage through the doubtfulness of great enterprises, than any other help of reason. For he that will attend an overture from every particular, and tarry for circumstances to accomplish all his purposes, and make no use of instance to better his advantages, shall never waste farre in businesses of moments, nor achieve that which he desireth. Which Cæsar well observed: for upon the accidental discovery of the disposition of one town, he thereby took occasion to make triall how the rest stood

E e stood

## Observations upon Cæsars

flood affected; and either found them or made them answerable to his hopes.

Concerning these places taken by Cæsar, it is to be understood, that *Pisaurum* is sited on the *Adriatick* sea, and belongeth to the Dutchie of *Urbino* a town famous of old, by reason of the prodigious opening of the earth, and swallowing up the inhabitants before the battell of *Actium*, some few yeares after it was thus taken by Cæsar.

*Favum* was so called of a fair Temple which was there built to Fortune. Tacit. *Annal.* 10. *Exercitus* Vespasianus ad *Favum* Fortunæ iter fuit; The Army of Vespasian made a halt at the Temple of Fortune. It is a small town on the same sea, and belongeth to the Pope.

*Ancona* is a famous town upon the *Adriatick* sea, sited upon a bow-like promontory, which taketh in the sea between two fore-lands; and to maketh one of the fairest Havens of all Italy, as well for largeness as for safety. From whence it is called that common saying, exprelling the rareness and singularity of three things; thus *Petrus in Roma*, One Peter in Rome; noting the beauty of Saint Peter's Church: thus *Livius in Cremona*, One tower in Cremona; the excellent workmanship of a Steeple there: And thus *Portus in Ancona*, One Haven in Ancona; which is this Haven. The Emperor *Titianus*, to give it more shelter, and keep it from the fury of the wind, raised the top of the Promontory in fashion of a half moon, with a mount made of great Marble stones; and made it Theatre-wale, with delicate and dejected to go to the sea; together with an Ark triumphall in memory thereof. The town is now under the Pope.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

This word *Decurio* hath a double understanding; for *Nummus* having 3000 foot and 300 horse divided them into three Tribes, and every Tribe into ten Centes, containing a hundred footmen and ten horsemen. Wherby *Macellinus* concludeth that *Decuriones* & *Centuriones* à numero est in *Militia* præsertim decuriorum; they were called *Decuriones* and *Centuriones* from the number they commanded in this warres. But *Petringius* of footmen (saith he) was called a *Centurio* or *Almop*; and a Troop of horse was called *Turma*, of *ter-decor*, containing thirty men, wherof the Captain was named *Decurio*. In which sense Cæsar speaketh; *Ex recerptis* *Legionibus* L. *Amilius* *Decurionis* equitum *Gallorum* hostibus nunciatur: This business was bewrayed to the enemy by the fugitives of L. *Amilius* *Decurion* of the French horse. But in this place it hath another signification for the Romans, when they sent any Citizens to people and inhabit a place, chose out

every tenth man; such as were found most able, and of best sufficiency to make and establish a publick Councill; whom they called *Decuriones*; according as *Pomponius* and other Civilians understand it. So that these *Decuriones* were the Senate of that place.

### CHAP. VII.

Lenulus fleeth in great fear out of Rome. Cæsar cometh to Capuam.

These things being reported at Rome, Cæsar, the City was suddenly struck into such a terror, that when *Lenulus* the Consul came to open the *Treasury*, to deliver out money to Pompey according to the Act of Senate, he fled out of the City, and left the inner chamber of the *Treasury* open. For it was reported (although untruly) that Cæsar was near approaching, and that his *Centuriones* were hard at hand. *Marcellus*, the other Consul, together with most of the other *Magistrates*, followed after. Pompey departing the day before, was gone to those legions which he had taken from Cæsar, and had left in *Apulia* to winter. In the mean while the insolence of soldiers caused within the City. No place seemed secure between that & *Capua*. There they began first to assemble and assure themselves; impressing for soldiers such as by *Julius* law were sent thither to inhabit. And *ex* *Julius* the *Centuriones* which were there trained and exercised by Cæsar, for the entertainment of the people of Rome, were by *Lenulus* brought out set at liberty, mounted upon horses, and commanded to follow him. But afterwards, upon advice of his friends (every man judiciously disallowing thereof) he departed them here and there throughout *Campania*, for their better safety and keeping.

Cæsar following from *Auximium*, marched throughout all the Countrey of *Picenum*, and was most willingly received by all the *Profectores* of those Regions, and relieved with all necessities which his soldiers stood in need of. Informers as *Commissioners* were sent unto him from *Cingulum*, a town which *Labienus* had founded, and built from the ground at his own charges, promising to obey what he ever he commanded, wherupon he required soldiers, and they sent them accordingly. In the mean time the twelfth legion overtook Cæsar; and with these he marched directly to *Asculum*, a town which *Lenulus* *Spinther* held with ten cohorts; who understanding of Cæsar's approach, left the place, and labouring to carry the troops with him, was forsaken by the greater part of the soldiers; and so marching with a few, happened by chance upon *Vibullius* *Rutilus*, sent of purpose by Pompey into the Countrey of *Picenum* to confuse and scathe the people. *Vibullius* being advertised how matters were there, took the soldiers, and so dismissed him of his charge: gathering likewise from the confining Regions, what cohorts he could get from Pompey's former insolencies; and amongst others, entertained *Ullucius* *Hirius*, flying with six cohorts out of *Camerinum*, wherof he had the keeping. These being all put together, made thirteen cohorts; with which by long marches he made towards *Domitius* *Ævolanus*, who was at *Corfinium*, telling him that Cæsar was at hand with two legions. *Domitius* had raised twenty cohorts, out of *Albania*, *Marlia*, and *Pelignia*, adjacent Countreys. *Asculum* being taken in, and *Lenulus* driven out, Cæsar made inquiry after the soldiers that had left *Lenulus*, and commanded them to be enrolled for him. And after one daies abode for the provision of Corn, he marched towards *Corfinium*. Upon his approach thither, *Domitius* sent five cohorts out of the town, to break down the bridge of the River, which was about three miles off. The vanguard of Cæsar's Army encountering with *Domitius* soldiers, drove them from the bridge, and forced them to retreat into the town; wherby Cæsar past over his legions, made a stand before the town, and inspected himself under the walls.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

It is well observed by *Guicciardine*, That Intolency and Timidity are never found alunder, but do always accompany one another in the same subject: For the mind being the centre of all such motions, doth according to every mans nature, give the like scope to passions of contrariety, and extend them both to an equidistant circumstance: as, if Courage shall happen to dilate itself to Insolency, then is Doubtfulness in like manner enlarged to Cowardice; and will imbale mens thoughts as low, as they did rise in height by insulating. For which cause it is advised by such astute of Morality, that men be well ware in admitting dilution of passions, or in suffering them to lie out beyond the compass of Reason, which containeth the measure of Equability, commended by *Cicero*, to be observed throughout the whole course of mans life. *Lenulus*, the Consul may be an instance of this weakness, and learn others moderation by shunning his intemperacy. For in question of qualifying the rage of these broiles, and sorting of things to a peaceable end, his arrogancy was incompatible with terms of agreement, and overwaid the Senate with heedlesse impetuosity. And again, when his authority and Consular Gravity should have settled the distracted Commons, and made good his first resolution, his over-hasty flying out of the City did rather induce the people to believe, that there was no safety within those walls, nor forso small a time as

Ullucius Hirius  
Camerinensis

Domitius  
Ævolanus  
Corfiniensis

Albania  
Marlia  
Pelignia

300. men.

Seneca  
et  
congruunt  
in  
med  
fimo  
sugge  
es, l'In  
lenus  
con  
la  
Timidit  
Lib. 3.

De Officiis

## Lib. I. Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

might serve to have shut the Treasury at his heels; and so he became as subject, as before he shewed himself insolent.

Concerning these words (*Aperto sanctore* *Ævario* rendered the inner chamber of the Treasury left open.) It is to be noted, that *Ævarium* was their publick Treasury; and by the appointment of *Valerius Publicola*, was made within the Temple of *Saturn*; wherof divers men make divers conjectures. *Macrobius* saith, that as long as *Saturn* continued in Italy, there was no theft committed in all the country; and therefore his Temple was thought the safest place, to keep money in. *Plutarch* thinketh rather, that the making of the Treasury in that place, did allude to the integrity of the time wherein *Saturn* reigned; for avarice and deceit was not then known amongst them. S. *Cyprian* is of an opinion, that *Saturn* first taught Italy the use and coinage of money; and therefore they gave the keeping thereof to his Deity. Howsoever, it is manifest, that not only the publick Treasury was there kept, but also their Records, Charts, Ordinances and Edicts; together with such books as were, for their immemorable greatness, called *Libri Elephantini*; containing all their Acts of Senate, and deeds of Arms achieved by the Commanders abroad, as also their military Ensigns which they fetched awayes from thence when they went into the field: and there likewise did such Embassadors as came to Rome enregister their names, as *Plutarch* affirmeth.

It was called *Ævarium* of *Æs*, signifying Brasse; for that the first money used by the Romans was of that metall, until the year of Rome 485; as *Pliny* witnesseth; when they began first to coin pieces of silver marked with the letter X, wherof they took the appellation of *Denarius*, as valuing ten asses of brasse, which before they used for their coin; and every of the said asses weighed 12 ounces. Touching their order observed in their Treasury, for their disposing and laying up of their moneys, we must understand, that as bodies politick require necessary and ordinary treasure to be employed in such manner, as may best concur with the publick honour and weal of the same; so there must be special care to provide against unuall and extraordinary casualties, which are not removed but by speedy and effectual remedies. According to which providence the Romans disposed of their treasure, and denice the Romans disposed of their treasury, which they took the twentieth part of their reccy, which they called *Aurum vicissimum*, and referred it to *Apur* in an inner chamber; whereto they proceeded, that it was a capitall crime to touch it, but in extrem and desperate necessity; as in time of war with the *Gallies*, or in a sedition and tumult of the people. *Livie* affirmeth as much, where he saith, *Cætera expeditibus que ad bellum opus erant consulis, aurum vicissimum quod in sanctiore* *Ævario* *adulimos casus* *re*

Ævarium

Plutarch, in vita Publ. Cæsar, ævarium

Remansus in ade Saturni habitare, tellus.

Libet Elephanti

signa re  
Mario  
promissa  
re  
Didaotem  
Lib. 4.

Lib. 3.

cap. 11.

Aurum vicissimum

Lib. 24.

re

## Observations upon Cæsars

*quæritur, promi placuit: prompta ad quatuor millia pondo Auri.* The Consul furnishing all other things needfull for the wars, it was resolved that the necessary gold, which should be brought forth and employed; which said gold was reserved in the inner Treasury, till such time as affairs happened to be in a desperate condition. Accordingly, there was 4000 pound of gold taken out.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SUCH as affect offices and dignities in a State, must ever have means to court Sovereignty, according as may best suit with her Politics; either as she is subject to a Monarch, or left in trust to a Multitude. Hence it was that the Romans, to gain the favour of the people, and to make way for their own ends, were very sumptuous in setting forth shows and spectacles, of divers sorts and fashions; and specially of Gladiators or Fencers, as best fitting a Roman disposition, and more pleasing then others of any kind. *Equestris* (saith Tully) *eximium, nullum tempus esse frequentioris populi, quam illud Gladiuorum, neque concius, nullus, neque vero illud Committionum* I everly believe that there is at no time a greater concourse of people, then is at the fence-plays; neither at an Oration, nor at an Assembly of the State. And in another place; *Id autem spectanti genus erat, quod omni frequentia, atque omni hominum genere celebratur, quo multitudo maxime delectatur.* That is a kind of shew, which is celebrated with the flocking together of all sorts of people; it being a thing the multitude are extremely delighted with.

Their manner was to keep great numbers of these Fencers, in some convenient and healthfull towns of Italy, as at *Reverunt*, and *Capua* (which were as Seminaries of these people) and there to train them up to the feat of fencing, until they had occasion to use them in their shews, either at their triumphall entries into the City upon their victories, or at the funeral solemnity of some perionage of memory; or otherwise at their feasts and jollities.

*Spectantem exhibitare viris convivia cade. Mos olim & misere cunctis spectacula dira.* The death of men made mirth at feasts of old. And banquets then were grac'd with fencers bold.

They fought commonly man to man, at all advantage, and were seldom excused, until one of the two lay dead upon the place. Neither was he then quieted that had slain his companion, but he then quitted to undertake another, and to a third, until he had foiled six or seven Combatants. And if his hap were to prevail so often, he was then honoured with a Garland wound about with ribands of wool, which they called *Lemmisi*,

and received of the Prætor a great knotted staffe, called *Rudis*; which he afterward carried about with him as an ensign of liberty. These bloody spectacles continued unto the time of *Constantine* the great, and were by him prohibited, as like- wise also by *Arcadius* and *Honorius*; and though- ly abolished after the reign of *Theoderick*, king of the *Goths*. Let him that would look further into the fashion of these shews, read what *Lipsius* hath written concerning the same. That which I observe herein is the use, which the State made hereof: for howsoever their fights and tournaments were let forth for the compassing of private ends; yet nevertheless the Commonwealth drew benefit from the same. For a multitude being of a fickle and mutable nature, are no way so well settled with contentment of the times, or kept from novelties and innovations, as with publick shews and entertainments; which are as flutes to their affections, that they swerve not from the government by which they live in civile concordation. So we read how the *Grecians* instituted, as popular entertainments, their *Olympian*, *Nemean*, *Isthmian*, and *Pythian* Games; The Romans, their *Apollinarian*, *Secular*, *Gladiatory*, and *Hunting* shews, with *Tragedies* and *Comedies*; and all for the satisfaction of the people. Wherein, howsoever, such Games as might be too extreme and entertain the people; yet the Romans failed not of the end aimed at in these spectacles, which was, to inure them to blood and slaughter, and to make them dreadlesse in cases of horreur.

But to leave all shews of this nature, as either too little for earnest, or too much for pastime; it shall suffice to note, that these publick entertainments are so far expedient as they consist of pleasure and contentment: for as their chiefest end is to please and content the people; so their manner must be directed by lawfulness and modesty. In which respect, a Tragedy is more commendable then a Comedy; forasmuch as few comical arguments do sympathize with honesty.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

TO be great and of a large proportion, doth not take away casualties of inconvenience; nor can it give a priviledge, to free things from diffidence: Tall men are as subject to Fevers, as others of lesser stature; and great Emperors as easily disturbed, as the States of petty Princes.

*O faciles dare summa Deos, eademque tueri; Difficiles tunc.*  
O Gods easy to grant, but to preserve Your gifts as hard.

It is easier to attain the end of high desires, then to keep it being got: and better is the assurance of

*Spectatum*  
*Ut & do-*  
*no tam jam*  
*vide. Hic*  
*The Ro-*  
*mans never*  
*used these*  
*Gladiators*  
*in any of the*  
*times, but only*  
*Civilis*  
*was.*  
*Ac deinceps*  
*refugerunt*  
*ut illius*  
*etiam milia*  
*Gladiato-*  
*rum: sed*  
*per civilia*  
*etiam fecerunt*  
*ut dicitur*  
*superius*  
*Tac. lib. 1.*

## Lib. I.

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

of seeking, then of possessing. The Roman people that had over-awed the world with Armes, and left no kingdom unfoiled with the fear of their legions, were as much daunted at a subjects dilatory, as was possible for an mean State to be amazed upon an alarm of any danger. And that City which suffered no enemy to approach near her confines, but in the condition of a Captive, was not trusted as able to give her own people safety.

*--- sic ut in per Hybern*

*Præcipui lymphata gradu, velut univacibus*  
*Spes fortis afflitis pavore excedere muros,*  
*Inconsultum tunc.*

*--- So through the streets*

With headlong madnesse ran the multitude,  
As if their case no other hope had left  
Of safety, then to quit their native walls.

The advantage is, that kingdoms of great command have great helps in cases of disturbance; but are otherwise as subject to apprehensions of distrust, as those of lesser power to resist.

### CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar, goeth on with the siege of *Confinum*, and taketh it.

Cæsar.

**D**OMITIUS being thus engaged, sent out skillfull men of the Country, with promise of great reward, to carry Letters to Pompey, intreating and praying, that he would come and receive him; for Cæsar, by reason of the streightness of the passages, might with two Armies be easily shut up: which opportunity if he neglected himself, with above 30 cohorts of soldiers, besides a great number of Senators and Roman Knights, were in danger of running a hard fortune. In the mean time, he exhorted his men to courage and resolution; placed his Artillery on the walls; assigned every man his quarter to be made good; promised in public assembly of the soldiers, four acres apiece to each man out of his own lands and possessions; and the like valuable parts to the Centurions and Evocati. Mean while it was told Cæsar, that the inhabitants of Salmo, a town distant seven miles from Confinum, were desirous to receive his commands; but that they were restrained by *Q. Lucretius* a Senator, and *Actius Pelignus*, that kept the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. Whereupon he sent thither *M. Antonius* with five cohorts of the seventh Legion; whose Ensigns were no sooner discovered by those of the towns, but the gates were opened, and the inhabitants and soldiers came all out, to gratulate and welcome *Antonius*. *Lucretius* and *Actius* conveyed themselves over the wall, *Actius* being taken and brought to *Antonius*, desired to be sent to Cæsar. *Antonius* returning the same day, brought *Actius* and the soldiers

that were found in Salmo, to Cæsar; whom he took to his Army, and sent *Actius* away in safety.

Cæsar, the three first days, made great noise to fortify his Camp; caused store of corn to be brought from the towns next about him; and there determined to stay the coming of the rest of his forces. Within the space of those three dayes the eighth legion came unto him, with 22 cohorts newly enrolled in Gallia, together with three hundred horse, which the King of Noricum had sent unto him. Upon the arrival of which forces, he made a second Camp on the other side of the town, and appointed *Curio* to command it. The rest of the time was spent in compassing the town with a Rampier and with Castles. The greatest part of which work being finished, he changed at the same time, that such as were sent to Pompey returned. The Letters being read, *Pompey* dissembling the truth, gave out in the council of war, that *Pompey* would come speedily to succour them; and therefore wished that no man should be dismayed, but to prepare such things as were of use industrially for the defence of the town, but he himself, conferring secretly with some of his familiar friends, consulted how he might escape away.

But forasmuch as his looks agreed not with his words, and that his carriage seemed more troubled and timorous then usual, and likewise his secret conferences with his friends were more then ordinary, as also by his avoiding of publick counsels and assemblies as much as he could, the matter could be no longer disguised. For Pompey had writt back, that he would not hazard the cause, by drawing it into secretisms of extremity: neither was *Domitius* engaged in the keeping of *Confinum* by his advice or consent; and therefore, if by any means he could, he should quit the place as so freight, and the works daily begird the town, that there was no hope of effecting it. *Domitius* purpose being known abroad, the soldiers within the towns, about the beginning of the evening forsook their stations, and drew themselves apart; and thereupon had conference with the Tribunes of the soldiers and Centurions to this effect: That they were besieged by Cæsar, whose works and fortifications were almost finished; their General *Domitius* (in hope and confidence of whom they were engaged in that place) seeing himself all matters whatsoever, was bethinking himself how he might escape and fly away; and in regard thereof, they were not to neglect their own safety. The March at first began to draw from the rest upon that point; & possessed themselves of that part of the town which seemed to be strongest; and such a division thereby gave among themselves, that they had almost gone to blows. Howbeit, under standing a while after (by messengers which

Ec 3

15000 men  
or three  
about.

Salmo.

*Lucan.*  
*lib. 1.*  
*P. 242.*  
*& quæritur*  
*ut dicitur*  
*diff. dist.*  
*lib. 17.*

And therefore  
were called  
Red, Bull  
and a Bull  
lib. 11a.

Let. 11a.

## Observations upon Cæsar

which pass to and fro between them) of Domitius purpose to flatter, whereof formerly they were ignorant; they agreed together, and with one consent brought Domitius out into open publick; and sent some to Cæsar, to let him know, they were ready to open the gates, to receive his commandement, and to deliver Domitius alive into his hands. Upon advertisement whereof (albeit Cæsar found it a matter of great consequence, to gain the town with as much speed as he could, and to take the souldiers into his Camp, lest either by large promises and gifts, or by entertaining other purposes, or otherwise through false bruits or devised messages, their minds might happily be altered, as oftentimes in the course of warres great and eminent chances and alterations do happen in a small moment of time; yet for that he feared lest the night-time might give occasion to the souldiers upon their entrance to sack and pillage the town) he commanding those that came unto him, sent them back again, and willed that the gates and the walls should be kept with a good guard. He himself disposed the souldiers upon the works, which he had begun; not by certain spaces and distances, as he had accustomed in former times, but by continuall watches and stations, one touching another round about all the fortifications. Moreover, he sent the Tribunes and Captains of the horse about, and willed them to have a care that there might be no eruptions or sallies, and that they should look to the private slipping out of particular men. Neither was there any man so heavy or dull, that suffered his eyes to be shut that night: for so great was the expectation of what would ensue, that of what would happen to the Cornificians, to Domitius, to Lentulus and the rest. About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther spake from the wall to one souldier that had the watch, and signified that he would willingly have leave to come to Cæsar. Which being granted, he was sent out of the town, attended with some of Domitius his souldiers, who left him not until he came in sight of Cæsar. With him he dealt concerning his life, and prayed him to pardon him; put him in mind of their former familiarity; acknowledged the favours received from Cæsar, which were very great; namely, that by his means, he was chosen into the Collegium Pontificum, that upon the going out of his Prætorship, he obtained the province of Spain, and in his first Consuls, he was much assisted by him.

Cæsar, interrupting his speeches, told him, that he came not from his government to hurt any man; but to defend himself from the injuries of his adversaries; to restore the Tribunes of the people to their dignities, that were thrust out and expelled the City; and to

put himself and the people of Rome into liberty, which were oppressed with the partialities of a few factions persons. Lentulus, being reassured upon this answer, prayed leave to return into the town; and therewith, that this which he had obtained touching his own safety, might give hope to the rest. To which whom some were so affrighted, that he doubted they would fall into some desperate course. And having obtained leave, he departed. Cæsar, as soon as it was day, commanded all the Senators and Senators children, together with the Tribunes of the souldiers, and the Roman Knights, to be brought out unto him. Of Senators there were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, Vibullius Rufus, Sex. Quinctilius Varus, the Treasurer, L. Rubrius; besides Domitius his sonne, and many other young men; with a great number of Roman Knights and Decurions, whom Domitius had called out of the Municipall Towns. These being all brought forth unto him, were protected from the insolencies and injuries of the souldiers. Moreover, he spake a few words unto them, concerning the ill requital to their behalfs, for the great benefits he had done unto them; and so sent them all away in peace.

The sixty Sesteria of gold which Domitius had laid up in the publick Treasury, being brought unto him by the two chief Magistrates or Chiefs of the Cornificians, he redelivered to Domitius; lest he should seem more content in taking away mens lives, then their money; although he knew that this money was part of the publick treasure, and delivered out by Pompey to pay souldiers. He commanded Domitius his party to be sworn his souldiers. And that day removing his Camp, went a full dayes march (after a stay of seven dayes about Cornificium) through the confines of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Lavinates, and came into Apulia.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS it is true, that a friend is not solely tied to the respects of right, but doth give more advantage by offices of good endeavour, then by that which duty requireth: so is it dangerous for a man to put his fickle further into a harveyl, then happily may deserve thanks of the owner. Neither can it be cleared from imputation of folly, to care another mans business, with hazard and perill of one own fortune. Howbeit, the current and drift of things doth oftentimes to engage both our persons and affections, either in the main action it self, or in some circumstances of the same, that we cannot avoid the hazard of rebuke, if our endeavours do not fort with his liking that is to approve them. Whereof Domitius may be an instance; who, taking Cornificium on the behalf of the State, was nevertheless disavowed in his merits, and consequently brought unto extremity of danger,

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

danger, for his over-forwardness in the service of his Country. Such liberty hath sovereignty, either to take or leave, when the event shall not rise answerable to a good meaning.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

VVhen a party is fallen into an exigence, it hath no better remedy for relief then that of the Comick, *Redime te capium quam queas minime*; redeem your self at as cheap a rate as you can. Which is not understood, that we should clear the head, and leave the rest of the members to misfortune: for that were to draw a double mischief on the whole body. But the head is to escape with as little prejudice to the other parts, as by wisdom and verue may be gained; and so much the rather, lest in seeking to purchase safety with hazard of the other members, it draw the whole destruction upon it self; as it fell out with Domitius, who going about to fly out of the town, and to leave such forces as by his means were marked in that caule, was justly made the sacrifice of their peace. Sulla deserved better to be followed by men of adventure: for, being moved to escape himself away by night, and to leave his troups to such fortune as *Jugurth* upon advantage should put upon them; he answered, *Etiamsi certa pestis adest, mansurum potius quam proditis quos ducebat, turpi fugas incerta, ac forsitan paulo post morbo interitura vitæ pareat*: Although the plague were never so near and certain to befall him, yet he would stay by it, rather then by a base flight betray those under his commands, thereby to save his fickle life for a times which it may be some disease or other would immediately after deprive him of. And therefore, if a Commander shall at any time goe about to betray his forces, with hope of his own safety, the issue will bring out either his dishonour, or his confusion.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

SUCH as undertake great designs, do likewise project the means of achieving the same, and do propound unto themselves such principles to be observed, as they take to be special way-makers to the fortune they reach at; from which grounds they seldom or never swerve. As appeareth by this of Cæsar: who aiming at the sovereignty of that Empire, and knowing no way so direct to lead him therto, as to climb up by the steps of Middlesties, and to make his Adversaries debtors to his Clemency, he let aside his Maxims of warre, to hold firm the principle; and did forbear to gain a town of great importance, with that speed which occasion and opportunity did afford him, and to take the troups into his Camp, for the prevention of such chances and changes, as do happen in a small moment of time, lest his souldiers

entering into the town, after the shutting of the evening, might take leave of the night-time to make forfeiture of his mercy.

It shall therefore be well becoming the wisdom of a Leader, to have always respect to the principles of his Means; and to distinguish between that which is fit and that which is morfit, in the native carriage of his business.

## THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

Concerning this Collegium Pontificum, the Collegium College of Priests, we are to note, that *Numa* Pontificum, the founder of the Roman Commonwealth, for the preventing of partialities and factions in that State, which at that time consist of two Nations or Tribes, did break the whole body into many small parts and factions, making his division by Arts and Occupations; whereby he ordained, that all Minstrels or Trumpeters should be incorporated into one Brotherhood; and that in like manner, Goldsmiths, Carpenters, Diers, Shoemakers, Coriers, Tanners, Bell-founders, Porters, and all other trades and Sciences, should have their peculiar body or Fraternity appointing their feasts, attomblies, and services, according to the worthiness of each mystery, as *Plutarch* hath observed in the life of *Numa*.

*Plutarch* Maximus maketh mention of the College of Papers or Minstrels. And *Plinius* in like manner, mentioneth the College of Copper-smiths. *Cicero* taketh notice of the college or company of Merchants, which he called *Collegium Mercatorum*; for that of old time, the humble-tongued *Mercury* was believed in, as the *Epiphanius* Guider and Protector of Merchants. The privileges and customs wherewith these Fraternities were endowed, are set down by *Cato* the Civilian. There are certain Colleges at Rome, saith he, incorporated by Act of Senate, and established with good ordinances and constitutions, having certain things in common in imitation of the publick weal; and as *Servilius* further noteth with power to make laws, for the better government of such Colleges and Societies; so the same be not contrary to the fundamental laws of the State. After the same manner, the Priests had their peculiar College or corporation; and at the first institution were but four in number, and all of Patrician families, unto the year of Rome 454: at what time there were four of the Commons chosen, and added to the former number; whom *Sulla* increased to fifteen, as *Dionysius* witnesseth. And these were called *Collegium Pontificum*, whereof this *Pontifex Maximus* was president: one of the aboliwest dignities of Rome, as being for term of life, and of greatest and divine authority. Which general distribution of the *Roman* into trades and mysteries, doth not unfittly bring into remembrance, that which is usual amongst the *Turks*, who by their

Lentulus Spinther.

Collegium Pontificum.

Lentulus Pontifex Maximus.

Lentulus Pontifex Maximus.

lavi

### Observations upon Cæsars

Acometus  
the great  
Tunk.  
Frater  
Baifa,  
Nailer, or  
parer of  
nails.  
Bultangi  
Baifa,  
Gardener.

law are all bound to be of an occupation ; not excepting the Grand Signior himself. For he that now upholds the *Ottoman* family, by the name of *Sultan Ahmet*, is a professed maker of Rings, which the *Turks* do wear on their thumb when they shoot, to let the string go easily without hurting them ; and his father *Mahomet* was a Fletcher, and made arrows. In like manner, all his Courtiers are of trades and occupations ; and every name is preceded by the title of his Art : as, he that was lately *Vizier Bassa* to the present Sultan, was called by the name of *Nucaiss Bassa*, the *Vizier Painter*, being indeed the *Sultans* Painter. Neither are they ashamed to acknowledge as much ; for, opening Letters which were sent into *Turky* out of *Christendome*, which were limned about the *Margins*, he said, he could paint as well as that himself.

### THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

The fifth thing which I observe out of these passages *Corinthis*, is, the returning back of money. *Domitius*, as were brought unto *Cæsar* by the Officers of the towns, and which he knew to be of the publick treasure of the State, Which howsoever it may seem admirable to the hearers of these times, wherein there is but this one rule for matter of money, *unde habes? quæris nescis, sed sporta habere*. No body asks how you come by it, but it must be had: Yet such as will lay a true foundation of honours, and thrive in it, that when they follow, must not be ignorant, that there is nothing more requisite to gaine credit and reputation in the carriage of any publick business, then to be clear of the least suspicion of covetousness. Neither is there any means that will sooner win a multitude to believe in those things which are at least by publick Authority, then those two virgin virtues, Abstinence and Continence: especially when they are found in Princes and chief Magistrates, that can otherwise judiciously show such love to sovereignty, and universal! oblation. Nor on the other side, that *Apollō* give out true Oracle then when they said, That there was no means to ruin *Stratibut* by Avarice.

In which tenets *C. Pontius* the *Sannite* with-  
ed, that the Gods had reserved him to times where  
in the *Romans* would have been corrupted with  
gifts; for then he would have been an enemy  
of their Commonwealth. And certainly that Em-  
pire could never have towed to high, nor continu-  
nured firm to many ages, had not her foundation  
been laid by men of admirable temper in this kind  
Such as was *Paulus Aemilius*; who having  
sacked *Macedonia*, and brought as much wealth  
into the publick Treasury as gave an end to Tri-  
butes and Subsidies, was no way the richer (but  
in honour) for all that he had taken. And Lucius  
also was *Scipio Africanus*; that of all the wealth

of Carthage, brought nothing into his private  
house, but a high and triumphant Name, as a me-  
morial of his virtues and deeds of Arms: leaving  
behind him this Oracle, as a document to follow  
in times; That covetous Captains are good to  
none but to the Enemy. And to conclude, such  
was *M. Curius*; who having triumphed of  
the *Samnites*, the *Sabines*, and *Pyrrhus*, re-  
fused a great malle of Gold, which was offered  
him by the *Samnites*; esteeming it more honour-  
able to have them that had Gold, than to  
have Gold of his own. Howbeit, such is the  
frailty of humane nature, that for the most  
part, men have always suffered their desire of  
money to increase with their wealth, although it  
were to their ruin and destruction. Which *Cæ-  
sar* well discerned, as appeared in this incident: *Hæc  
nostris optinebat, ut superiora daret et libera-  
retur in æquum.* It is a new way of  
conquering, to strengthen our selves by mercifulness  
and liberality.

### THE SIXTH OBSERVATION.

Upon occasion of Cæſar's calling unto him, ſome of the towns *Senators*, *Centurionque filios*, *Equitique Romanos*, the Senators, ſons of Senators, and Roman Knights, it ſhall not ſeem impertinent, to note the degrees and conditions of ſtate whereof the *Roman* people conſiſted. For the better clearing whereof, it is to be underſtood that by that notable tranſlation at *Comitiis* between *Romulus* and *Tatius*, it was agreed, That both thoſe Nations ſhould dwell together at *Romulus* town, which after his name ſhould be called *Romulus*, and that the inhabitants thereof ſhould be named *Quirites*, after the name of *Tatius* City. Howbeit, ſpecially they were divided into three Tribes, whereof they which were of *Romulus* party were called after his name *Ramneses*; thoſe that came with *Tatius*, *Tatienſes*; and the third Tribe *Luceres*, of *Lucius*, a Grove: for ſomuch as they being neighbours, were nevertheless remote, yet yet ſome of the *Romulus* were nevertheless neerer to that place, from divers parts, as to the Grove, where commonly aſſemblies were made to offer ſacrifice, and to perform their brethrenly ſolemities.

Each of these Tribes were divided by *Romulus* into ten *Curia*; and to make the number of thirty *Curia*. And out of each of these *Curia* he chose three persons, such as by their presence and sufficiency seemed fittest, and most worthy; which amounted to ninety. To whom, out of every Tribe he further added three, and out more of his own choosing, to make the number up a hundred; whom he established as his Council or Senate: by whose advice he resolved on all matters of consequence, either concerning peace or war; as *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* re-

Imperator  
res muneribus  
hientes,  
Hostibus  
sunt per-  
uiks.  
Appian. de  
bell. Hispan.  
Cic. Cato  
Major.

Lib. 2

Celer  
Equit  
ordo E  
Aris.

Plebs,  
popul

Senat  
minor  
Gent

**Pat.:**  
scrip

Source

Sue

Lib. I.      *Commentaries of the Civ. Warres*

teth. Howbeit *Plutarch* saith, they were seldom assembled but to underfit and the Kings pleasure; and had no other preeminence in the Commonwealth, saving they were the first that did know what was purposed. Howsoever, they were titled by the name of *Senatores, quasi seniores*, as thereby qualified to be admitted to Councell: and in the same sense they were called *Patres*.

The Senate being thus established, *Romulus* selected out of every of those *Curiae* ten young men, and so made up the number of three hundred, for a guard to his person; who for their readiness and nimbleness were called *Celeres*, all mounted on horseback; whence grew their *Ordo Equæstris*, or band of *Roman* knights, which were the mean between the Senate and the people, and as a Seminary to supply the Senate; for out of them were the Senators taken. The rest that were not of these two orders, were called the *hundred and thirty*, or the *tribe of the Commons*, or *Populus*. Whereas it appeareth that *Rome* consisted of three estates, Senators, Knights, and the Commons, according to that of *Aulus*;

Of three sorts Rome consists, Knights, Commons, Senate.

Touching the number of Senators, it is further to be noted, that *Quintus Præfens*, to gain the favour of the people, took a hundred of the Commons, and added them to the Senate, who were called *Seniores minorum Gentium*. And *Brutus* having reduced it to a Commonwealth, made them up three hundred out of the band of Knights; and from that time they were called *Patres conscripti*. Neither were they at all times limited in that number; for the seditious *Gracchus* added three hundred more unto them; and *Julius Cæsar* admitted unto the Senate all manner of persons, which were called *Quæstus*, as *Suetonius* saith.

In which regard *Aufgegrast* as *Sinarorum* ian-  
*senatorum affluentium numerum deformi*  
*incondita turba* (erant enim super mille, &  
*quidam indigulsi*) *ad modum pristinum*  
*splendorem redegit*: Reduced the excessive num-  
 ber of Senators, which was become a deformed  
 and shapeless company (for they were above  
 thousand, and divers of them unworthy fellows  
 to their ancient way and splendour.

Concerning a competency of wealth to make a man capable of the place of a Senator, we may observe, that in the reign of *Sextius* the King, he that was worth a thousand *asses* (which are about three hundred pound Sterling) was eligible. But the riches of the Empire increasing, a Senator's wealth was rated at nine thousand pound according to *Suetonius*; *Senatorum centum amplius, ac pro oligentiorum millium summa* diodesies II. s. *taxavit*, *suppletque* *libentibus*. The wealth of a Roman Knight was rated at three hundred threecore, or thereabouts.

This *Corfinium* was the chief town of the *Pelignians*, and flood in the centre of *Italy*, where all the confederate people assembled when they consulted of war against the *Romans*, for their right of *Burgesship*, or freedom of the City, which was then denied them: which war was called *Bellum sociale*, *Marcicum*, and *Italicum*. There is now nothing remaining of that town but the ruins, as a mark of the place where it anciently stood, upon a Plain, commonly called *Pentina*, or *Sant' Pelino*.

## CHAP. IX.

*Pompey goeth to Brundisium: Caesar maketh means  
to treat with him.*

**P**ompey understanding of these things which had past at Cossutius departure from Luceria, and went to Canusium, and from thence to Brundium; causing all the power he could to be raised by new recruits, and involuntaries, arming shepherds and slaves, and mounting them on horseback; of whom he made some three hundred horse. In the same time L. Manlius, the Praetor, fled from Alba with six cohorts; and Rutilius Lupus, Praetor, fled from Tarracina with three cohorts: who desercing of iure off the Cavalry of Caesar, commanded by Pubius Curius, forsaking the Praetor, turned their Engines towards Curius, and joyned with him. In like manner the dayes following, divers other cohorts came in as they marched some to the two troops, and some to the horse. Cn. Magnus of Cremona, master of the works, and of the munition in Pompeys Army, was taken on the way, and brought back to Caesar, whom he sent back again to Pompey, with commission to treat with him to this effect, *that if such as there had been happened no opportunity of meeting or conference, he was now determined to seek him at Brundium; for it much importured the Commonwealth, and every mans safety in particular, that they two might confer together. Neither could things be so well handled upon so great a distance of way, where the articles of treaty might be carried out, and so by a third party, as when they met facies facie to conclude of the conditions.*

This message being first given, he came to Brundisium with six legions; four legions of old soldiers, and the other raised by new recruitment, or made up as he came along the Country: for he had presently dispatched Domitius his cohorts from Corinthum into Sicily. At his coming, he found the Consuls gone over to Dyrrachium with the greatest part of the Army, and Pompey remaining at Brundisium with twenty cohorts. Neither could he certainly be informed, whether he remained at Brundisium to make

19

Corfinium,  
Strabo,  
lib. 6,

**Luccia**

F f food

# Observations upon Cæsars

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

good the ways whereby he might the easier be master of the Adriatick seas, and command both the inter parts of Italy, and the Regions of Greece, and so to keep the warre on foot on the one side and on the other; or whether he staid there for want of shipping. Howsoever, he would not endure that Pompey should think he could not be forced to quit Italy; and therefore resolved to stop up the mouth of the Haven, and to take away the use thereof: which he went about in this manner.

Where the mouth of the Haven was narrowest, he raised great mounds of earth on either side near unto the shore; for there the Sea was shallow: but going further into the deeps, where no such mounds could be raised, he placed double flotes of wood, right against the same mounds, of thirty foot square; and at the corners cast out four Anchors to fasten them, that they might not be tossed up and down by the waves. These flotes being thus placed, he then added other flotes of the same scantling, and covered them with bavin and earth, so the end men might come readily upon them to defend them. He armed them in front and on each side with hurdles and gabions; and on every fourth flote made a tower of two stories high, the better to defend them from violence of shipping, and from burning.

Against this work Pompey sent out great ships of burthen, which he found in the Haven, armed with towers of three stories high full of munitions, and all sort of weapons to hinder and distress the same. So that every day they fought as force off each with other, with engines, arrows, and other casting weapons. Which business Cæsar so carried, as being willing not to let fall the conditions of peace, if happily it might be effected. And albeit he greatly wondered that Magnus, whom he had sent to Pompey, did not return again, and that this Treaty so often attempted, did hinder much his designs: yet he thought it fit by all means to persevere therein; and therefore sent Caninius Rebilus, one of his Legates, an inward friend of, and near allied to Scribonius Libo, to speak with him; commanding him to persuade Libo to mediate a reconciliation, and that Cæsar himself might speak with Pompey. It might be, that thereupon both of them would yield to lay down their Arms upon equal conditions: the greatest part of which honour would redound to Libo, if by his intercession the warre might take an end.

Libo having heard Caninius, went straight to Pompey: and with a while returning, told him that forasmuch as the Consuls were absent, there could be nothing done touching an agreement. Whereupon Cæsar resolved to let fall the matter of Treaty, which he had so often attempted, and to prepare for warre.

This accident of taking *Cn. Magnus*, hath made known an officer of great place and use in the Roman Army, of whom otherwise their Histories make little mention. For, howsoever there is found in these Commentaries many particular descriptions of admirable and incredible works, such as may seem to be made rather by Giants and Cyclopes, than any labour of man; yet there is no mention of any *Præfektus fabrum*, or Master of the works in any of Cæsar's Armies. Howbeit *Legentius*, expressing their singular care to have in abundance all manner of provisions requisite for an Army, saith; That to every legion did belong Carpenters, Bricklayers, Smiths, Painters, and other Artizans, skillfull and fit to build lodgings for their wintering Camps; to make Engines and devices for warre; such as were their portatives, or ambulatory towers, targets, morions, collets, bows, arrows, darts, and piles, or whatsoever else might serve, either for offence or defence. Which Artificers were all known by the name of *Fabri*; and he that was Chief, and had the command of them, was called *Præfektus fabrum*. And in like manner *Plutarch* saith, that there was such an officer; as also that the place was given by the Generall; where he saith, that *Vibius a Siciliis* refused to lodge *Cicero*, as he passed to exile through *Lucania*; although that in his Consulship he had bestowed upon him the place of *Præfektus fabrum*. And albeit Cæsar maketh no mention of any such officer; yet *Caullus* doth it for him, in such being Triumvirs as will not be forgotten:

*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,  
Nisi impudens, & vorax & Hellos,  
Mamurram habere, quod Comata Gallia  
Habeat & ultima Britannia?*  
Who can this endure to see  
But must a wanton glutton be,  
That Mammyra should have all  
Fetch'd from Britain and from Gall?

Of which *Mammyra Plinie* thus writeth; *Cornelius Nepos* saith he writeth that *Mammyra*, a Roman knight, born at *Formia*, and Master of the works under Cæsar in Gallia, was the first that covered all the walls of his house, which he built in Mount *Calvus*, with leaves of Marble. Neither let any man chide the Authour as a mean person; for this is that *Mammyra*, whom *Caullus* doth note in his verses; whose house was farre more stately then *Caullus* did expresse, by saying he had gotten all the wealth of *Gallia Comata*. For the said *Cornelius* affirmeth, that he was the first in Rome that made the pillars of his house of solid Marble, even hewen out of the quarries of *Caristus*, or *Luni*. Thus farre goeth

Cæsar be-  
ingd from  
py at Tre-  
dium, the  
23 day of  
February  
At m m his  
cond. 764.


Pompey's  
son married  
Libo's  
da. ghter.

Præfektus  
Fabrum.

lib. 3.  
cap. 11.

Plutarch in  
the life of  
Cicero.

lib. 36.  
cap. 4.



eth *Pliny*. Out of which may be noted, that exorbitancy in gaining doth produce the like course in spending; and howsoever such comings in may be close and secret, yet the issuings out will proclaim it in profuse and lavishing manner; and therefore such as command in these places, and have such means to enrich themselves, had need to be clean-fingered. *Cæsar* writing to *Oppidius*, mentioneth the taking of this man as a thing of some note. *Cæ. Magium*, *Pompeii* *Præfectum* deprehendi scilicet, meo instructo usus sum, & cum statim missum feci: jam duo Præfetti fabrum in meam potestatem venerunt, & 2 me missi sunt: When I had taken *Cæ. Magius* a master of the works to *Pompey*, according to my usual manner, I let him go. So that there have two Masters of the works fallen into my hands, and I have let them both freely go. Concerning the use of these manwall Arts, and the prerogative they have in well-ordered States; it is to be noted, that without these, no City can conveniently be built, fortified, or furnished with Arms. And thereupon such Artizans have alwaies challenged a place of chief regard in the Commonwealth. Whence it was, that *Mythes* (corned hoc se fabrum profiteris to profess himself such an Artizan.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The *Maxime proprium*, or most proper part of warre is opposition; and that universal, rather than any other kind of repugnancy: for there is no sympathizing condition between two enemy Armies, otherwise then by mutual exchange of *velle* & *nolle*, throughout the whole course of their intendments; as may be here observed upon *Cæsar's* arrival at *Brundisium*. For finding *Pompey* to remain there after the departure of the Consuls, and not certainly intayed of the reason of his stay; lest he should think he could not be forced to quit *Italy*, *Cæsar* went about to thrust him out headlong: or otherwise, if his purpose were to follow after the Consuls to *Dyrrachium*, *Cæsar's* design then was to shut him in, and so to have followed the rule of contradiction, by which souldiers are directed in their achievements.

Concerning the site of *Brundisium*, which hath ever been famous for the commodiousness of the Haven, and the usual port where the Romans took shipping for Greece, being but a hundred *Italian* miles distant from *Apollo-nianum* in *Epirus*; we are to note, that the town standeth upon a Langet of earth, extended into the Haven Pointlike-like from the main land, resembling the neck and head of a Stagge, and in that regard is called *Brundisium*, of *Brum*, which signifieth a Stagge: which Langet hath

many crooked outs, or inlets of the Seas capable of great shipping; besides the two main Ports on either side of the town, which with the rest of the Haven, make the safest and fairest road of that part of the world. The mouth of the Haven where *Cæsar* made his flottes, is very freight; and opposite thereunto, some three miles distant into the Seas, standeth a small Island, to abate the violence and rage of the waves. Now to besiege *Brundisium*, it was requisite to take away the use and benefit of the Haven: which *Cæsar* attempted with such rare and artificiall works (of mountes where the Sea was shallow, and of flottes where the water was deep; and those made firm with earth, and fenced with hurdles and turrets, that the Reader may discern it, by the description, to be a Miter-piece of excellent invention.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

It is truly said of old, That peace is not dear at any rate. Which *Antiochus* well understood, when he bought it of the Romans for twelve thousand *Attick* talents, and 540000 bushels of wheat: Esteeming it as the sovereign happinesse of mans fortunes, and an extraordinary effect of those intelligent spirits, which guide the motions of the celestiall spheres, to keep the elements in a disagreeing concord, and the sect of men in the paths of tranquillitie. Hence it is, that such as are instruments of so great a good, and shall thereby happen to redeem a Nation from horror and confusion, have in all ages been crowned with honour and renown, as the due reward of a Mediatour of Peace. And therefore *Cæsar*, persuading *Libo* to negotiate a cessation of Arms, and to work in *Pompey's* disposition to an agreement propounded the honour which attended this service, and the merit of that endeavour which brought back peace into the Empire.

CHAP. X.

*Pompey* leaveth *Brundisium*, and shippeth himself for Greece.

His work being half perfected, and nine dayes labour bestowed upon it; the ships that had transported the Consuls and the other part of the Army, returned from *Dyrrachium* to *Brundisium*: and thereupon *Pompey* began to sit himself for a departure; being induced thereunto either by the works which *Cæsar* had begun, or by a resolution formerly taken to quit *Italy*. And the better to retard *Cæsar's* prosecution (lest upon his issuing out, the souldiers should enter the town) he moved

ill. ad  
v. c. lib.  
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8. Dec. 4.

Cæsar

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Cæsar  
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da. 23



## Observations upon Cæsars

up the gates, and stop the entrances of the streets and passages; sunk ditches and trenches cross the ways; therein stuck sharp piles and stakes; and covering the same with slight hurdles; levelled it with thin and light earth: leaving only two ways free, which went unto the Haven, which he bedged in with a strong Pallado of huge sharp Piles.

These things being thus prepared, he commanded the soldiers to get aboard, without noise or tumult; and left upon the walls and in the towers, where the rest of the ready Slings and Archers, to be called away upon a warning sign, when the rest of the soldiers were all shipped; appearing Gallies to take them in at an easie and safe place. The inhabitants of Brundisium, oppressed with the injuries and continuels of Pompey and his soldiers, disavow Cæsar's party; and understanding of this departure, whilst they were running up and down, and busied about getting aboard, gave notice thereof from the tops of their houses. Which being perceived, Cæsar (not to omit any opportunity of achieving his purpose) commanded Leaders to be prepared, and the soldiers to take Arms. Pompey a little before night weighed Anchor: and the soldiers keeping guard on the walls, upon the watch-word given, were all called from their stations, and by known passages repaired to the ships. Cæsar's soldiers with Leaders got upon the wall: but being admonished by them of Brundisium to take heed of the blind rage, they stood still. At last they were brought a great compass about, and so came to the Haven: and with knives and boats, forced two paths with soldiers, which stuck by chance upon the Mounds which Cæsar had made.

### OBSERVATIONS.

Forasmuch as this manner of Pompey's departure from Brundisium, and the sleight he used to imbarke himself and his Armie without danger of Cæsar's entering the town, is commended for one of the best stratagems of warre that ever he used; let us a little consider the parts thereof, which present themselves of two sorts: the one consisting of the works he made, to hinder and retard Cæsar's entrance, if happily he should have knowledge of this departure; and the other, in the clean conveyance of his men aboard, without noise or tumult; and the semblance he made of keeping the town, by continuing watch upon the walls, to the end there might be no knowledge taken thereof. The works were of three sorts. For first he mured and stopp'd up the ends and entrances of streets and lanes, which might give access to a pursuing enemy. And to that end also, he sunk ditches, or trenches, cross the ways and passages: which he stuck full of sharp stakes and galthropes, and covered them with light and thin hurdles,

that the Enemy might not espy them. And thirdly, heged in the ways leading to the Port, with a strong Pallado of huge sharp piles. And so used both the Lions and the Foxes skin, to avoid the danger which might have fallen upon him; if Cæsar happily had found means to attach them, as they were incubent in getting to their husbands and disposing themselves to flee away. Which being an occasion that might have given him great advantage, was in this manner carefully prevented by Pompey. Howbeit, this his quitting Brundisium is censured but for a faultie resolution handsonely carried: for Cicero doth much blame him for abandoning Italy; calling it a Themistocleum politico: perwade his party to forsake their Country; and to leave the best of their pleasures, and the weakest of each sexe, to such miserie and desolation, as moved pittie in those that considered but the condition of the dogges and brute beasts; as it tell out at Athens, when Themistocles perwaded the Athenians to leave their town and Country, and betake themselves wholly to seas, to fight against Xerxes.

### CHAP. XI.

Cæsar dispatches forces into Sardinia and Sicilia, Cato undertakes to keep Sicily for Pompey.

As for Cæsar well known, that it much imported a speedy end of the business, to get ships and passe the Seas after Pompey, before he could join himself with the forces of the transmarine parts; yet doubting the less, and the long time before it could be effected, that Pompey had taken with him all the shipping he could get, and thereby left him for the present no means to follow after; it remained that he attended shipping to be brought from remote parts, as out of Gallia, from Ancona and the Streights; which at that time of the year, would require a long and troublesome passage. In the mean time, he thought it no way fit that Pompey's old Army, and the two Provinces of Spain should be settled and assured; (one of them being deeply engaged to Pompey for many great and ample benefits;) or that they should have time to raise new troops, especially of horse; or that Gallia or Italie should be solicited or wrought from him in his absence. And therefore for the present, he resolved to desist from making any further pursuit after Pompey, and to go into Spain; giving order to the Dumviri of all the Municipall townes to provide shipping, and send it to Brundisium. He sent Valerius, a Legate, into Sardinia with one legion; and Cato, the Propator, into Sicily with three legions; commanding him after he had possessed Sicily, to transport his Army into Africa. Marcus Cotta governed Sardinia, and M. Cato Sicily. Tubero should by long have held Africa.

The

The Caralitani understanding that Valerius was to be sent unto themselves he baddest Italy, of their own accord thrust Cotta out of the town. Cotta arrived there, and perceiving withall that the whole Province gave consent unto it, fled presently out of Sardinia into Africa. Cato prepared and new named the Gallies in Sicily giving order to the townes to build new, and presented his direction with great diligence. Moreover, by his Legats, he mistered and involved Citizens of Rome in Lucania and Brutia requiring rateable numbers of horse and foot from the townes in Sicily, which things being almost accomplished, understanding of Curo's coming, he complained in publick how he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey; who without any providence or preparation had engaged himself in an unnecessary warre: and yet being demanded by himself and the rest in the Senate, answered confidently that he was provided of all necessaries fit for warre. And after he had thus publicly complained, he fled out of the Province. By which means, Valerius found Sardinia, and Cato Sicily, void of governments, and either brought their Armies.

Tubero arriving in Africa, found Aëtius Varus commanding the Province, who (as we have formerly shewed) having lost his cohorts at Auxim, fled forthwith into Africa, and of his own authority possessed himself of the Province, which he found without a Governour. He got together by new recruitments two compleat legions, which he raised by his knowledge and experience of the people of that Country, by reason he had governed that Province as Prator some few years before. Tubero arriving with his fleet at Utica, was by Varus kept out of the town and the Haven; neither would he suffer him to set his foot ashore, which was sick, but compelled him to weigh Anchor and depart.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

This Chapter maketh the first period of this Warre; as it is taken from the beginning of these Civil Broiles, unto Pompey's forsaking Italie, which was begun and ended in the space of 60 daies: and also openeth the pace to second resolutions, which are prosecuted as the sequel of the Historie will manifest. Containing likewise the reasons, why Cæsar made not present pursuit after Pompey, as the langes of the succeeding Wars, and the true causes of the consequences of the same. In the consideration whereof, albeit Cæsar understood the advantage of him that prosecute a receding enemy, and the hopes which might be thereby conceived of a speedy end of that warre; yet having no ready means to accomplish his desire, he thought it better to prevent such inconveniences as might happily have fallen out upon the same: and to keep his party in a progreſſe

of their active thoughts, by clearing and assuring that Western part of the Empire, which Pompey had left unto him by his departure; rather then to leave an enemy on the back to admit a cooling and languishment of their resolutions, through expectation of shipping, to follow that course which otherwise had been without exception.

In the carriage whereof we may observe, that as upon the first breaking out of these troubles, they lambered for the townes of Italie, and sought to strengthen their parties by such as had no voice in the grand Chapter of the Senate, but onely enjoyed the benefit of Municipall rights; so now being parted afunder, and the contagion of this intestine evil spread abroad, and grown of more ripeness, they made like haste to fasten upon the remoter Provinces, wherein Cæsar had the better portion. For in his share were contained Italie, Gallie, Britannia, Hispania, Sicilia; which being the prime Countreys of Europe, were consequently the flour of that Empire, for that Europe hath ever been taken for the principall and chieft part of the world.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe in Cæsar, the effects of a Stoicall or formal spirit, which are more valuable in the easiness of peace, then in the difficulties of warre. For howsoever he made shew of bettering himself, in rigging and crumming up the Gallies of his Provinces, commanding more to be built, raising new troops of horse and foot, and prosecuting his commands with purpose of an exact account; yet in the end, understanding of Curo's coming, he spent his furie in complaining of his friends, and laying the cause of those garboiles upon him, without election and content he had formerly set up, to make head against such, as otherwise might be supposed would have contained themselves in a better measure of moderation.

### CHAP. XII.

Cæsar goeth to Rome; and calling a Senate, to complain of the injuries done unto him.

These things being ended, that the Cæsar's soldiers might for the residue of the time be a little eased and refreshed, Cæsar brought them back into the next Municipall townes; where himself went directly to the Citie; and having called a Senate, he laid open the injuries and wrongs offered unto him by his Adversaries; shewing them, that he never sought honour in the State by extraordinary means; only he looked to have enjoyed the full time of his Consulship; and therewith to have been contented: which was no more then any Citizen might stand for. The Tribunes of the people had required, that

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## Observations upon Cæsar

confidence might be had of him in his absence; notwithstanding the opposition of his enemies, and Cato his bitter resistance, spending the times after his old manner, with long and tedious speeches: which if Pompey (being Consul) had disliked, why did he suffer that to pass which was censured? But if then he did allow and like of it, what reason had he to hinder him from enjoying a benefit which the people of Rome had bestowed upon him? From that, he is to speak of his patience: which appeared, in that of his own accord he moved that either party might quit their forces; which might have been very prejudicial to his honour and dignity: Declared what had been the malice and bitterness of his Adversaries, who refused to do that themselves which they required of another man; choosing rather to imbrile and confound the whole State, than to forge the command of an Army: Spoke at large as well of the wrong done unto him, by robbing the two legions from him, as also for their hard and insolent dealing, in putting the Tribunes of the people by their place and authority.

He forgot not likewise to relate the conditions which he propounded; the conference which he desired, and would not be granted. In regard whereof he prayed and required that they would take the charge of the Common-wealth, and give a helping hand to him for the government thereof. But if they should upon any doubt or mistrust refuse to join with him, he would not much importune them, but would take it into his own hands, and in the mean time let Commissioners be sent to Pompey to treat of peace. Neither did he respect what Pompey a little before had said in the Senate, that to whomsoever Embassadors were sent, to such seemed to be ascribed Authority and Power, as, on the contrary parts, which as yet then, manifested an apprehension of fear: for these were arguments of pusillanimity. For his part, he had gone beyond him in deeds of Arms and noble acts; so would he in like manner, endeavour to excel him in justice and equity.

The Senators were well pleased that Embassadors should be sent; but there was no man found that would go, every man refusing in particular, for fear of Pompey; who upon his departure from Rome, had said in the Senate, that he would hold him that stayed at Rome, in the same condition with that that were in Cæsar's Camp. So that three days were spent in debate and excess; L. Metellus, Tribune of the people, being drawn by Cæsar's adversaries to protract the time; and to hinder any matter which Cæsar should propound unto them.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe, how illcomely it is humane nature, for him that hath tasted the

twettnesse of authority, to forgo the reins of command, and again to involve his name in the list of common duty; descending from the throne of sovereignty, to the condition of obedience, and to lose his eminence in respectlesse equality: especially if the honour be Military, and of a Martiall nature. For that fallenness on us with a flounger hold, then any other power; being little capable of moderation; and waited on with the eyes and expectation of present and future ayes. Whereby men grow desperately jealous of the opinion of the world, and cannot endure to quit themselves of that care, although they have attained to the full time of their deliverance: but to be supplanted in the midst of so glorious a race, or to be pulled out of the seat of Magistracie by an abortive miscarriage, is able to surge an ambitious spirit to farre beyond the bounds of modestie, that it will not spare any endeavour to confound the great Empire with irrecoverable calamities.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe the disposition of S<sup>en</sup>ators, that by their flaying at Rome, became new all in that Faction; and thereupon refused either to take Cæsar's command or to present themselves to Pompey, as Mediators of peace. Plutarch hath two reasons, why the Senators would undertake no such matter of Commiffion as was required by Cæsar. The first is this, which is here exprest; every man fearing the displeasure of Pompey, who at his departure from Rome, had protested to hold them for enemies that went not along with him: whereas Cæsar censured their forbearance with better advantage to himself, and took their neutrality as an argument of becoming his followers. The other reason which Plutarch avoucheth, is the opinion which the Senators had of Cæsar's double dealing; as not carrying his heart in his mouth, but pretending that which he never meant. For they could not be persuaded that his end was a cessation of Armes, or such a peace with Pompey as should have kept them on foot their ancient liberty; but sought rather to overthrow the pretence of good meanings, to colour his designe of making Rome his servate. Howsoever, we may not omit what is reported to have happened between him and Metellus, more then he himself speaketh of. For going about to take Money out of the Treasurie, he was there stoutly testified by this Metellus, of whom he complained; alleging the Lawes and Acts of the State, forbidding any man to touch that Money, but in such times of extremity as were then expressed.

To which Cæsar answered; That those Lawes were only made for time of peace: but now Armes and warre required another course of proceeding. Nevertheless Metellus would not suffer him to break open the doors, until Cæsar advised him to be gone if he loved his life; for it was

was easier for him to dispatch him then to speak it; and to entered and carried away the Treasurie. Whereupon groweth that of *Florus*, *Confinium & patrimonium populi Romani ante rapuit quam Imperium*; He carried away the treasurie and patrimony of the people of Rome, before he got the Empire.

And Appian, deriding the scrupulositie of the ancient Romans, that would not touch that Treasurie but in extreme of warre against the Cæsar or Gallies, saith that Cæsar might lawfully take it, for that he had vanquished and subdued the Gallies, whereby the Romans had no further cause to fear them.

### CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar leaveth the Cite, goeth into Gallia, and treateth with the Marcellians.

Cæsar perceiving their resolution, after he had spent there in vain some few daies, that he might not lose any more time, and leave those things undone which he purposed intended, he left the Cite, and went into the further Gallia. Upon his arrival there he understood that Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, whom Cæsar had awhile before taken at Consilium and dismissed him: and that Domitius likewise was gone to take Marcellus, with eight Gallies, which he set out from Sicilia and Sardinia, and manned them with slaves, men infranchised, and his own husbandmen; sending as messengers before, certain young noble men of Marcellus, with whom Pompey upon his departure from the Cite had secretly dealt, that Cæsar's new favours might not put out of their remembrance the old benes which he had done unto them. Those of Marcellus having received this message, that their eyes against Cæsar, called into the Cite the Albicans, husbandmen and men of ancient people (who of ancient time had held amities with them, and dwelt upon the hills above Marcellus) brought Corn from all the adjacent Regions and Cisties into the town, set up offices and forges to make Armes, repaired both their walls, their navies, and their gates.

Cæsar called unto him some fifteen of the chiefest men of Marcellus, & treated with them, that the beginning of the warre might not grow from that town; who should rather follow the example of all Italies, then apply themselves to the will of any one man, not omitting such other persuasions as he thought pertinent to a sound resolution. These men reported at Marcellus when Cæsar had delivered and by the common consent of the town returned this answer: That they understood, that the people of Beneventus divided into two parts; neither was it in them to judge, or could they discern which of the two was in the right. The Leaders of these two factions were

Pompey and Cæsar, both speciall Patrons and Benefactors to their Cite: of whom, one had augmented the publick revenues of the State, and endowed it with the lands and territories of the Volce Arcomici, and the Helvi; the other, having conquered and subdued Gallias, gave it unto them, whereby their tributarie Income Gallias were much augmented, and therefore as they were equally bound to both their favours, so near would they carrie to both an equal respect, not assisting either of them against the other or receiving them within their gates.

Whilst these things were in handling, Domitius arrived at Marcellus with his shipping; and being received in, was made Governour of the City, and had the whole direction of the warre committed unto him. By his appointment the fleet was sent out into all Coasts, and such ships of burthen as they found, they brought in: the nails, timber, and tackling whereof they took to mend and rigge out other ships. When Corn socer was found in the City, was brought in publick keeping; reserving the surplus of victuall and provision for a siege, as an occasion should require.

Cæsar provoked with these injuries, brought three legions to Marcellus, determined to make towers and manicles ready for an assault, and to build twelve new Gallies at Arles, which were armed, rigged, finished, and brought to Marcellus, within thirty daies after the timber was cut down. Of these he made D. Brutus Admirall, and left C. Trebonius to follow the siege.

### OBSERVATIONS.

FROM the Marcellians we may learn, that it is farre easier to lay well then to do well: for howsoever they were able to discern the truth and to give an answer to Cæsar, well-becoming the fame and opinion of their literature and knowledge, (being an Academicke title inferior to the best, and in later times more frequented by the Romans, for the studie of Oratorie and Philosophy, than Athens; or any other chief civill school of the Muses;) yet in their actions they discovered all: taking upon them not unseasonably to arbitrate those differences, and to shew their opinion of the quarrell, by taking part with one faction. Wherein their error the more appeared, in that the party grieved was not liable to their award, but rather had occasion to gain thereby a double honour to himself; first, by forcing them, and then by pardoning their rashness. And yet some Writers do think, they did no more then they were tied unto by former treaties and leagues with the Empire (which they took to consist in Pompey's party) whereof they were loyal and zealous confederates; as appeareth by their loves, when Rome was taken by the Gallies; for having news thereof, and understanding of the composition

## Observations upon Cæsars

tion which was to be made to raise the siege from the Capitol, they provided all the gold and silver they could get, and sent it to Rome for that service. In regard whereof they were endowed with many Privileges and Immunities, both in the City, and elsewhere in the Empire. Howsoever, their hap being to respect more an exact observance of what had passed, than the farall succeeding course of things, drew upon them a sharp and bitter warre; whereof they could not be freed, but by submitting themselves to his mercy whom they had rejected. And thus we see verified that of the Poet;

Horace.

*Quicquid delirant Reges plectuntur Achivi.*  
Kings play the fools, and the poor people suffer. Which implieth also how dangerous it is for men of authority and employment to be subject to willful ambition. For as their service is of great importance to government, when it is attended with well qualified affections; so are their motions as fearful, which are carried with the violence of exorbitant passions: especially, considering the means they have, either to misemploy the power of the State, or to give way to such inconveniences as may necessarily pervert all things but the ends they aim at: besides the aptness of a high spirit not to doubt the truth of that saying which is attributed to Cæsar, *Si violandum est jus, regnum et gratia violandum est*; If a man would violate all right and law, he would do it for a kingdom.

CHAP. XIV.  
Cæsar halseth into Spain.

Cæsar.



When these things were prepared and put in order, he sent C. Fabius, one of his Legates, with three legions that had wintered about Narbonne, before him into Spain; commanding him with all speed and diligence to take the passage of the Pyrenean hills, which were kept at that time with the forces of L. Atianus; and gave order for the other legions which wintered further off to follow after. Fabius, according to his directions, made haste, put the Garrison from the passage, and by great journeys marched towards Atianus' Army.

Petrus, Varrus.

Upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, who (as is formerly related) was sent by Pompey into Spain, Atianus, Petrus, and Varrus, Pompey's Legates (of whom the one governed the nearest Province of Spain with three legions; the other held the Country from the fortress of Castilio to the river Ana, with two legions; and the third commanded the Vectones and Lusitanians with the like number of legions;) did so dispose and divide their charges, that Petrus was appointed to bring his legions out of Lusitania, through the territories of the Vectones, and join himself with Atianus; and that Varrus with his power, should keep the further Province of Spain, which

being so resolved and determined, Petrus having commanded the Lusitanians to levie horsemen, and other Auxiliarie forces; and Atianus likewise having made the like levie in the territories of the Celtiberi, Cantabris, and the rest of the barbarous Nations bordering upon the Ocean: Petrus came speedily through the Vectones to Atianus; and induced by the opportunity of the place, by mutual consent, they resolved to keep the war on foot near about Iberia.


There were with Atianus (as formerly hath been shewed) three legions, with Petrus two, besides Targetiers of the nearer Provinces, and Buckler-bearers of the further Provinces, some 80 cohorts, and of both Provinces about 5000 horse. Cæsar had sent his legions into Spain, accompanied only with six thousand Auxiliarie forces, and three thousand horse, which had been with him in the former wars. And the Galles at his request furnished him with the like number, besides the noblest and valiantest amongst them of whom he had made particular choice, to follow him in that war. To these were added the better sort of the Aquitanians and high-landers borderers upon the Province in Gallia. He was advertised that Pompey was on his journey, coming through Mauritania into Spain; and that he would speedily be there with his legions; and thereupon he borrowed money of the Centurions and Tribunes of the soldiers, and gave it to his Army, whereby he gained two points; For first, he engaged the captains by that loan to endeavour his good success; and secondly, through the good affections of the soldiers by largesse & distribution. Fabius omitted no opportunity to get the favour of the Cities near about him; which he laboured as well by Letters as Messengers; and had already made two bridges over the river Sicoris, distant one from another about forty miles; and over these bridges sent out his men to forrage; for he had spent all that was to be found on this side the river. The same thing, and upon the same occasion, did the Leaders of Pompey's Army; and oftentimes their Cavalry met and encountered together. And as it happened that two of Valus legions going out to forrage according to their daily customs, and had passed the river, the carriage and the Cavalry following after, upon a sudden (by the over-passing of horses, and swelling of the water) the bridge broke, and the rest of the Cavalry was scindled and cut off from the legions. Which Petrus and Atianus perceived, by the barrels and planks that came down the river. Atianus presently by the bridge which was adjoining to the town, and his camp, put over a legion, and all his Cavalry, and went to meet with Fabius his 2 legions. Upon whose approach, L. Plancus, that commanded the legions, being constrained by necessity, took the upper ground, dividing his men into two Battalions, and making their fronts to stand contrary waies to the

end

\* Salsus  
Callalonense  
fir.  
\* Gaudina,  
com. m. de  
the Vectones  
and Lusitanians  
with the  
like number  
of legions;  
;) did so  
dispose and  
divide their  
charges, that  
Petrus was  
appointed  
to bring his  
legions out  
of Lusitania,  
through the  
territories of  
the Vectones,  
and join  
himself  
with Atianus;  
and that  
Varrus with  
his power,  
should keep  
the further  
Province of  
Spain, which

superior  
river Sicoris,  
distant  
one from  
another  
about  
forty miles;  
and over  
these  
bridges  
sent out  
his men  
to forrage;  
for he  
had spent  
all that  
was to be  
found on  
this side  
the river.  
The same  
thing, and  
upon the  
same  
occasion,  
did the  
Leaders  
of Pompey's  
Army; and  
oftentimes  
their  
Cavalry  
met and  
encountered  
together.  
And as it  
happened  
that two  
of Valus  
legions  
going out  
to forrage  
according  
to their  
daily  
customs,  
and had  
passed the  
river, the  
carriage  
and the  
Cavalry  
following  
after, upon  
a sudden  
(by the  
over-passing  
of horses,  
and swelling  
of the  
water) the  
bridge  
broke, and  
the rest  
of the  
Cavalry  
was  
scindled  
and cut  
off from  
the  
legions.  
Which  
Petrus  
and  
Atianus  
perceived,  
by the  
barrels  
and  
planks  
that  
came  
down  
the  
river.  
Atianus  
presently  
by the  
bridge  
which  
was  
adjoining  
to the  
town,  
and his  
camp,  
put  
over  
a  
legion,  
and all  
his  
Cavalry,  
and went  
to meet  
with  
Fabius  
his 2  
legions.  
Upon  
whose  
approach,  
L. Plancus,  
that  
commanded  
the  
legions,  
being  
constrained  
by  
necessity,  
took the  
upper  
ground,  
dividing  
his men  
into two  
Battalions,  
and making  
their  
fronts to  
stand  
contrary  
waies to the

plancus five  
legions.  
Petrus  
perceived  
by the  
barrels  
and  
planks  
that  
came  
down  
the  
river.  
Atianus  
presently  
by the  
bridge  
which  
was  
adjoining  
to the  
town,  
and his  
camp,  
put  
over  
a  
legion,  
and all  
his  
Cavalry,  
and went  
to meet  
with  
Fabius  
his 2  
legions.  
Upon  
whose  
approach,  
L. Plancus,  
that  
commanded  
the  
legions,  
being  
constrained  
by  
necessity,  
took the  
upper  
ground,  
dividing  
his men  
into two  
Battalions,  
and making  
their  
fronts to  
stand  
contrary  
waies to the



end they might not be circumvented by the horsemen. And although the number were very far unequal, yet he valiantly withstood very violent charges of the enemy. The Cavalrie being thus engaged, the Ensignes of two legions were desired as far off, which Fabius had sent by way of the further bridge, to second the other two; suspecting that which was come to pass, that the Commanders of the adverse Army would take the occasion and benefit of this accident, to cut off our partie. Upon whose approach the battell ceased, and the legions on either side were brought back into their Camps.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE first observation may be taken from this designe of *Cæsar's* upon *Spain*, being at that time under the government and command of *Pompey*; the standing or falling whereof did much import the successe of that war: for which respect it was that when *Cæsar* could not buckle with the person of his enemy, he used all means to beat down his authority, as the next degree to his essence and being, and most concerning his honour and reputation. For if he took from him those Provinces, which the State had commended to his charge, and left him no interest in the obedience of such, whom he might in a sort challenge for his own people; what assurance could the other parts of the Empire have in his protection? or what could he elsewhere expect of that which they refused him?

The excellency of a General is that perfection of judgement commended by *Aristotle*, enabling him to discern, *quid primum*, or what is most materiall in that variety of undertakings, which falleth out in following a war. And if that cannot with any conveniencie be attained, then to know the next point of importance; and so consequently to distinguish the degrees of difference, as they stand ranked in the order of judicious proceeding.

For the effectual prosecuting of which designe, let us take a short view of their forces on each side, according as we find them mustered in this chapter; that by the inequality of their troops, we may judge of the want or sufficiency of their directions. *Africanus*, as it is said in the story, had three legions; and *Perceius* two legions together with 80 cohorts of Auxiliarie forces, supplied unto them by the two Provinces of *Spain*; which cohorts equalled the number of eight legions, and so in all made thirteen legions; and according to the usual rate at that time of 5000 in a legion, amounted to 65000 men: together with 5000

*Prætor* & horse; which came to seventeen thousand men, or thereabouts. To confront to great an enemy, *Cæsar* had five legions, 12000 Auxiliary troops, & 10000 *Evocati* from the *Gallies*; and peradventure 10000 *Evocati*:

which according to the former rate of a legion, did rise to 35000, or 40000 men at the most. Where *Cæsar* by the one exceeding the other well-near in a 150000 double proportion of strength, and yet failing in correspondence of successe, callath the verity of that proverb in question, *Ne Hercules contra duos*, *Hercules* himself cannot deal with two. Besides, the inequality of the place where the trial was to be made, being wholly devoted to the greater partie, was a matter of no small consequence. For he that maketh war in a Country absolutely favouring the enemy, and confronting his purposes had need of more forces than the adverse partie, or better fortune in his proceedings. And therefore *Fabius*, to prevent such mischiefs as might grow by that advantage, fought all means to draw some of the towns to his faction, and to make himself friends for his better support and securitie; according to that which was said of old, That war cannot be made without some peace.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, we may observe the means he used to secure himself of the loyalty of his Armie, and wholly to engage the souldier in his fortune. For the money he borrowed of the Tribunes and Centurions, was a speciall Tie of their affections to his service: forasmuch as no man wisheth ill to him, by whose welfare and prosperitie he hopeth to thrive; for so (wounding himself through another mans bodie) the hurt would fall upon his own head; but rather desireth such an accomplishment of his hopes, as may make himself partaker thereof. And on the other side, the largesse he made unto the souldiers did so oblige their endeavour to his purposes, that they were thereby ready to perform as much as warlike *Latins* had promised in *Latius*: his own person, on the behalf of the rest.

*Pellere si fratris gladium, iugulogque Patulcani, e ventis*  
*Condere me iubeas, plenaque in viscera partu*  
*Coniungis, iuvata peragam tamen omnia*  
*dextra.*

Bid me to stab my brother, cut  
My father's throat, or rip the gut  
Of my big-bellied wife (though loath) I'll doo't.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly, let us consider the effects of diligence and provident foresight, which do oftentimes redeem an Armie from a dishonourable overthrow; as may be learned from two circumstances in *Fabius's* directions. First, in that he trusted not to one passage over the river *Secoris*, but made two severall bridges, as well for the conveniencie as the better securitie of his people. Secondly, upon

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the occasion which the enemy might take by the breaking of the bridge, to dislodge the legions on the other side of the water, he presently sent out succours to prevent such a casualty: which albeit it might seem to have proceeded out of curious suspicion, or idle fear, yet it fell out to be no more than was requisite and expedient. Which may teach a General to be careful even of possibilities, and to prevent contingencies, with the certainty of industrious directions; accounting always that which may happen, to be as certain as any thing we most expect.

### THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

**C** Concerning *Spain*, we are to note that the *Romani* first divided it into two Provinces, which they called the *Nearer* and the *Further*; or according to *Sirabo*, the *Utter* and the *Inner*; and they were separated afunder by the river *Iberus*, now *Ebro*: And thence also they were called *Cis Iberum*; & *ultra Iberum*. *Spain* on this side *Ebro*, and *Spain* beyond. The *Nearer* Provinces, being the lesser, continued without alteration during the *Roman*'s government; and was sometimes called *Tarracensis* *Provincia*; of *Tarraco*, the principal town of the same. But the *Further*, in process of time was divided into two parts; the one called *Betis*, and the other *Lusitania*; and so the whole Region of *Spain* came to be divided into three Provinces. It was first entered by the *Romani*; by occasion of the notable siege of *Saguntum*; upon which, *P. Scipio* having subdued the *Carthaginienses*, reduced *Spain* into a Province, and left it governed by *Proconsuls*, unto the time of *Cornelius Lentulus* and *Lucius Stervinius*. Afterwards it was governed by *Proprators*, and sometimes by *Prators*; according as the Empire came to be enlarged; and had thereby many governments, for the preference of such as had supplied the places of dignity in the State. Now nevertheless, in the times of *Augustus*, and afterwards *Caesar* Augustus

Pyren calsanimbo, verticis arcu  
 Duosq; Celus late prospectat Iberas;  
 Aque eternatæ nixis digniora terris.  
 Namque Rhyecia duxere à virgine colles.  
 Hæstis Alcidæ crimen: qui forte laborum  
 Gæstionis petere cum longa tricoloris arva,  
 Perfusus Rubeo, seque Rhyecis in aula  
 Lugendam formæ virginitate reliquit  
 Pyrenem ---- and a little after,  
 Deserunt; iucent Montes per secula nomen.  
 The lofty tower of Pyren's clouds head  
 O'erlooks the Iberas, whom it proudly from Cætris,  
 For aye dividing those two spacious lands,  
 From Rhyecia daughter first these hills took  
 name,  
 Ravill'd by Iuvenal: who as he went  
 The divided Cæris's land to feize  
 Drunk at the time, and lodg'd in Rhyec Court,  
 Pyren left to be bewail'd by beauty,  
 No more a Virgin ----  
 And her lamen'd name the Hills still keep.

But according to the opinion more generally received, they are so called of the *Greek* word *ῥήγ*; for that Shepherds and Headmen let them once on fires as wethers *Diodorus Scylus*; And *Aristotle* in *Hileia* inquit *congruibus attingendo sylvestribus Sylvas calcantibus ignis terrena munifera argenti defluisse*; *crumpe postmodum terra motu supervenisset*, *equipie bitumina*, *magis copiens argenti collectis*; *argenti* *inde Marcellis* *fidem* *in vulgares obsequia* *transfudit*; *faith* *that on a time in Spain the Shepherds* *having let fire on the Woods*, *the ground was so heated thereby*, *that plain rains of silver flowed from the hills*; *and that afterwards by reason of earthquakes*, *several gapings being made in the face* *of the earth* *they gathered great plenty of silver*; *which the Marcellus made no small benefit of*. The Country of *Spain* is common to many things, as may appear in the following Catalogue; a monument of which is *Plautianus* the Poet is written, as though the Author had been a Penitent to the Kingsdome.

Quid dignum memorare tuis Hispania terris  
Ex humana valet? primo lavat equore solem  
India: tu fessos exuita luccae, iugales  
Prohitis, inque tuo respirant sidera fluctu.  
Dives equibus, frugum faciliis, pretiosa metallis,  
Principibus facunda piis. ---

What noted thing in *Spa'n* can man commend?  
As Indian seas first drench the morning Sun,  
So his tir'd fteeds wash here when day is done:  
In Spanish waves the wearied fairs take breath;  
*Spa'n* store of horse, fruits, precious metals hath;  
Breeds pious Princes. -----

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

*Cæſar coming to his Armie, advanceth forward, and incampeth near unto the Enemy.*

**N**Isbin two dayes after Cæsar came into the Camp with nine hundred horse, which he had kept with him for a convoy. The bridge broken by the tempests, was almost re-edified, and that which remained undone, he commanded to be finished in the night. And having seen the nature and situation of the place, he left six cohorts to keep the Camp and the bridge, with all the carriages of the Armie. And the next day, putting all his forces into a triple battell, he marched towards Nerda: and there standing a while in Armes, offered battell, in an equal and indifferent place. Atianus brought on his hills, under his Camp. Cæsar perceiving that Atianus at that time was not disposed to fight, determined to incamp himself (long ago) between the foot of the hill. And to keep the soldiers should be interrupted in their works by the sudden assaults and incursions of the enemy, he forbade them to fortifie with a rampier or walls, which must necessarily be discovered and seen after ass: and he caused a ditch to be made of fifteen foot broad, and in the front of the Camp new into the Encamp. The first and second battell (according as was directed) continued in that place. Which being finished, he drew his legion within the ditch, and so stood in Armes all night.

The next day he kept all his Armie within the ditch. And forasmuch as the matter to make the Rampier to be fetched farre off, he kept the like course for the finishing of the rest; allowing each side of the Camp to be fortified by a severall legion, with a ditch to be sunk about of the same scantling; and in the meane time, made the other legions to stand ready in Armes against the enemy.

Atranius and Potevius, to the end they might amuse the soldiers, and hinder the work brought down their forces to the foot of the hills, and provoked them to fight. However, Cæsar intermitted not the work, intrusting to three legions in Armes, and the mention of the ditch. The Enemy not making any long stay, or advancing further then the foot of the hills, led back their troops into the Camp. The third day Cæsar fortified his Camp with a Rempier: and commanded the rest of the cohorts and the carriages which were left in the other Camps, to be brought unto him.

OBSERVATION.

IT may be observed for *Cæsar's* custom throughout the whole course of his wars, to approach as near the enemy as conveniently he could; that to him might be better observe his passages, and be ready to take the favour of any opportunity, which either the nature of the place, or the motions of the adversary would afford him. Which was the rather his advantage, in regard of his dexterity, and superlative knowledge in the use of Arms, together with the experience of his old legions; whereby he was able, not onely to improve his own designs to the utmost of an honourable successe, but to return the disgrace of any attempt made upon his Army, upon the heads of them that were authors of the same. For otherwise, his accounting to near an enemy, might have turned to his own losse; as being full of hazard, and subject to more casualties then he that standeth further off. And therefore the rule is, That he that desireth to fit near his adversary, must be exceeding circumspect, and sure of some advantage, either from the place, or the over-awing power of his forces, or else out of his own virtue, or by some other means, to over-lay the inconveniences which attend such imagements. Which may appear by that which *Frontinus* observeth hence, touching the stratagem whereby *Cæsar* was fallen; being either to give battle, which the enemy refused; or to make good that place, from whence he could not retreat; but with danger. Whereupon a little before night he stole the making of a ditch on the back of his Army, and retiring himself within the same, stood in Arms all night, for his better safety.

The use of such ditches are of much importance, and have oftentimes redeemed an Army from great extremities : and were to frequent upon all occasions with the *Romans*, that he that shall deny them to be good ditchers, shall do them wrong. And not onely they, but other Nations could tell how to make use of the Spade.

*Pericles of Athens*, being forced by them of *Peloponnesians* into a place that had but two outlets of escape, sunk a ditch of a great latitude thwart one of the passages (as though he meant to keep out the enemy) and let his soldiers to break out the other way. The *Peloponnesians* thinking he could no way escape by the passage which the trench was cut, applied themselves wholly to the other place, where the soldiers made a show of breaking out : whereby (through the help of bridges which he had formerly provided) he escaped over the ditch without resistance. Sometimes they added other helps to these trenches, especially when they sought handsome means to get themselves away.

Gg 2 way.

## Observations upon Cæsar.

way: whereof *Senecius* may be an instance; who, having the enemy pressing him in the rears and being to pass a River, drew a ditch and a rampier at his back, in the fashion of a half-moon: which rampier he heaped with wood and combustible matter, and so setting it on fire, kept off the enemy, and passed with ease over the water.

In like manner, *Heraculus*, one of *Senecius*'s Legates, having rashly entered with a small power into a long and narrow passage, between two hills, and finding himself pursued by great forces of the enemy, sunk a crooked trench between the two Mountains; and piling the rampier with wood, set it on fire, and so cut off the enemy.

## CHAP. XVI.

*Cæsar*'s attempt to possess himself of a small hill: what disadvantage he ran by missing of his purpose, what means he used to recover himself.

Cæsar.

**B**etween the town of *Ilerda*, and the next hill where *Petennius* and *Afranius* were encamped, there was a Plain of about three hundred paces; in the midst whereof stood a little Male, rising higher than the rest: which if *Cæsar* could get and fortify, he hoped to cut off the enemy from the town, and the bridge, and from such vituals and provisions as were brought to the town. Hereupon he took three legions out of the Camp; and having put them into order of battle, he commanded the *Antesignani* of one legion to run before, & possess the place. Which being perceived, the cohorts that kept watch before *Afranius*'s Camp, were presently sent a nearer way to take that Mount. The matter came to blows: but forasmuch as *Afranius*'s parties came first to the place, our men were beaten back; and by reason of new supplies sent against them, were constrained to turn their backs, and retire to the legions.

The manner of fight which those soldiers used, was first to run furiously upon an enemy, to seize any place boldly and with great courage; not much respecting their orders or ranks, but fighting in a scattered and disorder'd fashion. If they chanc'd to be thoroughly charged, they thought it no shame to give way as druties; accustomed thereto by frequenting the *Lutitanians* and other barbarous people, that kind of fight is as commonly fallacious; that where the soldiers have long lived, they get much of the use and condition of those places. Now withstanding our men were much troubled therewith as unaccustom'd to that kind of fight: for seeing every man leave his rank, and run up and down, they feared least they should be circumvented, and let upon in flank, and on their bare and open

sides; whereas themselves were to keep their order, and not to leave their places, but upon extraordinary occasion.

Upon the running of the *Antesignani*, the legion that stood in the corner left the place, and retreated to the next Hill; although all the Army being affrighted, upon that which had happened beyond every man's opinion, contrary to former use.

*Cæsar* encouraging his men, brought out the ninth legion to second them; by that means compelling the enemy (insolent of good successes, and shrewdly pursuing our men) to turn their backs, and to retire to the town of *Ilerda*, and there to make a stand under the walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, carried on with endeavours, and going about to repair their loss, rashly followed the enemy into a place of disadvantage, and came under the Hill whereon the town stood; and as they would have made their retreat, they were charged afresh from the upper ground; the front of the place had an unequal broken ascent, and was on each side steep; extended only so much in breadth as would serve three cohorts to impetrate: neither could the Cavalry come to help them. The Hill declined easily from the town about four hundred paces in length; and that way our men had some convenience of retreat: from the disadvantage to which their desire had unadvisedly led them. The fight continued in this place: which was very unequal both in regard of the straightness thereof, as also for that they stood under the foot of the Hill, whereby no weapon fell in vain amongst them. Notwithstanding, by prowess and valour they patiently endured all the wounds they received. The enemies' forces were supplied and renewed, by such cohorts as were often sent out of the Camp through the town, that fresh men might take the place of such as were retired on. And the like was *Cæsar*'s plan to do, sending fresh cohorts to that place to relieve the wearied.

After they had thus continually fought for the space of five hours together, and that our men were much over-charged with an unequal multitude, having spent all their weapons, they drew their swords, and ascend up the hill as a charge, and assault the enemy: and thereon slain a few of them, the rest were driven to make retreat. The cohorts being thus put back to the walls, and some of them for fear having taken the town, our men found an easier retreat. Our Cavalry did from a low ground get up onto the top of the hill; and riding up and down between the two Armies, made our foot soldiers to retreat with better ease; and so the fight succeeded diversly.

About seventeen of our men were slain in the first onset. And amongst these was slain *Quintus*, Captain of the first *Haspæ* Centurie of the fourteenth legion; who, for his exceeding

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ceeding valour, was preferred to that place from the lower orders. Six hundred at least were wounded. And of *Afranius*'s party were slain *T. Cæcilius*, Centurion of a *Præmipile* order, and four Centurions more, besides two hundred soldiers. But such was the opinion of that day's business, that either side believed they left with the better.

*Afranius*'s party was so persuaded, for that they long stood to hand-to-hand, and resisted the violence of the soldiers, although in all mens judgement they were the weaker; as also, for that they at first took and held the place which gave them an advantage in the first encounter, occasion of their fight, and in the first encounter, compelled our men to turn their backs. Our men in like manner, though they had the better, in regard they had maintained fight for five hours together, in a place of disadvantage, and with an unequal multitude; that they ascend up the hill with their swords drawn, and compelled their adversaries to turn their backs, and to retreat into the town, manage the disadvantage of the place.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

In this direction which *Cæsar* gave, to take the little Hill between *Ilerda* and *Afranius*'s Camp, we may observe the danger depending upon the mischiving of an action. For the failing of a purpose, in seeking to obtain that which would prove of great advantage, doth oftentimes draw whole course of Nature, and as the men into as great inconveniences. And as the end in every design premeditated gains, so the means thereof do give way to hazard: from whence it consequently followeth, that such as are employed in execution, had need to use all endeavour, not to falsify the grounds of good directions, by negligent or inconsiderate carriage; but rather to make good any want or defect, by serious and wary prosecution of the same.

And the rather, for that it specially concerneth their good that have the charge and handling of commands: for they first are like to feel the smart of any error committed therein; or otherwise, to have the honour of any fortunate success, forasmuch as Virtue hath all her praise from Action.

Concerning the use of running, we are to understand that the *Romani* (amongst other their exercises of Arms) had special practise of this, as available in four respects, according as *Vegetius* hath noted. First, to the end they might charge the enemy with greater force and violence. Secondly, that they might possess themselves with speed, of places of advantage. Thirdly, that they might readily discover, as should be found expedient upon all occasions. And lastly, to prosecute a flying enemy to better purpose and ef-

fect. And this, as *Seneca* saith, they practised in peace; that being accustomed to needful labours, they might be able to discharge necessary duties. And *Livius*, amongst the military exercises, used by *Scipio*, to fit his men for those glorious exploits which he afterwards achieved, saith, That the first day, the legions ran four miles in Arms. And *Suetonius* affirmeth, that *Nero* Caesar having appointed a race for the *Prætorian* cohorts, carried a Target listed up before them with his own hand. And that *Galba* to make more admirably, for being fured of purpose to make himself eminent, he directed a field-race with a Target, himself running as fast as the Emperor's Chariot, for twenty miles together.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The second thing to be noted in these specialties, is the bold enterprise of *Cæsar*'s men, in charging the enemy with their swords drawn, against the Hill; whereby making them to give back, they had an easier and safe retreat from the danger wherein they were engaged. Whereby we may observe, that difficulties of extremity are never better cleared, than by adventurous and desperate undertakings: According to the condition of diseases and diftemperatures of the body, which being light and easy, are cured with mild and easy motions; but being grievous and doubtful, do require sharp and strong remedies. Which doth also in like manner appear throughout the whole course of Nature, and particularly in the weights: for as ponderous and heavy bodies are not moved, but with a counterpoise of greater force; no more can extremities of hazard be avoided, but by like perilous enforcement.

And hence groweth the difference between true valour and fool-hardy rashness; being but one and the same thing, if they were not distinguished by the subject wherein they are shewed. For to run headlong into strange adventures, upon no just occasion, were to shew more levity than discretion: And again, to use the like boldness in cases of extremity, doth shew the opinion of virtuous endeavour. As is well observed by *Homer*, in the person of *Hector*, betwixing the *Trojan* and the *Grecians*; This is the time, saith he, considering the danger wherein we are, to use that prowess and courage which we be wont of.

And accordingly, *Diomedes* censured *Glaucus* in the same place, for offering himself to the fury of the *Grecians*; Either thou art some God, fith he, or else but a lost and forlorn man. Which may serve to learn us the true use of courage; that ordinarily is never more shewed than in misemployment.

# Observations upon Cæsars

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

The part  
of a legion.

I Have already, in the observations of the second Commentary of the warres of *Gallia*, discussed particularly of the parts of a Legion: Where it appeared, that in *Cæsar's* time a Legion consisted of five thousand men, or thereabout; and according to the sufficiency and experience of the soldiers, was divided into three parts. The first and meanest of such as followed an Ensigne, were called *Hausti*; the second, *Principes*; and the third and chief fort, *Triarii*; and according to this division, had their place and precedence in the Army.

Again, each of these three kinds was divided into ten companies, which they called *Maniples*; and every *Manipulus* was subdivided into two *Centuries* or *Orders*; and in every Order there was a *Centurio* or Captain. These Orders were distinguished by the numbers of the first, second, third, and so consequently unto the tenth orders, which were the last and lowest of each of these three kinds. So that this 2. *Legion*, here mentioned, was *Centurio* of the first and prime order of the *Hausti*; and T. *Cælius*, *Centurio* of the first order of the *Triarii*, which by excellence was called *Primipilus*, or the Leader of the first company of a legion.

Antesigna  
name.

Lib. 3.

Lib. 2.

Lib. 5.

Now concerning their imbatellings, we are to note, that according to this former division of *Hausti*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, upon occasion of fights, they made a triple battell, one standing in front to another; which we call the vanguard, battell, and reer-ward. Whereof the *Hausti* were called *Antesignani*: not for that they had no Ensignes of their own; for every *Manipulus* had an Ensign; but because they stood imbatelled before the Eagle, and other the chief Ensignes of the legion. To which purpose is that of *Livius*, *Pugnatoris est, non illorum ordinis per Hostes, Principesque* & *Triarii, nec in primis Antesignani, post signa alia pugnare Aciis*: The fight began, not a regular fight by *Hausti*, *Principes* and *Triarii*; nor in that order, in which the *Antesignani* fought before the Ensigns, and another battell behind the Ensigns. And again; *Cadunt Antesignani: & non indemur pugnatoribus signis, sit ex secunda prima Aciis*: The *Antesignani* were cut down; so that let the Ensigns should be left naked of defendants, the second battell was made the first. Whereby it appeared, that most of the chiefest Ensigns were with the *Principes*, which were called *Subsigni*, as the *Triarii* *Postsigni*.

Amongst other benefits of these to particular divisions of an Army, that is not the least which is noted by *Thucydides*, *Iti iustis imperioris brevis spacio ad singulos milites descendere possent*: the commands of the general

are thereby suddenly transmitted to every particular soldier.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Cæsar* brought into great extremity by overflowing of two Rivers.



He enemy fortified the Mount for which they contended, with great and strong works; and there put a Garrison. In the space of these two days that these things were in doing, there fell out upon a sudden a great inconvenience: for such a tempest happened, that the like waters were never seen in those places. And further besides, the snow came down so abundantly from the Hills, that it overflowed the banks of the River; and in one day broke down both the bridges which *Fabius* had made: and thereby brought *Cæsar* into great extremity. For, as it is formerly related, the Camp lay between two Rivers, *Sicoris* and *Cinga*; and within thirty miles neither of these Rivers were passable, so that all the Army were of necessity couped up in that straightness: neither could the Cities which had formerly ranged themselves with *Cæsar's* party, furnish any supplies of victual and provision; nor such of the Army as had gone far for forage, being hindered by the rivers, could return to the Camp; nor yet the great convoies and reinforcements, coming to him out of Italy and Gallia, could get to the Camp.

The time of year was very hard; for there was neither old corn left of their winter provisions nor that on the ground was as yet ripe. The cities and towns near about were all emptied: for *Alaricus* before *Cæsar's* coming, had caused all the Corn to be brought into *Ulcida*; and that which remained, was since *Cæsar's* coming all spent. And for *Cæsar* (who might have relieved this necessity) by reason of the warres, they were removed by the bordering towns, and carried further off. Such as were gone out to forrage, and to seek Corn, were by the high-armed *Portugalls*, and the *Buckler-bearers* of the *hispan* *Spaniards*, much troubled and molested: for these men could easily pass the rivers, forasmuch as none of them used to go to war, without bladders for that purpose. On the contrary parts, *Africanus* abounded with all necessary provisions: great quantity of Corn was formerly provided and stored up, much was brought in from all the Provinces round about; there was also great plenty of forage in his Camp: for the bridge at *Ulcida* afforded means of all these things without dangers, and the Country beyond the river was whole and untouched, which *Cæsar* could not come unto by any

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any means. The waters continued for many days together, *Cæsar* used all means to recathe the Bridges; but neither the swelling of the River would permit him, nor yet the cohorts of the Enemy, placed on the banks of the other side, suffer him to go forwards with it: which they might easily hinder both in regard of the nature of the rivers, and the greatness of the waters, as also for that they might easily cast their weapons from along the bank, unto one place or point. Whereby it was very hard, as one and the same time to do the work, and to join the weapons.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe, that the strength of a multitude is not privileged from such casualties as be the weakness of particular persons; but doth oftentimes undergo extremities, which can neither by providence be prevented, nor removed by industry; and are such as proceed not from the endeavour of an enemy, but out of the circumstances of time and place; together with such accidents as are interlaced with the same. In respect whereof it was that *Cæsar* told *Cynus*, That in the course of war he should meet with some occasions, wherein he was not to labour and contend with men, but with chances and things; which were not to be overcome with less difficulty than an enemy; and are the more dangerous, according as they give way to scarcity and lack of victual. For as it is laid in the same place; *Scis brevem habuimus imperium, si committat ex cunctis curat*: You know that if your Army be once starved, your Empire can be but short-lived.

The remedies whereof are first, Patience: which is as requisite in a soldier as either courage or any other ability; and in such cases keepeth an Army from discontentment and disorders, until means of better fortune. And secondly, Good endeavour, which availeth much in such chances; the effect whereof will appear by that which *Cæsar* wrought, to redeem his Army from these inconveniences.

Bladders  
used by the  
Spaniards,  
into which  
men were  
over  
Rivers.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning that which is here noted of the *Spaniards*, that made nothing of passing a River with the help of bladders, which the *Romans* were ready to wonder at, then to imitate; it is observed, that as people exquisitely fashioned to a civil life, by a firm and settled police of governments are firm and settled in the whole course of their proceedings, and accordingly do shew their punctuality as well in their solemnities and

private carriages, as in their magnificent and stately buildings; so on the other side, barbarous and rude Nations, that live under general and slight laws, are as slight and rude in their actions; as amongst other things, may appear in that the *Spaniards* thought it no scorn to use the help of bladders in passing over a River, as a device common next to hand; which the people of a wise and potent State would not have done, but by a sure and substantial bridge.

The use of which bladders, as it hath been ancient amongst people of that nature, so it is continued in the same manner by the *Savages* inhabiting *Greenlands*, and the North parts of *America*; as appeareth by discoveries made of late by the *Moscovy Merchants*, about the North-west passage from whence such as are employed in those voyages have brought great and large bladders or bagges made of Seal-skins, ingeniously devised to be filled and blown with wind, and tied behind at their girdle, and at their collers to help themselves in swimming. And after the same faculty, the *Indians* of *Peru*, as *Josephus* *Acofta* lib. 4. writeth (instead of wood and stone) made their bridges over great Rivers of placed Reeds, which they fastened to the banks on each side with stakes; or otherwise of bundles of straw and weeds, by which men and beasts (if there be any credit in his story) pass over with ease. Howbeit as when the ancient *Greeks* would note a man of extreme insufficiency, they would say he could neither read nor swim: so *Cæsar* seemed of the same opinion, by commending the skill of swimming, as a thing of much consequence in the use of Armes. Whereof he made good experience in *Egypt*: where he cast himself into a small boat for his better safety; and finding it over-charged and ready to sink, he leapt into the sea, and swam to his Fleet, which was two hundred paces off, holding certain papers in his left hand above the waters, and trailing his coat of Armes in his teeth, that might not be left to the enemy.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Africanus* marcheth with three legions, to cut off a party. The scarcity of victual in *Cæsar's* Army.



It was told *Africanus*, of great troops of *Cæsar*, and convoies that were coming to *Cæsar*, but were hindered by the Rivers side: for thither were come *Archers* out of *Ruthenia*, and horsemen out of *Gallia*, with many carres and curiages; according to the custome of the *Gallies*. There were besides, of all sorts, about six thousand men, with their servants and attendants; but without orders, or any known command: for every man was at his own liberty, travelling



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ling the Countrey without fears, according to the former freedom and safety of the ways. There were likewise many young men of good rank, Senators sons, and knights of Rome; besides Embassadors from sundry States, and divers of Cæsar's Legates. All these were kept back by the River.

Athanas went in then by time with three legions, and all his horses to cut off this party; and sending his Cavalry before, set upon them unawares. Howbeit, the Cavalry of the Gallies put themselves speedily in order, and buckled with them. And as long as it stood upon indifferent terms, they being but a few, did withstand a great number of the enemy; but as soon as they discovered the Ensignes of the legions coming towards them, some few of them being slain, the rest betook themselves to the next hill.

This small time of encounter was of great consequence for the safety of our men: for by this means they had opportunity to take the upper ground. There were lost that day two hundred Archers, a few bowmen, and no great number of the soldiers boys, together with the baggage. As to the reason of all these things, it was, as well in regard of the present want, as also for fear of future poverty, as commonly it happeneth in such cases; inasmuch as a bushell of Corn was worth fifty pence, whereby the soldiers grew weak for want of sustenance; and the inconveniences thereof daily more and more increased. For so great was the alteration which happened in a few days, that our men were much afflicted with the extreme want of all necessary provisions: whereas they on the other side having all things in abundance, were held for victors. Cæsar sent unto those States which were of his party, and instead of Corn, gave them order to furnish him with Cattle; did furnish soldiers boys, and sent them to towns further off; relieving the present scarcity by all the means he could.

Athanas and Petreus, together with their friends, enlarged these things in their letters to Rome: rumour and report added much hereunto; so that the war was even almost at an end. These Messengers and Letters being come to Rome, there was great congruence from all parts to Athanas houses much congratulation and rejoicing for these things: and thereupon many went out of Italy to Pompey, some to be the first messengers of the news; others, that they might not seem to expect the event of the wars, and so prove the last that came to that party.

When the matter was brought to these difficulties and extremities, and all the ways were kept by Athanas soldiers and horsemen, and no bridges could be made. Cæsar gave order to the soldiers to make such Boats and Barks as he had in former years taught them the use of

in the warre of Britain: the keels whereof were built of light staves, and small timbers, and the upper parts made with wicker, and covered with hides. Which being finished, he laden them upon Carries, and carried them in the night some twenty two miles from the Camp. And in those Barks transporting his soldiers over the river, upon a sudden he posset himself of a little hill, which lay near unto the water side: which hill he speedily fortified before the enemy had notice thereof. Afterwards he brought over a legion to that place, and made a bridge from side to side in two dayes space: and so the convoies, which had gone forth for provisions and forage, returned back in safety; whereby he began to settle a course for provision of Corn.

The same day he passed over the river a great part of his Cavalry, who falling inlooked for upon the forragers (scattered here and there without fear or suspicion) cut off a great number of men and cattell. Whereupon the Enemy sending certain Spanish troops, bearing little round bucklers, to second and relieve the forragers, they divided themselves of purpose into two parts; the one to keep and defend the booty which they had got, and the other to resist and beat back the forces sent to charge them. One of our cohorts which had assily run out before the Army, was intercepted, and cut off: the rest returned by the bridge into the Camp in safety with a great booty.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

These Rubeni inhabited that part of Provence where Rhodes now standeth: amongst which Cæsar had ordinarily a legion or two in Garrison, for the better keeping of the Countrey in obedience, being a stout and valiant people, and using archery, as appeareth in this place. Which howsoever the course of time hath brought into utter contempt, yet let us not learn to take notice that anciently it hath been used by such as performed the greatest feats of Arms: For Hercules had but two sorts of weapons to achieve labours of so much variety; a Club for such monsters as would contend with his valour, and Bow and Arrows for others that kept farther off. And in the old warre of Troy (if Homer may be believed) Pandarus Duke of Lycia having a stable of gallant Counters, left them all at home, left he himself to furnish means at Troy to give them their ordinary keeping; and came on foot with his bow and arrows, with thick reparation of his deeds of Arms, that Aeneas fought him out in a conflict to resist the rage and extreme perillous of Diomedes. And on the contrary part, Ulysses relieved the distressed Grecians from a hot and desperate pursuit, by slaying with his bowlight valiant Trojan Hector he thrust his foot.

Con-

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres

Concerning the use of which weapon, howsoever it may seem ridiculous (to such as understand nothing but the course of the present age) to recall the long bow to the service of a batell; yet they may remember, that the Gray-goose wing gave our forefathers such advantages, that they wrought wonders amongst all Nations for deeds of Arms: which we should imitate with as much hope of success, if we could handle our bowes in any measure as they did. Of this I have already formerly treated.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

As ill  
than  
conch  
not alone.

It is a saying as true as it is old, that An ill ship cometh not alone, but is always attended with such consequences as will enforce other inconveniences; as may be observed by this extremity here mentioned. For the mischief was not bounded with the affliction which Cæsar suffered for want of needfull provisions, notwithstanding the weight was such as could not be born by ordinary patience: but the enemy enlarged it to his further advantage, by vanquishing it as a helpeless remedy, and making out dispatches to send victory to Rome. Which gave him yet further prejudice in the opinion of the world; and made those his enemies that formerly shewed no dislike of his proceedings. And thus every ill chance hath a tail of many other misfortunes; which if either providence or endeavour may prevent, it shall much import a Commander to avoid them.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Necessity  
further  
force  
conform  
facile  
de  
cap.

Lib. 5.

As Necessity maketh men constant in their sufferings, so Custom give easiness and means of deliverance: according as may appear by this direction of Cæsar, which was wholly drawn from former experience. For first the Boats here preferred, were such as he used in the warre of Britany; and as far as may be gathered out of the former Commentaries, were those he commanded to be built for his second journey: which he would now imitate in regard of the statelike of their bottomes, and not otherwise. For it is not to be supposed, that those Barks were covered with skinnies; unless peradventure he used some such as they upon occasion in that war, not expressed in the story.

Herodotus in his Clo, describeth the like; The boats (saith he) which come from Babel, down the River Euphrates, are made by the Headmen of Armenia, of light Timbers in a round fashion, without beak or pouce. Scattered with skinnies, the haw is side upward; and in these they take their passage. Such as fish for Salmon in the River of Segura, use the like boats in all respects, which they call Corrales of Corrim; being all covered with horse-skinn tanned.

Conces.

Secondly, the means he used to passe over without impeachment from the Enemy; by carrying those boats in the night-time up the River to a place of security, was such, like whereof he had formerly practised in Gallia, to passe the River Loire, being then guard of the other side by the Enemy. Whereby we see how much use and continuance doth inable men, beyond others of smaller experience: according to that, Dies Dilem docet, One day teacheth another; or, Old and wiser.

## CHAP. XIX.

The Massilians encounter with Brutus at Sea, and are beaten.

While these things were done at Ilerda, the Massilians (by the direction of L. Domitius) rigged and set out 17 Gallies, whereof eleven were covered; besides many lesser vessels which went along with them, to make the Navy seem the greater for the astonishment of the Enemy. In these they put a great number of Archers, and many Albicks, of whom we have formerly made mention; encouraging them both by rewards and promises. Domitius required certain ships for himself, and them he filled with Shepherds and Countrymen, which he had brought thither with him. The Navy being thus furnished, set forward with great confidence towards our shipping, whereof D. Brutus was Admirall, and lay at Anchor at an Island right over against Marticles. Brutus was far inferior to the enemy in shipping; but Cæsar having picked the chiefe & valiantest men out of all the legions, as well of the Antesignani as Centurions, put them aboard the Fleet, they themselves requiring to be employed in that service. These men had prepared hooks and grapvies, and had likewise furnished themselves with many Piles and Darts, and other sorts of weapons; and understanding of the Enemies coming, put to sea, and encountered with the Massilians. They fought on either side very valiantly & fiercely: neither were the Albicks much inferior to our men in prowess, being rough mountaine people, exercised in Arms, and having a little before fallen off from the Massilians, did now remember the late contract and league they had made with them. The Shepherds, in like manner (a rude and untamed kind of people, stirred up with hope of liberty), did strive to show their valour in the presence of their Master.

The Massilians (trusting to the nimbleness of their shipping, and in the skill and dexterity of their Pilots, did frustrate in a delin-

Hiding

## Observations upon Cæsar's

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ding manner) the back of our ships, when they came violently to storm them, And forasmuch as they had so room enough they drew out their Navy at length, to compass and inclose our men about, and sometimes they would single out one of our ships, and set upon them with divers of the y<sup>e</sup> vessels, or w<sup>o</sup>pe off a side of their oars in their p<sup>r</sup>etty along by them.

When they came to deal at hand (leaving aside the art & skill of the Pilots) they took themselves to the stoutness and valour of the Highlanders. Our men were said to use worse oarsmen and more unskillfull Pilots, who being lately taken out of ships of burden did not well know the true names of the tackling, and were much troubled with the heaviness and singleness of the shipping, which being made in haste of unseasoned timber was not so nimbly or ready for use. But as the matter came to hand, blows every single ship did withing undertake two at once, and being grouped in the order of themselves on each side, were certainly the enemies ships killing a great number of the Highlanders and Shepherds. Part of the ships they sunk, some they took with the men, and thereof they beat back in the Haven. That day the Mallians lost nine ships, with these they were taken. This news was brought to Cæsar at Ilerda.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

See fight.

I have formerly observed the manner of their fights, consisting of three parts. The first was, their nimble and skilfull managing of their ships, either forcibly to assault, or to lamine and wear off as might fall for their best advantage: wherein the Mallians, by reason of the skilfulness of their Pilots, had great confidence. The second was, their fight before they came to grappling, as well with great eagerness, such as were their *Rustica* and *Carpetarii*, although they and logs of wood one against another, as also with slings, arrows and darts; when by which purpose, their ships were built with iron-cables and turrets, and other advantages of height, for their casting weapons. The third was, their grappling and forcible entry; wherein, forasmuch as the matter was referred to the arbitrement of valour, the legionary bouldier carried the cause. Where we may observe, that their legions were the nurseries of their valiant and worthy men, as well for the sea as the land; being fitted up the discipline of their Military exercises, to undertake any service subject to humane industry; whereof they gave an account worthy the School-masters, as we have noted.

Neither is there at any times but that such kindredness as a discipline contains in their men in Academies of various Arts, do always keep them here or at a high place, affording at all times means of absolute and complete carriage, both for disengagement and performance.

I have a little before shewed out of *Livy* that the Antesignani were ordinarily taken for the *Haslari*; which being the easiest sort of soldiers, according to the general division of a legion, doth seem to contradict the passage in this Chapter, *Sed delictis ex omnibus legionibus Fortissimi viros Antesignanos, Centuriones Cæsar ei classis attribuerat*; But Cæsar having picked the valiantest of the Antesignani out of all the Legions, put them into this Fleet as Centurions. For the better clearing whereof, we are to note, that as the *Haslari*, or first battel of a legion, were generally taken for the Antesignani (as standing before the Eagle and other the chiefest Ensigns, which were always amongst the *Prætorum* or second battell;) so every Mangle having an Ensign in the midst of the troops, the bouldiers that stood in front before the Ensign were likewise called in Antesignani, and were the best soldiers in the Company for the Centurions, standing always in the head of the troops was accompanied with the valiantest and worthiest men; the rest filling up the rear, comforted with the Lieutenants who thereupon was called *Terti-dutior*.

Whence we may admire the temperance and disposition of a Roman Army; being full generally divided into three battels; whereof the meaneft were in the vanguard, to make triall of their strength, and to spend the heat of their young blood in the first affront of an enemy: The *Prætorum* old bouldiers, being left in the rearward, to repair any losses, which either force or casualty should cast upon their Leaders. And again, to counterpoise themselves in such a manner as the weakest might not always go to the wall, such private Companies were to be ordered, that the best men were always in front. Whereby they made such an exquisite temper, as kept every part of the Army in their full strength.

### CHAP. XX.

Upon the making of the Bridge at Ilerda, the Enemy resolved to transfer the warre into Celibertia.

When Cæsar's making of his Bridge, Cæsar's Fortune suddenly changed. The enemy, fearing the courage and valour of our Cavalry, did not so freely range abroad, as they had wont to do; sometimes seeking forage within a small distance of the Camp, to the end they might find a safe and easy retreat if occasion required; sometimes fetching a great compass, about to avoid the guard and stations of our horsemen. And if they had received but the least check, or had but deferred the Cavalry to assure off, they would have cast down their burdens, and fled away.

At last they omitted foraging for many daies together, and (which was never used by any Nation) sent out to seek, in the night, in the

## Lib. I.

Ofa.  
Calagris.

the mean time those of Ofca and Calagris being in league together, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, with offer of their services, in such sort as he should please to command. Within a few daies the Tarracoenes, Lactani, and Austani, together with the Illurgavonens, which border upon the River Ebro, followed after. Of all these he desired supplies of Corn and provision: which they promised to furnish; and accordingly got horses from all quarters, and brought grain into the Camp. In like manner, the Regiment of the Illurgavonens, understanding the resolution of their State, left the Enemy, and came unto him with their Colours: and suddenly a great alteration of things appeared.

The bridge being perfected, five great Cities and States being come in unto him, a course set for provision of Corn, and the rumour blown over of the succours and legions, which Pompey was said to come withall by the way of Mauritania; many other towns further off revolted from Afranius, and delivered to Cæsar's party.

The enemy being much affrighted and abashed at this thing, Cæsar (to avoid the great circuit by which he continually sent his horsemen about by the bridge, having got a convenient place resolved to make many trenches of thirty foot in breadth, by which he might drain some part of the river Sicoris, and make it passable by a ford. The five trenches being almost made, Afranius and Petreus did thereupon conceive a great fear, lest they should be cut off altogether from vitual and forrage, forasmuch as Cæsar was very strong in horse; and therefore they determined to leave that place, and transferre the warre into Celibertia, being the rather thereunto induced, for that of those two contrary Factions, which in the former warre had stood for L. Sutorius, such Cities as were subdued by Pompey, did yet stand in awe of his Name and Authority: and such as from the beginning had continued firm unto him, did continually love him, for the great benefits they had received from him; amongst whom Cæsar's name was not known. Therefore they expected great succours both of horse and foot, and made no doubt but to keep the warre on foot until winter.

Ofogr.

This advice being agreed upon, they gave order to take up all the boats that were on the river Iberus, and to bring them to Odogela, a town fitted upon Iberus, twenty miles from the Camp. There they commanded a bridge of boats to be made; and transporting two legions over Sicoris, fortified their Camp with a rampier of twelve foot in height. Which being known by the Discoverers, Cæsar by the extreme labour of the soldiers continued day and night in turning the course of the water. At length bringing the matter to that passe, that the horsemen (with some difficulty) durst adventure over; but the foot troops, having nothing above the water

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but their heads, were so hindered as well by the depth of the River, as the swiftness of the stream, that they could not well get over. Notwithstanding, at the same instant of time, news was brought of the making of the bridge over the River Iberus, and a sword was found in the River Sicoris.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, concerning the places here mentioned, the Reader may take notice that Ilerda (now Lerida, known by the name of *Lerida*) standeth upon the River Sicoris in the Province of Catalonia; and being fitted upon a hill, is inclosed round with a wall of hewen stones, in a pleasant and fertile Country, both for corn, wine, oyl, and fruit: as it is graphically described by *Lucan*, Lib. 1.

*Colle tumet modico, levique exerevit in altum*

*Pingue solam tumulus super hunc fundata vestigia*

*Surgit Ilerda manu; placidis prælabitur undis*

*Hesperis imer Sicoris non ultimis amnes: Saxens ingenti quem pons amplectitur arcem, Hybernæ passurus aquas.*

With a light rising to a pretty height The rich ground swells on which by ancient hand

Ilerda's plac'd: with gentle waves slides by The Sicoris, none of Spain's meanest streams, O'er it a bridge of stone with noble Arch, Subjett to suffer by the winter floods.

It was formerly a University, and at all times famous for salt meats and pickled fish. Whereunto *Horace* alludeth, when he tells his book. That although it fell out that no man would regard it, nevertheless it might serve at Ilerda to wrap Salt-fish in.

*Aut fugies Ilcam, aut nullus mittitur Ilerdam.*

Either to Illica thou'lt passe, Or to Ilerda in an oily case.

Ofca, now called *Huesca*, a town likewise of Catalonia, in former time furnished *Vitruvius*, *Vindas*, where *Sertorius* kept the fornes of the Gracides of Spain, as pledges of their loyalty, under pretext of learning the Greek and Latine tongue, which he had there caused to be taught, in form of an Academy.

In this town his hap was to be slain by *Perperius*, as *Paterculus* recordeth the story; *Tum lib. 1.* Ad Perpernam prætoris, et præscriptis, generis clarioris quam animi, Sertorium inter canam Kæpæ interemit; Romani que certam victoriæ ampari, suis excidiis, sibi turpissimè mortem.

H h 2

## Observations upon Cæsars

tem, pessimo auctoritate facinoræ. Then M. Perperna a pratorian, one of the proscribed party, of a more noble stock then mind, slew Sertorius at *Ætosa* as he was at supper; occasioning by this wicked deed of his certain victory to the Romans, ruine to his own party, and a shameful death to himself. Which *Ætosa* is by all men taken for this *Olca*.

The inhabitants boast of nothing more at this day, then that S. Lawrence was a Citizen of their town.

Calaguris. *Calaguris*, now *Calahorra*, is seated upon a hill on the banks of *Iberus*; the people whereof are famous for their courage and faithfulness to their Commanders and specially to Sertorius; Lib. 7. cap. 6 as appeareth by that of *Valerius Maximus*: *Quo perseverantius interempti Sertorio cœnibus, obsequium Cn. Pompei frustantes fidem præstarent; quia milium iam aliud in urbe eorum superaret, omnes, uxores suas, natuque, ad usum nequitiæ dapis vertentes; quoque ducibus armatis juvenis viscera sua visceribus suis alteris infelices cadaverum reliquias alere non dubitavit.* That they might demonstrate their fidelity to the ashes of Sertorius, to the very last, by defeating Pompey's liege, in regard there was no live thing else left in the City, they most inhumanely made their wives and children serve them for food; and that those which were in arms might so much the longer with their own bowels feed their bowels, they stuck not to salt up the pitiful remainders of the dead carcases.

Nevertheless *Afranius* took them in the end by continual treachery, amongst whom that antiquity of *Ibericus* is very remarkable, which is yet extant near to *Logronno*.

D. IIS. MANIBUS.  
Q. SERTORII.  
ME. BEBRICIUS. CALAGURITANUS.  
DEVOI.  
ARBISTRATUS.  
RELIGIONEM. ESSE.  
EO. SUBLATO.  
QUI. OMNIA.  
CUM. D. IIS. IMMORTALIBUS.  
COMMUNIA. HABEBAT.  
M. INCOLUMEM.  
RETINERE. ANIMAM.  
VALE. VIATOR. QUI. HEC. LEGIS.  
ET. MEO. DISCE. EXEMPLE.  
FIDEM. SERVARE.  
IPSA. FIDES.  
ETIAM. MORTUIS. PLACET.  
CORPORUM. HUMANO. EXUTIS.

In English thus: To the Div Manes (or divine ghost) of Q. Sertorius, I B. bebricus of Calaguris devote my self; supposing it a business of conscience, he being gone, who had all things in common with the immortal Gods, for me to seek

to save my own life. Farewell Traveller, who readest this, and learn of me to be faithful. Faithfulness is a thing pleasurable even to the dead, when they have put off their humane bodies.

In memorie of whose fidelity, *Augustus Cæsar* took a band of these people for a guard to his person. In this town was *Quintilian* the Rhetorician born; and being brought from thence to Rome, in Nero his time, was the first that taught a publick School for salarie: as witnesseth Saint Hierome; *Quintilianus ex Hispania Calaguritana primus Roma publicum Scholam tenuit*, & *Salario cælestis publico claruit.* *Quintilian* a Spaniard of Calaguris first taught a publick School at Rome, and had a stipend allowed him.

*Celiberia* was the Countrey lying along the River *Iberus*, inhabited by people coming out of *Gallia Celtica*: whereupon *Lincus* saith,

— prolesque a gente vestita  
Gallorum Celæ, præscites nomina Iberis.

Some Celtic fugitives from Gall. a comes  
And with the Iberi made a compound name.

*Florus* calleth them *Hispania Robur*. And *Valerius Maximus* affirmeth, That they were alwayes glad of warre, as being to end their life in happines and honour; and lamented their ill fortune to die in their beds, as a miserable and shameful end.

*His pugna recitasse decens, corpusq; cremari* sil. 1. 1.  
*Tule nefas: calo cedunt, superisque referri* lib. 1.  
*Impassim caput simenta, succenta vultus.*

— To die in fight  
They count great honour, know no funeral  
Heav'n's then 's they think, & the celestiall seats,  
Whose scattered limbs the ravenous Vulture  
eats.

Their Armes and weapons were of singular raritie: for besides the water of *Elbro*, which gave them an invincible temper, they had also a peculiar fashion of working them, as witnesseth *Diodorus Siculus*; hiding their plates of Iron in the earth, untill the worst and weakest part were eaten out with rust, and of that which remained, they made very hard swords.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The suddain alterations of warre are like the changings of mens minds upon small accidents; which are so facile to Philosophers to describe arduous, as made a great Philosopher to describe a man by the properties of mutable Animal, or a changeable living creature. And it is notably seen in this; That *Afranius* in the compass of a few daies, triumphed of Cæsar's overthrow, and

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away for fear of his power. Whence we may note the advantage coming to a party, when they shake off any eminent distresse: for as the extremity thereof threatneth ruine and destruction, so the alteration bringeth with it an opinion of victorie. And surely, such is the condition of all sorts of Miserie, that when the storm is over, and the bitterness of the affliction alaid, good times come redoubled upon the Patients; as though the vicissitude of things did enforce contrary effects. And therefore a Commander, knowing the advantage of such an opportunity, must endeavour to improve the same as may best serve to a speedy end.

## CHAP. XXI.

The Enemy setteth forward, and is slain by Cæsar.

Cæsar.



He Enemy thereupon thought it expedient for him to make the more haste; and therefore leaving two Auxiliary cohorts for the safekeeping of *Iberis*, he transported all his forces over the River *Sicoris*, and incamped himself with the two legions which formerly he had carried over. There remained nothing for Cæsar to do, but with his Cavalrie to impeach and trouble the enemy in their march. And forasmuch as it was a great compass about to go by the bridge (whereby it would come to passe, that the Enemy would get to *Iberus* a fayre nearer way) he passed over his horsemen by the foord. About the third watch, *Petereus* and *Afranius* had raised their Camps, upon a suddain the Cavalrie (showed themselves in the eve, & swarming about them in great multitudes, began to stay and hinder their passage. As soon as it began to be day-light, from the upper ground where Cæsar lay incamped, it was perceived, how the rearward of the enemy was hard laid to by our Cavalries, and how sometimes they turned head again, and were nevertheless broken and routed: sometimes their Ensignes stood suddenly still, and all their foot troops charged our horse, and forced them to give way; and then turning back, went on their way again. The soldiers walking up and down the Camp, were grieved that the enemy should so escape their hands, whereby the matter would consequently be spun out into a long war: and went unto the Centurions and Tribunes of the soldiers, praying them to beseech Cæsar not to spare them for any danger or labours, for they were ready and willing to passe the River where the horse went over. Cæsar moved through their desire and importunity, allowed them to expose his Army to a river of be it feared to expose his Army to a river of that greatness; yet he thought it expedient to put it to trial, and therefore commanded that the weakest soldiers of all the Centuries should be

taken out, whose courage or strength showed a disability to undertake that service: and as he left in the Camps with oneligion to defend the same, bringing out the other legions without carriage or burden: and having set a great number of horses and cattle both above and below in the river, he transported his Army over. Some few of the soldiers, being carried away with the stream, were succoured and taken up by the horsemen; inasmuch as not one man perished.

The Army carried this over in safety, he ranged them in order, and marched forward with a brave old battell. Such was the endeavor of the soldier, that albeit they had set a circuit of six miles to the foord, and had pent much time in passing the river, yet by the ninth hour they did overtake the enemy that rose in the afternoon about the third watch of the night.

As soon as *Afranius* and *Petereus* had discovered the legions assayre off (being terrified with the novelty of that pursuit) they betook themselves to the upper ground, and there imballasted their troops. In the meantime Cæsar refreshed his Armie in the field, and would not suffer them (being weary) to give battell: and as the enemy tried again to go on in their march, he followed after and slain them; whereby they were forced to incamp sooner then was purposed: for there were hills a little before them, and for five miles together, the passages were very difficult and narrow.

By which means (being advanced between the hills) they hoped to be free from Cæsar's Cavalrie, and by keeping the passages, to hinder the Army from following after; to the end they themselves might without peril or fear, put their forces over the river *Iberus*: which by all means was to be effected. Nevertheless, being wearied with travelling and fighting all day, they put off the business to the next morning.

Cæsar also incamped himself on the next hill; and about midnight, some of their party being gone out from the Camp, somewhat far off to fetch water, were taken by the horsemen. By them Cæsar was advertised, that the Enemy with silence began to remove, and to send their troops out of their Camp. Whereupon he commanded the sige of rising to be given, and the cry (all waking, and trussing up their baggage) to be taken up, according to the discipline of soldiers.

The Enemy hearing the cry, starting least they should be impeached in the night, and forced to fight with their burdens on their backs, or to be spun up in those straight passages by Cæsar's horsemen, staid their journey, and kept their forces within their Camp.

## Observations upon Cæsar

## OBSERVATIONS.

This passage over *Sicoris*, was in the same manner as he carried his Army over the River *Loire*, in the seventh Commentarie of the war of *Gallia*; *Pado per Equites invento pro rei necessitate opportuno, in strachia modo atque Humeri, ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu, qui vim fluminis frangerent, incolument exercitum transduxit.* The horsemen having found a foord, in sufficient convenient in regard of the necessity they were put to, to the end that the fouldry might have their arms and shouldars at liberty and not be hindered by the water from carrying their weapons, he fo disposed his horse, that he broke the force of the river with their, and so carried his Army over in safety.

The horse that stood above brake the force of the waters and those that were below took up such as were overcome with the stream, and withally gave courage to the fouldier to venture with better assurance, seeing the passage impaled in on each side to keep them from miscarrying. His attempt upon *Sicoris*, to abate the swelling pride of that River, by dividing it into many streams, was in imitation of the first *Cyrus*, who taking displeasure at the River *Cydris*, next unto *Euphrates* the greatest River of *Assiria*, drew it into three hundred and threecore channels.

*Cæsar* not finding the River *Italis* passable by a foord, and having no means to make a bridge, sunk a great trench behind the Camp from the upper part of the River, and to draw all the water behind his Army.

*Vegetius* hath a particular discourse of passing an Army over a River, whether it be by bridge or boat, or by wading, or swimming, or any other way: to which I referre the Reader.

## CHAP. XXII.

*Afranius* seeketh to take the Straights between certain *Montains*, but is prevented by *Cæsar*.

He next day following, *Petereius* went out secretly with a few horse, to discover the Country; and for the same purpose some went likewise out of *Cæsar's* Camp. *L. Decidius Saxa* was sent with a small troop to view the site of the place. And either party returned with the same report: that for five miles the way was open and champaign, and afterwards very rough and mountainous, and whosoever first took these straights might easily impeach the enemy from going further. The matter was debated in the Council of war, by *Petereius* and *Afranius*; in the time of their setting forward was debated. Most of them thought it fit to take their journey in the

night; for by that means they might come to those straights before they were perceived. Others were of opinion, that it was not possible to steal out in the night; as appeared by the cry of rising taken up the night before in *Cæsar's* Camp, upon their removing: and *Cæsar's* horsemen did so range abroad in the night, that all places and passages were kept and shut up. Neither were they to give occasion of night fights, but to avoid the same by all the means they could; for, inasmuch as in civile disension, the ordinary fouldier would rather suffer himself to be overcome, rather than by fear, then continue firm in the allegiance which he had sworn unto; whereas, in the day time, every man hath shame and dishonour before his eyes, together with the presence of the Centurions and Tribunes, with which respects a fouldier is restrained and kept within the bounds of duty. And therefore the attempt was by all means to be undertaken in the day time: and although it fell out to some loss yet nevertheless the brav of the Army might pass in safety, and possess that place which they sought for.

This opinion prevailing in their consultation, they determined by break of day the next morning to set forward. *Cæsar*, having diligently viewed the Country, as soon as day began to appear, drew all his forces out of his Camp, and marched forward in a great avenue, keeping no direct way. For the waies which led to *Ictus* and *Otogela*, were taken up with the *Æmici* ravine, and a fouldierly vallies. And in many places broken Rocks and stones did so hinder them, that they were necessarily forced to give their weapons from hand to hand, the fouldiers lifting up one another, and so they passed most part of the way. However, no man thought much of the labour; for they hoped to give an end to all their travels, if they could keep the enemy from passing over the River *Ictus*, and cut off his retreat.

At the first, *Afranius* fouldiers ran fully out of their Camp to see the Army, casting out words of derision and reproach, that for want of will, all they fled and retired to *Ictus*; for the way they held was quite contrary to that they intended; whereby they seemed to go back again: and the Commanders themselves did much approve their own counsel, that they had kept their troops within the Camp. For that which confirmed them in their opinion was, that they perceived they were come out without their carriers: whereby they hoped necessity would not suffer them to continue long there. But when they saw the troops by little and little to wind to the right hands, and that they perceived, how those that were in front had fallen backward beyond their Camp, there was no man so dull, but thought it expedient presently to march out, and make head against them. Whereupon they cried

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to Arms; and all their forces, excepting some few cohorts which were left to keep the Camp, went out, and marched directly towards *Ictus*.

The whole business consisted in speed and accleritie, which of the two should first take the straight, and possess the hill. *Cæsar's* Army was hindered by the slowness of the way: and *Afranius* party was retarded by *Cæsar's* Cavalry. The matter was come to that point, that if *Afranius* party did first get the hills, they might have quite all the safety of danger; but the slowness of the whole Army, and the cohorts left in the Camp could not be forced: for being intercepted and scolded by *Cæsar's* Armies, there was no means to relieve them.

It fell out, that *Cæsar* first attained the place, and being come out from among those great Rocks into a plain champaign, put his Army in order of battell against the enemy.

*Afranius* seeing the enemy in front, and his rearward hardly charged by *Cæsar's* Cavalry, got the advantage of a small hill, and there made his stand: and from thence sent four cohorts bearing round bucklers unto a *Montain*, which in all means fight was higher than the rest; commanding them to run as fast as they could, and possess that hill, intending to follow after with all his forces, and averting his course to get along the sides and tops of the Mountains to *Otogela*.

As the cohorts were advanced forward by *Afranius*, *Cæsar's* Cavalry perceiving their hindernment, set upon them with such violence, that they were unable any time to bear their charges, but were surrounded by them, and all cut in pieces in the sight of both Armies.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*Petereius* and *Afranius*, in their Council of war, resolved by all means to shun night quarters, as a thing full of hazard and uncertainty; and apt for fooleries and disobedience for the night, being neither a discoverer of errors, nor yet a distinguisher either of actions or confusions, but wrapping up both the virtuous and the faulty in her mantle of obscurity, or to help a mistaking; but rather giving way to impudencie and licentious confusion, leaveth no hope of what is wished: Whereas the light is a witness of every mans demeanour, and hath both honour and relik to make due respect. For which causes, *Cæsar* (as it followeth in Lib. III. the next Commentarie) in his harangue before

that untimely expedition against king *Juba*, thus rejected their advice that would have had him set forward in the night; *At etiam in media nocte, presertim addunt: quo majorem crederent licentiam habeam qui peccare conantur: namque insinuant: res autem pudent aut metu teneant, quibus rebus nos maxime adversaria est.* Further then this advice us to set out in the middle of the night: that so (I think) those men who have a mind to do mischief may take the greater liberty: for in the day-time they would be reftrein'd either through shame or fear to both which the darkness of the night is a great adversary.

And that the danger may appear as well by effect as by discourse, let the Reader take notice of that battell by night, between *Antonius Primus* on the behalf of *Seffianus*, and the *Caesarians* legions against *Severus Cæstrinus*; whereof *Tacitus* hath this description: *Prælium tota nocte varium, incertum, utriusque viribus illis exitabile. Nil animus aut manus, ut oculi quidem prostrati plaudunt, &c.* The fight was doubtful and cloudy the whole night, now this party going to the worse, by and by that. A flourish or a valiant hand availed little, neither could the eyes see before them either advantage or disadvantage. And thus are all night-works condemned, wherein either order or honour are of any moment.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I have already noted, in the former Commentaries, the use of exact and particular discovery of the Country, where a party is engaged: then which nothing doth more advantage a Commander to expedite the happy issue of a war. For by that means he is not only able to judge of any motion which the enemy shall offer, and to give true directions to frustrate and make void the same; but also able to dispose himself according as shall seem expedient for his safety. Wherein, if a place or such consequence as is here mentioned shall by design be aimed at, this historie sheweth how much it importeth either party to obtain it: and therefore *Cæsar* had reason to make his passage through *Valles* and *Rocks*, rather then to lose victory, for want of labouring in an uncase way.

This *Lucius Decidius Saxa*, or *Didius Saxa*, advanced in this discovery was afterward promoted by *Cæsar* to be Tribune of the people; whereas *Julius* was so much offended. How can *Julius* I once (saith he) this *Decidius Saxa*, a man brought from the furthest end of the world, whom we see Tribune of the people, before we ever saw him a Citizen?

## CHAP.

## Observations upon Cæsars

## CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar refused to fight upon an advantage offered, contrary to the opinion and desire of all men.

Cæsar.



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Here was an opportunity then offered of doing something to purpose; neither was Cæsar, nor on either side. Such an overthrow given before their faces, did consequently so discourage them, that it was thought they would not endure a charge; especially being compassed about with the Cæsar's, in an indifferent and open place, where the matter was to be decided by battle, which was on all sides instantly desired at Cæsar's hands: for the Legions, Centurions, and Tribunes of the soldiers came jointly unto him, desiring him to make no doubt of giving battle, for all the soldiers were very ready and forward thereunto; whereas the contrary party had proved many arguments of fear and discomfitment. First, in that they did not succeed their fellows. Secondly, inasmuch as they had not long a space from the Hill, which they had look for retreat. Neither had they withstood the charge and men of the Cæsar's; but had thronged pell-mell together, and confusedly mingled their Enemies one with another, so that neither keeping his place or his colours. And he feared the inequality and disadvantage of the Place, he might take some other of more and sterrenesse; for certainly Afranius could not long stay where he was, but must depart from thence for want of water.

Cæsar was in hope to end the matter without either blow or wound of his men; so much as he had cut off the enemy from retreat. And why then should he lose a man, whilst he it were to gain a victory? it should be better his valiant and well-deserving soldiers, to be so much as hurt or wounded? Or why should he put the matter to the hazard of Fortune? especially when it was less concerned the honour and reputation of a Commander to vanquish them by force of Arms? being moved with all with a tender consideration of such Citizens of Rome as were consequently to be harassed or slain in the fight, whereas he desired to work on his own Enemies with the silent.

Thos word Cæsar was followed by most men; and the soldiers would not stick to speak plainly amongst themselves, forasmuch as such an occasion of victory was overslippt, that when Cæsar would have them, they would not fight. It notwithstanding continued firm in his opinion, and sell a little off from the enemy so less

and about their fear and amazement. Petreius and Afranius, upon the opportunity given them, withdrew themselves into their Camp. Cæsar having possist the Hills with garrisons of soldiers, and shut up all the passages leading to Icturus, incamped himself as near as he could to the enemy.

The Commanders of the adverse party being much afflicted that they had absolutely lost all means of provision of victuals, and of gaining the River locus, consulted together of other courses. There were two ways left open; the one to return to Herda, and the other to Tarracoma. And while they were considering of these things, it was told them, that such a vent out for water were very much pressed by our Cavalry, whereupon they placed many cohorts of guards, as well of horse, as Auxiliary footmen, interlacing the legionsary cohorts amongst them; and began also to raise a rampier from the Camp to the watering-place, that the soldiers might safely, without fear, such water within the bounds of their fortification. Which work Petreius and Afranius divided between themselves; and for the perfecting of the same, had occasion to far off from the Camp: by means of whose absence the soldiers taking liberty of free speech one with another, went on, and as my man had an acquaintance or neighborhood in each others Camp, they sought him out. And first, they all gave thanks to all our party, as in they had shared them when they were first set and unincamped the day before; in regard whereof they acknowledged to hold their lives by their favour. And afterwards, inquired how one another they might safely yield themselves to their Generals, concluding that they had not done it in the beginning; and so have joined their forces with their ancient friends and kinsmen.

And having proceeded thus far in their communication, they require assurance for the lives of Afranius and Petreius; that they should find to conceive mischief against their Generals, or betray them in seeking their own safety, which things being agreed upon, they promised to come with their Engines to Cæsar's Camp; and thereupon sent to Cæsar some of the Centurions of the first Orders, as Deputies to treat of peace.

In the mean time, they invited their friends who either side into the Camps, inasmuch as both on either side were seemed but one Camp. Many of the Tribunes of the soldiers, and Centurions came to Cæsar, recommending themselves to his favour; and the like did the Grandees and chief Princes of Spain, whom they had commanded on to take part in his war, and were now man with them as Hostages and Pedlers. These inquired after their old acquaintances, and answered by word whom each man might have decessed.

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to Cæsar with some commendation. In like manner, Afranius his son dealt with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sulpicius a Legate, touching his own and his fathers life. All things founded of joy and mutual congratulation: of them that had escaped such imminent dangers; and of us, that seemed to have effected such great matters without bloodshed. Inasmuch as Cæsar (in all mens judgement) reaped great fruit of his accustomed clemency and mildnesse; and his confessions generally approved of by all men.

## THE OBSERVATION.

This Chapter containeth a passage of that note and enmity, as the like is not read in any history. For if we search the records of all Nations, from the very birth of Bellons unto times of later memory, it will no where else appear that a General should an advantage to purchase a victorious name by the bloodshed and ruin of his enemy; especially contrary to the will and desire of his Army, that had undergone such difficulties and hazards to give an end to that war; contrary to his knowledge, and late experience of the mutability and change of time and fortune; contrary to the sweet rule of war.

-----Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirit?

Valour or Crafts who craves which in a Foe?

And contrary to the rule of Arms, which are always bent against an enemy to subdue him.

This is the fruit of that other part of Military knowledge, which men do rather admire than attain unto, no little concerning the honour of a Commander. \* Confilio superare quim est imperare; gladios to overcome by counsel and good direction, rather than by the sword, and was a main step to raise him to the Empire. For howsoever the soldier (to prevent further labour) stood hard for blood, not respecting that of the \* Comick Omnia prorsus experiri verbis, quim armis sapientem decet; a wise man should try all fair words before he brings the business to blows; yet if Cæsar had been so injurious to Nature, as to have left them to have violated the fires, and suffered their fury to have violated the law of humanity more then was requisite for victory; they would afterwards have loathed themselves, and cursed their swords for such unfeeling execution; and may be doubted, would have revenged it upon his head, before the time came to strike the fatal throak of the execution of that State. Cæsar effected it also a part of divine power to have men by troops, according to that of Seneca; Hæc d'vina potentia est, greges animas publice servare: It is a divine power that saves men by troops and all at once. And therefore he chose rather to displease the soldier for the pre-

sent; then to lose that honour which attended the sparing of home-bred blood: whereof foreign enemies are not altogether so capable.

## CHAP. XXIV.

Petreius breaketh off the Treaty, and new sweareth the Soldiers to the Party.

Afranius being advertised of these passages, lest the work which he had begun, and withdrew himself into the Camp; prepared (as it seemed) to take patiently whatsoever should befall him. But Petreius was no way dissuaded thereat: for having armed his household family, he went flying with them, and a Pratorian cohort of Buckler-bearers, together with some few stipendiary horse of the barbarous people, whom he was wont to keep about him, as a guard to his person, and came suddenly and unlooked for to the Rampier, brake off the soldiers treaty; thrust our men off from the Camp, killing such as he could apprehend. The rest gathered together, and affrighted at the suddenness of the danger wrapt their coats about their left arms, and with their swords drawn, defended themselves from the Buckler-bearers and horsemen; and trusting to the nearness and propinquity of their Camp, they took courage, and got safely thither, being protected by the cohorts that had the guard at the Camp gates.

This being done, Petreius went weeping about to the Altarpies, calling the soldiers, and beseeching them not to leave & forsake him, nor yet Pompey their General, that was absent, nor to deliver them over to the cruelty of their adversaries. Presently thereupon a great concourse of soldiers was about the Pratory, requiring that every man might take an oath, not to abandon or betray the Army or their Generals, nor yet to enter into private consultation thereof without consent of the rest. He himself first took an oath to this effect, and caused Afranius to take the same. The Tribunes of the Soldiers and Centurions followed in order: and after them, the soldiers were brought out according to their Centuries, and were sworn the same oath.

They caused it also to be proclaimed, that whosoever had any of Cæsar's soldiers, should cause them to be brought out: and being brought forth, they slew them publicly before the Pratorian Pavilion. But most men concealed such as were with them, and in the night time sent them out over the Rampier, whereby it came to pass, that the terror whereof the Generals had affrighted them, the cruelty they had shewed in punishment, together with the vain religion

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of the new oath, had taken away all hope of yielding for the present; and quite changing the soldiers' minds, had reduced the matter to the former course of war.

Cæsar for his part, caused diligent inquiry to be made of such soldiers as came into his Camp during the time of the treaty, and sent them away in safety. But of the Tribunes of the soldiers and Centurions, many of their voluntary accord remained with him: whom afterwards he held in great honour; and advanced the Centurions, and such Roman Knights as were of the better rank, to the place and dignity of Tribunes.

The Africans were sorely laid unto in their foraging, and watered likewise with great difficulty. Many of the legionary soldiers had store of Corn, being commanded to take provision with them from Nicta for twenty two days. But the Buckler-bearers and Auxiliary forces had none at all, having but small means to provide and furnish themselves, and their bodies not being used to carry burthens; for which cause, a great number fled daily to Cæsar.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THAT every man is the maker of his own fortune, is evidently seen in the several carriages of these two Generals. For *Africanus* gave way to the soldiers' treaty, and resolved to suffer whatsoever that transaction should cast upon him. But *Petræus*, copying himself to their distress, raised new troubles, had further designs, and another fortune. Wherein forasmuch as the event of things riseth according as they are first directed, either by weak or strong resolutions; the success followeth the temper of a soldier (howsoever the success fall out with our desires) rather to be stiff in what he wisheth, than to make his own caselle the ready means of his adventures happiness.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

VERUE at all times hath had this privilege in the difference and degrees of state and condition, to make a Noble mans word equal to a Common mans oath: but the integrity of former ages, had a more general prerogative, avouching every mans promise for the strictness of an oath. Hence it was that the Romans upon their inrolment for a war, gave but their promise to the Tribune of the soldiers; to keep such ordinances as their Militia required: until at length that the corruption of time (sanctifying the simplicity and truth of words) did enforce them to give an oath, as the surest bond of faith and obedience: as is noted by *Livy*

at large; The soldiers (said he) which was never before that time practised, were sworn by the Tribunes, to appear upon summons from the Consuls, and not to depart without leave. For until then, there was nothing required of them but a solemn promise (whiche the soldiers made by their Decuries, and the foot troops by their Centuries) not to leave their Colours by flight, or through fear, not to forsake their ranks, unless it were either to assault an enemy, to take up an offensive weapon, or to save a Citizen; which being at first but the offer of a free mind, was now by the Tribunes required by obligation of an oath.

The form of this oath was diversely varied, as appeareth by *Aul. Gel.* and more specially in the times of the Emperours: for *Cæsar* made this addition to the soldiers oath, That they should hold neither their lives nor their children dearer unto them then the Emperour *Cæsar* and his sisters. Concerning the respect had of this Military oath, that which *Tully* saith of *Cato* is of excellent note. *Popilius* Lib. 1. 1. 1. having charge of the Province of Macedonia, M. *Popilius* Lib. 1. 1. 1. (a young other Roman youth) *Cato's* Lib. 1. 1. 1. son, a young soldier in his Army; and being occasioned to dismiss a legion, discharged likewise young *Cato*, being one of that legion. But he desirous to bear Arms in that war, continued still in the Army: whereupon *Cato* wrote from Rome to *Popilius*, requiring him, that if he suffered his son to remain in that war, he would by any means swear him again; for being discharged of his first oath, he could not lawfully fight against the Enemy.

Ever since *Constantine* the great, the soldiers were sworn by a Christian oath, as *Vegetius* noteth; to obey all things the Emperour should command them, not to leave their warfare without licence, not to slay death for the service of the Publick weal. And at this day, amongst other Nations, an oath is given to the soldier upon his inrolment, to this effect; Well and lawfully to serve the King, towards all men, and against all, without exception of persons; and if they know any thing concerning his services, to reveal the same incontinently; and not to leave their Colours, without leave either of the General or his Lieutenant.

The ancient Romans did charge their solemn and publick oaths with many ceremonies: as appeareth by that form which was used in ratifying Treaties and Transactions; Their Heralds killed a hog, and cried out withall, that the like would happen to him that first falsified his faith: whereby the Romans and Carthaginians were in their accords, had the hair of his head tied up in an extraordinary manner: the parties invoking their *Jupiter*, to grant all prosperity to him that without fraud or deceit did enter into that agreement. But if (said he that took the oath)

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Lib. 16.

I shall either do, or purpose otherwise, all the rest being safe and sound, let me alone (in the midst of the thaws and justice of my Countreys, in my own habitation and dwelling, and within my proper Temples and Sepulchres) permit me to be unfortunately even as this stone flieeth out of my hand. And (as he spake those words) he cast away a stone.

I do not find the use of a Military oath in this Nation, Howbeit, the common form of our oath is as ceremonious and significative as any other whatsoever: which may be observed by the parts it containeth, as I have seen them allegorized in some Antiquities. For thus the book being altogether a part of holy writs, implyeth a renunciation of all the promises therein contained: Secondly, the touching it with our hands, importeth the like defiance of our works, never to be successful or helping unto us. Thirdly, the kissing of the book importeth a vain depending of our vows & prayers, if we satisfy any thing thereby averred.

## CHAP. XXV.

The endevour which *Africanus* used to return to *Nicta*; but failed in his design.

Cæsar.

THE matter being in this extremity, of two means which were left unto them, it was thought the reader and more expedient, to return to *Nicta*. For having left there behind them a little Corn, they hoped to take some good course for the sequel. *Tarraco* was further off, and thereby subject to more casualties concerning their passage. In regard whereof they resolved of the former course, and so dislodged themselves.

Cæsar having sent his Cavalry before, to incumber and retard the re-re-guard, followed after himself with the legions. The hindmost of their Army were constrained (without any intermission of time) to fight with our horsemen. And their manner of fight was thus. Certain expedite Cohorts, free of carriages, marched in the vanguard of their Army, and in open and champaign places many of these Cohorts made a stand, the nature of the place did easily repell the danger wherewith they were threatened; forasmuch as such as went before, might easily from the higher ground protect them that followed after: but when they came to a valley or descent, that hope that were in the former ranks could not help them in the rear, the horsemen from the upper ground did cast their weapons with great ease and facility upon the Enemy. And then continually they were in

great hazard & danger: and still as they approached near unto such places, they called to the legions, and willed them to make a stand with their Engines, and so by great force and violence repelled our Cavalry.

Who being retired back, they would suddenly take a running, and get all down into the valley. And presently again, being to ascend into higher ground, they would there make a stand, for they were so far from having help of their own Cavalry (whereof they had a great number) that they were glad to take them between their troops, (being much affrighted with former incursions) and so to shelter and protect them: of whom if any chanced upon occasion to stray aside out of the rout the Army held, they were presently attacked by Cæsar's horsemen.

The fight continuing in this manner, they proceeded slowly on their way, advancing forward but by little and little; and oftentimes stood still, to succour and relieve their party, as to wit fell out. For having gone but four miles on their way, being very hardly laid to, and much pressed by our Cavalry, they took to an exceeding high hill; and there putting themselves into one front of a battle, fortified their Camp, keeping their carriages laden upon their horses. As soon as they perceived that Cæsar's Camp was set, and that the tents were up, and their horses put to graze; they rose suddenly about mid-day, upon hope of some rescue, by reason of our horse put out to feeding, and went on their journey.

Which Cæsar perceiving rose and followed after, leaving a few Cohorts to keep the carriages; and about the tenth hour, commanding the foragers and horsemen to be called back, & to follow after, instantly the Cavalry returned, and betooke themselves to their accustomed charge.

The fight was very sharp in the rear, inso much as they were ready to turn their backs. Many soldiers, and some of the Centurions were slain. Cæsar's troops pressed hard upon them, and threatened the overthrow of their whole Army; inso much, as they had neither means to chuse a fit place to incamp in, nor to proceed forward in their march. Whereby they were necessarily enforced to make a stand, and to pitch their Camp far from any water, in an unequal and disadvantageous place. But Cæsar forbore to meddle with them, for the same reasons that have been formerly declared; and for that day, would not suffer the soldiers to set up their tents, that they might be the readier to follow after, at what time soever, by night or by day, they should offer to break away.

## Observations upon Cæsars

The Enemy having observed the defect of our Camps, employed all that night in advancing their works, and in casting their Camp with an opposite front to our Army. The like they did all the next day: but so it fell out, that by how much their Camp was brought farther on, and the fortification grew nearer to finishing, by so much farther off they were from water: and so remedied one evil with a worse mischief. The first night, none of them went out of their Camp to fetch water: and the next day, they led out all their troops together to water, but sent no man out to forrage. Whereby Cæsar, finding them oppressed with many inconveniences, chose rather to force them to a composition, then to fight with them.

## THE OBSERVATION.

IN this troublesome and confused retreat, which these Commanders undertook, to regain the advantages that formerly they had quitted at Illerdis, we may observe the difficulties attending a weaker party, when they would free themselves from the pressures of a strong confounding enemy. For the frailty of humane fortune is always to yoked with incurable weakness, and hath to many less from the native weakness of its own endeavour: that if the opposition of foreign malice shall therewithall unhappily concur, to stop the current of our desires, there is little hope of better success, then that which the ordinary condition of extremity doth afford: which is, to hazard the perill of a wound, in seeking to avoid the smart of a rod; and to fall into Scylla, upon a desire we have to shun Charybdis: according as it befell this party. Wherein let us farther note the advantage which a Commander hath either to take or leave, when he is able to over-master the Enemy in Cavalry: for the hostesmen serving an Army Royally by making discoveries, by foragings by giving rescue upon a sudden, by doing excursions, and regarding an Enemy in his march, if (over-awed by the Cavalry of the Enemy) they cannot perform these services as is requisite; the contrary party is the stronger by so many advantages.

## CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar goeth about to inclose the Enemy, and he to hinder Cæsar.

Cæsar.

**H**owbeit Cæsar laboured to inclose them about with a ditch and a rampier, to the end he might with better ease hinder their suddain sallies and eruptions, to which he thought the Enemy would necessarily betake themselves.

The Enemy being streightened for want of forrage, and to the end also they might be the readier to escape away, caused all their horses of carriage to be killed: and in these works and consultations were two dayes spent. The third day, a great part of Cæsar's works being already perfected, the enemy (to hinder the business intended concerning the fortifications) about two of the clock in the afternoon made the Alarmes, brought out the legions, and imbatelled themselves under their Camp. Cæsar called back the legions from their work; and commanding all his horse to troop together, putteth his Army in battell. For having made such a shew of unwillingness to buckle with the enemy, against the will of the souldier and opinion of all men, he found himself subject thereupon to much inconvenience: howbeit he was relieved (for the reasons already specified) not to strike a battell; and the rather at this time, for that the space between his Camp and the enemies was so little, that if he had put them to flight, it could not have much availed him for the gaining of a perfect and absolute victory. For their Camps were not above two thousand foot asunder; whereof the Armies took up two parts, and the third was left for incursion and assault. So that if he had given battell in that nearness of the Camps, they would have found a speedy retreat upon their overthrow. For which cause he resolved to stand upon his defence, and not to give the offer, and charge them first.

Africanus had put his Army in a double battell: the first consisting of five legions; and the Auxiliary cohorts, which usually served in the wings, were now placed for succours, and made the second battell.

Cæsar's Army was ordered in a triple battell: the first was of four cohorts, a piece of the five legions: the second, of three; and the third, again of three of each legion, following in order. The Archers and Slingers were in the midst, and the Cavalry on the sides. Being thus both imbatelled, they seemed to obtain their severall ends: Cæsar, not to fight unless he were forced to it; and the Enemy, to hinder Cæsar's fortification. But the matter being drawn out in length, they stood imbatelled until sun-setting: and then returned both into their Camps.


## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**C**ontra opinionem enim militum, famamque communi videri praelio dissuulere, magnum detrimentum asserbat. Having made a shew of unwillingness to buckle with the enemy, against the will of the souldiers, and the opinion of all men, he found himself subject to much inconvenience, saith the history. Whence we may observe two

Tela tene-  
re, jam miles,  
ait, feruere  
que rursus  
subtrahere,  
non ulla  
coniter mil-  
itum digne  
bellum.  
vincunt  
Vincunt  
propterea  
bellum.  
Lucan. l. 4.

Lucan. l. 4.

In id est in  
supplicium  
satis Chary-  
bdis.



Lib. 4. d. 1.  
or militiae Rom.  
mana.

o-  
w  
A-  
u-  
it-  
o-  
ve  
re  
as  
lp  
as  
d,  
ur  
g-  
ve  
es  
at-  
le-  
re  
it  
he  
m-  
di-  
u-  
ad,  
ren  
cos



It is hard  
catching  
hairs with  
unsling  
hoards.

two points. First, that a Commander in striking a field, must partly be directed by his Army: for he may neither fight against the liking of the soldiers, nor withhold them from fighting when they are willing to embrace it, if other circumstances do indifferently concur therewithall. For when men are commanded to do what they would do, the matter is thoroughly undertaken, and the issue is commonly answerable to the readiness of their desires: but being restrained in their affections, and put besides their aptness of their voluntary disposition, there groweth such a contrariety between the Generals order and the soldiers obedience, as will hardly sympathize to beget good fortune.

And if a Leader of that fame and opinion, and so well known to his Army, as *Cæsar* was, grew into dislike with his soldiers, upon so good causes which he had to shun a battle; what hazard that Commander runneth into, who leaveth that never gave argument of his resolution in this kind, may be conceived by this passage. The second thing which I note, is, that a General must learn especially to disguise his intentions, by making the more judicious sort meane the more. For albeit the more judicious sort of men are not so well satisfied with pretences as with deeds: yet so far as the condition of Princes, contrary to the manner of Private persons, requireth such a direction of business, as may rather suit with fame and opinion, then with particular ends; it behoveth them to use such glosses, as may take away all petulant and sinister interpretations, howsoever their courses may aim at other purposes. And certainly, the generality of people are better paid with appearances then with truth; according as *Machiavelli* hath observed. But concerning *Cæsar*, that which *Epithetes* said of himself, having imbatell'd his army to fight, That he feared nothing more, then that his enemy knew not his valour; may more properly be said here. For there was nothing abused the Enemy more, or made them take up so many Bravadoes, or use so much delay before they came to composition, but that they knew not *Cæsar*. For as the Eagle is able to mount aloft in all seasons and temperatures of the air; so was his sword steeld to make way through all resistance.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Their mis-  
take of im-  
batellling.

IN the next place, the manner of their imbatellling cometh to be observed: which generally in all Editions runneth thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alaria cohors obtinebat: Cæsaris triplex, sed primam aciem quaterna cohortes ex V. legione tenebant. Has subsidia verna & rursus alia totidem, sua cuiusque legionis subsequen-*

*bantur: sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acies, equitatus latus cingebat:* And needeth the help of some excellent Critick, to make it have answerable sense to the other parts of this history. For first, how shall we understand those words, *Acies Afraniana duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alaria cohors obtinebat*; the fifth legion, and the third for succours? Shall we take the meaning to be, that the first legion stood in front, and the other stood for succours behind? Or shall we take it with *Faernus*; *Acies Afraniana duplex: ex legione prima & tertia, in subsidii locum alarie cohortes obtinebant*; *Afranius &c.* out of the first legion and the third, the cohorts which were to be in the wings were put in place of the succours? But neither by the one or by the other, is there found more then two legions: whereas there is expresse mention of five, besides the cohorts of the Country. And therefore, as not knowing other more probable, I have translated it according to *Lipsius* correction and made the text thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legio numquamque in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant*; *Afranius* had put his army in a double battle: the first consisting of five legions; and the auxiliary cohorts, which usually served in the wings, were now placed for succours, and made the second battle. The first battle consisted of five legions; and the second, of the Spanish and Auxiliary forces.

The like help must be lent to *Cæsar*: for otherwise, the text doth afford him but few cohorts, (standing thus, *Primam aciem quaterna cohortes, ex guma legione, tenebant. Has terna, & rursus alia &c.* The first battle was of four cohorts out of the fifth legion: then followed three, and then as many others &c. For undoubtedly *Cæsar* had five legions equal to *Afranius*; but being farre inferior unto him in Auxiliary troops, was driven to a more artificiall division, to help his weakness in that point. And therefore, as the same Critick hath mented it, we are to read, *Quaterna cohortes ex quinque legionibus*, four cohorts out of the five legions: which bringeth forth this sense; In the first battle were five times four cohorts, in the second five times three cohorts, and as many in the third battle. And by the addition of *sua cuiusque legionis*, of every one of the legions, it appeareth, that every legion was so divided into three parts, that it had four cohorts in the first battle, three in the second, and three in the last.

Concerning the space which their Armies imbatell'd took up, it appeareth, that the whole distance between their Camps contained two thousand foot; whereof either army took up one third, being 666 foot, or a hundred and eleven paces.

\*Cæsar  
more libe-  
re in eo  
causilla  
quid libi  
condidit  
pauco  
principum  
diversis  
est, quibus  
pauca  
reum ad  
fiam dila-  
rigenda.

\*Liber  
sile de gli  
huenti si  
pale, coli  
di quello  
che pale  
come di  
quello che  
anzi modic  
vole si  
mao vomo  
pia per le  
cole che  
pauco, che  
per quelle  
che sono.  
Lib. I. S. P.  
Tit. Liv.  
esp. 25.  
Omnia &c.  
Aquila p  
neceabili.

Lib. 4. d.  
text thus;  
militia Ro-  
mana.

## Observations upon Cæsars


pases, a little more then a furlong: but that altered more or less, as place and occasion required.

## CHAP. XXVII.

### The Treaty of Peace.

Cefix.



 The next day, Caesar went about to finish and end the fortification which he had begun; and the Enemy to try whether they might find a ford in the River Salar, and so get over. Which being perceived, Caesar carried over the light-armed Cavalry, and part of the Cavalry, and disposed them in guard along the River bank. At length, being besieged and shut up on all sides, and having kept their horses without meat and water dayes together, besides their extreme want of water, wood and corn, they required a parole, and that (if it might be) in some place out of the presence of the souldier. Which Caesar did him selfe; it were in publick, whereupon Attianus his Sonne was given in hostage to Caesar; and so they presented themselves in a place of Caesar's appointing.

of Cæsar's supplicating.

And in the hearing of both the Arminius Africanus spake to this effect; That he was not to be offended neither with his nor with the soldiers, for being faithful and obedient to the General, Cn. Pompeius; but now having made sufficient proof of their duty they had all thoroughly suffered for the same, having endured the extremity of wounds, and all necessary provisions; In which time as they were that up as women, kept from waters, kept from going out, oppress'd with a great weight of grief in body, and of dishonour in their reputation, then they were able to bear; and therefore did confesse themselves to be vanquish'd and overcome: praying and beseeching, that if there were any mercy left, they might not undergo the extremity of Fortune. And this he deliver'd as humbly and demissively as was possible.

To which Caesar answered; That these terms  
of complaints and compassion could be used to no  
man more improperly then himself; for where-  
as every man else did his duty; he only upon  
every turn of time and place, refused to fight  
with men to the end all circumstances might  
concurre apace: Albeit his Army had suffer-  
ed much wrong; in the death and slaughter  
of their fellows; yet he had kept and preserved  
such of their party as were in his power, and  
came of their own accord to move a peace; where-  
in they themselves went about to procure the  
safety of all their fellows. So that the whole con-  
flict of his proceeding with them consisted of clemency.  
The which their Commanders abhorred the  
name of Peace, and had not kept the Laws either  
of treaty or truce: for they had caused many  
simple men to be massacred and flain; that were

deceived by a shew of treaty. And therefore it  
hath befallen them, as it happeneth for the most  
part to perverse and arrogant persons, to seek  
and earnestly to desire that which a little before  
they had foolishly contemned.

they had justly might take the advantage of this their submission; or of any other opportunity of times either to augment his power or to strengthen his party: but he only required, that those Armies might be discharged, which for many years together had been maintained against him. For neither were those six Legions for any other cause sent into Spain, nor the several thousand men sent into the Kingdom of Navarre prepared, nor so many and so great Armies raised, nor such expeditions undertaken, (for some of them were so) but to keep Spain in quiet; nothing being so prepared for the use and behoof of the Province, which (by reason of their long continuance of peace) needed not any such assistance. All these things were long ago provided in a readiness against him: New forms of government were made and ordained against him: That one and the same man should be President at the gates of Rome, and the whole superintendency of the Affairs of the City business; and yet notwithstanding, hold two warlike Provinces for so many years together being absent from both of them.

*Against him, and for his ruin were changed the ancient Rights and Customs of Magnificity, to sending men to the end of their Priorship or Confineship; to the government of Provinces, as was always accustomed; but in lieu of them, were chosen some that were allowed and authorized by a few. Against him the prerogative of age did no longer prevail: but whatsoever they were that in former wars had made good proof of their valour, were now called on to command Armies. To him only was denied that which was granted to all other Generals; that when they had happily brought things to an end, they might dismiss their Army, and return home with honour, or at the least without dishonour.*

honour. All which things he notwithstanding baird  
and would suffer patiently: neither did he  
now go about to take their Army from them,  
and retain them in pay for himself, which he  
might easily do: but that they should not have  
means to make head against him. And there-  
fore, as it was said before, they should go om of  
the Provinces, and discharge their Army: if they  
did so, would hurt no man: But thus was the  
only and last means of peace.

### O B S E R V A T I O N S.

**T**Here is not any one vertue that can challenge  
a greater measure of honour, or hath more pre-  
rogative

*Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.*

rogative either amongst friends or enemies, their fidelity. For which cause it, that men are more strict in matters committed to their trust for the behoof of others, than they can well be, if the same persons concerned themselves. And yet nevertheless there is a *quatenus* in all endeavors, and strength to be limited with such appearance; as true affection may make of a good meaning; as true friendship of a good will. I took to move was the ground which *Afranius* took to move *Cæsar* for a pardon; *Non esse aut ipsius imperatoribus successedamque fidem credere valuerim; sed suis iam fecisse officio, fatigasse inflicitis iustis &c.* That he was not to be angry either with him or the soldiery, for being faithful to their command *Cn. Pompeius*; but that now they had sufficiently done their duty, and as thoroughly acquitted themselves of their charge, so were they snatched for the fame, & for as *Cicinius*, hath been a false tuiting his fortune. For as *Cicinius*, hath observed, Men in fear give reverence to words, and the tongue is ever conditioned to be serviceable to the hand.

FINIS.

the chief witness of our torments.

On the other side, *Cesar* produced nothing for his part, but such wrongs as might seem valuable to make good those courtes which he profecuted.

As first, injuries done by them, and that in the highest degree of blame against his soldiers, that they went but to seek for peace. Injuries done by their Generall, in such a fashion, as shewd not to evict the fundamental rights of the State, to bring him to ruine and confusion. Whereby he was moved to indeavour that which Nature teach every man unto, *Propellere injurias*, to repell an injury from himself: and having brought it to their terms wherein it now stood, he would give assurance to the worlds by the revenge he there took; that he entered into that warre for this only end, that might live in peace: and so required no more but that the Army should be dismissed.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The execution of the Articles agreed upon.

Cesar,



**H**e conditions propounded were most acceptable and pleasing to the soldiers as might appear by them: for being in the condition of vanquished persons, and thereupon expecting a hard measure of Fortunes, to be rewarded with liberty and exemption of Arms, was more then they could expect: in such as where there grew a controversy of the time and place of their dismissions they all generally standing upon their demands, signified both by their speeches, and by their hands, that their desire was it might be done instantly; for it could not be provided by any assurances that it would continue firm, if it were deferred untill another time. After some dispute

on each side, the matter was in the end brought to this issue; that such as had houses and possessions in Spain, should be discharged presently, and the rest at the River Varus. It was conditioned, that no man should be injured, that no man should be forced against his will to be sworn under another's command.

And Cælar promised to furnish them with Corn, until they should come to the Army Varus: adding withal, that he would have every one had full in the time of the warre, which should be found with any of his Soldiers, should be rewarded to such as loyally, and to his Soldiers be paid the value thereof in money. If any controversy afterward grew amongst the Soldiers of their own accord they brought the matter from time to time before Cælar. As when the Soldiers were Commanders affirming for want of pay, that they were not yet come, Petreus and Altranus replied, that Cælar might understand the cause, and both parties were contented with their judgement.

*A third part of the Army being dismissed in those two days, he commanded two of his legions to march before their Army, and the rest to follow after, and continually to incamp themselves not farr from them; and appoyned Q. Fulvius Calenus, a Legate, to take the charge of that business. This course being taken, they marched out of Spain to the River Vauus, and there dismissed the rest of their army.*

### OBSERVATIONS.

**T**he River *Varys* divideth *Gallia Narbonensis* from *Italy*; and was thought an indifferent place to discharge the Army, whereby there might be an end made of that warre. Wherein if any man desire to see a parallell drawn between *Cesar* and the other Leaders for matter of warre, it shall suffice to take the illue for a square of their directions; being drawn to this head within forty dayes after *Cesar* came within sight of the Enemy, as *Curius* noeth in his speech to the souldiers,

Cato fearing the prosperous success of *Cæsar* against *Pompey*, laid their was a great uncertainty in the government of their Gods; alluding peradventure to that of *Plato* in his Politics, where he saith, that there are ages, wherein the Gods do govern the world in their own perfoms; and there are other times, wherein they altogether neglect the same; the world taking a course quite contrary to that which the Gods directed. But *Lucan* spake from a surer ground; where he saith,

*Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed viſta Catoni.*  
The conquering cauſe plea'd Jove, the con-  
quered Cato.

And thus endeth the first Commentary.

## The Second Commentarie of the Civile VVarres.

### The Argument.

**H**is Commentarie hath three speciall parts. The first containeth the siege of *Marseilles*: the strange works, and extreme endeavours to take and to keep the Town. The second expresseth the vain labour which *Varro*, *Pompey's* Lieutenant, undertook, after that *Afranius* and *Petereus* were defeated, to keep the Province of *Andaluzia* out of *Cæsar's* power and command. And the third part consisteth of the expedition *Curio* made into *Africa*; and endeth with his overthrow.

### CHAP. I.

The preparations for the siege, as well within as without the Town.

**W**Hilst these things were doing in Spain, *C. Trebonius* the Legate being left to besiege *Marseilles*, had begun in two places to raise Mounts, to make Mantlets and Towers against the Town: One next unto the Port where the Ships lay; and the other in the way leading from Gallia and Spain into the town, just upon the creek of the sea near unto the mouth of the Rhodius. For three parts of *Marseilles* are in a manner washed with the sea; and the fourth part which growth passage by land; whereof that part which belongeth to the Castle (by reason of the nature of the place, and fortified with a deep ditch) would require a long and difficult siege. For the perfishing of those works, *Trebonius* had commanded out of all the Provinces great store of horses for carriages, and a multitude of men; requiring them to bring rods to make Hurdles, and other materials for the work; which being prepared & brought together, he raised a Mount of fowre score foot high.

But such was the provision, which of ancient time they had stored up in the towns, of all equipage and necessities for the war; with such provision of munition and engines, that no Hurdles made of rods or Osters were able to bear out the force thereof. For out of their great Ballists, they shot beams of twelve foot long, pointed with

Iron, with such force, as they would pierce through four courses of Hurdles, and stick in the earth. Whereby they were forced to roof their Gallery with timber of a foot square, and to bring matter that way by hand to make the Mount. A Testudo of sixty foot in length was always carried before, for the levelling of the grounds, made of mighty strong timbers, covered and armed with all things which might defend it from fire and stones, or what else should be cast upon it. But the great use of the work, the height of the walls, and towers together with the multitude of Engines, did retard and hinder the proceeding thereof.

Moreover, the *Alvici* did make often sallies out of the town, setting fire to the mounts and to the towers; which were kept by our soldiers with great facility and ease, forcing such as sallied out to return with great loss.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**H**AVING described in the former Commentaries these Engines and works here mentioned, the Reader may please (for his better satisfaction) to review those places; as also farther to note, that the word Artillery was brought down to these ages from the use of ancient Engines, which consisted of those two *Artes* and *Telumi*. And according as diversity of Art and we found means to fit these to use and occasions, so had they severall and distinct names; whereof I find chiefly these, *Ballistæ*, *Catapultæ*, *Tollenæ*, *Scor-*

## Lib. II.

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

*Scorpiões*, *Onagri*. Of each of which there are divers and severall sorts; as first, of the *Ballistæ*, some were called *Centenariæ*; others *Talentiariæ*; according to the weight of the bullet or weapon they shot. Of the rate and proportion whereof *Vitruvius*, and his learned interpreter *Daniel Barbarus*, have made accurate description. Again, some were made to shoot stones; as appeareth by that of *Tacitus*, *Alaquinidine eximius*, *quartatrem aciem promissit*; the *Ballistæ* of the fourteenth legion being an exceeding great one, beat down the army of the enemy with huge stones; and others, to shoot darts and piles of timber, headed with Iron; as it is manifested by this place. Moreover, the manner of bending of these Engines made a difference: some being drawn up with a winch or screw, and some with a wheel; some having long armes, and others having short; but the things were generally either all of iron, or of womens hairs as strongest and surest of any other kind. Of these *Scorpiões* preferred the *Ballistæ*, and the *Onagri*, as unsuitable when they were skillfully handled. The word *Onagri*, as *Ammianus Marcellinus* noteth, was of a later stamp, and imposed upon those Engines which former time called *Scorpiões*; and was taken from the nature of wilde Askes, that are said to cast stones backward with their feet at the Hunters with such violence, that oftentimes they dashed out their brains.

In the time of *Barbarus*, all these Engines were generally called *Mangonellæ*: as appeareth by *Vegancius*, in his Annotations upon *Onofrius*. Which is likewise shewed by that which *Mrs. Camden* hath inserted in the description of *Bedfordshire*, concerning the siege of *Bedford Castle*, in the time of *Henry the third*, out of an Author that was present; *Ex parte orientali sunt una Petraræ & duo Mangonellæ, quæ quoties turrin infestabant; ex parte occidentali duo Mangonellæ, quæ turrin veterem contraveniunt; & unum Mangonellum ex parte Australis*. On the East side was placed one Engine to cast stones, and two *Mangonells*, which continually plaid upon the tower; and on the West side two *Mangonells*, which beat down the old tower; and one *Mangonell* on the South side. *Secundo* powder having been out of use, it were to no purpose to insist longer upon them.

### CHAP. II.

The *Marseillians* prepare themselves for a Sea-fight.

**N** the mean time, *L. Nasidius* being sent by *Cn. Pompeius* with a Navy of sixteen ships (amongst which, some few had their beak-head of Iron) to the succour and supply of *L. Domitius* and the *Marseillians*, he passed the

straights of *Sicilie*, before *Curio* had intelligence thereof; and putting into *Metellana*, by reason of the suddain errorry of the principal men, and the Senate that took themselves to flight, he surprized one Ship in the road, and carried her away, and so held on his course to *Marseilles*. And having sent a small Bark before, he certified *Domitius* and the rest of his coming; exhorting them by all means, that joyning their forces with his supplies, they would once again give fight to *Brutus* Navy.

The *Marseillians* since their former overthrow, had taken the like number of ships; one of their *Arcevall*, and new rigged and trimmed them, and with great industrie furnished and manned them for that service; for they wanted neither Oar-men, Mariners, Sailer, nor Pilots, fit for that purpose. To these they added certain Fisher-boats, and fenced them with coverings, that the Oar-men might be safe from casting weapons; and these he filled with Archers and Engines. The Navy being thus furnished and prepared, the *Marseillians* (incited and stirred up with the prayers and tears of old men, women, and maids, to give help and defence to their City in time of extreme danger; and to fight with noble courage and confidence then formerly they had accustomed) went all aboard with great courage; as it cometh to pass through the common faults of Nature, whereby we put more confidence in things unseen and unknown, or otherwise are more troubled therewith: according as it then happened. For the coming of *Nasidius* had filled the City full of assured hope and courage; and thereupon having a good wind, they left the Port, and came and found *Nasidius* at *Tarenta* (a Castle belonging to the *Marseillians*) and there fitted themselves for a fight; encouraging each other again to a valiant carriage of that service, and consulting how it might be best performed.

The right Squadron was given to the *Marseillians*, and the left to *Nasidius*. And to the place repaired *Brutus*, having increased the number of his Ships; for these he which he took from the *Marseillians*, he had added unto the other which *Cæsar* had caused to be made at *Arelate*, and had mended them (since the last fight), and fitted them with all necessities for men of war. And the Enemy, as a vanquished party, having already failed and overthrown them when they were in their strength, they set forward against them with great assurance and courage.

Out of the Camp of *C. Trebonius*, and from all these higher places they might easily perceive and see in the City, how all the youth which remained in the town, and all the aged, with their wives and children, did from the publick

## Observations upon Cæsars

places of guard, and from the town walls, stretch out their hands towards heaven or otherwise run to their Churches and Temples; and there prostrating themselves before their Images, did desire victorie of their Gods. Neither was there any of them all that did not think the event of all their fortunes to consist in that daies service: for the chiefest of all their able men; and the best of all sorts and degrees, were by name called out; and intreated to go aboard, to the end that if any disaster or mischance should happen, they might see nothing further to be endeavoured for their safety; and if they overcame, they might rest in hope to save their Cite, either by their own valour or by some other help.

## OBSERVATIONS.

*Communi sit vitio natura, ut invisit, latitantibus, atque incognitis rebus, magis confidimus, vehementiusque exterrimur, ut tum accidit. It cometh to pass, through the common fault of nature, &c. In cases of hazard, things brought unto us by report do more abuse our judgement, either in conceiving too great hopes, or yielding too much to distrust, then any matter present can move or enforce: for these perturbations attending upon our will, are enlarged more according to the qualitie of our desires, then as they are directed by discourse of reason; and so draw men either easily to believe what their wishes do require, or otherwise to reject all as utterly lost.*

The uncertainty whereof, and the disappointment ensuing those deceivable apprehensions, hath brought the hope of this life into very flight account, being reckoned but as the dream of him that is awake; and as *Piafranti*, or a charitable delusion, to support us through the hard chances of this world, and to keep mans heart from breaking: for every mans lively hope, which never affordeth present relief, but allwaies the bitterness of extremities, by

*Virg. lib. 4. --- Dubit Deus his quoque finem, God once will put an end to these things too.*

## CHAP. III.

The fight, and the *Marsillians* overthrow.

Cæsar.



*He fight being begun, the Marsillians were wanting in no point of valour: but bearing in mind such exhortations as a little before had been given them by their friends, they fought resolutely, as though they meant not to fight again; or as if any one should chance to misfortune in that battell, he should*

*make account that he did but anticipate, for a small moment of time, the fatal end of his fellow-Citizens, who (upon taking of the towns) were to undergo the same fortune of war. Our Ships putting on by little and little, were glad to give way to the nimbleness and mobility of their shipping, which by the skill of their Pilots were well managed. And if it happened that our men had found means to grapple with any of their ships, they presently came on all sides to their rescue. Neither did the Allics show themselves backward when the matter came to hand; or were they inferior to our men in courage or valour. Moreover, out of the lesser Ships were cast infinite numbers of darts, and other weapons, wherewith our men busied in fight were suddenly wounded.*

*In this confust, two of their Triremes having spied Brutus ship (which by her flag might easily be discerned) came valently against him from two contrary parts: but the danger being foreseen, Brutus did so prevail through the swiftness of his Ship, that he a little out-stript them; whereby they coming with their full swing, did so encounter one another, that they were both very much shaken with the blow: for the beak-head of one being broken off, the water was ready to come in on all sides. Which being observed by some of Brutus party that were near about, they set upon them (being thus distressed) and quickly sunk them both.*

*The ships that came with Nalidius were found of no use, and therefore quickly left the fight; for there was not offered there unto them either the sight of the Convey, or the exhortations and prayers of their husbands and allies, as motives to hazard their lives in that quarrell: so that of them there was none wanting. Of the Ships that came out from *Marseilles*, five were sunk, and four taken. One escaped with *Nalidius* fleet, which made towards the *Ibber* Spain. One of them that remained was sent before to *Marseilles*; who coming as a messenger before the rest, and approaching near unto the town, all the multitude ran out to hear the news: which being once known, there was such a general mourning and desolation, as though the town were instantly to be taken by the Enemy. Notwithstanding, they left not off to make ready such necessaries as were requisite for defence of the same.*

## OBSERVATIONS.

*This was the second fight the Marsillians made, to keep the sea open for the aid and relief of the Town; being otherwise straightly besieged by land, & yet that was not to tenderly cared for as their shutting up by sea; the free passage whereof brought in all their profit in time of peace, and their succours in times of war:*

for



for which regard it was, that they commended to their gods the success of that enterprise, with as much devotion, as tears, vovves and prayers could expell.

The benefit a Town besieged receiveth from an open in-let by sea, cannot be better manifested, then by the siege of *Ofend*; for by that occasion specially, it endured the most famous siege that was in Christendome these many years. This *L. Nasidius* was rather a constant friend to the cause, then a fortunate Admirall: for afterwards, he refused not to take the like overthrow for the father. And surely it falleth out (whether it be through the uncertainty of sea-faring matters, or that men have fairer pretences at sea, to avoid occasions of hazard, then are found at land, or that *Pauca d'gad nascuntur in Mari*, few things of value come from the Sea, according to the proverb, or for what other cause, I know not) that there are few of those which lough honour in this kind, who have attained the least part of their desires. And yet nevertheless, some there are of famous memorie as *Hybanus*, a terror of the *Levantine* seas; *Andreas*, *Antioch* of *Gennastene* renowned for his great exploits upon the *Turk*: together with divers of our own Nation; as namely, *Sir Francis Drake*, who for skill and fortune at sea, is held matchable with any other whatsoever; besides, *Mr. Candish*; for voyages to the South; and *Sir Martin Frober*, for discoveries to the North.

Howbeit, these latter times have advantage without comparison of former ages, through the invention of the Sea-compass with the Needle; which was found out little more then three hundred years ago, by one *Flavus*, born in the kingdom of *Naples*; without which, no ship can shape a course in the Ocean, and to which nothing can be added, more then to find a perfect and ready direction for longitudes.

## CHAP. III.

The works which the legionary Souldiers made against the Town.

828.

It was observed by the legionary souldiers, that had the charge of the right part of the works, but it would much advantage them against the often eruptions and sallies of the Enemy, if they built a tower of brick under the town wall, in stead of a Hold or Receptacle: which at first they made low and little, only for the repelling of suddain assaults. Thither they usually retreated, and from thence, if they were over-charged, they made defence, either by beating back, or prosecuting an Enemy. This tower was thirty foot

square, and the walls thereof five foot thick: but afterwards (as use and experience is the master of all things) it was found by insight and industrie of men, that this tower might be of great use, if it were raised to any height; which was accordingly performed in this fashion.

When it was raised to the height of a story, they so framed the floor, that the ends of the joists did not jettie out beyond the sides of the tower; least any thing might be thrust out, or which the fire which the enemy should cast might take hold: and then paved that floor with as much brick as the *Monteleis* and *Cabions* would suffer to be laid upon the starras thus made they laid crosse beams along the sides, as a foundation to an upper story, for the top and covering of the tower. And upon these beams they raised crosse timbers, thwarting each other for the sides of the tower, and coupled them at the top with side beams.

These crosse timbers were longer, and bare further out then the square of the tower; that there might be means to fasten coverings and defences, against the blows and darts of the Enemy, whilst the workmen were finishing the walls and sides of that building. The top or upper story of this tower they likewise paved with brick and clay, that no fire might fasten on it; and laid *Mattresses* on the top thereof, to the end the floor might not be broken with any weapons shot out of Engines, nor the pavement shivered in pieces with stones cast out of Catapults.

Moreover they made three nettings or mats of Hawfers, equall in length to the sides of the tower, and four foot in breadth. And upon these three sides which confronted the Enemy, they fastened them upon poles to hang before the tower: which kind of defence they had in other places tried to be of proof, and not to be pierced with any weapon or engine. And as one part of the tower came to be covered, finished, and fortified, against any violence of the enemy, they carried their *Monteleis* and defences to the rest unfinished. The top of which tower they framed upon the first story, and then raised it up with winches or cranes, as far as the close netting would serve them for a defence. And so covered with these shelters and safeguards, they built up the sides with brick; and then again serving up the top higher, they fitted the place to build the sides higher: and as they came to the height of a story, they laid the joists of the floor in such sort, as the ends thereof were hid and covered with the wall or sides that were of brick; and so from that story they proceeded to another, by serving up the top, and raising their netting. By which means they built very safely six stories, without any wound or other danger at all; and left windows and loop-holes in the sides; for

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for the putting out of Engines in such places as they thought convenient, when by means of this power they might be in hope to defend the works near about it: they then made a *Musculum* or mouse of six foot in length, and of two foot timber square to conveigh it most safely from their tower or Bricks, another of the Enemy, and to the town wall: whereof this was the form. They cut two side groundstalls of equal length, and made the space between them to contain four foot; upon them they erected little columns of five foot high, and joined them together, putting braces of an eagle sloping in such distances, as the rafters were to be placed: to bear up the roof: and upon these braces they laid rafters of two foot square, sustaining them both at the ridge, and at the eav-  
ings, in plates and bolts of iron. They lathed the roof with Lath of four fingers broad: and so the building being made with a gulberidge handfully fashioned, the top of the house was all covered with clay, to keep the house from burning; and the corners of the house, which were fenced with thick boards, and the tower might not be washed away with peevor gutters of water, which might be letted all upon them. And lest those sides should be spoiled, either with fire or great stones, they laid *Aluteres* upon them.

fished; they then made a ladder, and drew up into  
 the tower, through the help and means of defensive  
 murtherers & gunnemen suddenly being the enemy  
 was aware of it, a ship, engine and rollers put  
 under it they brought it so near a tower of the ene-  
 mies that it being upon the wall thereof, The  
 townsmen being upon a sudden appalled there-  
 at, brought the greatest stones they could get,  
 and with levers tumbled them down from the  
 wall upon the mase: but the strength of the  
 tower did not break at the blows, and thus her  
 fell upon it, & fixed down the toping of the roof,  
 which when they perceived, they altered their  
 purpose, and got pots of Rofin and Pitch, and  
 set of them on fire, threw them down vpon the  
 Mause; which tumbling down from the roof,  
 were removed away with long books and poles. In  
 the mean times the founders that were within the  
 Mause, pulled out the lower stones that were in  
 the foundation of the tower. This Mause or  
 Miniceler was defended by our men out of the  
 brick tower; with throwpans and engines: and by  
 means thereof the Enemy was put from the wall  
 & the towers so that they could not well defend  
 the same. Many of the stones being tumbled out  
 of the foundation of the tower, parts thereof sud-  
 denly fell, and there fell leamed as though it would  
 not stand long after.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**F**Orasmuch as it requireth the labour of an industrious pen to shadow out the effects of Industrie; I will onely produce the evidence of these

works, to shew the power it hath in humane actions, rather then by any mainied or shallow discolure, weaken the force of to great an Engine. Wherein first it may be noted, how in little and the like attempting endeavours, one thing draws on another, according as practice maketh overtune to matters: For our understanding growing by degrees, hath no intuitive faculty to discern perfection, but by little & little worketh out exactness; making every Morrow Yellowclaires scholar, as a reason findeth means of discolure from causes to effects, or from effects to causes.

And to this Tower, was made at first but for a retreat of defence, gave occasion to let them see the like or better use thereof in the offensive part; for it was raised to a height convenient for the fame: which they performed with as much Art as the wit of man could use in such a work. For having made the first story, they then made the roof, for the shelter and safety of the soldier: and securing it up by little and little, they built the sides, having fenced the open place with netting, for avoiding of danger; arming it with brick and clay against fire, and with Matrestles against stones and weights. And then again they proceeded to the making of that Mantlet or *Asculum*, which gave them passage to the wall, building it with longer rafters, ranged one of two foot, and three of three, and so on, till they came to the inner rafters, and those so fitted, as neither fire, waters, weapons, nor thole could prevail against it. And thus they laboured to gain their own ends, and bought Fortune with innocent labours incour.

## CHAP. V.

The *Marseillians* get a truce of the *Romans*, and break it deceitfully.

**The Enemy** being then much appalled  
in the sudden ruine and fall of the  
tower, and greatly perplexed at so  
unexpected a mischiefe; with out-  
burst with a fear of the wrath and  
indignation of the Gods, and of the sack  
and spoil of their City: they came all unarmed,  
throwing out of the gates, waving both their  
supplive hands to the Ladies and the Army,  
Upon which words, the Army, with joyful  
cheer, and with joyful cries, ceased for the  
time, and the soldiers withdrawing themselves  
from the assault, were carried with a desire of  
hearing and understanding what would passe at  
that time.

When they came to the Legates and to the Army, they cast themselves all down at their feet praying and beseeching that things might be suspended until Caesar's arrivall. They lawfully thus their town was already taken; their works were perfected, their own tower demolished; and therefore they desisted from making any further defence:

Discipulus  
prioris  
posterior  
dies,  
Aulus Gels  
lius.

*ed* **Caesar**

**Incarnes**  
can infall

\* The first  
and the  
nine.

defence: there could be no let to hinder them from preſent ſpoil and ſucking; if upon Cæſar's arrivall they ſhould reſuſe to obey his M. indues. They ſhewed further, that if their tower were abſolutely overthrowen, the ſoldiers could not be kept from entering the town in hope of pillage, and wouid thereby bring it to a ſmall deſtruction.

These, and many the like things were uttered by them very movingly (as men learned and eloquent) with great lamentation and much weeping, whereby the Legates (moved with commiseration) withdrew the soldiers from the fortifications, put off the assault, and left a small guard to keep the works. A kind of truce being through pity and commiseration thus made, and concluded, Caesar's coming was expected; no weapon was cast; either from the town really, or from our side: informally as every man left off his care and diligence, as though all had been ended. For Caesar hid by Letters, *roga* (Frangere) charged to Trebonius, not to suffer the town to be taken by assault; *sestis* (sestis) (moved through their reluctance to contempt, together with the like reason, as well they had satisfied: *volens* put them above thirteen years of age to the sword; and those that threatened to do, were then hardly kept from breaking into the town; *rogans* the matter very graciously, that Trebonius seemed to hinder them from effecting their purposes. But the enemy, being people without Faith, do only watch for time and opportunity, to put in practice their fraud and deceit.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**11** *Field.* **T**HIS is a saying of an ancient Writer, that As our nature doth cover the body, so it doth uncover the nakedness of the mind. Whereupon it is, that men have found means to fute themselves upon occasions, according to the disposition of their inward affections, as they are either dlated with joy, or contracted with sorrow, lifted up with wealher lunkled with affliction. And accordingly the *Marcellians*, in token of their humility and humiliation, came out, wearing an attire, here called *Lufts*; which *Servius* describeth to be a kind of Coats made after the form of a Diamond, with two pendants on each side, called *Vites*.

Those which the *Romans* used of this kind, were fashioned like a Pyramid: the point whereof did signify the Elements, ascending upwards in such a pointed fashion; and by the two pendants, or bands, were denoted the Water and the Earth. They were made wholly of wool, as *Festus* writeth, *Infulæ sunt filamenta lineæ, quibus Sacerdotes, hylixæ & templi velabantur*: Infulæ are certain ornaments and tippets made of wool, wherewith the Priests use to be clad, the Sacrifices to be covered, and the Temples to be hanged: to

shew humbleness and simplicitie; whereof wool is a Hieroglyphick; for no kind of beaſts have more need of it, and ſuccour then Sheep: and therefore it was, that all Supplicants were attired with ruffles of wool. Or otherwiſe, as ſome will ſay, becauſe that the habit of the Penitencer might call to remembrance the flexible diſpoſition, which is well-beſeeming thoſe that have power and means to give help and relief: according to the uſe of Heaſthen ages, wherein their Images of their Idols had their ſciet tied with cords of wool; to ſhew the mildneſs and eaſineſs which upon devout ſupplications was found in diuine Powers, whereof wool was a Symbolum.

Macrobr.  
lib. I. Sa-  
turnalia 8.

\* Græc.  
fide omnia  
ag. c.  
Oratio  
pro Flacco.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION:

**T**he *Marsellians* being an ancient progeny of the Greeks, notwithstanding the long descent of time, and alteration of air, did keep a touch of the natural disposition of that Nation, as well in such frains of eloquence, as were familiar unto them above other peoples in 't wittitude and duplicite of dealing. Which passage of the *Marsellians* is observed by *Jully*, as a matter enforcing the due prizes of Illiquence, and the use it hath upon all occasions to draw content, with the sweetests of a well-tuned tongue, above that which may be attained either by Linguists or a strong hand. Wherefore, if we should go about to compare the force of Armes with the power of a *Magistrate*, and set a fouldier parallel to an Orator, there might hence be taken divers profitable reasons to second that saying, which hath been thought to laymore me of vain-glories then of true illiquence.

*Cedant armatoq; concedat laurea lingue ;*

Let arines to gowns, the bay-leaf yield to th'  
tongue,

Or at leastly to make a resemblance of *Phaëthre's* two Wrattlers, of whom one bring always cat's, and neverdittie periwade the other that he cat's liar, and so, howsoever he became foiled, yet let the face with an opinion of victorie: And isalwaies more easily effected, when it is attended with cunning and deceit, according to that of *Valerius Maximus*, *Efficax ille vires perdidit: ementi*; *et fallere*. The main thing of perfiditiously is lying and deceiving. But, as it is observed by *Philip de Commines*, The 'example of one sole accident is sufficient to make many men wife: fo thus may feave to teach succeeding times; not to truit to words, whereof there is no hold; but to ratifie like compositions with irrevocable performances.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, we may note, how far the anger of a *Roman* Armie was extended, upon such provocations

2 Auto.  
Perch.

ns

vocations as are here mentioned, viz. *Ad interficiendos pueros*, to the slaying of all the males above fourteen years of age; for from that stage of life, they accounted all in the rank of men; according to the institution of *Larginius Præfens*, who in his triumph of the *Sabines*, made a special Oration in the praise of his own sonnets, that had assaulted and struck the Enemy in those warres, being then but fourteen years of age; and thereupon gave him liberty to wear mans apparel, which was that *laga prætexta* (edged or faced with P. ple) whereof their histories make so often mention.

But to define precisely h. reof, were to mistake the fury of the fouldier. For howsoever the rule is certain from the law of *Natus*, that no single civi can be infinite in effects; or that a mortall hate should have a boundle revenge; yet occasion made it variable, and as irregular as that of *Alexander*; who four times saved all, and at other times (as at the taking of *Tyre*) saved none at all, but such as had taken the protection of the Temple. The inhumane cruelty of the *Turks* exceedeth all former hostilities in this kind: for they never leave any out of commutation, but for private use; and do rather chuse to destroy mankind, then suffer it to live for any other purpose then their own.

## CHAP. VI.

The *Marcellians* taking advantage of the Truce, confound with fire all the Roman works; which are afterwards re-edified.

After a few days, when our men were grown remisse and careless, suddenly about high noon, as some were gone one way, some another, and others wearied with continual labour had given themselves to rest, the weapons being cast and laid up; they rushed out of their gates, and coming with the wind that then blew hard, they set our works on fire: which was so carried and dispersed with the wind, that the Mount, the *Monteleis*, the *Testudo*, the Tower and the Engines, were all on fire at once, and were burned down and consumed, before it could be known how it came.

Our men astonished at so sudden and unthought of an accident, caught up such weapons as were next at hand, and others running precipit from the Camp, set upon the Enemy, but were hindered from following them as they fled, by Engines and Arrows from the town wall. They, on the other side, being retired under the protection of the wall, did at their ease burn down the Mount and the brick-tower: and so many months labour was, through the perfidiousness of the Enemy, and the force of the tempest, consumed and brought to nothing in a moment of

time. The *Marcellians* attempted the like the next day after, having opportunity of the like tempest; and with greater confidence sallied out, and threw much fire upon the other mount and the tower. But as our men the day before (expecting nothing less than to be surprised in that sort) had neglected more then ordinary their usual guards; so being now made wiser by that which had happened, they had made all things ready for defence: by which means, having slain a great number, they drove the rest back into the town, without effecting any thing.

*Trebonius* began again to re-edifie such works as were ruined and consumed with fire, and that with greater alacrity of the fouldier then before. For when they saw their great labours and endeavours sort to no better success, and the force broke by the treachery of the Enemy, it was agreed amongst them to have their valor thus derided. And forasmuch as there was nothing left in all the Country for the raising of a Mount, all the trees being already cut down, and brought far and near to make the first Mount, they began a Mount of a strange and unheard-of sort, on a sed with two side-walls of brick, being six foot thick, and joined together with floors. The walls were of equal distance, to the latitude of the former Mount, which was all of solid matter: and where the space between the wall was the weakness of the work did require it, there were pillars set between, and beams, and planks laid downward for the strengthening thereof. The floors, made between those walls, were laid with hurdles, and the Hurdles were covered with clay.

The fouldiers being thus sheltered on both sides with a wall, and defended in front by *Monteleis* and *Gubons* did safely, without danger, bring whatsoever was necessary for that building, whereby the work was carried on with great speed: and the loss of their former continual labour was in a short time recovered again, through the admirable dexterity and valour of the fouldier. To conclude, they left gates in the walls in such places as were fittest for sallies.

When the enemy perceived, that what they hoped could not be repaired again in a long time, was with a few daies labour re-edified and finished, whereby there was no place left to praise defeat, or to sally out with advantage, neither was there any means left by which they could prevail, either by force of Armes to hurt our fouldiers, or by fire to consume our works; and understanding likewise, that by the same manner of fortification, all that part of the town which had passage and access from the firm land, might be encompassed with a wall and with towers, that their fouldiers should not be able to stand upon their works; and perceiving withal

that

that our Army had raised a counter-mine, against the wall of their town, and that weapons might be cast by hand unto them; that the use of their Engines (wherein they much trusted) was by the narrowness of space quite taken away; and lastly, that they were not able to confront our men upon equal terms) from their walls, and from their towers, they descended to the same Articles of ventry and submissions were formerly agreed upon.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that a Generall cannot be too secure of an Enemy, that stands upon terms to render up a place. For the action being but voluntary by constraint, if haply the constraining force be removed, then that doth cease which involuntary; and for cometh by consequence to a refusal. As appeareth by this passage of the *Marcellians*; who being brought into hard terms, as well by their two overthrows at Sea, (where the siege laid so close by land, (where they were so violently assaulted, that their towers of defence made passage for the Romans to enter upon them); did nevertheless (upon cessation of those informations) alter their purposes, and entertained new hopes: which maketh good that saying;

Timeo Danaos & dona ferentes

I fear the Greeks, even when they bring their gifts.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe that a will, forward to undergo labour, doth never lack at any difficulty, nor is at all diminished by the loss of any pains; but is rather redoubled in courage and industry; especially being edged on with a desire of revenge. Which (if *Flaminius* may have credit) doth always add a third part to mans strength; as appeared by *Dionides*, being hurt in the shoulder with one of *Pindarus* arrows: for revenge whereof, he exceeded himself in a sesquialter proportion of valour, and slew more Trojans by a third part then otherwise he could.

Howsoever, as there is nothing so hard, but is subject to the endeavour of the mind: so there is nothing so easy, as to dispossess our selves of that intent care which is requisite in these employments. For these Romans, that through the greatness of their spirits had made such firm and lasted works, as the memory thereof will last with the world, were surprised when they lay in the *Imerius*, as it were unprepared, in as great remissness and neglect (howsoever drawn out by deceit) as if they had been able to do no such matter as is here reported. And therefore it be-

hoveth a Commander, to keep his Armie always seasoned with labour; forasmuch as Exercise laboure profits, and consents. An Army thrives by employment; but grows old by idleness.

Vergilius.

## CHAP. VII.

Varro raiseth great troupes to maintain Pompey's partie in Spain; but to no purpose.

*M*ARCUS VARRO in the further Province of Spain, having from the beginning understood how things had passed in Italy, and distrusting how matters would succeed with Pompey, did oftentimes give out very friendly speeches of Cæsar: That Pompey had by way of prevention gained him in his party, and honoured him with a Lieutenantcy, whereby he was obliged in dutie to him; howbeit, in his particular disposition he stood no less affected to Cæsar: neither was he ignorant of the duty of a Legat to whose trust and fidelity the government of the Province was left, as in dispoit, upon condition to be rendered up at all times and seasons, as he that commanded in chief should require it: He likewise knew very well what his own forces were, and what was the affection and disposition of all the Country towards Cæsar.

This was the subject of all his speeches with-out any show of inclining either to the one or to the other. But afterwards, when he heard that Cæsar was lodged at *Maritullus*, that *Petrenus* forces were joined with *Afranius* Armie, that great aides were come unto them, that every man was in great hope and expectation of good success, and that all the bither Province had agreed together to undertake Pompey's cause; as also what had after happened concerning the want of vittuals at *Ileida*, (all which things were writ with advantage unto him by *Afranius*); he then upon that alteration changed his mind according to the times, and levied fouldiers in all parts of the Province: and having raised two complete legions he added unto them some thirty cohorts of the Country fouldiers, to serve for wages to the Army, and gathered together great quantity of Corn, as well for the supply of the *Marcellians*, as for the provision of *Petrenus* and *Afranius*.

Moreover, he commanded them of *Gades* to build and provide ten Gallies; and ordered further, that many other should be made at *Hippalis*. He took all the money and the ornaments out of *Hercules* temple, and brought the same into the town of *Gades*, and in lieu thereof sent six Cohorts out of the Province to keep the temple. He made *Caius Gallionius* (a Roman Knight

and

Macro. lib. 4. c. 44.

Quint. Car. lib. 5.

Cæsar.

Voluntas ad laborem prompti, curia vincit, et firmitate constringitur.

Nihil tam arduum, quod animi fortitudine superari non possit. Apprehendit bellum Hispanicum.





## Observations upon Cæsars

lick *Orasion* made at Corduba, gave thanks generally to all men. As first, to the Roman Citizens, for the endeavours they used to be Masters of the town. Secondly, to the Spaniards, for driving out the Garrison. To them of Gades, that they traversed and prevented the project of the adversaries, and had restored themselves to liberty. To the Tribunes of the soldiers, and Centurions, that were come thither to keep the town, for that by their valour and magnanimity the resolution of the townsmen was assured and confirmed. He remitted such levies of money, as the Roman Citizens had promised Varro for the publick service. He restored the goods confiscated of such as had given more freely than was pleasing; and gave drivers rewards, both publick and private: the rest he satisfied with hope of good time for the future. And having lived there two daies, he went to Gades: where he gave order that the monies and monuments, which were transferred from Hercules Temple to a private house, should be carried back again to the temple. He made Q. Cassius Governor of the Province, and left with him four legions. He himself in a few daies space, with his wife (by which M. Varro, and those of Gades (by his commandment) had made, came to Tartaco; for there the Embassadors of almost all the other Province did attend his coming. And having received them with private and publick honour, in the same fashion as formerly he had used, he left Tartaco, and came by land to Narbone, and thence to Matellies: where he received first advertisement of the law made at Rome, for creating of a Dictator; and that himself was named thereunto, by M. Lepidus, Prator.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is one of *Cæsar's* peculiarities, recorded by *Suetonius*, that he never left behind him any spark or suspicion of wrath; least it might be said he did not thoroughly conquer where he came. For he that doth a bullfinch to halves, hath as much more to do before it be done: and the remainder in matter of war, groweth commonly to a greater head than that which first gave occasion of Arms; like fire, which is smothered for a time; stopp'd out afterwards with greater fury. And therefore that he might not be thought to provoke an Enemy rather than subdue him, he neglected all occasions how important soever, which might draw him into *Italy*; to the end he

might little *Spain* in a peace, answerable to an absolute victory. Which he easily effected, having over-mannered the chiefest of the party, and turned their troops out of the Country, as men altogether mistaken in the matter. The same whereof so prevailed with the rest, that rather then they would stand out, they forsook their Commanders. And having thus removed all occasions of force, he then proceeded to take away all doubtfulness, which might accompany a new reconcilment, by shewing such respects as well becomed ancient defect.

For this, he made a public acknowledgement of their general love & affection towards him:—and then taking notice of particular services, engaged them further with honours and rewards; righted such as were oppressed by the adverse party; remitted all levies and taxes (to shew the difference between his & the Enemies favour) and filled all men with hope of good times: as knowing that fair words, accompanied with large promises, are powerful instruments to work out whatsoever is desired. And so he without further trouble; as believing in the words, that What is well done, is twice done.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*M. Varro* here mentioned, made more profession of knowledge and Arts, than any other of his Nation; being thereupon styled by the name of *Dolius* or Learned; & yet in the judgement of learned Philosphers, was fitter to perform such a task. *Tully* being deprived of publick offices, handled Philosophy a little in his own language: *Pliny* and *Senecca* tell us *Varro* or *Tully*, But what are these to *Aristotle* or *Plato*? Or rather, what hath learning to do with a *Roman* General, whose knowledge consisted in their Military discipline, and in the powerful means of victorious endeavour. Wherein *Varro* was assignate, as was *Don Raimundus* the eleventh king of *Arragon*, in managing of Arms; who taking his sword in one hand, and his buckler in the other, held the force, bridle in his teeth. However, if *Qui* minus facit, minus Iamblich,

precare, he that does leaſe, offends leaſe, were a  
good excuſe, it were fitting to make him  
blameleſſe, that deſerv'd to well of learning a-  
bove all others of that Empire. But forasmuch as  
his actions appear to far inferior to that which  
is conceived of his understanding, let that be ac-  
knowledge'd which is true, that *Confidat agere*  
*pluris iſte, quam cogitare prudenter*; conſider-  
ate action is more worthleſſe than thinking.  
This *Ilipa Italica* was the chief town of the  
*Turdetani* in *Andaluſia*; & is conjectured by  
the ruines yet remaining to ſtand over againſt  
*Sevill*.

*Tarraco* is that which is now called *Tarragon*; *victrix*.

Lib. 4-  
Cap. 20.

**Cordoba.**

Lib. II. *Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.*

a Colony of *Scipio* his planting, whereof the Province taketh appellation; which is extended to *Almie* wintethell, from *Catalonia* to *Nauvarenc* and *Callicia* along the *Alpes*. *Blasé de Figenere* reporteth, that in the year 516, there was a Council held at *Tarraco* by ten Bishops; wherein it was decreed, that Sunday should always begin presently after Evening prayer (or their Vespers) on the Saturday. From whence it is, that the *Spaniards* do not work at all after that time; and so the Saturdays are tupp'd up with the feast, and the emalls of little death, as is killed in the Shambles (together with other pretty bits which they call *Morfills*) without prohibition or scruple of conscience. In this town of *Tarraco* was born *Paulus Opirius*, that noble Orator.

*Cordebus*, otherwise called *Colonia Patricia*, was held the next of worth and dignity to *Sevill*; but for excellent wits to be preferred above all the towns of *Spain*: for here first were born the two *Senecas*, the father, the Rhetorician, and the sonne, the Philosopher; together with their kintman, *Anneus Lucanus*, the divine Poet, of whom *Martial* writeth;

*Duosque Senecas, un'cumque Lucanum  
Facunda loquitur Corduba.  
One Lucan and two Senecas  
Brave Corduba doth shew.*

Besides of later times, *Avenzoar*, *Avicenna*, and *Averrois*, as excellent a Philosopher, as the other was a Physician : of whose works

—Fama loquetur Annus.  
—Fame when she's old will speak.

And from hence come those *Cordovan* skins,  
so much in request.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Concerning the office of a Dictator, whereunto *Cæſar* was named by the Pretor *Leptidus*, we are to obſerve, that the Dictatorſhip was the greateſt place of dignity in their government, as *Polubius* notes. The Conſuls, ſaith he, having each carried bundles of Rods before them, which ſignified Magiſtracy, the Dictator had always twenty four; to ſhew that the ſovereign power divided between the two Conſuls was then reduced to one ſole command. The occaſions of eſtabliſhing a Dictator were divers; howbeit, it was commonly to take order in ſome great matter of conſequence, which fell out to be extraordinary, and required the command of one man. And as it is in the Faſtes or Records of the Capitol, either *Reipub. regendi cauſa*, to govern the commonwealth,

as was this first Dictatorship of *Cæsar*; or otherwise, *M. Fabius Ambulius Diti*, *dictator* *facunda* *causæ*, *M. Fab. Amb.* was created Dictator to quiet a Edition; and at another time, *Cn. Quinctius Varus Dictator*, *clavi figendi* *causæ* to strike in the nail; which was one of the superstitious they used in time of pettience, and to divers the like. Of all which there is this form expressed by *Tully*: *Si quando dillum gravem diffidit Civium crementum, minus ne amplius fex mensis, nisi senatus decreverit, interitis jura quæ duo Consules tenent, esse quo finistra ditiis Mæstros Populi esse*. If at any time either a great quarrell happen, or discord arise amongst the Citizens, then let one man have the same power that the two Consuls have, for six months, and no longer, unless the Senate shall otherwise decree; and let this man (in an ill hour) be termed the Matter of the People.

But forasmuch as *Magister Populi* was a harsh and odious name to the people, they called him by a more modest name, *Dictator*; whereof *Varro* giveth this reason, *Dictator quod a Consule dicebatur, cuius dicto audieris omnes essent*: He was called Dictator because he was named to that office by the Consul, whose orders they were all to be obedient to. And as none could name a Dictator but the Consul (for *Cæsar* was named by the Prætor in an extraordinary time; ) so none could be named to that place, but such as were or had been Consuls: *Consulares legere ita lex jubet* Liv. lib. 1; *but de Dictatore creando lata*; the law for the creating a Dictator commands to chuse consular men only. To which may be added the circumstance of time, which was always in the night; *Nocte deinde silent, ut mos est, Populorum Dictatorem dixit*, he named *Populum* to the Dictatorship (as the customers are) in the dead of the night. The Dictator sometimes is the dead of the night: they are especially distinguished from Monarchs; and thereupon *Cæsar* adjudgeth *Syllæ*, Dictatorship to be a mere tyranny, and so did *Plutarch* *Cæsar*'s; because both were prorogued beyond the time prescribed by the law. *Cæsar* held this Dictators place but eleven dayes, and then left it off: but afterwards had it for his life, and so came to be styled *Dictator perpetuus*, perpetual Dictator.

CHAP. IX.

The *Marseillians* give up the Town.

**L**He Marsellians being much oppressed, and almost worn out with all sorts of inconveniences, brought to an extreme exigent of virtuell, defeated & overthrown in two fights

at sea, broken and cut in pieces oftentimes in their fallies out, afflicted with a grievous persistance through long showering up and alteration of diet (for they lived of nothing but of old fish, and mostly Barly, which was long before laid up in publick for this purpose) their tower being overthrown, and a great part of their wall down, out of hope of any succours from the Provinces, or of other Armies, which they knew were come into the hands and power of Cæsar; they seriously determined (without fraud) to give up the town. But a few dayes before, L. Domitius understanding their resolution, having got three ships (whereof two he assigned to his familiar friends, the third he took himself, and taking the opportunity of a troublesome storm) put to sea: which being perceived by the ships that by Brutus commandement did continually guard the mouth of the Haven, they weighed their Anchours, and made after them. Notwithstanding, that whereon Domitius was held on her course, and by the help of the foul weather got out of sight. The other two being afraid of our ships, returned back into the Haven.

The Maritillians, according as was commanded, brought their Arms and Engines out of the town, drew forth their shippings, both out of their Haven and their Accenalls, and delivered up their publick treasure. Which things being accomplished and performed, Cæsar willing to save them rather for the name and antiquity of the town, then for any merit of theirs, left two legions there for a Garrison, and sent the rest into Italy. He himself took his way towards Rome.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Hence we may observe, that when men refuse to be led by reason, as the best means to guide them to convenient ends, they are commonly constrained by the commanding warrant of Necessity, to undergo the same thing upon harder conditions. As it happened to the Maritillians, who not regarding the Army then present, and ready to take a strict account of their answers (which with good excuse doth command a neutral State) chose rather to be shut up with a siege, than of all miltaries to account the worst; and therein to caressed themselves, as they left no stone unremoved to make good their refusal: but for want of better helps, brought their Fraud to play a parts to their greater disadvantage. And if the Conquerour had not took all occasions to shew his clemency, they might hap-

pily have paid dear for their contempt. But where either desire or other motives wanted, there women, & vetustas, their name and antiquity was sufficient to make Cæsar constant to his own ends: which, as near as the course wherein he was engaged would afford him, were always levelled at the generall applause of his actions; taking that to be no little help to work himself into the sovereignty of the State: observing it the rather in cases of great and happy success, which are ever more restrained then lesser fortunes. Howsoever, it cannot be denied but that Clemency is a property of excellent honour: which Cæsar shewed in saving the town.

## CHAP. X.

Curio transporteth two legions into Asfrick.

About the same time, C. Curio set sail from Sicily to passe into Asfrick: and making no account at all of Actius Varrus forces, he carried with him but two legions of the four which were delivered him by Cæsar, together with five hundred horse. And after he had been at Scavro dayes and three nights he arrived at a place called Aquilaria, distant twenty two miles from Clupea; where there is a very commodious Road for ships in Sommer, sheltered on each side with two large and eminent Promontories. L. Cæsar, the sons attended his coming at Clupea with ten Gallies; which being taken from the Pirats in the late warres, and laid aground at Utica, were repaired and new trimmed by Varrus: but being afraid of the great number of his ships he forsook the sea, and ran his Gallies on shore; and leaving her there, fled by land on foot to Adrumetum, a town kept by Condidus Longus, having one legion only in garrison.

The rest of Cæsar's Navy, seeing their Admirall flee away, put into Adrumetum. M. Rufus the Treasurer pursued him with twelve ships, which Curio had brought with him out of Sicily, to wrest the ships of burthen; and finding the Gallies left upon the sands, he towed her off, and returned to Cusfands, he towed her off, and returned to Cusfands with his Navy. Curio sent Marcus before with the ships to Utica; and he himself set forward thither by land with the Army, and in two dayes journey came to the River Bagrada; where he left C. Caninius Rebilus, the Legate, with the legions, and went himself before with the Cavalry, to view a place called Cornelius Camp, which was held very fit and convenient to incamp in, being a well ridge of a hill, shooting out into the Sea, steep

steep and broken on each side, and yet shelving by a little more gentle descent on that side which was next Utica, being distant from thence (if the nearest way were taken) a little more then a mile. But in that shortest cut there rose a spring, in that part which was furthest off from the sea, and so made a narrow bogge; which whosoever would avoid, must fetch a compass of six miles to go to the town.

A view being taken of this place, Curio beheld afarre off Varrus Camp, joyning to the town with, at the gate called Bellica, marvelously fortified through the strong situation of the place, having the town on the one side, and a Theatre which stood before the town on the other; and by reason of the great circuit of bulding which it contained, made a narrow and difficult passage to the Camp. He observed further, yet at store of carriages, which by reason of this suddain alarme, were brought out of the Conventy towards the town: for the intercepting whereof he sent the Cavalry. And at the same instant, Varrus likewise had sent out of the town, 600 Numidian horse, and 400 foot, which King Juba (a few dayes before) had sent to Utica, for the strengthening of that party. This Prince had acquaintance with Pompey, by reason that his father lodged with him, and bore a steem to Curio, for the law which he preserved when he was Tribune of the people; for the confiscation of Juba his Kingdome, till the Cavalry on either side met together, and the Numidians were not able to abide the charge of our men; but about an hundred and twenty being slain, the rest betook themselves back to the Camp at the town.

In the mean time, upon the arrivall of our Gallies, Curio commanded it to be proclaimed, that such Villanders and ships of burthen as were in the Bay at Utica (being in number about two hundred) and would not presently come to the Cornelian Camp, should be held and taken for enemies. At which Proclamation upon an instant of time, they all weighed anchor, and came to the place whether they were commanded; whereby the Army abounded with all necessary provisions. This being done, he returned to the Camp at Bagrada; and by the acclamation of the whole Army, was saluted by the name of Imperator.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

This Chapter beginneth with the third part of this book, containing Curio's passage into Asfrick: concerning whom it is to be observed, that in the beginning of these broils, no

man was more enemy to Cæsar, nor made more bitter invectives to the people against him, then he did in his Tribune ship; but afterwards he fell off, and was gained by the voluptuous inticements of M. Antonie, together with a huge mass of money which Cæsar lent him. Whereupon he plotted the turn-coat; and with might and main afflied that Party; prevailing much with the Communitie, by his eloquence and persuasive speeches; the lively force whereof is able to stir up affection in stones. For which cause it is that Pollicius Paterculus notwithstanding that he is that of those excellent discourses; audacious, prodigall of his own and of other mens, subtle, ingenious, extreme vicious, and always well-spoken, to the ruine of the publick weale. Which sweeteneth of words came unto him by inheritance, as Plinius writes, *Quia familia Curionum in qua re continua pateriorum extiterunt*. In the one family of the Curiones there were three notable Orators, one after another. Of whose monstrous prodigality the same Author hath made a very large account. And out of their overweening humours it was, that he became so unwise as to divide his Army; neglecting the Enemy, and the varableness of war, which altereth as the Moon, and keepeth no constant shape whereby it may be known. Concerning the dismembering of an Army lightly, and upon heedlesse rashness, Cyprius giveth grave advice, in the beginning of the first book of Xenophon. To which (for the present) I refer the Reader.

Clupea was a town in Asfrick, named by Plinius *Oppidum Liburnorum*, a free Town, and situed upon the Promontorie of Mercury, in the territories of old Carthage. It was so called because it carried the form of a Target retorted; and for the same cause it was called Asfris.

In Clupea speciem curvatis turribus Asfris. situta. Asfris with turrets bowing like a shield.

This Promontorie, which Curio chose to incamp in, was famous for three things. Firstly it was reputed the place where Antau the Giant dwelt, which Hercules slew, by strangling him in his Armes, that he might not touch the Earth, from which it is said he received his strength. Secondly, P. Cornelius Scipio, that subdued Asfrick, made that place his chief Camp of strength; and so it came to be called *Cornelius Camp*. And lastly, for this expedition which Curio made, to lose two legions, and himself withall, as unwilling to see the morning, after such a loss; for *Vixit off. avidus, quia quis non Seneca vult, mundo scem percutere, mori*; He loves *Tenebre* life indeed, that is not willing to dy when the world falls.

## CHAP. XI.

Curio marcheth to Utica. His Cavalry put to flight great troops coming from king Juba. His Army strangely possessed with an idle fear.

Cæsar.

**H**e next day he brought his Army to Utica, and encamped himself near unto the town. But before the fortification of his Camp was finished, the horsemen that stood Centinell gave notice of great forces of horse and foot, coming towards Utica, from king Juba: and at the same time, a great dust was seen rise in the aire, and presently the first troops began to come in fight. Curio astonished at the novelty of the thing, sent his horse before, to sustain the first shocks, and to stay them: he himself, calling the legions with all speed from their works, imbarcelled his Army. The Cavalry encountering with the Enemy (before the legions could be well unfolded and put in order) did put to flight all the Kings forces, that came marching without fear or order; and slew a great number of the foot troops: but the horse, making halt, got almost all safe into the town, by the way of the sea-shore. The next night after, two Centurions of the Nation of the Marfii, fled from Curio, with twenty two of their soldiers, to Aëtius Varus.

These Centurions, whether it were to please Varus, or otherwise speaking as they thought (for what men wish, they easily believe; and what they think, they hope others do think the same); did confidently affirm, that the minds of the whole Army were altogether alienated from Curio; and that it was very expedient that the Armies should come in fight, and find means to speak together. Varus being persuaded to that opinion, the next day, early in the morning, drew his legions out of the Camp: the like did Curio; either of them putting their forces in order upon a small Valley which lay between both their Armies.

There was in Varus Army, one Sex. Quintilius Varus, who (as it is formerly declared) was at Cornifinium; and being let go by Cæsar, went into Africa. It fortuned that Curio had carried over those legions, which Cæsar had formerly taken at Cornifinium: so that a few Centurions being slain, the Companies and Companies remained the same. This occasion being fully offered, Quintilius (going about Curio his Army) began to beseech the soldiers,

that they would not forget the first oath they had taken to Domitius, and to him their Treasurer; nor bear Arms against them, that had drawn the same fortune, and endured the same siege; nor fight for those, who (by way of reproach) had called them fugitives. To these he added some promises, to put them in hope of a good recompence, out of his own liberality, if they would follow him and Aëtius.

Having delivered this unto them, Curio his Army stood mute, and declared not themselves by any sign, either one way or other: and so either side drew back to their Camp. Notwithstanding, Curio his Camp was afterwards possessed with a great fear, and suspicion: which was quickly augmented, by divers reports raised upon the same. For every man forged opinions and conceits; and out of his own fear, added something to that which he had heard of another. Which when it was spread from one another to many, and one had received it from another, it seemed there were many authors of the same thing. For Covile war is always compounded of such men, as hold it lawful to do and follow what and whom they please.

Those legions which a little before were in the service of the Enemy, did willingly embrace what was offered them; for old acquaintance had made them forget what benefits Cæsar had lately bestowed on them: being also of divers Countries and Nations, and not all of the Marfii or Pelignians, as those the night before, which were their Cabin-mates, and fellow-soldiers: whereupon they took occasion, to publish abroad in worse terms, that which others had vainly given out; and some things were coined by those that would seem most diligent in doing their duty.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**O**BSERVE firstly from the revolt of these Centurions, that a fellow or two of rank and fashion falling from a Party, do gain caly credit to their advertisements, by averring any thing which the Enemy desired. Whence it is, that forasmuch as fugitives can little otherwise avail, (one man being but as no man) they seek favour and reputation with the party they fly unto, by their advice and discovery, and consequently, the remuneration of espiall; which according to the president made by Fabius to the Spies of Clusina, is worth a mans labour.

And herein Revolvers (specially those of judgement) are very dangerous instruments; not

Nalla fides  
peracque  
visu quo  
calta fo  
quantur  
venaleque  
maribus il  
lato, ut  
maxima  
me, locu  
lucua.

Lib. 12.

## CHAP. XII.

Curio dispueth the matter in a Councell of war.

**O**r which causes a Councell of war Cæsar, being called, they began to deliberate what course was to be taken. There were some opinions which thought, that it was very expedient to assault and take Vatus Camp, for that there was nothing more dangerous then idleness, for the breeding and increase of such imaginations as the soldiers had conceived. Others said, it were better to try the fortune of a battle, and to try themselves by valourous endeavour, rather then to be forsaken and abandoned of their own party, and left to undergo most grievous and extreme torments. There were others which thought it fit, to return about the third watch of the night to Cornelius Camp; that by interposing some respite of time, the soldiers might be better settled, and confirmed in their opinions; and if any mischance further happened, they might (by reason of their store of shipping) with more ease and safety return back to Sicily.

Curio mulling both the one and the other, said, that there wanted as much good resolution in the one opinion, as abundance in the other: for these entered into a consideration of a dishonourable & unbecoming flight; and those were of an opinion to fight in an unequal and disadvantageous place. For with what hope (saith he) can we assault a Camp so fortified, both by Nature and Art? Or what have we gained, if with great life and damage, we shall go away and give it over? As though things well and happily achieved, did not get to the Commander great good will from the soldier; and things ill carried, as much hate. Concerning the removing of our Camp, what dash it imports but a shameful retreat, a defeat in all men, and an alienation of the Army? For it is not fit, to give occasion to the prudent and well-advised, to imagine that they are distressed; nor on the other side, to the ill-disposed, that they are redoubted or feared: and the rather, because fear in this kind will give them more liberty to do ill, and abate the endeavour of good men in well-doing. And if (saith he) these things are

not only in weakening or making frustrate such designs as may be contrived against an Adversary; but also in discovering the secrets of their own Party, and disclosing of that which is absolute and well, until it be made known. For there is no lubfittling thing so perfect, but hath alwaies some part or other open, to give an easy passage to destruction: according to that of the Poet,

*Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentes filo.*

All humane things hang by a slender thread.

And therefore, it is no small means of preserving each thing in being, to make shew of strength and conceal weaknesse, as the registers of afflicted ruin. For which cause it is, that fidelity is commended, as the foundation of humane society: and perfidious treachery, divulging the secret imperfections thereof, is the plague and band of the same.

Vides fundamenta societas hominum i prelio re- ro quidem pectus. Plu- to, l. 5. di- legibus.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**A**s there is nothing more dangerous in an Army then fear; so there is nothing sooner bred to disturb a multitude, then this passion, which metamorphoseth a troop of men into a heard of Deer. For hence it appeareth, that one The first is able to leaven a whole Army; and an idle conceit bred in the weak thoughts of some Treasurers, begeth oftentimes a main cause of distrust throughout all the Party: which as it spreadeth abroad, is so delivered from one to another, as the Reporter (not believing what he telleth) addeth alwaies somewhat to make the hearer believe what he could not himself. And so weak minds do multiply the vain apprehension of idle humours, in such a fashion, as there is more humin fearing, then in the thing which is feared.

Epaminondas was more fortunate then all others in this kind: for while he led the Thebans as their Commander, they were never taken with any sudden affrightments, nor possessed with any Rank terror, to berayve them of their senses, or falsify the truth of their understanding; being all (as it seemed) of the same mind with the General, who accounted, no death to honourable as that which came by war. However such is the frailty of humane nature, and so strange are the convulsions of the mind, that a Commander must expect to meet with times wherein his men will stand in danger of nothing so much as their own infirmity: being troubled rather with strong apprehensions, then for any danger of the thing feared.

Turbans homines, non reus, non quæ de rebus habent opinio, Epia, Encluid.

are well known unto us already, that are spolen of the revolt and alienation of the Army (which, for mine own part, I think wiser to be altogether false, or at least, lesse then in opinion they are thought to be) is it not better to dissemble and hide them, then that they should be strengthened and confirmed by us? Ought we not, as we do hide the wounds of our bodies, to cover the inconveniences of an Army, lest we should minister hope or courage to the Adversaries? But some there are that advise to set forward at midnight; to the end (as I imagine) that such as are desirous to offend, may perform it with more scope and licence. For such disorders are repressed and reformed either with shame or fear; to both which the night is an enemy. And therefore, as I am not of that courage, to think without hope or means that the Enemies Camp is to be assaulted; so on the other side, I am not so fearfull, as to be wanting in that which is fitting: but am rather of opinion, that we try all things before we yield to that; and do assure my self, that for the most part, we are all of one mind concerning this point.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**A**S in matter of Geometry, Rectum est Index sui & obliquus, a straight line manifesteth both it self and a crooked line, being equall to all the parts of rectitude, and unequal to obliquity: so it is in reason and discourse. For a direct and well-grounded speech carrieth such a native equality with all its parts, as it doth not only approve it self to be levelled at that which is most fitting, but sheweth also what is indirect and crooked, concerning the same matter; and is of that consequence in the variety of projects and opinions, and so hardly hit upon, in the same discourse of common reason, that Plato thought it a piece of divine power, to direct a path free from the crookedness of errors, which might lead the straight and ready way to happy ends. And the rather, forasmuch as in matter of debate, there are no words too weighty, but do seem balanced with others of equal consideration: as here it happened, from those that pointing at the cause of this dissimulation, convicted themselves for the Author of their vanity and unsteady minds: and as \* Xenophon hath observed, very hard to be endured in one man, much worse in a whole family, but no

way sufferable in an Army; which the Romans called *Exercitium*, ab exercitio from exercise. For remedy whereof, they propounded labour without hope of gain, and such services could bring forth nothing but losse. Officers, preferring security before all other courtes (as believing with Livie, that Captains should never trust Fortune further then necessity constrained them) perfwaded a retreat to a place of safety, but upon dishonourable terms. Which unbecometh of opinions Curio made straight by an excellent Maxime in this kind; thinking it convenient to hold such a course, as might neither give honest men cause of distrust, nor wicked men to think they were feared. For so he thought to be sure (in good terms of honour) neither to discourage the better sort, nor give occasion to the ill-affected to do worse. And thus winding himself out of the labyrinth of words (as knowing that to be true of Annus the Pretor, that it is importunate occasions to do things to say) being an easy matter to fit words to things unfolded & resolved upon; he brake up the Council.

## CHAP. XIII.

Curio calleth a generall assembly of the souldiers, and speaketh unto them, concerning their fear and tradition.

**H**e Council being risen, he gave or Cæsar order for a Convocation of the Army; and there called to remembrance what they had done for Cæsar at

Corfinium: how by their favour and assistance, he had gained the greatest part of Italy to be on his side. For, by you (saith he) and by your endeavour, all the rest of the Municipal towns were drawn to follow Cæsar: and there, fore not without just cause did he at that time reprove great assurance in your affections towards him; and the adverse party conceived as great indignation & spite against you. For Pompey was not forced away by any battell; but being prejudiced by your aid he quitted Italy. Cæsar hath recommended me, whom he held near unto himself, together with the Provinces of Sicily and Alick (without which he cannot defend the City and Italy) to your trust and fidelity. There are some which sollicite and perswade you to revolt from my command: for what can they wish or desire more, then to make it but one work, to bring us both to ruine and overthrow, and to engage you in a most detestable wickedness? Or what worse opinion can they conceive of me, than that you should betray those men, that profess themselves wholly yours; and that you might afterwards come into their power,

power, who take themselves to be undone by your means?

Have you not understood what Cæsar hath done in Spain? two Armies beaten; two Generalls defeated; two Provinces taken; and all within forty daies, after he came in view of the Enemy? Those whose forces were not able to make resistance when they were whole and entire, how is it possible they should hold out being beaten and discomfited? You that followed Cæsar when the victory stood doubtfull; now Fortune hath adjudged the Cause, and determined of the issue of the War: will you follow the vanquished Parties, when you are to receive the reward of your service? They gave out, that they were forsaken and betrayed by you, and do remember you of the former oath you took. But did you forsake L. Domitius, or did he forsake you? Did not he thrust you out, and expose you to all extremity of service? Did he not seek to save himself by flight, without your knowledge or privity? Were you not preferred and kept alive by Cæsar's clemency, when you were abandoned and betrayed by him?

How could he tie you with the oath of allegiance, when (having cast away his spear of Rods, and laid down his authority) he himself was made a private person, and became captivated to the command of another mans power? It were a strange and new religion, that you should neglect that oath, wherein you stand now engaged; and respect the oath, which was taken away by the vengence of your Generall, and the loss of your liberty. But I believe you think well of Cæsar, and are offended at me, that am not to preach of my merits towards you: which as yet are left then my will, and unworthy your expectation: yet your souldiers have always used to seek, and reward upon the shutting up of a war; as a tacit law, what event it will have, make you no ill in all my adoptions. Doubt. And why should I omit the diligence & quick which have already used, and how the business hath hitherto proceeded? Dost it offend thee in you, that I transported the Army over to hostium pacis, without losse of any one ship? That at my coming, I bent and dispersed at the first onset the whole fleet of the Adversaries? That twice, in two daies, I overcame them only with the Cavalry? That I drew two hundred Ships of burthen out of the Road and Port of the Enemy; and have brought them to the extremity, that they can be supplied by provisions neither by sea nor by land? All this Good fortune, and these Commanders will mislead, and forsaken, will you rather embrace the ignominie you received at Corfinium, or your flight out of Italy, or the revenging up of Spain, or the prejudicial suc-

cess of the war of Africk? Truly, for mine own part, I was desirous and content to be called Cæsar's souldier: but you have filed me with the title of Imperator. Which if it repents you, I do willingly quit my self of your grace, and return it back unto you: and do you, in like manner, restore me to my name again, least you should seem to give me honour which might turn to my reproch.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N the handling of this accident, the difference cometh to be observed between a Council of war, and a Concio, or convocation of the souldiers. The first was more particular, consisting of some choice men; and those the most eminent in the parties. *Is qui non universum populum, sed partem aliquam adesse jubet non comitis, sed concilium edicere debet*; he that calls together only a part of the people; and not the whole, calls a Council, not a generall assembly. Their convocation or preaching was more generall, the whole Army being convened together, to be fitted by perswasion and discourse to follow the resolution taken by a Council; and was properly called *Allocutio*, and sometimes *Conventus*: *Cicero perilem Epistolam Cæsaris in conventum militum recitat*; Cicero read the letter from Cæsar in a conventus, or generall meeting of his souldiers. The parties called to a Council, were according as the Generall valued the occasion: for sometimes the Legats and Tribunes were only consulted; and now and then the Centurions of the first Orders, together with the Captains of horse, were called to their assistance; and sometimes all the Centurions. But howsoever, Curio resolved out of his own judgement, as great Commanders commonly do, and is specially observed by Pierre Mathieu, of the French King; who ever loveth to hear the opinion of his Captains, but always finds his own the best.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**A**Mongst other strains of this discourse, it is acknowledged, that Rome could not stand without Sicily: & the reason was for the plenty of Corn which it brought forth: for Sicily was always reputed as the Granary or Bar of Rome; & accordingly cared for by the Senates as a place without which their Citie could not continue. The grain of that Island is hard like horne, and cannot well be broken or ground into Meal: whilst it is wet with water, and then dited in the shade, rather then in the sunne; by means

M u whereof

max amicus  
est p...  
et p...

Confilium  
dare, coram  
que inter  
bonos di  
vinissimum  
Oratio  
tionis oratio  
equalis op  
positior.  
Sed  
Philos.  
Variat  
tempus dan  
dum mem  
ris. Lib.  
lib. a Lib.  
a Corp.

Duces nullo  
loco, nisi  
quantum  
secessus  
egit, se  
comitibus  
fortuna de  
buit.  
lib. 2. 1.  
Ad tum  
mum veni  
perit, cogi  
to magis quid  
gratum  
quid  
laqueum  
facit, ut  
confilium  
commodat  
velut ver  
ba. lib. 3.

Aulus Gell.  
lib. 15. c. 27.

Cum s. bell.  
Gall.

Toma.  
lib. 4.

whereof it yieldeth so exceedingly, that it is accounted twenty in the hundred better than any Poment Wheat; especially, for that it will keep long in their Vaults and Caves under the earth; & seldom or never take heat, being of it felt to hard and dry.

The glutinous use of flesh hath made men ignorant of the virtue and strength of Corn, which the *Romans* better understood; for their legions never fed on flesh as long as they could get Corn. *Pecora, quod secundum poterat esse inopia subministrata*, they latched in cattle, as the second way to help their want, saith *Cæsar*. And in another place, *Ita complures dies militum frumento caruerunt; Pecore & longinquioribus vicis ad alia extremam famem sustinentes*; the souldiers having for many daies been without corn, they were faine to sustain their extreme hunger with cattell which they had fetched afar off. And in the same place, *Quod minor erat frumenti copias, Pecus imperabat*; because there was but little corn, he gave order for cattell. And again, *Non illi herdum cum daretur, non legumina recubant. Pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat in Epiri copia, magno in honore habebatur*. They refused neither barley nor pulse when it was offered them; but cattell, whereof there was good store in *Epirus*, they prized at an high rate.

By which places it appeareth, that they never fell to flesh, but when they wanted Corn. Which is doubtlesse a firmer nutriment, lesse excrementall, and of better strength, than any other food whatsoever; as containing the prime substance of Meats, and the spirit of Wine: for *Aqua vite* is as well made of Wheat, as of the lees of Wine. Flesh is good to make Wretchlers of a grosse and heavy constitution; as *Plutarch* noteth: but the *Roman* souldier stood in need of an effectuall and sinewy vigour, able to undergoe carriages, fitter for a Mule than a Man, together with such works, as later ages do rather hear then believe; and was attained by feeding onely upon bread.

The Rabbinists and Thalmudists do write, that the Giants of the old world first fell to the eating of flesh, making no difference between a man and a beast; but grew so execrable, that they made women cast their fruit before their times to the end they might eat it with more tenderness and delicacy. Which is also said to be practised by the Cannibals, upon the first discovery of the *Indies*. *Vigener* reporteth, that he knew some great Men in *France* to fraine, that they caused oftentimes Doers ready to faine to be killed, and the young ones took out alive, to be made meat for monstrous appetites. But there is no indifference Parallel to be drawn, between the sobriety of the ancient *Roman* souldier and the gluttony of these times; far exceeding that of *Agamem-*

*non*, which *Achilles* noted with words of high reproach, calling him Hogs-head of Wines eyes, and of a Dog, and hart of a Dea.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, from this elaborate & well-couched speech, we may note, that Eloquence is a very beautifull ornament to Princes, and great Commanders; besides the use it hath to lead a multitude to such ends as is wished; for smooth words prevail where force booteeth not. According to that of *Cicero*, *Cum populum persuadeamus, ut non sitis, ut non sitis, ut non sitis*; If the people will not be persuaded, let us not think it fit to go about to compell them,

## CHAP. XIV.

Curio bringeth out his troops, and putteth Varus Army to flight.

He souldiers moved with this Orator, did oftentimes interrupt him in his speech, signifying with what grief they did endure the suspicion of insidelity. And as he departed from the Assembly, every man exhorted him to be of a good courage, and not to doubt of giving battell, or to make trial of their fidelity and valour. By which means, the minds & disposition of all men being changed, Curio resolved (out of a generall consent) as soon as any occasion was offered, to give battell.

The next day, having brought out his forces, he made a stand, and battelled them in the same place where he stood in Armes the day before. And Varus likewise drew out his troops; whether it were to sollicite the souldier, not to omit the opportunity of fighting, if it might be afforded in an indifferent place. There was a valley (as we have formerly declared) between the two Armies, of no very hard or difficult ascent; and either of them expected who should first come over it, to the end they might fight in a place of more advantage: when upon a sudden, all Varus Cavalry that stood in the left Corner of the Army, together with the light-armed souldiers that stood mingled amongst them, were seen descending into the Valley. To them Curio sent his Cavalry, together with two cohorts of the *Marceus*. The Enemies horsemen were not able to endure the first encounter of our men; but having lost their horses, fled back to their party. The light-armed men that came out with them, being left and forsaken, were all slain by our men, in the view and sight of Varus

Varus whole Army. Then *Rebilius*, Cæsar's Legate (whom Curio for his knowledge and experience in matter of war, had brought with him out of Sicily) said; Curio, thou seest the Enemy affrighted: why makest thou doubt to use the opportunity of time? Curio without making any other answer, then willing the souldiers to remember what they had assured him the day before, commanded them to follow him, and ran foremost himself. The Valley was so cumbersome and difficult, that in gaining the ascent of the hill, the foremost could hardly get up, unless they were lifted up by their followers. Howbeit the Enemy was so possessed with fear for the flight and slaughter of their fellows, that they did not so much as think of resisting; for they took themselves all to be already surprised by the Cavalry, so that before any weapon could be cast, or that our men could approach near unto them, all Varus Army turned their backs, and fled into their Camp.

In this flight, *Fabius Pellignus* (a certain souldier of one of the inferior Companies of Curio's Army) having overtaken the first troop of them that fled, fought for Varus, calling after him with a loud voice; as though he had been one of his own souldiers, and would either advise him, or say some-thing else to him. And as he being often called looked back, and stood still (inquiring who he was, and what he would) he made at Varus (souldier which was unarmed) with his sword, and was very near killing him: howbeit he avoided the danger, by receiving the blow upon his target. *Fabius* was instantly inclosed about by such souldiers as were near at hand, and slain.

In the mean time, the gates of the Camp were pestered and thronged with multitudes and troops of such as fled away, and the passage was so stopped, that more died in that place without blow or wounds, then perished either in the battell or in the flight. Neither wanted they much of taking the Camp, for many left not running until they came to the town. But the nature of the place and the fortification of the Camp, did hinder their access; and Curio his men coming out, prepared onely for a battell wanted such necessities as were of use for the taking of the Camp. And therefore Curio carried back his Army, with the loss of no one man but *Fabius*. Of the *Adversaries* were slain about six hundred, and many more wounded, who all upon Curio his departure, besides many other that signified themselves hurt, left the Camp for fear, and went into the town, which Varus perceiving, and knowing also the assistance of the Army, leaving a Transpacer in the Camp, & a few Tents for themselves, went the

third watch, he carried his Army with silence out of the Camp into the town.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is a part of wisdom, and oftentimes a main help to victorie, to attend the advantage of an Enemies rashness, and to see if his folly will not make way to his overthrow. Whereof Curio made good use: for he kept his Army in the upper ground, until the Cavalry of the *Adversaries* were loosely fallen into the Valley; and then fell upon them, and cut them all in pieces. The fight whereof masked the whole Army, and kept Curio in safety, upon the like disadvantage, in the cumbersome passage of the same Vale; by means whereof he put to flight the whole forces of the Enemy; and made a great slaughter in the party. Wherein I may not forget that trick of a *Roman* policy, whereby the Author let cometh memorable to posterity, in calling after *Varus* by name, to make him the sacrifice for both the Hosts. Whence we may observe, that when a battell is joined pell-mell, no man can be assured in his own valour, nor share out his fortune by the length of his sword; but is oftentimes subject to weaknesses of contempt, and vanquished by such as cannot be compared unto him but in Corn.

I have heard it reported, that at the battell of *Evexens*, *Maurine* (that known woman in *France*) took prisoner & disarmed a Cavalero of Spain: who being brought before the King, and by him demanded whole prisoner he was, or whether he knew the parcie that had forced him; answered, no; but that he knew him to be a gallant man of Armes. Whereat the king smiled: and the Gentleman, understanding what fortune he had run, was as much dismayed as a man possibly could be; that considered, *Quod ferrum equit, in bello, robustioribus imbecilliores*. The two equalled the weakest to the strongest.

## CHAP. XV.

Curio leaveth Venice to meet with King Tuba. His Cavalry overtaking the forces led by Sabura; which leadeeth him on to his overthrow.

He next day Curio prepared to be Cæsar's siege Utica, including it about with a ditch & a rampier. There were in the town a multitude of people unacquainted with war, through the long peace they had enjoyed; and the inhabitants stood very affectionate to Cæsar, for many benefits they had received from him. The rest of the multitude consisted of divers sorts of men, much

Mm 2 terris

Lib. II. bcl.

Lib. I.

Mill Ma. eland.

Solitaria, quasi sine ebrietate.

terrified and affrighted by the former encounters: whereupon every man spake plenty of giving up the towns and dealt with Pub. Attius, that their fortunes and lives might not come in danger, through his pertinacity and wilfulness.

While these things were a doing, there came messengers from King Juba, signifying, the King was at hand with great forces and would then to keep and defend the town. Which news did much encourage and confirm the wavering and diffident minds of the Enemy. The same was also reported to Curio: whereupon for awhile he gave no credit; such was his confidence in the success of things. And how withal, came Letters and Messengers into Africa, of that which Cæsar had so fortunately achieved in Spain: so that being absolutely assured with all these things, he was persuaded the King durst attempt against him. But when he found by assured discovery, that his forces were within twenty five miles of Utica, leaving his works already begun, he withdrew himself into Cornelius Camp; and began then to fortify his Camp, to get Corn and other provisions, and to furnish it with all necessary material for a defence: and sent presently a dispatch into Sicily, that the two legions, and the rest of the Cavalry might be sent unto him.

The Camp wherein he lay was fitly accommodated to hold out the war, as well by reason of the nature of the place, as the artificial fortifying thereof, the nearest of the sea, and the plenty of water and salt: whereof there was great quantity brought thither, from the Salt-pits near adjoining. No strife could be wanting, through the great force of wood which was about the place, nor yet any Corn for the plenty that was to be found in the confining fields: and thereupon, by the advice and approbation of all men, Curio resolved to attend his other forces, and to draw out the war in length.

These things being thus disposed by the consent and liking of all men, he heard by some that lately came out of the town, that Juba was called back, by occasion of a war happened between the confederates, and that by reason of the Periponthe controversy and dissensions of the Lepitani he was detained at home in his kingdome; but that Sabura his Lieutenant was sent with some competent forces, and was not far from Utica. To which reports giving too light and easy credit, he altered his purposes, and resolved to put the matter to trial of battell: whereunto his youthfull heat, the greatness of his courage, the success of former time, and his confidence in the managing of that war, did violently lead him. Being carried on with these induc-

ments, he sent the first night all the Cavalry to the River Bagrada, where the Enemy lay incamped under the command of Sabura: but the King followed after with all his forces, and lay continually within six miles, or thereabouts.

The horsemen sent before, and making their journey in the night, set upon the Enemy at unawares, and not thinking of their approach: for the Numidians lodge, scattered here and there in a barbarous manner, without any government or order. And surprizing them thus oppressed with sleep, and scattered upon the ground, they flew a great number of them: the rest, in great terror and amazement, fled by flight. Which service being thus executed, the Cavalry returned to Curio, and brought the captives unto him. Curio was gone out about the fourth watch of the night with all his forces, having left five cohorts for a garrison to his Camp: and having marched six miles, he met with the Cavalry under flood which was done, and inquired of the captives, who was General of the Camp at Bagrada. They answered Sabura. He omitted for haste of his way to inform himself of the rest: but turning himself to the next Ensignes, did not see, soldiers, that the confession of the captives doth agree with that which was reported by the fugitives. For the King is not come; but hath sent some small forces, which cannot make their parties good with a few horsemen: and therefore hasten to take the spoil with honour, and renown; that we may now at length begin to think of rewarding your merits.

## OBSERVATIONS.

IT is observed by Marcellinus, that when misfortune cometh upon a man, his spirit dries groweth so dull and benumbed, as his senses seem to be dimmed of their charges. Which appeared hear in Curio: who having taken a prophetic and sure course, such as was approved in every mans judgement, and beleemed well the wisdom of a Commander, did nevertheless contrary to all sense and discretion, forgo the same, and cast himself upon the hazard of that which fugitives had vainly reported. Concerning which, as it is noted, that Incertitudo is hurtfull only to the unbeliever; so this passage preeth that for a Commander to be too light of belief, is a danger to the whole Partie, and bringeth many to ruine, that had no part in that credit. Cæsars in the relation hereof, noteth three special things in Curio, that carried him headlong in this disaster, and may serve as marks to avoid the like Syres.

The first was, *Juvenilis ardor*, his youthfull

courage and heat: which is always attended with strong affections, stirring the quality and temperature of the body, being then in the prime height of strength, & accordingly led on with violent motions; whereas age goeth slowly and coldly forward, and is always sorer in undertaking, then hot-spirre youth. And albeit no man in cold blood could better advise then Curio, or fore-see with better providence; yet his youthfull boldness over-swaied his discourse, and drew all to a mischance, in despite of his wisdom.

The second was, *Superioris temporis proventus*, the happy issue of former proceedings: which of all other conditions is to be suspected, and needeth Gods assistance more then any other fortune; for that no man sooner erreth or is more uncapable of order, then such as are in prosperity. And therefore Plino refused to make laws for them of Cyrene; as a matter of great difficulty, to give ordinances to men that were in happiness. And doubtless, such is the exorbitance of our nature, that nothing better informeth then fortunes; which are as instructions and warnings, for the preventing of ruining calamities. Wherein Curio was not beholding to Fortune at all; that dangled him in her lap for a while, to cast him out at length headlong, to his ruine. It had been much better, he had exchanged a frown with a faviour, rather then to have given him much good together, and to receive an irrecoverable disgrace for the upshot.

The third was, *Fiducia rei bene gerende*: which favouritism more of folly then any of the former; it being always an argument of an imprudent man, to assure himself of good fortune. For presumption, being ever accompanied with Negligence, is subject to as many casualties, as those that go unarmed upon extremity of danger. And these were the three things that miscarried Curio. Out of which we may observe with Xenophon, that *Ingeni et arduum opus*, recte imperare; is it a weighty and difficult matter to command well.

## CHAP. XVI.

Curio pursueth the Enemy, with more haste then good success.

Cæsar.

That which the Cavalry had exploited, was certainly a matter of great service; especially the small number of them, being compared with the great multitude of the Numidians: and yet notwithstanding, they spoke of these things with greater ostentation then the truth would bear; as men are willing to divulge their own praises. Besides, they showed much spoil which they had taken; Cæ-

sius and Horser were brought out; that whatsoever time was omitted, seemed to be a let and hinderance to the victory; by which means the desires and endeavours of the Soldiers were no way short of the hope which Curio had conceived. Who commanding the Cavalry to follow him, marched forward with as much haste as he could; to the end he might find the Enemy distracted and astonied, as the flight and overhrow of their fellows. But the horsemen, having travelled all night, could by no means follow after. Whereby it happened, that some staid in one place, some in another: yet this did not hinder or discourage Curio in his hopes.

Juba being advertised by Sabura of the conflict in the night, sent instantly two thousand Spanith and French horse, which he kept about him for the safety of his Person, and such of the fore-trumps as he most trusted, to succour and relieve him: he himself with the rest of the forces, and forty Elephants, followed softly after Sabura, supposing by the horsemen coming before, that Curio himself was at hand, imbellated all his forces; commanding them, that under a pretence of counterfeiting fear, they should retreat by little and little, himself when occasion served, would give them the signe of battell, with such other directions as should be expedient.

Curio was strengthened in his former hope, with the opinion of the present occasion. For supposing the Enemy had fled, he drew his forces from the upper ground into the Plain; wherein after he had marched a good space (the Army having travelled sixteen mile) he made a stand. Sabura gave the signe to his men of beginning the battell, led on his Army-men about his troops, to exhorte and encourage his soldiers. However, he led his men only for a short service off, and sent the Cavalry to give the charge. Curio was not wanting to his men; he wished them to let all their confidence in their valour. The soldiers, (howsoever harried and wearied) and the horsemen (although but a very few, and those spent with travel) yet wanted no courage or desire to fight. But these being but two hundred in number (for the rest staid by the way) whereas part of the Army sever they charged, they forced the Enemy to give way: but they could neither follow them far as they fled, nor put their horses to any round or long career.

At length, the Cavalry of the Enemy began from both the wings to circumvent our Army, and to maul them down behind; and as our Cohorts issued out from the battell towards them, the Numidians (through their nimbleness) did easily avoid the shock; and again

## Observations upon Cæsars

as they turned back to their ranks, inclosed them about, and cut them off from the battell: so that it neither seemed safe to keep their order and places, nor to advance themselves on, and undergo the hazard of adventure.

### OBSERVATIONS.

THE Principles and Maxims of War are always to be held firm when they are taken with their due circumstances: for every Rule hath a qualified state, and consisteth more in cautions and exceptions, than in authority of precept. It is true, that nothing doth more advantage a victorie, then the counsell of *Lamachus*, the third Duke of the *Athenians*; which was, to set upon an Enemy when he is affrighted and distracted; for so there is nothing to be expected on his behalf but despair and confusion. But either to be mistaken therein, or otherwise to make such haste to oblige this rule of war (*As Curio did*) that the best part of the Army shall lie by the way, and the rest that go on shall be so spent with labours as they are altogether unfit for service, and yet (to make the matter worse) to bring them into a place of disadvantage, to encounter a strong and swift Enemy, is to make the circumstances overflew the Rule, and by a Maxime of Warre, to be directed to an overthrow: neglecting altogether that which is observed by *Sevius Aurelius Vittor*, *Satis celeriter his quicquid commode geritur*, that which is well done, is done soon enough.

### CHAP. XVII.

Curio defeated and slain. Some few of the Army get passage to Sicily: the rest yield themselves to Varus.



THE Enemy was oftentimes reinforced by Juccurs from the King: our men had spent their strengths and fainted through weariness: such as were wounded, could neither leave the battell, nor be conveyed into a place of safety. The whole Army being encompassed about with the Cavalry of the Enemy (whereby despairing of their safety as men commonly do, when their life draws towards an end) they either lamented their own deaths, or recommended their friends to good fortunes; if it were possible that any might escape out of that danger: all parts were filled with fear and lamentation.

Curio, when he perceived the souldiers to be so affrighted, but they gave care neither to his exhortations nor intreaties, he commanded them (as the last hope they had of safety) that

they should all flee unto the next hills; and thither he commanded the Ensignes to be carried. But the Cavalry sent by Sabura had also possessed that place before; whereby our men began to fall into utter despair, and partly were slain as they fled by the horsemen, or fell down without wounding. Cn. Domitius General of the horse, standing with a few horsemen about him, persuaded Curio to save himself by flight, and to get the Camp; promising not to leave or forsake him. But Curio confidently replied, that he would never come in Cæsar's sight, having lost the Army committed unto him; and thereupon fighting valiantly was slain.

A few horsemen saved themselves from the furie of the battell; but such of the Rearwards, as stayed by the way to refresh their horses, perceiving a fur off the rout and flight of the whole Army, returned safe into the Camp. The footmen were all slain to a man. M. Rufus the Treasurer, being left by Curio in the Camp, exhorted his men not to be discouraged. They praised and besought him, they might be transported into Sicily. He promised them they should; and so that end gave order to the Masters of ships, that the next evening they should bring all the Skiffes to the shore. But such was the astonishment and terror of all men, that some gave out, that Julia's forces were already come; others, that they saw the dust of the Army marching towards them; whereas there was no such matter at all: others suspected the Enemies Navie would speedily make to them; in somuch as every man flustered for himself: such as were already on ship-board made haste to be gone. Their departure gave occasion to the ships of war to follow after.

A few small Barks were obedient to the command; but the shore being thronged with souldiers, such was the contentions which of all that multitude should get aboard, that some of the Barks were sunk with press of people, and the rest, for fear of the like calamities, durst not come near them. Whereby it happened, that a few souldiers, and Masters of families (that through favour or pity prevailed to be taken in, or could swim unto the ships) were carried back safe into Sicily. The rest of the forces, sending by night some of the Centurions as Embassadors to Varus, rendered themselves unto him.

The next day after, Julia seeing the Cohorts of these souldiers before the town, cried out presently, that they were part of his booty: and thereupon gave order that a great number of them should be slain, and selecting a few of the rest, sent them into his kingdome: Varus

## Lib. II.

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

Varus complaining in the mean while, that his faith and promise was violated, and yet durst not resist it. The King rode in the town, attended with many *Soldiers*, among which was Ser. Sulpitius, and Licinius Damasippus: and remaining there a few daies, gave such order for things as he thought fit, and then returned to his kingdome, with all his forces.

### OBSERVATIONS.

AND this was the period which Divine power made, to the hopefull beginning of Curio's design upon *Africk*; and happened so suddenly, as they were left ere they were aware. Like a tempest at Seas that swalloweth up vessels in the same place, where a little before they swam most proudly, and in the like unrecoverable manner. For war is not capable of a second error; one fault being enough to ruine an Army, and to disable Curio for ever doing the like of whom Lucan hath left this memoriall;

*Haud alium tanta Civem talis rudole Romæ,  
Aut cui plus leges deberam recta sequenti.  
Perdita nunc primis nocuerunt scutula,  
postquam  
Ambitius & luxus, & opum metuentia fastidia,  
Trausverso, mentem dabam torrente cubitus  
Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio verum,  
Gallorum capitis spoliis & Cæsaris Auro.*

So virtuous Citizen Rome never bred;  
Whilst right the Laws a friend like him ne'er  
had.

But she; had time first took him from his hold:

Ambitious; Not; and the force of Gold  
In a wrong stream soon drew his wavering  
minds.

Of great concern which way so e're inclin'd,  
Fet off with Gallick spoils and Cæsars  
gifts,

His body lay unburied, as a witness of *Nemidæ* hate (which is alwaies extreme, like the heat of the Country) and of *Juba's* particular revenge, for tendering an Edict to the peoples to confiscate his kingdome.

To conclude this Commentarie, The loss either Partie sustained unto this stage of the War, was in these particulars: Pompey was driven out of Italy, lost *Marseilles*, and both the Provinces of Spain; Cæsar received this loss in *Africk*, besides that in the *Adriatick* sea, where *Antonius* ulcerated; whereas he maketh no mention in these Commentaries. And as when *Tarpator* weighed the fortune of *Homer*; the *Greeks* and the *Troians* by a scale of *Bal-lance*, it fell out the *Greeks* had more ill luck then the *Troians*; so the fortune of these Parties being weighed by the relation made thereof, it falleth plainly out, that Pompey had the worst.

And thus endeth the second Commentarie.

The



## The Third Commentarie of the Civile VVarres.

### The Argument.

**T**He former Books contain the drifts and designs which these famous Chiefs attempted and prosecuted, while they were asunder. And now cometh their buckling at hand to be related; together with the judgement which the Warre gave of the Cause in question, on Cæsar's behalf.

### CHAP. I.

Cæsar giveth order at Rome, for matter of Credit and Usury, and other things.

**C**æsar the Dictator holding the assembly for election of Magistrates; Julius Cæsar and Pub. Servilius were created Consuls: for in that year he was capable by law to be chosen thereunto. These things being ended, forasmuch as he found that credit was very scant throughout all Italy; and that money lent upon usury was not paid; he gave order that Arbitrators should be appointed to make an estimation of possessions and goods, according as they were valued before the war; and that the Creditors should take them at that rate for their moneys. For this course he thought to be fittest and most expedient, as well for the taking away of any fear of composition or new assurances for the quitting and abolishing of all debts (which do commonly fall out upon wars and civil broils) as also for the keeping and preserving of the Debtors credit.

In like manner, he restored the ancient course of Appeal, made by the Prætors and Tribunes to the people; as also certain consules used in suing for Magistracy (which were taken away by a law made in Pompey's time, when he kept the legions about him in the City); and likewise reformed such judgements in juries and trials of Law, as were given in Cases, when the matter in controversy was heard by one Judge; and the sentence pronounced the same day by another Judge. Last of all,

whereas divers stood condemned for offering their service unto him in the beginning of the Civil war, as if he should think it fit to accept thereof; and holding himself as much obliged unto them, as if he had used it: he thought it best expedient for them, to be acquitted by the people, rather than by his commandment and authority; least he should either seem ungratefull, in not acknowledging their deserts; or arrogant, in assuming to himself that which belonged to the people.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Cæsar, as he was Dictator, holding the assembly for the choice of Magistrates himself with P. Servilius Isauricus were made Consuls, in the year of Rome 705, which was just ten years after his first Consulship; whereby he became capable thereof, by the law published by Sylla; wherein it was provided: That no man should be chosen to an office, within ten years after he had supplied the same. In this year happened all these things which are contained in this third Commentarie; as Paterculus noteth in these words; C. Cæsar and P. Servilius being Consuls, Pompey was militarily massacred after three Consulships, and three Triumphs; and was slain, the day before his birth-day being aged 58 years. The Choice day was regularly the first of January: and the Assembly was called Comitum Centuriatum.

Touching the difference of these Assemblies, the parties present thereat, the manner of the choice, and other circumstances appertaining, the Reader may receive information at large

## Lib. III. Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

Lib. 6. de comitia.

large by Rosinus. Only it is to be remembered, that Comitum Centuriata were never holden without consent of the Senate. And forasmuch as the chief part of them were with Pompey, Lucan taketh exception at this Creation.

—marientia tella

Lib. 5.

Cæsar habet, vacuasque domos legesque silentes; Clausaque iusticio tristis fora. Curia solas illa videt Patres, plena quos urbe fugavit. Sad roofs and empty houles Cæsar found. The Laws were silent; & the Courts shut up. No Fathers met in Senate, only they Who when the town was full were forced away.

The persons that were suitors for the Consulship, were called Candidati; who oftentimes used extraordinary means to attain the same.

Anno 116. 704.

This moved Pompey to make a law, That no man should sue for publick offices by bribes, or other corrupt courses; and it was called Lex de Ambitu, which indeed was but renewed: for the same was set on foot Anno 116. 395, by Petilius, Tribune of the people; and renewed again by Pub. Cornelius Cethegus Anno 572; and within a while after made capital, as far as banishment concerned the party. Caponius was so condemned, having bought a voice with an Amphora of wine. The law which Pompey now made, was very strict, as

\* Four gal-  
lons and a  
half.  
Phi. 1. 35.  
cap. 12.  
\* Lib. 19.

\*Dio noteth: for it was ordained, That upon producing of witnesses, the Proccesse should end in a day, giving the Accuser two hours to lay open the matter, and the Defender three to make answer; and the Judgement instantly followed. The rigour of which law Cæsar here reformed.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The second thing I observe is the difficulty of taking up money upon credit, in time of trouble or warres; which Cæsar expresteth in these terms; Cum fides tota Italia esset angustior, in regard credit was very scarce throughout all Italy. The word Fides hath ever been taken for a real performance of any promise or agreement, which Tully calleth the foundation of Justice, and the very prop of a Commonwealth; taking the Exymon to grow, quia fin quod dictum, because that which was spoken is done. According to that of Nonius Marcellus; Fides nomen ipsum videtur habere, quoniam sic quod dicitur, Fides seems to have its appellations, when that's done which was spoken. And for that men commonly are covetous-keepers, not so much by the perfection of their nature, as out of distrust of laws; falleth out, that where there are no laws, there is no

performance; and consequently, little or no credit either given or kept, in time of Warres, because Silent leges inter arma, Laws are silent in time of warre.

Cæsar to provide for this inconvenience, appointed Commissioners to rate every man in the lands and possessions, as they were valued before the warres, and to satisfy the Creditors with the same. Which Plutarch explaineth in this manner; That the Creditors should take yearly two parts of the revenue of their Debtors, untill such time as they had paid themselves; & that the Debtors should have the other third to live withall. Whereof it seemed he had some light, by a president in the Consulship of Valerius Publicola, which is extant in Livie; Novi consules sanxerunt quoque rem levari, aggressis, solutionem aris alieni in publicum, Tab. 7.

curiam verterant, quinque viris creatis, quos censurarios, ab dispensatione pecunie appellaverunt. The new Consuls intending to ease the people in point of Usury, made the payment of debts a part of the publick care, and created five men to that purpose, who were called Censurarios, from their disposal of those monies.

This general acquaintance for debts, the Romans called Nova Tabule; in this respect, as Cælius Rhodiginus hath it, Quod cum pecunie creditæ obertatis condonantur, nova mox coarctantur Tabule, quibus nomina continentur nova; in regard that when the debt was remitted to the debtors, new Tables were made, wherein new names were put; and is nothing else, but what is ordinary amongst our Bankrupts, compounding for so much in the pound with their Creditors upon new assurance, and other chusen, which they called Nova Tabule; agreeing to that of Tully; Tabule vero nova quid habent argumenti, nisi ut omnes mea pecunia fundum, cum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam? What else mean these new Tables, but that you shall buy a piece of ground with my money, and keep it to your self, whilst I go without my money?

Concerning matter of Usury, which was the ground of this mischief, Tacitus noteth it as an old and deadly disease, and the cause of many seditions in that Empire; and is never better likened, then to the biting of a Serpent, called Aspidem, upon the infusion of her venom; seditionem Aspidem, upon the infusion of her venom; non, puteth the Patient into a heavy slumber, and in a short time, bringeth all a mans substance to death and destruction. And thereupon it is called Fumus & fœces, from the fertile and ample increase of money. For as Basil noteth, The Labourer loseth the seed, and the contented himself with the fruit or increase; but the Usurer will have the fruit, and yet not loofe the seed. Whereby there must needs grow great increase. The law of the twelve

N n

Tables



places of danger. For doubting how he might safely venture upon any of the known Ports of that Coast; which he judged to be kept by the Enemy he made choice of that place which is called Phatialis; and there arriving in safety with all his ships, he landed his soldiers.

At the same time, Lucius Vespillo and Minutius Rutilus (by order from Lælius) were at Oricum, with eighteen ships of Asia: and M. Bibulus was likewise at Corin, with one hundred and ten ships. But neither durst those come out of the Port, although Cæsar had not in all above twelve ships of war, to wait him over; amongst which, he himself was embarked: neither could Bibulus come soon enough, his ships being unready, and his Mariners ashore; for that Cæsar was desired near the Continent, before there was any bruit of his coming in all those Regions. The soldiers being landed, he sent back the same night the shipping to Brundisium; then the other legions, and the Cavalry might be brought over.

Pullus Calpurnius, the Legat, had the charge of this service, and was to use all expedite in transporting over the legions: but setting out late, and omitting the opportunity of the night winds, they failed of their purpose in returning back. For Bibulus being certified, at Coast of Cæsar's arrivall, and hoping to meet with some of the ships of burthen, met with the empty ships going back to Brundisium: and having taken liberty of them, he wreaked his anger (conceived through grief and omission) and set them all on fire, consuming therein both the Masters, and the Mariners; hoping by the rigour of that punishment, to terrify the rest.

This being done, he possess all the Castles from Salona to Oricum, with fifty-and-one of war; appointing guards with more diligence than formerly had been used. He himself, in the depth of winter, kept watch ship-boards, not refusing any labour or duty, nor expecting any success, if he happened to meet with Cæsar. But after the departure of the Liburnian Gallies, M. Octavius with such ships as he had with him, came from Illyricum to Salona; and there having incited the Dalmatians, and other barbarous people, drew Hilla from Cæsar's party. And finding that he could not move them of Salona, neither with promise nor threatenings, he resolved to besiege the Town. The place was strong by nature, through the advantage of a Hill; and the Roman Citizens (there inhabiting) had made towers of wood to fortifie it within; but finding themselves too weak to make resistance (being wearied out and spent with wounds) they

fell at length to the last refuge of all; which was, to enfranchise all their land-slaves; above the age of fourteen years; and cutting their women's hair, they made Engines thereof.

Their resolution being known, Octavius encompassed the town about five Camps; and at one instant of time began to force them by siege, and by assault. They being resolved to undergo all extremities, were much pressed through want of Corn; and thereupon sending Messengers to Cæsar, sought help of him. Other inconveniences they endured as they might.

And after a long time, when the continuance of the siege had made the opportunity of the moon time, when the Enemy was retired aside, and placing their children and women on the wall, that neither might seem contented of that which was usual they themselves, together with such as they had lately enfranchised, brake into the next Camp near the Town, which being taken, with the same violence they set upon another, and then upon the third, and so upon the fourth; and in the end upon the fifth, driving the Enemy out of all the Camps; and having slain a great number, they forced Octavius, and the rest remaining, to beseech them to their ships; and so the siege ended. For Octavius despairing to take the Town, the Winter approaching, and having received such losses, retired to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

It hath been generally conceived, that there is little or none of women in times of war; but that they are a burthen to the soldiers, and that by acts of Armes, and do better life the licentiousness of peace, then the dangers of warlike. Whereof *Andromache* is made an instance; from that which *Homer* reporteth of her tears, sighs, and prayers; to withdraw Hector from those valorous exploits, which he undertook for the defence of Troy. And therefore they are by *Ovid* wished to handle the distaff and the spindle, and leave the warres as fitter for men, then the weaknesse of their Sex.

----- columine

I cape cum cultibus; & flamina pollice torque:

Bella relinque viris -----

Go take thy basket on thy head,

And at the distaff twist thy thread.

Leave warres to men -----

Nevertheless it cannot be denied, that howsoever

#### CHAP. III.

Cæsar sented to Pompey, touching a Peace; taken in Oricum, Apollonia, and other places.

forever the tendernesse of women doth require a passive course of life, under the shelter of a safe roof, rather than in the bleak storms of active endeavour; yet there have been some Viragoes that have over-topped the pride of men in points of war; amongst whom, *Semiramis* may lead the rest; together with *Tomyris* Cyrus Mithres by conquest. As also *Lendinis* that subdued the Persians; and *Helenus*, Queen of the Russes.

Besides other noble spirits, that could answer such as told them news of the death of their sons in battell. That they had brought them into the world for that onely purpose. Which do prove, as well a call, as a potentiall aptnes of that Sex, to the use and practice of Armes.

And if any man (as unwilling to afford them so much worth) will know wherein they avail the fortune of a War, he may take notice, that even in expeditions (wherein they are most subject to exceptions) they always give acceptable assistances to their Husbands both in their provisions and otherwise; and are such Companions, as can hardly be left at home, without danger of greater hazard.

But in places besieged, women do not onely afford hair to make ropes; need require (as it fell out in this siege) but are able to cast pieces of Mill-stones upon the Enemy, with better fortune sometimes than any other man; and have thereby slain the Generall, to the raising of the sieges, and saving of the Cite.

But to take instances of later times: It is not to be forgotten, that when the Arch-Duke *Matthias* (after the death of Count *Mansfield*) commanded the Christian Army, at the siege of *Strygonium*; while the Turks, within the Castles were making works for a retreat, the women (in the mean time) made good the breaches; and there bestowed such store of Will-bowes, that the Italian Squadrons (commanded by *Aladyrandine*) being joynted polldron to polldron, pressed into the breaches, and all of a fire at once; and were forced to fall off with great terror and confusion.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

A Town assaulted by a warlike Enemy, is not kept or freed, with Charnies or Spells; or as the Inhabitants of *Tombly*, in the East Indies, chase away the Portugalls, with Hives of Bees, when they were possessed of the walls; but with such valour as may overcome the Enemy, and extend it self to the taking of five Camps, if need require; which was performed by these Inhabitants of *Silence*.

It is before declared, that *Vibullius Rutilus* (one of Pompey's Lieutenants) was twice taken by Cæsar, and dismissed; once at *Confinum*, and a second time in Spain. *Item* d'd Cæsar deem (in regard of the favours which he had showed him) to be a fit person, to be sent with a Message to Pompey; and thereafter for that he understood that he was in good account and credit with him.

The summe of his Commission was, to tell Cæsar, that it befel them both to give an end to their misfortune, to lay down their Armes, and not to tempt Fortune any longer; for either side had been sufficiently afflicted with loss and damages: which might serve for instruction, and example to avoid other inconveniences. He for his part was driven out of Italy, with the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Provinces of Spain, as also of one hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman Citizens in Spain and Italy. Himself was afflicted with the death of Cato, with the loss of the African Armie, and with the reard of the soldiers at Corin. And therefore they should have regard of themselves, and of the Commonwealth.

They had good experience by their own losses, what Fortune could do in war. This was the onely time to treat of peace, whilst either Party stood confident in his own strength, and seemed of equal might and power. But if Fortune should chance to sway to one side, he that thought he had the better end of the staff, would never hearken to any conditions of peace, nor content himself with a reasonable party, because his hope would exceed him all.

Concerning the Articles of Treaty, so far much as they could not agree thereof themselves, they ought to seek them from the Senate and people of Rome. In the mean while, it was fit that the Common-wealth and themselves should rest satisfied, (if without further delay) both of them did take an oath in the presence of their Armes, to discontinue their forces within three daies next following to lay down Armes, and send away their Auxiliary troops, where in they so relied; and consequently, to depend upon the judgement and decree of the people of Rome. For assurance whereof on his behalf, he would presently discharge as well his forces in the fields as those in garrison.

*Vibullius*, having received these instructions from

from Cæsar (thinking it no less requisite to advertise Pompey of Cæsar's arrival, than he might consult of that before he delivered what he had in charge) post-night and day taking at every place fresh horse, that he might certify Pompey, that Cæsar was at hand with all his forces.

Pompey was at that time in Candavia, and went out of Macedonia to Winter in Apollonia and at Dyrrachium. But being troubled at the news, he made towards Apollonia by great journeys, lest Cæsar should possess himself of the maritime Cities.

Cæsar having landed his forces, went the next day to Oricum. Upon his approach, L. Torquatus, who commanded the town under Pompey, and had there a garrison of Patlians, shutting the gates, went about to defend the place, commanding the Grecians to take Arms, and make good the walls. But they refusing to fight against the power and authority of the people of Rome, and the townsmen endeavouring of their own accord to receive Cæsar in, he opened the gates, desiring of all other Succours, gave up both himself and the town to Cæsar, and was entertained by him in safety. Oricum being taken in by Cæsar, without any further delay he went to Apollonia.

His coming being heard of, L. Straberius, the Governour, began to carrie water into the Citadel, to fortifie it, and to require pledges of the inhabitants. They, on the other sides, desired to give any, or to shut their gates against the Consul, or of themselves to take a resolution contrary to that which all Italy and the people of Rome had thought convenient. Their affections being knowne secretly conveyed himself away. The Apollonians sent Commissioners to Cæsar, and received him into the town. The Bellidenses followed their example, and the Amantini, together with the rest of the adjoining Cities. And to conclude, all Epirus sent unto Cæsar promising to do what he commanded. But Pompey understanding of these things, which were done at Oricum and Apollonia, fearing Dyrrachium, posted thither night and day. However, upon the report of Cæsar's approach, the Army was so afflicted, that for haste on their way, they left almost all their Ensignes in Epirus and the adjoining Regions: and many of them (casting away their Armes) seemed rather to flee, then to march as soldiers.

As they came near to Dyrrachium, Pompey made a stand, and caused the Camp to be interlined; whereas yet the Army was so affrighted, that Labienus stood out first, and

took a solemn oath. Never to forsake Pompey, but to undergo with him chance for Fortune had allowed him. The same night took the Legates; being seconded by the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and contrary to the will of all the Army that took the like oath.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

*U* Num est tempus (saith Cæsar) de pace agendi; dum uterque sibi confidit, & pares ambo videntur; The only time to treat of peace is, whilst either party is confident of his strength, and both seem of equal might and power. Which may serve for an excellent Rule, to point out the fittest and seasonable time for competition between two opposite Parties. For as in quantities, equality begetteth equality and disparity a like unevenness of nature, so in other things as namely in Treaties of Agreement, the conditions do commonly sit to either Party, according as they stand ballanced in the scale of Equality; or otherwise, as the difference of their means shall allow them. For if that be true in the Extremity, which *Curtius* hath. That Lawes are given by Conquerours, and accepted upon all conditions, by them that are subdued; it doth consequently follow in the Mean; that men find dealing proportionable to their fortune. To which purpose is that of *Plato*, where he saith. That Peace and Quietness consist in equality; as Trouble and Motion are always in inequality.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*I*T appeareth here by the surpris and astonishment of Pompey's Army, that the course he took to abandon *Italië*, was of not good advice or direction. For whereas he might with farre more honour, and no little hope of success, have contested with Cæsar, in the place where the warre broke out, and kept him to a task which should have left him in the conquest of *Spain*, or such other achievements as he easily wrought in the absence of his Adversaries: it fell out that his departure into Greece sort to no other end, then by time to abate the edge of the forward desires, and to furnish a numerous Army to be daunted with noise and clamours of continual victories, gotten upon apart of themselves; and then to give occasion to the Conquerour to come in the tail of Fame and take them disarmed of expectations to their great amazement.

#### CHAP.

#### CHAP. V.

(Cæsar) took up his lodging for Winter. Bibulus differed at Sea for want of provisions, somewhat of a Treaty: which being carried on the other side with good caution, breaketh off again.

Cæsar.

*C*æsar understanding that his passage to Dyrrachium was thus intercepted, did forbear his haste, and incamped himself upon the River Apus, in the confines of the Apollonians; that by the means of his Guards and Forts, such Cities as had well deserved of him, might be in safety: and there determined to winter, in Tents of skin, and to attend the coming of his other legions out of Italy. The like did Pompey, pitching his Camp on the other side of the River Apus; and there assembled all his troops and foreign aids. Calenus having (according to Cæsar's directions) embarked the legions and Crowds at Brundisium, and taken in as many as his shipping would contain, he set sail: but being gone a little out of the Ports, he received Letters of advice from Cæsar, that all the Havens and the Sea-coast was kept with the Enemies fleet. Whereupon he made up into the Haven, and called back all the ships: only one, holding on her course without regard of the command, carrying no soldiers, but belonging to private men, arrived at Oricum, and there was taken by Bibulus; who spared neither bond nor free, of as many as were of age, but put all to the sword. Whereby it happened, that in a moment of time, by great chance the whole Army was saved.

Bibulus as is before declared, lay at Oricum with his Navy. And as he kept the Sea, and the Ports from Cæsar; so was he kept from landing in any of those Countries: for all the Sea-coast was kept by Guards and Watches set along the shores, that he could neither water, get wood, nor bring his ships to land upon any occasion: Inasmuch as he was brought into great straits and exigences, for want of all necessities; and was constrained (besides all other provisions) to fetch his water and wood from Corin. And one time amongst the rest it happened, that the weather being foul, they were forced to relieve themselves with the dew which in the night time fell upon the skins, that covered the Decks of the ships. All which extremities they patiently endured; and would by no means be brought to leave the Ports, or abandon the Sea-coast.

But as they were in these difficulties, and that Libo and Bibulus were come together, they both of them spake from a ship bound to M. A-

cilius and Statius Murcus, Legates (of whom one was Governour of the Town, and the other had the charge of such Guards as were along the shore) signifying, that they would willingly talk with Cæsar of matters of great consequence, if they might have leave. For a better shew and assurance whereof, they intimated something concerning a Composition. In the meantime they earnestly desired there might be a truce: for the thing they propounded imported matter of great weight, which they knew Cæsar exceedingly affected; and it was thought that Bibulus was able to work somewhat to that purpose.

Cæsar at that time was gone with one legion to take in some towns further off, and to set a course for provision of Corn which was brought sparingly unto him; and was then at Buthrotum, opposite to Corin. Being certified thereby Letters from Acilius and Murcus, of that which Libo and Bibulus had requested, he left the legions, and returned himself to Oricum. At his arrival thither, they were called out to treat. Libo came forth, and executed Bibulus, for that he was exceeding choleric, and had besides conceived a great anger at Cæsar, about the Adultery and Prætorship; and in regard of that, he did him the Conference, left a matter of that utility and importance should be disturbed by his inconsiderate carriage. Pompey, he said, alwaies was desirous that matters might be accorded, and that Arms might be laid aside: but they of themselves could do nothing therein; forasmuch as by the general resolution of a Council, the superintendency of the warre, and the disposition of all things were referred to Pompey. However, when they understood what Cæsar required, they would fain instantly dispatch him, and be a means that he should accomplish all things with good satisfaction. In the mean time let there be a truce, and until an answer might be returned from him, let neither Party offend one another. To this he added somewhat concerning the Cause in question, the forces and aids. To which Cæsar did not think it fit at that time to make any answer: nor do we think there is cause now to make mention thereof.

Cæsar required, that it might be lawful for him to send Embassadors to Pompey without danger; and that they might undertake, that such as he sent, might be well treated, or take them into their charges, and bring them safely to Pompey. Concerning the Truce, the course of the warre fell out to be so carried, that they with their Navy did keep his ships and Succours from coming unto him; and he, on the other sides, did prohibit them from landing.

landing, or taking in fresh water: and if they would have that granted unto them, let them cease guarding of the Coast; but if they would continue that, then would he continue the other. Notwithstanding, he thought the Treaty of accord might go on, albeit these were not omitted; for he took them to be impediments thereunto. They would neither receive Cæsar's Embassadors, nor undertake for their safety; but referred the whole matter to Pompey: only they instanced, and very vehemently urged for the Truce. But Cæsar perceiving that all this speech tended only to avoid the present danger, and to supply themselves of such waits wherewith they were strengthened, and that there was no condition of peace to be expected, he began to think of prosecuting the warre.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS in contracting with a party, it is due to be cared, that War be not shrowded under the fair name of Peace; for a Truce demanded by an Enemy, is to be handled sparingly and with suspicion: as a thing never commonly required, but when necessity doth move them thereunto; and not to be granted, but as it may inferre the like advantage. But to yield to a suspension of Arms, advantageous to an Enemy, and no way gainfull to them that consent unto it, is neither allowable by reason, nor Cæsar's example. And if occasion prove it requires, it must be but for a little time: for a Prince engaged in the field, that shall entertain a Truce for any long season, shall see his Army consumed both in courage, and in the parts thereof, which will fall alunder of themselves; and was the means; by which Lewis the eleventh put by Edward the fourth King of England, from going on with a warre that might have given him the possession of the Crown of France. Whence it is, that such as seek a Peace, desire no more than a cessation of Arms, for some reasonable time, as an introduction into forcing the same.

Concerning leagues, we are to note that there are found three differences. The first is, a league of Peace: which by the Apollites rules, should extend to all men; *Habere pacem cum omnibus*, have peace withall men; and by example of holy Patriarchs (of *Isaac* with *Abimelech*, *Jacob* with *Laban*) may lawfully be made with Heathen Princes; being as the golden chain, that teth all the Nations of the earth in peaceable community. The second is, a league of Intercourse, or Commerce; which is likewise by the same Patriarchs, tending for Corn into *Egypt*, and *Solomon's* cut-

course with *Hiram* King of *Tyres*, together with divers other examples, allowable with Infidels. For Nature being rich in variety of commodities, doth therefore divide her works amongst the Kingdomes of the earth, that there might be a mutual intercourse of exchange between the parts of the same. The third is, a league of mutual assistance; such as *Jehoshaphat* made with *Achab*: and it is hardly safe with any Prince; but no way allowable with Infidels.

Touching the Persons to be offered in a Treaty, it is to be observed from *Bibulus*, that no man, whose presence may either give offence, or whose intemperance may any way interrupt a course tending to a happy issue, is fit for any such employment.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THERE were in Rome certain officers called *Aediles*, or *Aedilites*, as having the care of houses and buildings, both publick and private, that they might be built and maintained in such manner as was agreeable to the ordinances of that State, together with other things whereto they had the charge. *Nunc sum dignatus Aedilis* (saith Cicero) *habeo rationem quod a Populo Romano acceperim, mihi ludos funtissimos, maxima cum ceremonia, Cereis Liberoque faciendos: mihi Floram Matrem populo plebique Romanæ, ludorum celebrare placandam: mihi ludos antiquissimos, qui primi Romani sunt nominati, maxima cum dignitate ac religione, Jovis Junonis, Minerveque esse faciendos: mihi sacrorum Aedilium procuratorem: mihi totam remm laborum esse commissam: ab eorum verum laborum sollicitudinem fructusque istos datos, antiquorum in senatu sententia dicende bonum, togam pretextatam, sellam curulem, juramentum, ad memoriam posteritatisque prodendum.* Now that I am appointed to bear the office of Aedility, I reckon with my self what charge I have received from the people of Rome: viz. to see to the solemnizing with highest ceremony of the most holy plays consecrated to *Ceres* and *Bacchus*; to the pacifying of *Flora* towards the people with celebration of plays due to her; as likewise to the performing of those most ancient plays in honour of *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and *Pallas*, with the greatest splendour and religion possible: to have a care of sacred houses, and in general of the whole City; &c. whereto it was to be noted, that these shows and Plays were always made and set forth at the charge and costs of the Aediles: and thence it was, that the allowing or disallowing of all Play-books belonged unto them. Moreover,

they had the charge of all the publick buildings and works of the City, together with the provision of victual and Corn. And for the misting of this office, was *Bibulus* angry with Cæsar, and would not be regained upon any condition.

## CHAP. VI.

*Bibulus* dieth, Cæsar useth means to procure a Treaty of Peace; but prevailed not.

Cæsar.

**B**ibulus being kept from landing many days together, and fallen into a grievous sickness, through cold and extreme labour (and having no means of help, nor yet willing to forgo his charge) could no longer withstand the violence of the disease. He being dead, there was none appointed to take the whole charge, but every man commanded his own fleet. It was shortly being quieted which Cæsar's friends virtually had moved, *Vulturnus* with the assistance of *Lisus*, together with *L. Lucceius* and *Theophanes*, to whom Pompey was wont to communicate matters of greatest importance, resolved to deliver what Cæsar had recommended unto him: and entering into the relation thereof, was interrupted by Pompey, forbidding him to speak any further of that matter, *What use or need have I (saith he) either of my life, or of the City, when I shall be thought to enjoy it by Cæsar's favour? neither can the opinion thereof be removed, until the warre be ended; that of my self I return back into Italy, from whence I am come.*

Cæsar understood this, from those that were present when he spake it; and yet notwithstanding, he endeavoured by other means to procure a Peace of peace. For the two Camps of Pompey and Cæsar were only separated by the River *Aplis*, that ran between them; where the soldiers had often colloquies, and by agreement amongst themselves, threw no weapon during the time of their treaty. Wherupon he sent *P. Vatinius*, a Leguee to the River bank, to utter such things as did chiefly concern a Peace; and to ask sometimes with a loud voice, whether it were not lawfull for Citizens to send to Citizens, touching a treaty of peace; being a thing permitted to the Thieves of the Pyrenean Mountains: or at least, to move that Citizens should not in Arms contend with Citizens. And having spoken much very respectfully, as well concerning his own well-fares as the safety of all the rest, he was heard with silence by the Soldiers on both sides.

At length, it was answered from the other Party, that *A. Varro* did offer himself for a conference the next day; so that the Commis-

sioners on both sides might come and go in safety, and deliver freely their opinion: for which a certain time was then appointed. The next day, great multitudes of either side presented themselves at the place assigned; and great was the expectation thereof; every man seeming to incline to peace. Out of which troop stepped forth *T. Labienus*, and spake softly touching the peace: and at last, entered into altercation with *Vatinius*. In the middle of their speech were weapons suddenly cast from all parts: which he avoided, being covered and defended with weapons. Notwithstanding many were wounded, and amongst others, *Cornelius Balbus*, *M. Plotius*, *L. Tiburtius*. Centurions besides many other soldiers. Then said *Labienus*, Leave off therefore to speak of any composition; for unless Cæsar's head be brought, there can be no peace.

## OBSERVATIONS.

THIS final piece of the Story containeth divers notable passages of extremity, in the carriage of Pompey, and others of his Party. As first (to take them as they lie) that of willfulness in *Bibulus*: whom neither sickness, nor despair of help could move to intermit the task he had undertaken; but chose rather to suffer unto death, in approving his zeal to the Cause, than to give himself a breathing time for the saving of his life: and may serve to admonish any other *Bibulus*, to value his life above that which a little and willful opinion may lead him unto; beyond the measure of honourable endeavour, or what else may any way be justly expected; least in striving to do much, he happen to do nothing. For that cannot be understood to be well done in another mans behalf, that is not well done in his own.

The second is, Pompey's resolution; being so extreme as no composition, or other thing whatsoever, could give him satisfaction; but only a victorious end of that warre. Our proverb saith, Better a lean agreement, then a fat remedy. And the casualties of warre may move an experienced Commander, to embrace a safe and quiet peace; as knowing, that he that goeth about to vex another, shall have his turn of suffering the like misfortunes: and as war begunneth when one party lieth idle, it endeth when the other side pleaseth.

Facilis descensus Avernus: ————

Sed revocare gradum superasque eadere ad urvis: ————

Hoc opus hic labor est: ————

The way to hell is easy:

But to come back, and to recover life,

This is a task indeed: ————

And therefore let no Commander, how great soever, refuse all peace, but that which

Tiberiam ne fab pacis volumine bellum. Cicero. 2. l. 7.

Facilis Pacis.

Facilis descensus Avernus.

Facilis descensus Avernus: pax, qui fletu non sapit.

Facilis descensus Avernus: ————

Sed revocare gradum superasque eadere ad urvis: ————

Hoc opus hic labor est: ————

The way to hell is easy:

But to come back, and to recover life,

This is a task indeed: ————

And therefore let no Commander, how great soever, refuse all peace, but that which

is bought by extremity of war; least the event (whereof there can be no assurance) fall out as it happened to Pompey: but rather with the use, let him learn the end of Arms; which is, to make straight that which is crooked, and out of discord and dissension, to draw means of a happy peace.

To which may be added that other of Labienus, as far in extremity as either of the former; whom nothing would satisfy but Cæsar's head. It cannot be denied, but that he strook at the root; for his head was the head of that war. But to say it rather then to do it, was no argument of Labienus worthiness. For as Polybus noteth, It is common to most men to magnify themselves, with words full of wind; yea and more then that, to follow their designs with impetuous violence: but to direct their undertakings to a successful issue, and to remove by industry or providence, such hindrances as happen to traverse their hopes, is granted but to a few; and now denied to Labienus; notwithstanding this Bravado. And therefore, let such Commanders as are in good opinion and esteem with their General, be well wary of imbarcking their party in any cause, farther then may belong to the wisdom and experience of judicious Leaders; as believing in that of Metellus to king Bocchus: *Omne bellum sumi facile, ceterum acerrime desicere, non in ejusdem potestate initium ejus & finem esse: incipere civis citius, senatus licere; deponi, cum virores velint.* Every warre is easily begun, but hardly so soon ended: the beginning and the end of it are not in the same man's power: any poorly spirited fellow may begin a warre; but it shall end when the Conquerour please, and not before.

## CHAP. VII.

Cælius Rufus moveth sedition in Italy, and it flain.

Cæsar.

At the same time, M. Cælius Rufus the Prator at Rome, undertaking the business of debts, in the beginning of his Magistracy, placed his seat by the chair of C. Trebonius Prator of the town; promising to be assisting to any man, that would appeal unto him, concerning valuation and payment to be performed by Arbitrators, according as Cæsar had ordained. But it came to passe, as well through the equity and indifferency of the Decrees, as through the lenity of Trebonius (who was of opinion, that those times required an easy and mild execution of justice) that none were found from whom the beginning of the Appeal

might grow: for to pretend poverty, or to complain of particular misfortune, and of the calamity of those times, or otherwise, so to propound the difficulties of selling their goods by an out-ropes, was every mans practise; but for any man to acknowledge himself to be in debt, and yet to keep his possessions whole and untouched, was held to be a very strange impudency: so that there was no man found that would require it.

Moreover, Cælius carried a very hard hand to such as should have received benefit thereby. And having made this entrance (so the end he might not seem to have undertaken a shameful or dishonest cause) he published a law, That there should be no Interest paid for any Monies let out upon considerations for thirty six dayes of the time agreed on. But when he perceived that Servilius the Consul, and the rest of the Magistrates did oppose themselves against him therein, and finding it not to suit with his expectation (to the end he might incite and stirre up the humours and spirits of men) he abrogated that law, and instead thereof made two others. The one, which cut off the yearly rents that Tenants were accustomed to pay their Landlords for the houses they dwelt in: and the other, touching new assurances, and the abolishing of old debts, whereupon the multitude ran violently upon C. Trebonius, and (having hurt divers that stood about him) pulled him out of his Chair.

Of these things, Servilius the Consul made relation to the Senate: who thereupon decreed, that Cælius should be removed from his Pratorship. And by means of that decree, the Consul interdicted him the Senate, and also drove him from the Speaking-place, as he went about to make a speech to the people. Cælius moved with shame and despite, made as though he would go to Cæsar; but sent messengers secretly to Milo, condemned to banishment for killing Clodius. And having recalled him into Italy, that by great gifts and rewards had gained to his party the remainder of the Company of Fencers, he joined himself with him; and then sent him before to Thurin, to excite and stirre up the Shepherds to sedition; he himself going to Cassiline.

At the same instant his Ensignes and Arms being layed at Capua, besides his family suspected at Naples; and their attempt against the town perceived; their other designs being discovered, and their Partizans shut out of Capua; fearing some dangerous forasmuch as the inhabitants had took Arms, and held him as an Enemy, he let fall his former determinations, and brake off his journey.

In the mean while, Milo, having sent Letters to the Municipall Towns, that what he did

did, was by the authority and commandment of Pompey, according as he received it from Bibulus, he applied himself to, and solicited such as were in debt: with whom prevailing nothing, he brake up divers prisons, and began to assault Colo in Thurin: and there he was slain by Q. Pedius the Prator, with a stone which he cast from the wall.

Cælius going on (as he gave out) towards Cæsar, he came to Thurin; where when he had moved divers of the Inhabitants, and promised money to the French and Spanish Cavalry, which Cæsar had put there for a Garrison, he was in the end slain by them. And so the beginning of great Matters, which put all Italy in fear and trouble, by the indirect practices of the Magistrates, and the iniquity of the times, had a speedy and easy end.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is to be noted, for the better understanding the Passages, that of those which were chosen Prators, the two chiefest remained at Rome. The one, to administer justice to the Citizens, which was called Prator Urbanus; who in the absence of the Consuls, had the superintendency of the affairs of the State assembled the Senate, received Packets, made Dispatches, and gave order in all things: which place was now supplied by Trebonius. The other was called Prator Peregrinus, whose office was, to order the causes and suits of foreigners and strangers: whereunto Cælius was chosen; and being of a turbulent and unquiet spirit, took occasion upon this rent in the State, to raise new garbols, fit for his own purposes; as having learned what Aristotile teacheth, That all things which are already stirred are more easily moved, then other natures that are yet in quiet. And thereupon having power by his office to decide causes of Controversy, he removed his Tribunals, and placed it hard by where Trebonius sat, to the end he might oppose the Decrees he made, for the prizeing of goods to fustie Creditors, and draw the people to appeal unto him; publishing whithall certain dangerous Edicts on the behalf of those that were in debt.

This Cælius was C. Cero's scholar for Oratory; and in the opinion of Quintilians was thought worthy to have lived longer, if he had been of a staid and staid carriage; but now must stand for an example of a willful Magistrate.

Touching Ruffs, which I have translated the Speaking-places, it was a part of their Fo-

rum, where the Consuls and other Magistrates spake unto the people: wherein was built a Chair or Pulpits of the beak-heads of Ships, which the Romans took from the Antians, and thereupon took the name of Rostra; memorable amongst other things, for that Antony set Tulles's head between his two hands, in the Chair, where he had often spoken most eloquently, and with as many good words, as were ever found in humane Oratory.

## CHAP. VIII.

Libo takeeth an Island right over against the Haven of Brundisium; and is beaten off by a Stratagem.

Libo departing from Ostium, with Cæsar's fleet of fifty ships, came to Brundisium, and took an Island, which lieth over against the Haven, as a place of great importance, by which our Army must necessarily come forth; thereby shutting in all the Ports, and parts of that shore: as also surprising by his sudden coming, certain ships of burthen, he set all on fire, saving one laden with Corn, which he took along with him. Whereby he put our men into a great fear; and landing certain soldiers and horsemen in the night-time, he dislodged the Cavalry that were there in Garrison: and so prevailed, through the advantage of the place, as he writ to Pompey, that he might draw the other shipping on shore, and new trim them; for he would undertake, with his fleet alone, to hinder those forces from coming to Cæsar.

Antonius was then at Brundisium; who trusting to the valour of the soldiers, armed out three score Skiffs belonging to great Ships, and fencing them with burdles and planks, put certain choice soldiers in them, disposing them in severall places along the shore: and further commanded two Triremes (which he had caused to be made at Brundisium, for the exercise of the soldiers in rowing) to go out to the mouth of the Haven.

Libo perceiving these to come out somewhat loosely, and hoping to intercept them, sent out five Quadrimemes to attack them; which were no sooner come near unto our ships, but the old soldiers that were aboard fled back into the Port.

The Enemy, carried on with a desire of taking them, pressed after somewhat rashly, and unadvisedly: when at length, upon

a signal given, the *skiffs* came suddenly out from all parts, set upon them, and at the first took one of the *Quadriremes*, with all the oar-men and soldiers in her; the rest they compelled to fly away shamefully. To which loss they were further added, that they were kept from water, by the Cavalry which Antonius had disposed along the Coast: through necessity whereof (as also by reason of the ignorance received) *Libo* departed from Brundisium, and gave over the siege.

At any months were now past, and the winter came hard on, yet neither the shipping nor the legions came from Brundisium, to *Cæsar*. And some opportunities seemed to be omitted, for that the wind was good oftentimes; which *Cæsar* thought they would have taken. And the longer they staid there, the stronger was all the Coast guarded and kept, by such as commanded the fleet: being now in great hope to hinder their passage. Which they did the rather endeavour, because they were oftentimes reproved by Letters from Pompey, for that they did not impeach *Cæsar's* coming at first, which he did make them the more careful, to hinder their supplies. And in attending, from day to day, an opportunity of passage, it would wax worse, and worse, the winds growing more foul and gentle.

## OBSERVATIONS.

BY how much easier it is to keep the out-let of one Port, then to guard the Coast of a large Country: by so much was *Libo* more likely to prevail, in seeking to shut up the Haven of *Brundisium*, to hinder these supplies from coming unto *Cæsar*; then the other, that went about to guard all the Maritime parts of *Epirus*, to keep them from landing, after they were at Sea.

But such is the uncertainty of enterprises of war, that albeit our course be rightly shapen, yet it doth often fail of leading us to that which is desired. For, howsoever he was possessed of this Island, that lay thwart the mouth of the Haven, and had thrust out the guard of horsemen, and so became confident of blocking up the Port: yet there was means found by the adverse Party, to give him such an affront, as made him quit the place with more dishonour, then could be recompensed by any thing he got.

## CHAP. IX.

*Cæsar's* supplies pass over into Greece, and take landing.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar is troubled at these things, writ very sharply to them at Brundisium, not to omit the opportunity of the next good wind, but to put to Sea, and to shape their course to

Oicum, or to the Coast of Apollonia; because there they might run their ships on ground: and these places were free from Guards; by reason they could not ride far from the Port.

They, according to their accustomed courage and valour (Marcus Antonius and Fulvius Calenus directing the business, and the Soldiers themselves being forward thereunto, as refusing no danger for *Cæsar's* sake) having got a South wind, weighed Anchors, and the next day passed by Apollonia and Dyrrachium: but being discovered from the Continents, Quintus Coponius, Admiral of the Rhodian Navy, lying at Dyrrachium, brought his ships out of the Haven. And as he had almost (upon a slack wind) overtaken our men, the same South wind began at length to blow stiff, by which means they escaped. Yet did not he desist from pursuing them; but was in hopes by the labour and industry of the Mariners, to overcome the force of the tempest, and follow them, notwithstanding they were past Dyrrachium, with a large wind. Our men, at the favour of Fortunes, were nevertheless afraid of the Enemies Navy; if the wind should chance to slack: and having got the Port called Nymphæum three miles beyond Lissus, they put in with their ships.

This Port lay sheltered from the South-west wind; but was not safe from a Southwind; howsoever, they accounted an ill road less dangerous then the Enemies fleet: and yet they were no sooner put in, but the wind (which had blown southerly for two dayes together) did now most happily come about to the South-west.

And here a man may see the sudden alteration of Fortune; for they which of late stood in fear of a dangerous Road, were now by this occasion, received into a safe harbour: and those which threatened danger to them, were forced to betake themselves to their own safety. So that the time thus changing, the tempest served our Party, and sunk theirs. Inasmuch as sixteen of the Rhodian ships were all shaven in pieces, and perished with shipwreck; and of the great number of oar-men and soldiers, part were dashed against the Rocks and slain, and part were taken up by our men: all which *Cæsar* sent home in safety. Two of our ships coming forth, and overtaken with the night, and not knowing where the rest had taken shore, stood at Anchor right over against Lissus. Thence did *Ottacilius Crastus*, Governour of Lissus, go about to take with Skiffs, and other little ships, which he had prepared for that purpose; and with all, treated with them of yielding themselves, promising life and safety upon such conditions.

One

One of the ships carried two hundred and twenty men, of the legion made of young soldiers; in the other were less then two hundred old Soldiers. And here a man may see, what assurance and safety consisteth in courage and valour of mind; for the new made soldiers, terrified by the multitude of ships that came against them, and spent with Sea-sickness, upon oath made not to receive any hurt, did yield themselves to *Ottacilius*; who being brought all unto him, were contrary to his oath, most cruelly slain in his fight.

But the soldiers of the old Legions (howsoever afflicted with the inconvenience of the tempest, and with the want of the Pump) did not slack anything of their ancient valour: for having drawn out the first part of the night in conditions of treaty, as though they meant to yield themselves, they compelled the Master to run his ship ashore; and having got a convenient place, they there spent the rest of the night.

As soon as it was day, *Ottacilius* sent four hundred boats, which had the guard of that part of the coast, with others of the garriſon, to assault and take them: but they valiantly defending themselves, slew divers of them; and so got to our men in safety. Whereupon, the Roman Citizens residing in Lissus (which town *Cæsar* had formerly given them to be kept and guarded) received in Antonius, and assisted him with all things needful. *Ottacilius*, fearing himself, fled out of the town, and came to Pompey.

Antonius sent back the greatest part of the ships that had brought over his troops (which were three legions of old soldiers, one of new soldiers, and eight hundred horse) to transport the rest of the soldiers and horse, that remained at Brundisium: leaving the Pontones, which were a kind of French shipping, at Lissus; to this end, but if happily Pompey thinking Italy to be empty and uninhabited, should carry over his Army thither, *Cæsar* might have means to follow him: and withall sent Messengers speedily to *Cæsar*, to let him know where the Army was landed, and what men he had brought over.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**D**OLUS an virius quis in hoste requirit. It is no matter whether the enemy does his business by Valour, or subtilty; is not so justifiable by the laws of true Vertue, as that of *Achilles*, who professed to hate that man more then the gates of Hell, that promised one thing, and purposed another. Neither do the Justs conclude otherwise; having for the more appa-

rence of truth, drawn it to a Question; *An perfidia in perfidum sit*; Jus sit, whether it be lawful to break faith with a faith-breaker; alleging *Lubienus* practice against *Comius* of *Hirtia* lib. 8. de bello Gallico. Answers that their example standeth as a precedent, to deal with them as they deal with others. But to falsify religion, as *Ottacilius* did, and to make an oath the Broker of unworthy ends, is abhorred by God and Man, and accordingly succeeded.

The most remarkable instance in this kind, is that (which is to be wilfuld were forgotten) of *Lewis* King of *Hungary*, who having concluded the honourablest peace, that ever Christian Prince had before that time made with any of the Turkish Sultans, and confirmed the same by an oath taken upon the holy Evangelist; did nevertheless at the persuasion of *Julian*, a Cardinal (whom took upon him by power from the Pope, to disannull the league, and absolve him from the oath) break the peace, and gave battle to *Amurath* at *Varana* (where the Infidel took occasion purposely to blaspheme, in calling for vengeance on such, as in their deeds had denied the Godhead of their most sacred & blessed Lord) and was there slain, to the utter ruine of his kingdom, and the reproch of Christian Name. Neither did the Cardinal escape the vengeance, which his treachery had drawn upon that royal Army: but being there wounded unto death, was found lying in the high way, by *Gregory* *Suavo*, ready to give up the ghost; and being that to take with him the bitter curses of such as passed by, flying from the battels of the due reward of his peridious abolition.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN case of difficulty and hazard (as *Cæsar* *Andronic* (eth) there is always great help in a good fortune and courage. For, whether it be that good hap attended a valourous carriage, or that vertue be a test, to remove all opposition, or what other cause *Virtutis* (eth) there is besides; but thus it falleth out, that such quick in as entertain a noble resolution, are ever safest *rebus bellis* in extremity of perill; and instead of losses, get a little honour and renown.

*Brasidas* found a Mouse amongst dried figs, which bit him so that he let her go. & thereupon said to those that stood by, That there was nothing so little, that could not save it self, if it had a heart to defend it self against such an assaulted it.

And herein we may observe that to be true, which the Poet hath delivered; *Seris venit utilis ab ammis*, Time and Practice do much avail to perfect this courage in the minds of Men of War, as knowing beforehand the weight of such labours, and having encountered the like dangers, even to the redeeming of themselves.

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## Observations upon Cæsars

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Bell. Iust. c.  
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Cass. Iust. c.

not at any time dipped either in the tears or in the blood of the people. But Tully draweth it to a more certainty, by making Necessity the square of his commands. *Da operam* (saith he) *in omnes intelligant, si sibi esse velint necesse, sit ut esse pareant*; Do your endeavour to let all (scd that they must obey necessity if they mean to be safe. And to the opening of private mens purses, is but to keep them shut and safe from such enemies as would consume all; according as Scipio once answered, when the Romans blamed him for spending their Treasure. Howsoever, Scipio knew well what he did in getting into his hand such store of Treasure; for War cannot any way be maintained, but with plenty of Money: neither can any State continue, if the revenue which supporteth the Common-wealth be abated; as Tacitus hath well observed, *Disolvitur imperium si fructus in quibus res pub. sustinetur diminuitur*.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsar sendeth forces into Thessalia, Atolia, and Macedonia. Scipio cometh into Greece.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar being joyned with Antonius, drew that legion out of Oricum, which he had formerly lodged there to keep the Sea-coast; and thought it expedient to make triall of the Province, and to advance further into the Country. And whereas Embassadors came unto him out of Thessalia and Atolia, assuring him, that if he would send forces to protect them, the Cities of those Provinces would readily obey what he commanded: he sent L. Cassius Longinus, with the legion of young soldiers, called the seven and twentieth, and two hundred horses, into Thessalia; and C. Calpurnius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a few horse, into Atolia; exhorting them specifically to take a course for provision of Corn in those two provinces, which lay near at hand.

He sent likewise Cn. Domitius Calvinus with two legions, the eleven and the twelfth, and five hundred horse into Macedonia; of which Province (for this part thereof which is called Frank or Free) Menanderus, a principall man of that Country, being sent as an Embassador, had professed exceeding great forwardness on their behalf. Of these, Calvinus upon his coming was entertained with great affection of the Atolians: and having cast the garrison of the enemy out of Caledon and Naupactum, became Master of all Atolia. Cassius arrived with the Legion in Thessalia; and finding there two Factions, was accordingly received with contrary affections.

Egeferatus, a man of ancient power and authority, favoured Pompey's party: and Petreus, a man of a most noble house, endeavoured by all means to deserve well of Cæsar. At the same time also came Domitius into Macedonia: and as Embassadors began to cometh, unto him from divers States of that Province, it was told him, that Scipio was at hand with the legions, and came with great fame and opinion of all men: which is oftentimes a fore-runner of novelties. He, making no stay in any part of Macedonia, marched directly with great fury towards Domitius; and when he came within twenty miles of him, turned his course suddenly to Cassius Longinus, in Thessalia: which he did so speedily, that news came together of his coming, and of his arrivall. For, to the end he might march with greater expeditions, he left M. Favonius at the River Haliacmon (which divideth Macedonia from Thessalia) with eight cohorts, to keep the carriages of the legions: where he commanded them to build a Fort.

At the same times the Cavalry of King Cottus, which was wont to keep in the confines of Thessalia, came flying suddenly to Cassius Campe, whereto he being astonished (understanding of Scipio's coming and seeing the horsemen whom he thought to be his) made towards the hills which inclose Thessalia, and from thence marched towards Ambracia. And as Scipio made hast to follow after, Letters overtook him, sent from Favonius, that Domitius was at hand with the legions, and that he could not hold the place wherein he was left, without Scipio's help.

Upon the receipt of which letters, Scipio altered both his purpose and his journey: so leaving Cassius made hast to help Favonius: so that continuing his journey night and day, he came unto him in very good time. For as the dust of Domitius Army, approaching, was seen to rise, the fore-runners of Scipio his Army were likewise discovered, whereby it happened, that as Domitius indurately did help Cassius, so did Scipio his speed save Favonius.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Cæsar being now ready with his forces to proceed against Pompey, the first thing he did, was to make triall of the provinces of Greece, and to get their favour and assistance, for his better furtherance in contesting his Adversary. For as an Army standeth firm by two speciall means, first, in themselves, as they are able to resist any opposing force; and secondly, through the favour of the Country, wherein they are engaged: so on the other side, their overthrow

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either proceeded from their own weakness; or otherwise, when the Provinces adjoining do refuse such mutual respects, as may relieve the wants of a contending multitude. And therefore, having got all the forces together which he looked for, or could any way expect, he sent out to try the affection of the Country, and to alter that in a moment, which Pompey had been settling for a year together, and then resolved to attack him nearer.

And doubtlesse, if Scipio had not by chance interrupted their course, upon his coming out of Asia to aide Pompey, they had as easily got all Thessalia and Macedonia, as they did Atolia; and were nevertheless to ordered and disposed, as they got more honour of Scipio, then he could win of them.

## CHAP. XIII.

The Passages between Domitius and Scipio.

Cæsar.

**S**cipio about two daies in his standing Camp, upon the River Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius Camp. The third day, as soon as it began to be light, he passed his Army over the River by a Forch, and incamped himself. The next day in the morning, he embattled his forces before the front of his Camp. Domitius in like manner, made no difficulty of bringing out his legions resolving to fight. And whereas there lay a field of six miles between both the Camps, he led his troupes imbattled under Scipio's Camp; who neverthelesse refused to move any yet from his standing: yet for all that, Domitius souldiers were hardly kept from giving battell; but specially a River lying under Scipio's Camp, which was broken and uneven banks did hinder them at that time.

Scipio, understanding of their alacrity and desire to fight, suspecting it might happen, that the next day he should be forced to fight against his will, or with great dishonour kept himself within his Camp, having with great expedition in the beginning gone on lightly, and unadvisedly, was now discommoded with a reproachfull end. For in the night-time he resolved without any notice or warning for the trifling use of the baggage, and passing the River, returned the same way he came, and in an eminent place, near unto the River, he pitched his Camp.

A few daies after, he laid an ambushment of horsemen in a place, where our men had formerly accustomed to forrage. And as Q. Varrus, General of the horse in Domitius Army, came out according to his ordinary use,

they set upon him at a suddain. But our men did valiantly sustain the onset; and every man braving himself speedily to his rank, they all together of their own accord charged the Enemy: and having slain four score, they put the rest to flight, with the lesse outcry of two of their men.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It appeareth here, that to these readines and resolution to fight, upon such grounds as are justifiable by the rules of War, is no small advantage to the prosperous carriage of the fame. For albeit Scipio was great in his own strength, and as great in the opinion and expectation of men: yet when he found such an alacrity in the Enemy, to give and take blows, and a desire to entertain seriously all occasions of giving battell; he was so far from protecting what he had pretended, as he rather chose the fortune of a safe retreat, and consequently to turn the advantage which the world in opinion had given to his Army, to his own reproach and disadvantage. Whereas on the other side, to be found for the most part unwilling to hazard the triall of a Field, or indispotied to fight upon any occasion, doth invite an Enemy to attempt that, which otherwise he would not; and giveth them courage to beat him from all his purposes, as knowing the resolution of their Adversary, and the means they have, either to take or leave at their pleasure.

## CHAP. XIV.

Domitius draweth Scipio to a losse, by an Ambushment, young Pompey's attempt upon Oricum.

**A**fter these things, Domitius hoping that Scipio might be drawn to fight, he made as though he were in great want and scarcity of Corn; and thereupon, rising from the place wherein he was incamped, with the usual cry of removing, according to the custom of War, and having marched three miles, he lodged all his Army, with the Cavalry, in a convenient and secret place.

Scipio being ready to follow after, sent his horsemen and a great part of his light-armed souldiers, to discover what way Domitius took: who marching forward, as the first troupes came within the Ambushment (suspecting somewhat by the neighing of the horses) they fell back again. Those that followed, after seeing the former troupes so suddenly retire, stood still.

P p Ony

## Observations upon Cæsars

Our men finding themselves discovered, and thinking it in vain to attend the rest, having got two troops of horse within their reach, they contented themselves with them; amongst whom was M. C. P. the General of the horse. The rest of those two troops they either put to the sword or took alive, and brought them to Donatus.

Cæsar, as is before shewed, having withdrawn the Garrisons from along all the Seacoast, left only three Cohorts at Oricum, for the defence of the Town: and to them he committed the custodie and safe keeping of the Gallies, which he had brought out of Italy; whereof Acilius the Legate had the charge, being left Governour of the town. He, for the better security of the shipping, had drawn all the fleet into a back angle, behind the town, and there fastened them to the shore: and in the mouth of the Haven had sunk a great ship, and set another by her, upon which he built a tower, to keep the entrance of the Port; and filled the same with soldiers, to defend the Haven from any sudden attempt.

Upon notice whereof, Pompey's son, being Admiral of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum, and with many handiers and books weighed up the sunk ship; and assaulted the other ships set by Acilius for the defence of the Haven, with ships wherein he had made towers, which stood by counterpoise, that he might fight with advantage of height, supplying continually fresh men; and attempting also from the Land side, to take the town by scaling Ladders, as by Sea with his Navy, to the end he might distract and dismember the forces within.

In the end, with extreme labour and multitude of weapons, he overcame our Party, and took the ship, having cast out such as had the guard; who fled all away with Skiffs and Boats. At the same time, being likewise seized of a small height on the other side of the town, in the nature of a Peninsula, he conveyed over four small Gallies, with Rollers and Towers, into the inner part of the Harbour, lying behind the town; in so much, as setting one each side upon the Gallies tied unto the shores, empty and unfurnished, he carried some of them away, and burned the rest.

This being done, he left D. L. L. whom he had taken from the Egyptian fleet, to keep the passages that no vituals, or other provisions, might be brought into the town, either from Bullis or Amantia: and he himself going to

Lissus, found thirty ships of burthen, which Antonius had left within that Haven, and set them all on fire. And as he went about to take Lissus, the soldiers which Cæsar had put there for a garrison to the Town, together with the Roman Citizens, and the townsmen thereof, did so well defend the same, that after he had continued there three daies, and lost a few men in the siege, he left the place, without effecting any thing.


## OBSERVATIONS.

AN Ambushment is easily at all times laid: but to do it so that it may not be suspected, and in such manner that the Enemy may fall into the danger thereof, is that which is to be aimed at therein. And therefore, to give the better colour to such deliques, the trick hath been to pretend fear (and so flight) or want of Corn, or somewhat else, to draw the Enemy to follow after with more boldness and resolution. And so to have it well done, there must be two deccits to assist each other; as in this of Donatus: to make shew of removing, through scarcity and want; and then to lie in wait for an advantage: According to that of the Spaniard, *A un Traydor, dos Alcesos*. For the prevention of such snares of deceit, the rule is generally given by Onofander, That the de-  
For opposi- tion, the hostilian discipline, or the English discipline, is to be observed.  
parture or falling away of an Enemy, is always to be suspected.

And for the more security therein, experienced Commanders have been careful before they stirred their Army, to make exact discovery, even to the place where they intended to lodge. For as in Physick, it is the greatest part of the cures to know the disease: so in matter of warlike danger is almost over, when it is perceived whence it may grow.

The manner observed in discoveries, hath usually been to send the Parties out in three Companies or troops; The first, consisting of a small number, to beat the way at ease, and to range about from place to place, as shall be found convenient: the second Company, being somewhat stronger, to second and relieve the first, if there be occasion: and the third, able to engage a good number of the Enemy.

And after this manner Cyrus disposed of his fore-runners; as appeareth in *Xenophon*. But this being subject to the consideration of time and place, and other circumstances, may varie, as shall seem expedient to the wisdom of the Generall.



## CHAP. XV.

Cæsar marcheth towards Pompey; offereth him batel; and cutteth him off from Dyrrachium.

**A**fter Cæsar understood that Pompey was at Alparagus he marched thitherward with his Army: and taking by the way the town of the Parthians, whereon Pompey had put a Garrison, the third day he came to Pompey in Macedonia, and lodged himself fast by him. The next day he drew out his forces, and putting them in order, presented him batel. But when he found that he would not accept thereof, he drew back his Army into the Camp, and betwixt himself of some other course. For the next day taking a difficult and narrow way, he set forward with all his forces towards Dyrrachium: hoping either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the town, or at least, to cut him off from all Convoys and Munition, which was there stored up for the whole provision of the war; as afterwards it came to passe. For Pompey being ignorant at first of his purpose, inasmuch as he took a contrary way, thought he had been driven thence through scarcity and want of Corn. But being afterwards advertised by the discoverers what course he took, he rose the next day, in hope to meet him a nearer way. Which Cæsar suspecting, exhorted the soldiers to endure a little labour with patience. And resting a small part of the night, in the morning he came before Dyrrachium, even as the first troop of Pompey's Army was discovered afar off, and there incamped himself.

Pompey being cut off from Dyrrachium, when he could not accomplish his purposes, fell to a second resolution, and fortified his Camp in an eminent place, called Petra; from whence there was an insensible passage to the ships, and sheltered likewise the Haven from certain winds. Thither he commanded part of the ships to be brought; together with Corn and provision of vittuals from Asia, and such other Countries as were in his obedience.

Cæsar, doubting that the war would prove long and tedious, and despairing of any success of vittuals from the Coast of Italy, for that all the shore was (with great diligence) kept by Pompey's parties, and that the shipping which in Winter he had made in Sicilia, Gallia, and Italia, were staid and came not to him; he dispatched L. Canuleius a Legate into Epirus, to make provision of Corn.

And forasmuch as those Regions were far off, he appointed storehouses and Magazines

in certain places, and imposed carriage of Corn upon the Countrey bordering about them. In like manner, he commanded what grain soever should be found at Lillus, Parthenia, or any other place, to be brought unto him: which was very little, forasmuch as the Countrey thereabout was rough and mountainous, and afforded no Corn, but that which was brought in from other places; as also, that Pompey had taken order in that behalf, and a little before hadransacked the Parthians, and caused his horsemen to carry away all the Grain, which was found amongst them.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**he first thing that Cæsar did, after their approach near one unto another; was to offer batel; as the best Arbitrator of the Cause in question, and most fitting the usage of the ancient Romans. But forasmuch as the endeavors of such as are in action, are always ordered by him that is the Sufferer; and that Pompey refused to accept thereof, knowing himself to be much stronger in forces, better accommodated, having a far greater party in the Countrey, and the Sea wholly at his command (which advantages were like to end the business, without hazard of a batel;) Cæsar betwixt himself of some other project, which might take away the scorn of that refusal, by undertaking such things as much imported the state of his Adversarie. For in such cases, when an Enemy will not fight, somewhat must be done to cast dishonour, or greater inconveniences upon him; or at least, to make overtures of new opportunities. And therefore he took a course, either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the Town wherein all his provisions of war were stored up, or otherwise to cut him off from the same. The least of which was a sufficient acquaintance of any disgrace, which the neglect of this offer might seem to inferre; having thereby occasion to use that of the Poet, *Jam sumus ergo pares* now we are even.

## CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar goeth about to besiege Pompey.

**C**æsar being informed of these things, entered into a deliberation, which he first took from the very nature of the place wherein they were: for whereas Pompey's Camp was inclosed about with many high and steep Hills, he first took those Hills, and built Forts upon them; and then at the condition of each place would bear, he made

## Observations upon Cæsars

works of fortification from one Fort to another, and determined to inclose Pompey about with a Ditch and a Rampier. And especially upon these considerations; for that he was greatly straitened through want of Corn, and that Pompey being strong in horse, he might with less danger supply his Army from all parts with provision: as also to the end he might keep Pompey from foraging, and so make his Cavalry unserviceable in that kind; and further, that he might abate and weaken the exceeding great reputation, which Pompey had attained unto amongst foreign Nations, when it should be noised throughout the world, that he was besieged by Cæsar, and durst not fight.

Pompey would by no means be drawn to leave the commodious of the Sea, and the town of Dyrrachium, having there laid up all his provision of war, Arms, Weapons, Engines of what sort soever; besides Corn, which was brought from thence to his Army by shipping. Neither could he hinder Cæsar's fortifications, unless he would accept of battle, which for that time he was resolved not to do. Only it remained, as the last thing he could think of, to possess himself of as many Hills as he might, and to keep as much of the Country as he could with good and strong guard; and by that means, to distrust, as much as possibly he might, Cæsar's forces: as accordingly it fell out. For having made twenty four Castles and Forts, he took in twenty five miles of the Country in circuit, and did forage within that space, and there caused many things to be set and planted by hand, which in the interim served as food for horses.

And as our men perceived their fortifications to be carried, and continued from one Castle to another, without intermission; they began to fear, lest they had left some places to fall out, and so would come upon them behind, before they were aware.

And the reason they made their works thus perfect, throughout the whole inward circuit, was, that our men might not enter in upon them, nor circumvent them behind. But they (abounding in number of Men) exceeded in their works, having also on the inside a less compass to fortify.

And as Cæsar went about to take any place, albeit Pompey was resolved not to fight, or interrupt him with all his forces: nevertheless he sent out his Archers and Slingers,

of which he had great numbers; by whom many of our men were wounded, and stood in great fear of the arrows: and almost all the soldiers made their coats, either of quilt or stiffening, or of leather, to keep them from danger.

To conclude, either Party used all force and means to take places, and make fortifications: Cæsar, to shut up and straiten Pompey what he could; and Pompey, to enlarge himself, and possess as many hills as conveniently he might; which gave occasion of many skirmishes and encounters.

### OBSERVATIONS.

WE may here take notice of the strangest enterprise, that ever was undertaken by a judicious souldier. For where else may be read or understood, that a weaker Party went about to besiege a strong adversary, and to inclose a whole Country by Castles and Towers, and perpetual fortifications from hill to hill; to the end he might shut him up as he lay incamped in the field? But herein appear the infinite and restless endeavours of a Roman spirit, and the works they wrought to achieve their own ends: and yet not besides the limits of reason. For if that of Seneca have any affinity with truth, That a man is but a commodity, or rather contemptible thing, unless he raise himself above ordinary countes: it is more peculiarly verified in a Souldier; whose honour, depending upon the superlative degree, must seek out projects beyond all equality: and the rather, upon such inducements as are here alleged; which shew good reason he had to be to make.

### CHAP. XVII.

A Passage that happened between both Parties, about the taking of a Place.

AMONGST these fights and encounters, Cæsar, it happened, as Cæsar's ninth Legion had taken a certain Place, and there began to fortify, Pompey had possessed himself of the Hill next adjoining thereunto, and began to hinder our men from their work. And having from one side an easy access unto it, first with Archers and Slingers, & afterwards with great troops of light-armed men, and engines of Battery he began to disturb them in their business. Neither were our men able at one and the same time, to defend themselves, and go on with their fortifications.

Cæsar,

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

Cæsar seeing his souldiers wounded and hurt from all parts, commanded them to fall off, and leave the Place. But so far much as they were to make their retreat down the Hill, they did the more urge and presse upon them; and would not suffer them to fall back for that they seemed to forsake the Place for fear. It is reported that Pompey should then, in a vain glory, say to those that were about him: That he would be content to be taken for a General of no worth; if Cæsar's men could make any retreat from thence (where they were so rashly engaged) without great loss.

Cæsar fearing the retreat of his souldiers, caused Hurdles to be brought, and set against the Enemy; in the brim of the Hill; and behind them sunk a trench of an indifferent latitude, and incumbered the place as much as possibly he could. He lodged also Slingers in convenient places to defend his men in their retreat.

These things being perfected, he caused the legion to be drawn back. But Pompey's party began with greater boldness and insolency to press our people; and putting by the Hurdles which were set there as a Barricadoe they passed over the ditch. Which when Cæsar perceived, fearing lest they should rather seem to be beaten off, then be brought back, whereby a greater scandall might consequently ensue, having also sent from the mid-way encouraged his men by Antonius, who commanded that legion he willed that the signe of charging the Enemy should be given by a Trumpet, and gave order to assault them.

The souldiers of the ninth legion, putting themselves suddenly into order, threw their pikes; and running furiously from the lower ground, up the steep of the Hill, drove the Enemy headlong from them; who found the Hurdles, the long poles, and the ditch to be a great hindrance unto them in their retreat. It contented our men to leave the place without loss: so that having slain many of them, they came away very quietly, with the losse of five of their fellows. And having stated about that place a while, they took other hills, and perfected the fortifications upon them.

### OBSERVATIONS.

THIS Chapter sheweth, that advantage of place, and some such inductions countes as may be fitted to the occasion, are of great consequence in extremities of war: but above all, there is nothing more available to clear a dangerous valour. Valour is the Hercules that overcometh so many Monsters: and verifieth that saying, which cannot be too often repeated, Virtute faciendum est quicquid in re-

bus bellicis est gerendum; What a man does in matter of war, must be done with valour. But of this I have already treated.

### CHAP. XVIII.

The scarcity which either Partie endured in this siege.

THE carriage of that war was in a strange and unusual manner, as well to respect of the great number of Forts and Castles, containing such a circuit of ground within one continued fortification, as also in regard of the whole siege, and of other consequences depending thereupon. For whatsoever went about to besiege another, doth either take occasion from the weakness of the Enemy, daunted or stricken with fear, or overcome in battail, or otherwise being moved thereunto by some injury offered; whereas now it happened that they were far the stronger, both in horse and foot. And generally the cause of almost all sieges is, to keep an enemy from provision of Corn: but Cæsar, being then far superior in number of souldiers, did nevertheless besiege an Army of twelve and untouched forces, especially at a time when they abounded with all necessary provisions; for every day came great store of shipping from all parts bringing plenty of all things needfull: neither could there any wind blow, which was not good from some part or other.

On the other side, Cæsar having sent all the Corn he could get far or near, was in great want and scarcity: and yet notwithstanding, the souldiers did bear it with singular patience; for they remembered how they had suffered the like the year before in Spain, and yet with patience and labour had ended a great and dangerous war. They remembered likewise the exceeding great want they endured at Alexandria much greater at Avaticum and yet for all that, they went away Conquerors of many great Nations. They refused neither Barley nor Peas, when it was given them in stead of wheat. And of Cantell (whereof they were furnished with great store out of Epinus) they made great account.

There was also a kind of roots found out by them that were with Valtinus, called Chara, which eaten with Milk did much relieve their want; and made with ball a kind of bread whereof they had plenty. And when Pompey's Party happened in their Colloquies, to cuss in their teeth their scarcity and misery; they would commonly throw this kind of bread at them, and scatter it in divers places, to discourage them in their hopes. And now Corn began to

beripes, and hope it self d'd relieve their wants, for that they trusted to have plenty within a short time. And oftentimes the souldiers, in their watches and conferences, were heard to let fall speeches, that they would rather eat the bark of trees, then suffer Pompey to escape out of their hands.

Besides, they understood by such as ran away from the Enemy, that their hope of service could scarce be kept alive, and that the rest of their Cattell were all dead, and that the souldiers themselves were in no good health, as well through the narrowness of the place wherein they were pent, as also by means of the ill favour and multitude of dead bodies, together with continuall labours being unaccustomed to travel and pains, but especially, through the extremewarmth of waters, for all the Rivers and Brooks of that quarter, Catv had either turned another way, or dimmed up with great works. And as the places were mountainous, with some intermission and distinction of Valleys in the form and fashion of a Cave or Den; so he stopped the same with great piles beaten into the ground, and interlaced with fagots and bundles, and then strengthened with earth to keep back the water in such as they were constrained to seek low grounds, and Marshy places, and there to sing Wells, which labour they were glad to undertake, besides their daily works, albeit these Wells stood far distant from their Garrisons, and were quickly dried up with heat.

But Cæsar's Army was in exceeding good health, and had plenty of water, together with all kind of provisions, excepting Wheat; which the season of the year daily brought on, and gave them hope of store, Harvest being so near at hand.

In this new course of war, new policies and devices of warfare were invented and put in practice by either Party. They, perceiving by the fires that our Cohorts in the night time kept watch at the works, came stealing out, and discharged all their Arrows upon them, and then presently retreated, wherewith our men being warned, found out this remedy, that they made their fires in one place, and kept their watch in another.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FORasmuch as all matter of attempt doth much import the fortune of a war, we may not omit to take notice of the reasons here expressed by Cæsar, which are the true motives of undertaking a siege. The first is drawn either from the weakness of an Enemy, or as he is daunted

with fear, or overcome in battel. For having thereupon no confidence in his own powers, he reflect himself in the strength of the Place which he holdeth and possesseth: whiclyevch his adversaries occasion to lay siege unto his Hold; and either to force them, or shut them up like wemen.

The second is, when one State hath offered injurie to another (which always importeth loss) beyond that which stood with the coule of respect formerly held between them. For revenge whercof, the other side laich siege to some of their Towns, to repair themselves by taking in the same.

And thirdly, the finall cause of all sieges is, to keep an Enemy from victuall, and other manner of provisions; and so to take them by the belly, when they cannot take them by the eais; which is a part so violent, as in requiring that which is due to Nature, as hath made the Father and the Son fall out for a Moule; as it happened at Athens, besieged by Demetrius.

Plat. de.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE second thing worthy our consideration is, the patience and depoyment of Cæsar's souldiers, in their so great wants and necessities. As first, in helping themselves with that root called Chama, described by *Dioscorides*, to Lib. 3. c. 59. to be a little feed, talling somewhat like Amise-seeds, good to help digestion, and having such a root as a Carex, which being boiled, is very good meat; and is the same which our Physicians call Caraway-feed: wherewith they fed their turn Lat. or milite with such contentment, as they seemed to have the assidue been trained up in the School of Frugality; a small virtue worthy of all regard, and the onely means so facilit to make easie the difficulties of war; being as necessary for a souldier, as the use of Armes; and in that which was aimed at in the answer offered with *Cyrus*, to shew the services in a souldiers diet, bread and wine. For being demanded, what he would have: made Xerophon, ready for supper; Bread, saith he; for we will up for the Fountain.

Neither hath it been thought fit, to give way to the naturall looseness of the stomacks appetite, upon any occasion; but to use the like moderation in the time of plenty. For *Zeno* took the answer of them, that would excuse their liberal expens by their ability of means, for no better payment; then they themselves would have taken the excuse of their Cooks, for putting too much salt on their meat, because they had salt enough.

Cæsar punished his Baker, for giving him better bread then his souldiers had. And *Scipio* cashiered a couple of Romans at the siege of Carthage, for feasting a friend in their Tent,

during an assault. Which austerity of life raised the Romans to that height of honour, and made them Masters of the world, from the East to the Western Ocean.

Secondly, as a consequence of this contentment, we may note their resolution to hold on their course of sieges, purposing rather to eat the bark of trees, then to suffer Pompey to escape their hands. It is an excellent point in a General, to keep himself from irresolution; being a weakness of will consequence, and not unlike the weakness of the Stagers, variably, uncertain, and without bottom or bound: whereas constantcy to purposes, produceth noble and worthy ends.

An instance whercof is *Fabius Maximus*, who notwithstanding the reproach and scandal cast upon him, continued firm in his determination, to the saving of his Country. And if he so well becoming a Leader, it is of much more regard in the souldier; especially considering that of *Xenophon*; *Non facile in officio potest miles contineri ab eo qui necessitas non subministrat*: He cannot easily keep his souldiers in obedience, which does not provide them necessaries. For as the same Author observeth in another place, *Nullus est adeo fortis aut audax, qui possit adversus famem aut frigus pergruam militare*: There is no man so stout and valorous, as can fight against cold and hunger.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

AMONGst all the parts of the Roman discipline, their Watch deserveth a particular description; supplying in the Army, the office of the naturall eye in the bodie, which is to give notice of any approaching danger, for the preventing of the same. *Polybius* hath left it to posterity in this manner; Of each sort of the Legionary foot, as namely the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, and likewise of the horse, there was chosen one out of the tenth and last Maniple, that was made free from watch and ward. This party, as the Sun began to decline, came daily to the Tent of the Tribune, and there had given him a little Tablet, wherein the watch-word was writ; which Tablet they called *Tessera*: and then returning to his Company, delivered it to the Centurion of the next Maniple, and that Centurion to the next, and so in order, until it came to the first and chieftest Company, which was lodged next unto the Tribunes; and by the Centurion thereof was returned to the Tribune before Sun-setting.

And if all the Tablets were brought in, then did the Tribune know the word was given to all. If any wanted, they made inquirie, and

by the notes of inscription finding which was missing, they punished the default as they saw cause. And this was their watch-word, by which their Party was distinguished from an Enemy, and in likelihood (for *Polybius* doth not assign to much) was by the Centurion given to such of his Maniple as were to watch that night.

Their night-watches were thus ordered; A Maniple, or Company, was always appointed to watch at the Generalls Pavilion. The Treasurer had three watches, and every Legat two. A watch consisted of four men, according to the generall division of their night into four parts: each of those four having his turn appointed him by lot, for the first, second, third, or fourth watch, and the rest sitting by. The *Vetles* kept watch without the Camp, and the *Deurries* of horse at the gates. Besides, every Maniple had private watch within it self.

Of those that were appointed to watch, a Lieutenant of each Maniple did bring to the Tribune in the evening, such as were to keep the first watch of the night: and to them were delivered lesser Tabletsthen were given out at first, called *Tesserae*, appropriated to every particular watch; one for himself, and three other for his fellows.

The trust of going the Round was committed to the horsemen: for it belonged to the first Commander of horse in each legion, to give order to his Lieutenant, to appoint before dinner four young men of his troop, to go the Round the next night; and in the evening, to acquaint the next Commander to appoint Rounders for the night following. These horsemen being thus appointed, did cast lots for the first, second, third, and fourth watch, and then repaired to the Tribune; of whom they had order what and how many watches to visit, having received the watch-word before from their Commander: and then all four went to attend at the Tent of the *Primipile*, or chieftest Centurion of a Legion, who had the charge of distinguishing the four watches of the night by a Trumpet.

When time served for him that was to go the Round the first watch, he went out accompanied with some of his friends, and visited those watches which were assigned unto him. And if he found the watch-man waking, and in good order, he then took the Tablet from him which he had received of the Tribune, and departed. But if he found him sleeping, or out of his place, he took witness thereof, and departed. The same did the rest of the Rounders, as their watches fell out in court. And as the day began to break, all the Rounders brought in the Tablets to the Tribunes. And

if all were brought in, there was no more to do: but if any wanted it was found out by the Character, what watch had failed; which being known, the Centurion was called, and commanded to bring those that were faulty. If the offence were in the watch-man, the Reward was to prove it by witnesses: if not it fell upon himself; and a Council of war was presently called, the Tribune gave judgement to kill him with a club. And in this manner did the Romans keep watch in the Camp.

## CHAP. XIX.

A relation of divers incounters, that happened between both parties.

There is a great part of the history in this place omitted.



**M**eanwhile Pub. Sylla, whom Cæsar (at his departure from the Camp) had left to command the Army, being certified thereof, came with two legions to succour the Cohort: at whose approach Pompey's party was easily beaten off, being neither able to endure the shock nor fight of our men. For the first being put off, the rest gave back, and left the place: but as our men pursued them, Sylla called them back and would not suffer them to follow far after. Howbeit, many men think that if he would have pressed hard upon them, the war had ended that day. But in my opinion, he is not to be blamed; for there is one charge and power peculiar to a Lieutenant, and another to him that commandeth in Chief: the one doing nothing but by order and prescriptions, and the other disposing every thing as he shall think fit.

All the first Legions were slain.

Sylla (in Cæsar's absence) having freed his men was content therewith, and would no further engage them in fight (which might happily prove subject to ill fortune) lest he should seem to assume unto himself the place and authority of a Generall. There were certain things that made the retreat of Pompey's men very difficult and hazardous. For having ascended from a bottom to a Hill, they now found themselves upon the top thereof. And as they were to make their retreat down again, they stood in fear of our men, preferring on them from some setting (for hoping to end it speedily, they drew out the business) until it was almost night, whereby Pompey was forced to take a resolution from thence, and to possess himself of a Mount, no further from the Fort than out of shot. There he made a stand, fortified the place, and kept his forces.

At the same time they fought in two other

places: for Pompey, to separate and draught our troops, assaulted divers forts together, so that the end they might not be recovered from the next Garrison. In one place, Volcatius Tullus with three Cohorts sustained the assault of a Legion, and made them for sake the place. In another part, the Germans (joining out of our works, slew many of the Enemy, and returned back to their fellows in safety. So that in one day there were six several fights; three at Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications: of all which an account being taken, there were found slain of Pompey's Party to the number of two thousand, with many Centurions, and other speciall men called out to that war. Amongst whom was Valerius Flaccus, the son of Lucius, who being Prætor had obtained the Province of Asia: besides, there were six Engagements taken. Our Party lost not above twenty men in all those fights; howbeit in the first there was not one man but was hurt.

Volcatius

Four Centurions of one Cohort lost their eyes; and for argument of their encounter and great danger, they made report to Cæsar, of thirty thousand arrows shot into the fort. There was also a Target of one Scævæ a Centurion, which was shoved into him, being pierced through in two hundred and thirty places, whom Cæsar (as having well deserved of him and the Common-wealth) rewarded with six hundred pound sterling; and advanced him from the Companies of the English rank, to be the chiefest Centurion, or Principle of the Legion: for it appeared, that by his means specially the fort was saved. For the Cohort, he doubled their pay as well in Money, as in Corn and Apparell; and rewarded them nobly with ornaments of Military honour.

Mithridates

Prinipal

Pompey having wrought all that night, to fortify his Trenches, the dayes following he built towers 15 foot high; which being finished, he added maimeters to that part of the Camp. And after five dayes, having got a dark night (shutting all the Ports of his Camp, and ramming them up) in the beginning of the third watch, he drew out his Army in silence, and betook himself to his old fortifications.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**he breach of the Historie in this place, is like a blot in a fair Table, or as a gap in a dance of Nymphs, and doth much blemish the beauty of this Discourse. But, forasmuch as it is a loffe which cannot be repaired, we must rest contented with the use of that which remaineth.

Out of which we may observe the notice they took of well-deferving; according to the institution

Solon. Plat. s. de leg. lib. 4. Liv. 6.

Lucius Cæsar

Interpub. multo pre. flit. benefici. equum. in efflu. inno. mœnem. esse. rousus. fignific. ut. ubi. neg. gis. p. in. imp. obior. Sal. Iugur.

tution of their discipline supported especially by Præmia and Pœnia, Reward and Punishment. The recognition whereof (according to the judgment of the gravest Law-givers) is the means to raise a State to the height of perfection. *Eo cum impendi laborum & periculis, unde emolumentum & honos spectaretur.* Men will then venture and take pains when they know they shall see themselves hereafter and preferment by it. The Romans both by this, owned the valour of their soldiers with eternal honour. Neither did any thing to much excite them to the achievement of noble Acts as their Triumphs, Garlands, and other Figures of publick renown: which Cæsar especially observed above the rest. For besides this which he did to *Cassius Scævæ* (recorded by all the Writers of these wars) *Plutarch* relates, that at his being in Britain, he could not contain from embracing a soldier, that carried himself valiantly in defence of divers Centurions. And whereas the poor man, falling down at his feet, asked nothing but pardon for leaving his Target behind him; he rewarded him with great gifts and much honour. Howbeit the difference which *Salustius* hath made in this kind is too generally observed; that It more importeth a Commonwealth to punish an ill member, than to reward a good act: for a virtuous deede is by neglect a little abated, but an ill man becomes unalterable. And thence it is that merit is never valued but upon necessity. It is fit that he that will have the honour of wearing a Lions skin, should first kill the beast, as *Hercules* did: but to kill a Lions and not to have the skin is not to avoide it as a meaner occupation. *Autem quæ in negotiis, alioquin, observat in that government, which is the true Idea of Perfection: En la cascade Dios janus fuerit, ni foras, meo in premio, ni culpa p. sent.* In the house of God there never was, nor is it nor shall be, desertion, rewarded, or fault unpunished.

## CHAP. XX.

Cæsar moveth Scipio to mediate a Peace.

Cæsar.

**A**etolia, Acarnania, and Ampholochia being taken by *Cassius Longinus*, and *Calpurnius Sabinus*, as is before declared, Cæsar thought it expedient to attempt and try Achaia, and to proceed farther in that course: whereupon he sent thither *L. Calenus*, and *Q. Sabinus*, and to them he added *Cassius* with his Cohorts. Their coming being bruited abroad, *Rutilius Lupus*, to whom Pompey had left the charge of Achaia, determined to fortify the Isthmus,

to keep out *Fulvius*. *Calenus* in the mean time, with the favour and assent of the States, took in Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenos, besides some other places which he took by force: the rest of the Cities he laboured to draw to Cæsar's party, by Embassages sent a boat unto them: and therein was *Fulvius* occupied for the present. Cæsar every day following brought out his Army into an equal and indifferent place, to see if Pompey would accept of battel; inasmuch as he led them under Pompey's Camp, the wayward being within shot of the Rampier. Pompey, to hold the same and opinion he had attained, drew out his forces, and so intreated them before his Camp, that their rearward did touch the Rampier; and the whole Army was so disposed, that every man was under the protection of such weapons as might be shot from thence.

While these things were doing in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, it was certainly known that *Scipio* was come into Macedonia. Cæsar not omitting his former purpose, sent *Clodius* into him, a familiar friend to both of them, and one whom *Scipio* had formerly so commended to Cæsar, that he had taken him in the number of his nearest favourites. To him he gave Letters and Messages, to be delivered to *Scipio*: whereof this was the effect. That he had used all means for peace, and yet had prevailed nothing at all: which he took to be the fault of such as had the charge of the business, being fearful to treat with Pompey thereof in an unreasonable time. But *Scipio* had that credit and respect, that he might not only deliver freely what he thought fitting, but might also (in some sort) constrain him, and reform his error. For being Commander in chief over an Army, besides his credit, he had strength to compel him, which if he did, every man would attribute the quiet of Italy, the peace of the Provinces, and the safety and preservation of the Empire to him only. All these things did *Clodius* make known to *Scipio*: and for the first dayes was well heard; but afterwards could not be admitted to speech; *Favonius* reprehending *Scipio*, for going so far with him, as afterwards we understood upon the ending of the war: whereby he was forced to return to Cæsar, without effecting any thing.

Cæsar that he might with greater facility keep in Pompey's Cavalry at Dyrrachium, and hinder them from forage, fortified and shut up two passages (which, as we have before





## Observations upon Cæsar

and the places of Garrison, and sent them to that part of the fortification which was next unto the Sea, and farthest off from Cæsar's greatest Camp. Thither also he sent the ships before mentioned, filled with light-armed men and sagors, together with as many other Gallies as were at Dyrrachium; and gave directions how every man should employ himself.

Cæsar had left Lentulus Macellinus, the Treasurer, with the Legion newly enrolled, to keep that fortification; who for that he was sickly, and of ill disposition of body, had substituted Fulvius Postumus as his conductor. There was in that place a Trench of fifteen foot deep, and a Rampier against the Enemy of ten foot in altitude, and as much in breadth. And about six hundred foot from that place was raised another Rampier, with the front the contrary way, but somewhat lower than the former. For some few daies before, Cæsar (fearing that place, least our men should be circumvented with their ships) had caused double fortifications to be made in that place; that if (peradventure) they should be put to their shifts, they might nevertheless make good resistance. But the greatness of the works, and the continuall labour they daily endured, the fortifications being carried eighteen miles in circuit, would not suffer them to finish it. Whereby it happened, that he had not as yet made a Rampier along the Sea shore, to join these two fortifications together, for the defence thereof: which was informed Pompey by these two Sivoiens, and brought great damage and loss to our people. For as the Cohorts of the ninth Legion kept watch and guard upon the Sea, suddenly, by the break of day, came Pompey's Army: which seemed very strange unto our men: and instantly thereupon, the souldiers from a ship-board assaulted with their weapons the inner Rampier; & the rest began to fill up the Trench.

The legionary souldiers, appointed to keep the inner fortifications, having planted a great number of Ladders to the Rampier, did amuse the Enemy with weapons, & Engines of all sorts; & a great number of Archers were thronged together on each side. But the coverings of Officers which they wore on their head-pieces, did greatly defend them from the blows of stones, which was the only weapon our men had for that purpose. And as our men were overlaid with all these things, and did hardly make resistance,

they found out the defect of the fortification; formerly mentioned: and landing their men between the two Rampiers, they charged our people in the rear, and so driving them from both the fortifications, made them turn their backs.

This Alarme being heard, Macellinus sent certain Cohorts to succour our men: who seeing them fly, could neither re-assure them by their coming, nor withstand the fury of the Enemy themselves: inasmuch as what relief sooner was sent, was distracted by the fear and astonishment of them that fled away. Whereby the terror and the danger was made much the greater, and their retreat was hindered through the multitude of people.

In that sight, the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, and fainting for want of strength, looking towards the horsemen: This have I, said he, in my life time carefully and diligently defended for many years together, and now, dying, with the same fidelity to be made in unto Cæsar: suffer not (I pray you) such a dishonour, the like whereof never happened in Cæsar's Army, but return it unto him in safety. By which accident the Eagle was saved: all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, but the first of the Example of the Principes. And now the Enemy, with great slaughter of our men, approached near Macellinus Camp.

The rest of the Cohorts being greatly astonished, M. Antonius holding the next Garrison to that place, upon notice thereof, was seen to come down from the upper ground with twelve Cohorts. Upon whose coming Pompey's Party was repressed and staid, and our men somewhat re-assured, giving them time to come again to themselves out of that astonishment. And not long after, Cæsar having knowledge thereof by smokes made out of the fire, according to the use of former time, came thither also, bringing with him certain Cohorts out of the Garrisons.

## OBSERVATIONS.

It is an old saying, that Thieves handiell is much worse naught. But Traitors handiell is much worse: as appeareth by the falling away of these two Sivoiens: who were the butt that left Cæsar in this wars, and the first that brought Pompey to good fortune: themselves standing culpable as great an offence, as if they had alienated the whole Army. In the course whereof

Arma aliena grave  
crimen est,  
et capta  
desiderata  
carquatur,  
unde fit  
Lib. 14.  
c. 42. in  
trans.

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## Lib. III.

## Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

we may see plainly that which I have formerly noted: that it is an excellent thing to be still attempting upon an Enemy, so it be done upon good grounds and cautions: for while Pompey stood upon the defensive ward, the honour of the contention fell continually upon Cæsar. And doubtless, he that observeth Cæsar's proceedings in the carriage of all his warres, shall find his fortune to have specially grown from his active and attempting spirit.

In this Eagle-bearer, we may see verified that which Pæculius affirmeth of *Atiridates*, That a valiant spirit is sometimes great by the favour of Fortune, but always great in a good courage.

For these titles of degrees, as *Principes* prior and the rest here mentioned, having formerly disconcerted at large of the parts of a legion, and the Hierarchy of their disciplines, I will rather refer the Reader thereunto, then bumbolt out a volume with dull and tedious repetitions.

## CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar purposeth to alter the course of warre; and attempteth to cut off one of Pompey's Legions.

Cæsar.

Cæsar understanding of the losses and perceiving that Pompey was got out of the fortifications, and was incamped upon the Scis in such sort as he might freely go out to forrage, and have no lesse access to his shipping then formerly he had, changing his course of warre, which had not succeeded to his expectations, he incamped himself fast by Pompey. The works being perfected, it was observed by Cæsar's Discoverers, that certain Cohorts to the number of a Legion, were brought behind a wood into the old Camp. The site of the Camp was after this manner. The day before Cæsar's ninth Legion opposing themselves against Pompey's forces, and working upon the fortifications (as is before declared) had their Camp in that place, adjoining unto a wood, and not distant from the sea above four hundred paces. Afterwards Cæsar changing his mind for some certain causes, transferred his lodging somewhat further off from that place. A few daies after the same Camp was possessed by Pompey. And forasmuch as he was to lodge more legions in that place, leaving the inner Rampier standing, he enlarged the fortifications so that the lesser Camp being included in the greater, served as a Castle or Citadel to the same. Besides also, he drew a fortification from the right angle of the Camp, four hundred paces out-right to a River, to the end the souldiers might water freely, without dan-

ger. And he also changing his mind, for some causes not requisite to be mentioned, left the place too: so that the Camp stood empty for many daies together, and all the fortifications were as perfect as at the first.

The Discoverers brought news to Cæsar, that they had seen an Ensign of a Legion carried thither. The same was likewise confirmed from certain Forts which stood upon the higher ground. The place was distant from Pompey's new Camp about five hundred paces. Cæsar hoping to cut off this legion, and desirous to repair that day's losse, left two Cohorts at work to make a show of fortifying, and he himself (by a contrary way, in as covert a manner as he could) led the rest of the Cohorts in number thirty three (amongst whom was the ninth legion, that had lost many Centurions, and was very weak in souldiers) towards Pompey's Legions, and the lesser Camp, in a double battell. Neither did his opinion deceive him: for he came thither before Pompey could perceive it.

And albeit the fortifications of the Camp were great, yet assaulting it speedily with the left Corners, wherein he himself was, he drove Pompey's souldiers from the Rampier. There stood a Turn-pike in the Gates, which gave an occasion of resistance for awhile: and as our men would have entered, they valiantly defended the Camp; T. Pulcio, by whose means C. Antonius Army was betrayed, as we have formerly declared, fighting there most valiantly. Yet nevertheless our men overcame them by valour; and cutting up the Turn-pikes entered first into the greater Camp, and afterwards into the Castle, and slew many that resisted of the legion that was forced thither.

But Fortunes that can do much in all things, and specially in warre, doth in a small moment of time bring great alterations; as is then happened. For the Cohorts of Cæsar's right Corner, ignorant of the place, followed the Rampier which went along from the Camp to the River, seeking after the Gates, and taking it to be the Rampier of the Camp: but when they perceived that it payned to the River, they presently got over it, no man resisting them; and all the cavalry followed after those Cohorts.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Pompey having cleared his Army of that siege, it hooded not Cæsar to prosecute his purpose any longer: for when the end is mislaid for which any course is undertaken, it were folly to seek it by that means: We must rather

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chafe new ways; that may lead us to the end of our hopes, then follow the old track, which led to no effect. And yet nevertheless the sufficiency of the General is no way disabled: for, alter a wife man doth not always keep one path; yet still he holdeth one and the same way.

Secondly, that of *Nervæ* appeareth to be true, that great attempts are always made with great difficulty and danger. Whence the wisdom of the heathen world ascribed all to Fortune, as the sole cause of all remarkable events; and that which filled up both the pages of all the Books, wherein men noted the course of things. *Clades in bello acceptæ, non semper ignoscendæ, aliquando Fortuna temeritatis sunt impetratæ.* Losses received in war are not always to be imputed to foolish carriage, but sometimes to the temerity of Fortune, saith *Arctidamus*; and is that which is aimed at by Cæsar.

## CHAP. XXIII.

The fight continueth, and Cæsar loseth.

Cæsar.

**I**N the mean while Pompey, after so long a respite of time, having notice thereof, took the first Legion from their works, and brought them to succour their fellows; and at the same time his Cavalry did approach near our horsemen, and our men that possessed the Camps did disorder an Army, unbattled coming against them; and all things were suddenly changed. For Pompey's legions assisted with a speedy hope of success, began to make resistance at the Decuman gates, and a bloody fight ensued.

Cæsar's Cavalry being got over the rampier into a narrow passage, leaving how they might retreat in safety, began to fly away. The right Cornet secluded and cut off from the left, perceiving the terror of the horsemen (Left they might be endangered within the fortifications) betook themselves to the other side from whence they came; and most of them (Left they should be surprised in the first fight) cast themselves over works of ten foot high into the ditch; and such as first got over being broken under foot by such as followed after, therewith saved themselves in passing over the bodies.

The soldiers of the left Cornet perceiving from the Rampier that Pompey was at hand, and that their own side fled away, fearing lest they should be shut up in these straits, having the Enemy both without and within them, thought it their best course to return back the same way they came. Whereby there happened

nothing but tumult, fear, and flight: insomuch as when Cæsar caught bold with his hand of the Engineer of them that fled, and commanded them to stand; some for fear left their Engines behind them, others forsaking their horses kept on their course; neither was there any one of them that would stand. Norwithstanding, in this so great calamity and mishap these helps fell out to relieve us when the whole Army was in danger to be cut off; that Pompey seeing how iracund (for that as I think, it happened beyond his expectations, who a little before saw his men fly out of his camp) durst not for a good while approach near the fortifications; and our men possessing the narrow passages and the Ports, did hinder the horsemen from following after. And so a small matter fell out to be of great moment in the carriage of that accident, on either side. For the Rampiers which was carried from the Camp to the River (Pompey's Camp being already taken) was the only hinderance of Cæsar's expedite and easy victory: and the same thing, hindering the speedy following of their horsemen, was the only safety and help of our men.

In these two fights, there were wanting of Cæsar's men nine hundred and threescore; and horsemen of note, R. Felginus, Tullianus Gallus, a Senator, J. J. Felginus of Placentia, Agravius of Purcolis, Sacrativus of Capua, ten Tribunes of the soldiers, and thirty Centurions. But the greatest part of these perished in the Trenches, in the fortifications, and on the River banks, prest to death with the fear and flight of their fellows, without any blow or wound given them. There were lost at that time thirty two military Engineers.

Pompey, upon that fight, was saluted by the name of Imperator; which title he then obtained, and so suffered himself to be styled afterward; howbeit he asked not in any of his Adversaries, nor yet in any of his Friends, nor yet in any of his Captives, whether they begged all the Captives, caused them (for greater ostentation) to be brought out in public; and to give the more assurance to such as were fled thither from Cæsar's party, calling them by the name of fellow-soldiers, in great derision asked them whether old soldiers were wont to flee; and so caused them all to be slain.

Pompey's party took such an assurance and spirit upon these things, that they thought no farther of the course of war, but carried themselves as though they were already victors: not respecting (as the case of all this) the paucity of our men, nor the disadvantage

of the places, and the streightness thereof, the Camp being possessed, and the doubtful terror both within and without the works; nor yet the Army divided into two parts, in such sort as neither of them were able to help or succour the other. Neither yet did they add to this, that the fight was not made by any other than encounter, or in form of battel; but that they received more hurt from the narrowness of the places, and from their own disorder, than from the Enemy.

And to conclude, they did not remember the common chances and casualties of war: wherein oftentimes very small causes, either of false suspicion, or of sudden fear, or out of scruple of Religion, do inferre great and heavy losses; as often as either by the negligence of the Generall, or the fault of a Tribune, the Army is misordered. But as though they had overcome by true force of their prowess, and that no alteration of things could after happens, they magnified their victory, by Letters and report throughout the whole world.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Sometimes we may think to repair a loss, and thereby hazard a greater misfortune. For albeit the saying be common, that a man must seek his coat where he lost it, as *Dices* do; yet there is always more certainty in seeking, then in finding. For the circle of humane affairs being carried round in a course, doth not suffer happinelle to continue with one Party. And thereupon it was, that *Pitatus* dedicated a Ladder to the Temple of *Astylene*, to put men in mind of their condition; which is nothing else but going up and down. The life of a soldier is a mere *Herophrodites*, and is made by Nature to beget Happiness of Adversity, and mischances of Good hap: as if the cause of all causes, by intermixing sweet with bitter, would lead us to his Providence, and consequently to himself, the first Mover of all Motions.

The diversity of these events are so inched together, as one seemeth to have relation to the other. For this task admitted not of *omni, vici, vici*, I only came, and law, and overcame; nor went on with *Alexander*, marching over the Plains of *Asia*, without rub or counterblow: but the business was disposed, he to receive a blow, and there to gain a victory. And so this loss at *Dyrachium* made the battel at *Pharsalia* the more glorious, and beautified the course of this war with variety of chances. The best use of these Disasters is

that which *Croesus* made of his cross fortune: *Atque casus, est ingratissimus, ubi tamen existit disciplina*; My mishaps, though they be unplesant, yet they have still taught me something.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

As the Mathematic's, by reason of their certainty, do admit demonstration, as well from the conclusion to the principles, as from the principles to the conclusion: so in the actions of mans life, it is not hard to assign the precedents causes by the sequels: the event being oftentimes an understanding Judge of things that are past. And although it do being oftentimes an understanding Judge of things that are past. And although it do no where appear what was the cause of *Lutetia* leaving Cæsar, yet his intemperate carriage towards these Captives, may make at least a probable conjecture, that his revolt proceeded from his own disposition, rather than from any cause on Cæsar's behalf. For where a man hath once done an injury, he will never cease heaping one wrong alter another, and all to justify his first error: whereas on the other side, a noble spirit, free from all deileit, will demean himself answerable to his first innocency.

## CHAP. XXV.

Cæsar speaketh to the soldiers concerning this mishap, and forsaketh the Place.

**C**Æsar being driven from his former Camp, purposes, resolved to change the whole course of the warre; so that at one and the same time omitting the siege, and withdrawing the Garrison, he brought all the Army into one place, and there spake unto the soldiers: exhorting them not to think much at those things that had happened, nor to be amazed therewith; but to counterpoise this loss (which was in a mediocrity) with many happy and fortunate battels they had gained.

Let them thank Fortune, that they had taken Italy without blow or wound; that they had quiered and put in peace both the Provinces of Spain, full of warlike men, and dressed by skillful and practised Commanders; that they also had subdued the fertile bordering Provinces; and likewise, that they should remember, without facility they were all transported in safety through the midst of the Enemies fleets; not only the Haven and Ports, but all the coast being full of shipping.

*Observations upon Cæsars.*

Having ended his speech, he disgraced and  
dishonoured some English-bearers. The Army

As being done, he retained two Legions within the Camp; and the rest, being led out at divers ports, about the fourth watch of the night he sent the same way. And after a little pause for the observing of Military order, and to the end his speedy departure might not be discovered he commanded them to take up the cry of tramping up their baggage; and presently setting forward, overtook the former troop, & so went speedily out of the sight of the Camp.

Caesar having made a just daires march, according to his first determination, and brought his Army over the River Genutius, he lodged in his old Camp over against Alparagus; and kept all the souldiers within the Rampier, commanding the horse that went out to forrage, to be presently taken in by the Decumane Port.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**Premessa**  
del la c.  
mentatio-  
nem non a  
eprunt.  
Veg. c. lib.  
I. c. p. 14.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

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*Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.*

Many are the cautions that may move a Commander to dislodge himself and leave his Adversary for a time; but the means to do it safely depend principally upon these two points. The one is, To advance himself on toward it, as far as possibly he can, so that the end he may get the better; the other is, To be ready to follow him; and is taught by *Xenophon*, who, after the death of *Cyrus*, in the battle against King *Artaxerxes*, brought back a dispirited men from *Greece*, from an Army of two hundred thousand men, who were well supplied hard upon them for five hundred leagues together. Whence retreat is exactly flouted by the said Author, in several books, containing all the difficulties concerning this point: among which, we find this passage,

**I(b.1.**

Live. 31.

Livic. 27

Lib. 2. de  
bello Gio

Front. lib. I.  
cap. I.

r

CHAP. XXVI.

... *Dromys* *beavis* ...

82 C2512

35

## Observations upon Cæsars

out far off to get wood, and to seek forrage: others, rising hastily, had left a great part of their luggage behind them; and induced by the nearness of the last night's lodging, left their Armes, and went back to fetch those things that were behind. Inasmuch as Cæsar, seeing them thus scattered (as before he had conceived how it would fall out) about high noon gave warning to depart, and led out his Army; and doubting that day's journey, he went from that place about eight mile: which Pompey could not do, by reason of the absence of his soldiers.

The next day Cæsar having in like manner sent his carriages before, in the beginning of the night, set forward himself about the fourth watch; that if there were any sudden necessity of fighting, he might (at all occasions) be ready with the whole Army. He like he did the day following. By which it happened that in his passage over great Rivers, and by difficult and cumbersome waters he received no detriment or loss at all. For Pompey being slain the first day, and afterwards fleeing in vain, making great journeys, and yet not overtaking us the fourth day gave over, and following, and betook himself to another resolution.

Cæsar, as well for the accommodating of his wounded men, as also for paying the Army, re-arming his Allies and confederates, and leaving Garrison in the towns, was necessarily to go to Apollonia; but he gave no longer time for the dispatch of these things, then could be spared by him that made haste. For seeing least Domitius should be engaged by Pompey's Arrival, he desired to make towards him with all possible celerity: his whole purpose and resolution insisting upon the foregoing; that if Pompey did follow after him, he should by that means drive him from the Sea-side, and from such provisions of war as he had stored up at Dyrrachium; and so should compell him to undertake the war upon equal conditions. If he went over into Italy, having joyned his Army with Domitius, he would go to succour Italy by the way of Illyricum. But if he would go about to besiege Apollonia or Onicum, and so exclude him from all the Sea-coast, he would then besiege Scipio, and force Pompey to relieve him. And therefore having writ and sent to Cn. Domitius, what he would have done (leaving four Cohorts to keep Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Onicum, and dispatching such as were weak through their wounds in Epirus and Acarnania) he set forward.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Consejlo jussu itere eius dei, having marched a full day's march, or gone a jult

day's journey, saith the story. Which giveth occasion to inquire how far this jult day's journey extended. Lippinus saith, it was twenty four miles, alleging that *offegeius; Militari; gradu* (saith he) *viginti millia passuum horis quinque duxit ac æstivis consuetudine: plenis autem gradibus citatio est solidum horis viginti quatuor*; A soldiers march did usually rid 20 miles in five summer hours; and if they marched with speed, 24 miles in the same time: understanding *justum itera* jult journey to be to much as was measured *militari gradibus* by a soldiers march. But he that knows the marching of an Army, shall easily perceive the impossibility of marching ordinarily twenty four miles a day. Besides this place doth plainly confute it: for, first, he saith that he made a jult day's journey; & then again rising about noon, doubled that day's journey, and went eight miles. Which shews that their *justum iter* was about eight miles: and to stretch the flow convenience of an Army, with more probability then that of Lippinus.

## CHAP. XXVII.

Pompey hasteth to Scipio. Domitius hearth of the overthrow.

**P**ompey also conjecturing at Cæsar's purpose, though he is requisite for him to hasten to Scipio, that he might succour himself, Cæsar should choose to intend that way: but if it so fell out that he would not depart from the Sea-side, and Corcyra, as expelling the legions and Cavalry to come out of Italy, he would then attack Domitius. For these causes both of them made haste, as well to assist their Party, as to surprize their enemies; if occasion were offered. But Cæsar had turned out of the way, to go to Apollonia; whereas Pompey had a ready way into Macedonia by Candavia. To which there happened another inconvenience: that Domitius, who for many days together had lodged hard by Scipio's Camp, was now departed from thence, to make provision of Corn, unto Heraclea Senica, which is subject to Candavia; as though Fortune would have thrust him upon Pompey. This Cæsar was at that time ignorant of. Moreover, Pompey had writ to all the States and Provinces of the overthrow at Dyrrachium in far greater terms then the thing it self was: and had noised it abroad, that Cæsar was beaten, had lost all his forces, and fled away.

which reports made the wates very hard and dangerous to our men, and drew many States from Cæsar's party: whereby it happened,

opened, that many Messengers being sent, both from Cæsar to Domitius, and from Domitius to Cæsar, were forced to turn back again, and could not passe. Howbeit, some of the followers of Roscius and Aegus (who, as is before shewed, had fled unto Pompey) meeting on the way with Domitius Discoverers (whether it were out of their old acquaintance, having lived together in the wars of Gallia, or otherwise out of vain-glorie) related all what had happened; not omitting Cæsar's departure, or Pompey's coming. Whereof Domitius being informed, and being but scarce four hours before him, d'd (by the help of the enemy) avoid a most imminent danger, and met with Cæsar at Ægium, which is a town situate upon the frontiers of Thessalia.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Joy is an opening and dilating motion, and oftentimes openeth the body to wide, as it leecheth out the soul, which returneth not again. And in like manner, the causes of all such conditions do, for the most part, spread themselves further then is requisite.

Pompey having victory in hope, rather then in hand, sought as though all were his: notwithstanding, that the happiness or disaster of humane actions, doth not depend upon the particulars rising in the course thereof, which are variable and divers, but according as the event last centure it. Whereupon the Ruffes have a saying in such cases, that he that laughs afterward, laughs then too: as Cæsar did.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

Cæsar sacketh Gomphi in Thessalia.

**C**æsar having joyned both Armies together, came to Gomphi, which is the first town of Thessalia by the way leading out of Epirus. These people, a few daies before, had of their own accord sent Embassadors to Cæsar, offering all their means and abilities to be disposed at his pleasure, requiring also a Garrison of soldiers from him. But now they had heard of the overthrow at Dyrrachium; which was made so great, and so prevailed with them that Androlithes, Pretor of Thessalia (choosing rather to be a partaker of Pompey's victory, then to a companion with Cæsar in adversity) had drawn all the multitude of servants and children out of the Country into the Town; and shutting up the Gates, dispatched Messengers

to Scipio and Pompey, for succour to be sent unto him: in that he was not able to hold out a long siege. Scipio under standing of the departure of the Armies from Dyrrachium, had brought the legions Laetia and Pompey did not as yet approach near unto Thessalia.

Cæsar having fortified his Camp, commanded Manteles, Ladders, and Hurdles to be made ready for a surprize. Which being fitted and prepared, he exhorted the soldiers, and shewed them what need there was (for the relieving of their wants, and supplying of all necessaries) to possess themselves of an open and full town; as also by their example, to terrifie the other Cities: and what they d'd, to do speedily, before it could be succoured. Whereupon, by the singular industry of the soldiers, the same day he came thither, giving the assault after the night hours (knowing that the exceeding height of the walls he took the Town before sunrise, and gave it to the soldiers to possess, and presently removing from thence, came to Metropolis in such sort, as he outwent as well Messengers, as news of taking the Town.

The Metropolitans, induced with the same respects, at first shut up their gates, and filled their walls with armed men: but afterwards, understanding by the Captives (whom Cæsar caused to be brought forth) what had happened to them of Gomphi, they presently opened their gates; and by that means were all preserved in safety. Which hapness of theirs being compared with the defolation of Gomphi, there was no one State of all Thessalia (excepting them of Laetia, which were kept in with great forces by Scipio) but yielded obedience to Cæsar, and did what he commanded. Cæsar having now got a place plentiful of Corn, which was now almost ripe, he refused to attend Pompey's coming, and there to prosecute the residue of that war.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Little faith, that the siege of that Place which we would quickly take, must be prosecuted with urged hard. Which rule Cæsar observed: for he followed it so hard, that he took the walls of the Town fortified with exceeding high walls, in fourty four spaces, or thereabouts, after he began to assault it. Which Plutarch saith, was to plentifully stored of all necessary provisions, that the soldiers found there a refectation of all the milities and wants they suffered at Dyrrachium: inasmuch as they seemed to be new made, both in body and courage, by reason

Lib. 6. de  
Indict. Cyt.

Rello lex  
acquirit  
pallidum.  
Bion. Cila  
licare, in  
exptu. legat.

Polys. lib. 3.

of the wine, victuals, and riches of that place; which were all given unto them, according to that of Xenophon, *Lux inter omnes homines perpetua est, quando belligerantium urbes capta fuerint: cuncta eorum esse qui eam ceperint, & corpora eorum qui in eis sunt & bona*; It is a general Law amongst all men, that when an Enemies town is forcibly taken, all that is found in it, as well bodies as goods, is at their disposal who have taken it.

Appian saith, the Germans were so drunk, that they made all men laugh at them: and that if Pompey had surprized them in these disorders, they might have paid dear for their entertainment. He addeth moreover (to show the stiffness of the inhabitants against Cæsar) that there were found in a Surgeous Hall, twenty two principal Persons, (stiff dead upon the ground, without appearance of any wound, having their goblets by them: and he that gave the poison, sitting upright in a Chair, as dead as the others.) And as Phlip having taken Acrolisse in the County of the Scythians drew all the rest to his obedience, though the fear they conceived of their usage: so the consideration of the calamity which befell Gomphi, and the good treaty which the Metropolitans found by yielding unto Cæsar, brought all the other Cities under his command.

## CHAP. XXIX.

Pompey cometh into Thessalia: his Army conceiveth assured hope of victory.

Cæsar:

Pompey a few days after came into Thessalia: and there calling all the Army together, first gave great thanks to his own men; and then exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that the victory being already obtained, they would be partakers of the booty and of the rewards: and taking all the legions into one Camp, he made Scipio partaker both of his honour and authority, commanding the Trumpets to attend his pleasure for matter of direction, and that he should use a Prætorial Pavilion.

Pompey having strengthened himself with an addition of another great Army, every man was confirmed in his former opinion, and their hope of victory was increased: so that the longer they delayed the matter, the more they seemed to prolong their return into Italy. And albeit Pompey proceeded slowly and deliberately in the business, yet it was but a drier work. But some there were that said, he was well pleased with authority and command, and to use men both of Consul dignity, and

of the Prætorian orders, as his vassals and servants.

And now they began to dispute openly, concerning rewards and dignities of Priesthood, and pointed out those which from year to year were to be chosen Consuls. Others begged the houses and goods of such as were with Cæsar. Besides a great controversy that further grew between them in open council, whether L. Hirrus were not to be regarded at the next election of Prætors, being absent, and employed by Pompey against the Parthians. And as his friends urged Pompey with his promise given at his departure, requiring he might not now be deceived through his greatness and authority; the rest, running a course of as great danger and labour, saw no reason should be respected before all others. And now Domitius, Scipio, and Spintier Lentulus, began to grow to high words in their meeting, concerning Cæsar's Priesthood: Lentulus alleging, by way of ostentation, the honour that was due to his age and authority; Domitius boasting of the credit and favour he had at Rome; and Scipio trusting to Pompey's alliance. Moreover, Attius Rufus accused L. A. franius to Pompey, for betraying the Army in Spain. L. Domitius gave out in council, That after the war was ended, such as were of the rank of Senators, should be inquired upon by a triple Commission: and that those which were personally in the war, should be of the Commission to judge the rest; as well such as were at Rome, as those that did no service in this war. The first Commission should be to clear such as had well deserved from all danger. The second, Penult: and the third, Capitall. And to conclude, every man laboured, either to have reward, or to be avenged of his Enemy. Neither did they think so much of the means how to overcome, as how to use the victory.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Tale which the Emperour Frederick related to the Commissioners of Lewis the eleventh, King of France (concerning the parting between them of the Territories of Charles Duke of Burgundie) Not to sell the skin before they had killed the Bear; might well have fitted these of Pompey's Parties, that contended for offices before they fell, and disposed of the skins ere they had took the Bears: not sparing out of their impatience to tax Pompey of spinning out the war, for the sweetness he found in authority and command; as Agamemnon did at Troy. Inasmuch as Plutarch re-

ported, that one Favonius, imitating Cato's severity and freeness of speech, went about throughout all the Camp, demanding, Whether it were not great pity, that the ambitious humour of one man, should keep them that year from eating the figs and delicate fruit of Tuscany? And all men generally stood to affected, as Pompey could not withstand their importuness. For, as Plow saith, *Militis animus, facit moram, principes omnium Ducis incunctantur*. The soldiers blamed the slowness, the confederates found fault with the delay, & the chief commanders with the ambition of their Generall. Only Cato thought it not fit to hazard themselves upon a desperate man, that had neither hope or help, but in Fortune. But as in most things besides, so in this he stood alone, and could not prevail against a multitude.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Placere sibi ternas tabellas avi, ad indicandum iis, qui erant ordinis Senatorii*. They agreed, that all such as were of the rank of Senators, should be inquired upon by a triple Commission, saith the story. *Tabellæ*, I have translated Commissions, as best suited our English phrase: but the meaning was as followeth.

It appeareth by history, that the Roman people, as well in election of Magistrates, as in causes criminall, did give their voices openly and aloud, for six hundred years together; until one *Gabinus*, a Tribune of the People, perceiving that the Commons, for fear of the great Ones, durst not dispose of their voices freely, and as they would, published an Edict, that the people should give their voices by Balloting. Which law Tully commendeth: *Gravæ est tabella quæ fronte operit, hominum veteris regis, disque cum liberum quod velint faciant*. It is an acceptable Law, which hides the faces and meanings of men, and gives all liberty to do what they please. And in another place, he calleth it *Præcipuum iustissime libertatis*, the foundation of most just liberty. Upon an election of Magistrates, the balls were given according to the number of the Commentors; that every man might chuse as he pleased.

In criminall Causes, every man had three: one marked with A. signifying Absolution, and another with C. for Condemnation, and another with N. L. for *Non liquet*, which they called *Amplius*, desirous to be further informed, which our Grand Juries do expresse in an *Ignoramus*. And in this manner would Domitius have had his fellow Senators either acquitted or condemned. The balls which were

given upon the making of a law, were two: one marked with V. R. which signified *Interrogas*, that it might go on: and the other with A. signifying *Antiquæ*, rejecting it. Foras Festus noteth, *Antiquare est in modum pristinum reducere*, to Antiquate, is to make the thing be as it was before.

And in this manner they would have proceeded against Cæsar's Partizans, being altogether mistaken in the allowance of their happiness; the continuance whereof depended upon Verne, and not upon Fortune.

## CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar finding the Enemy to offer battell in an indifferent place, prepareth to undertake him.

Revision of Corn being made, and Cæsar the soldiers well relaxed (to which end he had interposed a sufficient space of time, after the battell at Dyrrachium) Cæsar thought it time now to try what purpose or will Pompey had to fight. And therefore, drawing the Army out of the Camp, he imballotted his troops, first upon the place, and somewhat removed from Pompey's Camp: but every day following he went further off his own trenches, and brought his Army under the hills whereto the Enemy lay incamped. This made his Army daily the more bold and assured. He kept continually his former course with his horsemen; who because they were less in number by many degrees than those of Pompey's party, he commanded certain light young men, chosen out of them that stood before the Engines, for their nimble and swift running, to fight amongst the horsemen, who by reason of their daily practise, had learned the use of that kind of fight. So that one thousand of our Cavalry, in open and champaign places, whenned were, under the charge of seven thousand of theirs, and were not much terrified with the multitude of them. For at that time they made a fortunate encounter, and slew one of the two Saviours, that had formerly fled to Pompey, with divers others.

Pompey having his Camp upon a hill, imballotted his Army at the lower foot thereof, so see if he could get Cæsar to thrust himself into an unequal and disadvantageous place. Cæsar thinking that Pompey would by no means be drawn to battell, thought it the fittest course for him to shift his Camp, and to be always in moving: hoping by often removing from place to place, he should better accommodate

## Observations upon Cæsars

modated for provision of Corn; and withall, might upon a march find some occasion to fight; besides, he should weary Pompey's Army, not accustomed to travel, with daily and continual journeys. And thereupon he gave the sign of dislodging.

But as the Tents were taken down, it was a little before observed, that Pompey's Army was advanced somewhat further from their Trenches, then ordinarily they were accustomed; so that it seemed they might fight in an equal and indifferent place. Whereupon Cæsar, when his troops were already in the gates setting out, It behoveth us, saith he, to put off our removing for the present, and betink our selves of fighting, as we have alwayes desired; for we shall not easily hereafter find the like occasion: and presently drew out his forces. Pompey also, as it was afterwards known, was resolved at the instance of all that were about him to give battell; for he had given out in counsell some few daies before that he would overthrow Cæsar's Army, before the troops came to joyne battell.

And as many that stood by wondered at it, I know, saith he, that I promise almost an incredible matter; but take the ground whereupon I speak it, that you may undergo the business with more assurance. I have persuaded the Cavalry, and they have promised to accomplish it, that when they come near to joyn, they shall attack Cæsar's right Corner on the open side; and so the Army being circumvented behind shall be amused and routed before our men can cast a weapon at them: wherefore we shall end the war without danger of the Regions, or almost without any wound received, which is not difficult or hard to do for us that are so strong in horse. And withall, he gave order that they should be ready against the next day, for as much as the occasion was offered (according as they had often intended) not to deceive the opinion which other men had of their prowess and valour.

Labeius seconding this speech, as contemning Cæsar's forces, extolled Pompey's resolution to the skies. Do not think, Pompey saith he, that this is the Army where with he conquered Gallia, or Germania: I was present my self at all these battells, and do not speak rashly what I am ignorant of. There is a very small piece of that Army remaining: a great part of them are dead, as it cannot otherwise be, in so many battells. The Pestilence (the last Autumn) in Italy consumed many of them; many are gone home and many are left in the Continents. Have ye not heard, that the Cohors which are now at Brundisium, are made and raised of such as remained behind there to recover their healths? These forces that ye see,

were the last year gathered of the Mustres made in the hisher Gallia; and most of them, of the Colonies beyond the Po; and yet all the slower and strength of them was taken away in the last two overthrowes at Dyrrachium.

When he had spoken these things, he took a solemn oath, not to return into the Camp but with victory, exhorting the rest to do the like. Pompey commending him, took the same oath: neither was there any man that refused it.

These things being thus carryed in the counsell, they rose up and departed, with great hope and joy of all men; as having already conceived victory in their minds: and the rather because they thought that nothing could be spoken vainly by so skillfull a Commander, in so weighty and important a Cause.

### OBSERVATIONS.

Concerning the fashion of the Cavalry, in which either Party reposed so much confidence, we are to note, that the Romans had two sorts of horlemen; the one completely armed (according to their manner) and incorporated in the body of their Legions, whose entertainment was thrice as much as the footmen. *Æque impotens possitulum fuit* (saith Livie) *us de stipendio equitum* (mercenary enim triplex ea tempestate) *era demeretur*; It seemed as unreasonable a motion, that the horlemen's pay, which at that time was triple, should be lessened. And the other were as light-horlemen, which they called *Alarii*.

The first sort were thus armed, as *Josephus* writeth; They wore a sword on their right side, somewhat longer then that of the footmen, and carried a long staffe or spear in their hand, a Target at their horse side, and three or more Darts in a quiver, with broad heads, and not much less then their slaves: having such lead pieces and coislets as the foot-men had.

The light-armed men, had either light Darts, or Bow and Arrows. And doubtlesse, their chiefest service was with their casting weapons. And accordingly *Tully* putteth his son in mind, of the practise he had got in Pompey's Army (where he commanded a wing of horse) *Equitando, jaculando, omni militari labore tolerando*, in riding, casting darts, and undergoing all military duty.

And as their service consisted in breaking their Staves upon an Enemy, and in casting their Darts: so we exercise the practice of the former, in our triumphs at Tilt; and the *Sparring* at the later, in their *loco di cane*.


Our modern horlemen are either Lanciers, Petronelliers, or Pistoliers. The Petronelliers do discharge

Prima eque-  
gionum da-  
cum fup-  
ta victo-  
riam li-  
periculo  
comparare.  
Polya. lib.  
strateg.

Lib.7.

Lib.1.  
Arad.

a. Offe.



discharge at distance, making their left hand, that holds the bridle, their right: which is uncertain, and to no great effect.

The Pretorian, that will do somewhat to purpose, doth come up close to the other, & discharge his Pistol in his enemies neck, or under the confect, about the flank or seat of a man; and commonly misleth not.

I have seen a device to use a Musket on horse-back, which if it prove as serviceable as is by some conceived, will be of great advantage.

CHAP. XXXI.

The manner of imbatelling their Armies.

**A**S Cæsar approached near unto Pompey's Camp, he observed his Army to be imbatelled in this manner: There were in the left Corner two legions, which in the beginning of these broils were by order and decree of Senate taken from Cæsar; whereof one was called the first, and the other the third: and with them stood Pompey. Scipio had the middle Squadron, with the legions he brought out of Syria.

The Legion of Cilicia, joined with the Spanish Cohorts, which Afranius brought with him, made the right Corner. These Pompey held to be very strong. The rest of the troops were interlaced between the middle Squadron and the Corners. All made one hundred and ten Cohorts, which amounted to fifty five thousand men; besides two thousand old soldiers and men of note, whom he had called out to that war, and dispersed them over all the Army. The rest of the Cohorts, which were seven, he had left in the Camp, or disposed about the forts near adjoining. The right Corner was flanked with a River, that had high and cumbersome banks; and thereupon he put all his Cavalry together with the Archers & Slingers in the left Corner.

Cæsar observing his former custome placed the tenth legion in the right Corner, and the ninth in the left; albeit they were very much weakened in the fights at Dyrrachium: but to this he so turned the eighth, that he seemed almost to make one of two, and commanded them to succour each other. He had in all about eighty cohorts, which made twenty two thousand men: two cohorts he left to keep the Camp. He gave the left Corner to Antonius, the right to Pub. Sylla, and the middle Squadron to Cn. Domitius, and put himself opposite to Pompey. And without having well observed these things (according as I have formerly declared) fearing least the right Corner should be enclosed

about with the multitude of the Cavalry, he speedily drew six cohorts out of the third battail, and of them he made a fourth to encounter the horsemen, and shewed them what he would have done; admixing with battail, that the victory of that day consisted in the valour of these cohorts: commanding the third battail, and likewise the whole Army, not to join battell without order from him; which when he thought fit, he would give them notice of by an Ensigne.

And going about to encourage them to fight, according to the use of war, he put them in mind of his favours, and his carriage towards them from time to time, and specially that they themselves were witnesses, with what labour and means he had fought for peace, as well by treaty with Vatinus, as also by employing A. Clodius to Scipio: and like wise how he had endeavoured at Onicum with L. L. that Embassadors might be sent to treat of these things. Neither was he willing at any time to mispend the soldiers blood, or to deprive the Commonwealth of either of those Armies.

This speech being delivered, the soldiers both requiring and longing with an ardent desire to fight, he commanded the sign of battell to be given by a Trumpet.

OBSERVATIONS.

Concerning the order used in disposing these Armies, for the trial of this Cause, it appeareth by the Historie, that Pompey let two Legions in his left Corner, which are here named the first and the third. Howbeit Lucan saith, that those Legions were the first and the fourth.

— Cornu tibi cura sinistris,   
 Lentulus cum primis, qua tum suis optima bello.

Et quartæ legione d'itur.

— The left Corners care,   
 Which the first legion, (best in all that warre)

And fourth made up, O Lentulus, was thine.

The middle Squadron was led by Scipio, with the legions he brought out of Syria, which were also two; *Exspectabat enim Scipio ex Syria legiones duas*; he expected Scipio out of Syria with two legions as it is in the second chapter of this book.

In the right Corner was the Cilician legion, with the Cohorts that Afranius brought out of Spain: which amounting to the number of a Legion, made that Corner equal to the rest. And so of these six Legions, which were the strength and sinews of his Army, he fashioned his battell into a middle Squadron, and two Corners.

In manibus vestris quibus sic Cæsar hæc dicit. Lucan. lib. 7.



Cornets. His other forces being young soldiers, he disposed in the distances, between the Cornets and that middle Squadron.

*Lib. 3. cap. 3* Frontinus speaking of this point, saith; *Legiones secundum virtutem suam in medias, & in cornu locavit; specialem interposita tyrannibus supplevit*. He disposed his legions according to their goodnes & worth: the fourth he placed in the middle Squadron and the Cornets; filling up the spaces between with his young soldiers. His number of men by our text, was fifty five thousand; but *Plutarch* maketh them not above forty five thousand.

Cæsar had not half so many men; and yet made a triple battell; but not so thick or deep with Legions: for in the right Corner he put the tenth Legion, and in the left the ninth and the eighth; being both weak and far spent, by the former overthrows. Of the other Legions he maketh no mention: but it seemeth they filled up the distances between the Cornets and the body of the Army; and were as fish to those sinews and bones, which out of the prerogative of their valour, took the place of the Cornets, and the middle bulk of the battell. And fearing that his right Corner should be inconvenienced by the multitude of their Cavalry, he drew six Cohorts out of his third or last battell, to make a fourth battell to oppose the Cavalry: which got him the victory. For howsoever the Text saith, *Singulas cohortes detraxit*: yet *Plutarch* saith plainly, that those Cohorts he thus took were fix and amounted to three thousand men; which riseth to the number of so many Cohorts. And *Appian* agreeing herunto, saith that his fourth battell consisted of three thousand men. *Frontinus* likewise affirmeth, he took out six Cohorts, & *tenet in subsidio*; sed *de dextro latere conversas in obliquum*; and kept them as a reserve, placing them off obliquely from the right corner. Whereunto that *Lucan* agreeeth;

*----- Tenet obliquas post signa cohortes.*

He plac'd his troops oblique behind the battell.

Which is thus to be understood; that they turned their faces towards the left Corner of Pompey's Army, that they might be the readier to receive the Cavalry coming on to inclose Cæsar's right wing; as being sure of the other side, which was fenced with a River and a Marsh.

Touching Cæsar's Speech to the soldiers, it seemeth like that of *Themistocles* at the battell of *Salamina*: where *Xerxes* made a long Oration to encourage the *Perfians*, and lost the day; *Themistocles* spake but a few words to the *Greeks*, and got the victory. Howsoever, one thing is not to be omitted, that *Plutarch*, and such others as have dipped their pens either in the sweat or in the blood of this battell, do all

agree; that Cæsar had not above twenty two thousand men.

## CHAP. XXXII.

The Battell beginneth; and Cæsar overcometh.

**H**ere was one Crastinus in Cæsar's Army, called out to this way, who the year before had led the first company of the tenth Legion, a man of singular valour; who upon the sign of battell given, Follow me, saith he, as many of you as were of my company; and do that *enaeceunt* to your Emperour; which you have alwayes been willing to perform. This is the only battell remaining unconfused: which being ended, he shal be restored to his dignity, and live to our liberty. And whilst looking towards Cæsar, I will saith he, O Emperour, so carry my self this day, that thou shalt give me thanks either alive or dead. And when he had thus spoken, he was the first that ran out of the right Corner: and about one hundred and twenty elected soldiers of the same Centurie followed voluntarily after him.

There was so much space left between both the battells, as might serve either Army to meet upon the charge. But Pompey had commanded his men to receive Cæsar's assaults, and to undergo the shock of his Army without moving from the place wherein they stood (and thus by the advice of C. Titius) to the end that the first running out and violence of the soldiers being broken, and the battell disordered, they that stood perfect in their Orders, might set upon them that were scattered and dispersed: hoping the piles would not fall so forcibly upon the Army standing still, as when they advanced forward to meet them; and that it would fall out withal, that Cæsar's soldiers, having twice as far to run, would by that means be out of breath, and spent with weariness.

Which, in my opinion, was against all reason: for there is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the flames, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Nor was it vain of ancient time ordained, that the Trumpets should every where sound, and every man take up a shout; but that they thought the things did both terrify the Enemy, and incite their own Party.

But our soldiers, upon the sign of Battell, running on with their Piles ready to be thrown

thruons, and perceiving that Pompey's soldiers did not make out to meet them (as men tarys with long piles, and exercised in former fights) stop their course of their own accord, and almost in the mid-way stood still; that though they might not come to blow upon the spending of their strength, and after a little respite of time, running on against their piles, and presently drove their swords, as Cæsar had commanded them. Neither were Pompey's soldiers waiting in this business; for they received the piles which were cast at them, took the shock of the Legions kept their ranks, cast their piles, and betook them to their swords.

At the same time, the Cavalry, according as was commanded them, issued out from Pompey's left Corner, and the whole multitude of Archers thrust themselves out. Whole assaults our horsemen were not able to endure, but fell back a little from the place wherein they stood: whereby Pompey's horsemen began to press them with more eagerness, and to put themselves in squadrons to inclose the Army about, which C. Iulius perceiving, gave the sign of advancing forward to the fourth Battell, which he had made up of six Cohorts; who came with such a flight upon Pompey's horsemen, that none of them were able to stand before them, but turning their backs, did not only give place, but fled all as fast as they could to the highest Hills: whereby the Archers and Slingers being left naked without succour, were all put to the sword. And with the same violence those Cohorts encompassed about the left Corner, notwithstanding any resistance that could be made by Pompey's party, and charged them behind upon their backs.

At the same time Cæsar commanded the third Battell, which as yet stood still, and were not removed, to advance forward; by means of which fresh and sound men, relieving such as were faint and weary, as if so that others did charge them behind upon their backs, Pompey's party were able no longer to endure it, but all turned their backs and fled.

Neither was Cæsar deceived in his opinion, that the beginning of the victory would grow from those Cohorts which he placed in the fourth Battell, against the horsemen; according as he himself had openly spoken in his encouragement to the soldiers. For by them first the Cavalry was beaten; by them the Archers and Slingers were slain; by them Pompey's Battell was encompassed on the left Corner, and by their means they began to flee.

As soon as Pompey saw his Cavalry beaten, and perceived the part wherein he most

trusted, to be smitten and affrighted; and distrustful the rest, he forthwith left the Battell, and corcov'd himself on horseback into the Camp. And speaking to the Centurions that had the watch at the Prætorian Gate with a loud voice, as all the soldiers might hear, he said; Keep the Camp's defend it diligently, to prevent any hard casualty that may happen. In the mean while, I will go about to the other Ports, to settle the Guards of the Camp. And having thus said, he went into the Prætorium, distrustful the main point, and yet expecting the event.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Pompey so carried himself in the course of this was as he rather seemed a sufferer than a doer; never disposing his Army for any attempt or out-let, but only when he brake out of the place wherein he was besieged at *Dyrachium*. And accordingly he gave orders, that in the main action & point of trials his soldiers should suffer and sustain the assault, rather than otherwise. But whether he did well or no, had since been in question. Cæsar utterly disliked it, as a thing contrary to reason. *Est quædam* (saith he) *animi incitatio atque alacritas, naturæ deditur in omnia, quæ sunt pugnæ incitatio; hæc non reprimere, sed augere Imperatores debent*. There is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the flames, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Agreeable wherunto is that of *Cato* the Great; that in cases of battell, an Enemy is to be charged with all violence. And to that purpose it is requisite, to put the soldiers (at some reasonable distance) into a posture of vaulting and defiance, with menaces and cries of terror; and then to spring forward in such manner, as may make them fall upon their enemies with greater force: As Champions or Wrestlers, before they buckle, stretch out their limbs, and make their flourishes as may best serve to allure themselves, and discourage their adversaries; according as we read of *Hercules* and *Antæus*.

*Ille Cleonæi projecit terga Leonis.*  
*Antæus Libyci: perculit membra liquore*  
*Hæstæ Olympice servato more Palestre.*  
*Ille pavore fideus pedibus coningeret matronam.*

*Auxilium membris calidis infudit æneas.*

The one throws by a Cleonæan Lion's skins.  
The other's Libyan's and they are begining.

## Observations upon Cæsars

The one anoints himself from top to toe,  
As the *Olympian* Gamblers use to do.  
Not sure his foe would let his feet touch ground,  
Himself with sand *Anteus* sprinkles round.

Horat.  
lib. 3.

However, forasmuch as all men are not of one temper, but require severall fashions to tune their minds to the true note of a battle, we shall find severall Nations to have severall usances in this point. The *Romans* (as appeareth by this of *Cæsar*) were of ancient time accustomed to found Timpanets and Hoboies, in all parts of the Army, and to take up a great clamour and shout, whereby the souldiers (in their understanding) were encouraged, and the Enemy affrighted. Whereas, contrariwise, the *Greeks* went always with a close and silent mouth as having more to do then to say to their Enemies. And *Thucydides*, writing of the *Lacedæmonians*, (the flower of *Greece* for matter of Arms) saith, that instead of Timpanets and Cornets to incite them, they used the sweet harmony of Flutes to moderate and qualify their passions, least they should be transported with unbridled impetuosity.

It is reported, that Marshall *Byron* the Father, seemed to dislike of our *English* march (hearing it beaten by the Drums) as too flow, and of no encouragement: and yet it so fitteth our Nation (as *Sir Roger Williams* then answered) as we have divers times over-run all *France* with it. However, the event of this battle is sufficient to disprove *Pompey's* error herein, and to make good what *Cæsar* commanded.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THESE six Cohorts, which made the fourth battle, did to encounter *Pompey's* Cavalry, that they were not able to withstand them. It is said, that *Cæsar* gave them order not to fling their Pikes, as commonly they did, but to hold them in their hands like a Pike or a Javelin, and make only at the faces of those Gallants, and men at Arms on horseback. For the holding of them in their hands, I do not understand it, and cannot conceive how they could reach more then the next ranks unto them in that manner. But for making at the faces of the Cavalry, *Florus* saith that *Cæsar* as he galloped up and down the ranks, was heard to let fall bloudy and bitter words, but very pathetically, and effectually for a victory: as thus, Souldier, cast right at the face: whereas *Pompey* called to his men, to spare their fellow-Citizens.

*Frontinus*, in his Epitome of *Suetonius*, affirmeth the same thing, both of the one and of the other: and *Lucan* seemeth to averre the same, concerning that of *Cæsar*;

Lib. 4.  
cap. 2.

*Adversusque inbat ferro cum undere vultus.* Lib. 7.  
He bids them strike just at the Enemies face.  
*Frontinus* hath it thus; *C. Cæsar, cum in paribus Pompeianis magna equitum Romanorum esset manus, eaque armorum scientia melius conficeret, et oculisque eorum gladiis peti iussit, & sic adversum faciem cedere coegit*: *Pompey* having in his army a great company of *Roman* Knights, who being well-skil'd at their weapons made an end of their enemies; *Cæsar* commanded his men to make at their faces and eyes: and thereby compelled them to turn away their faces.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.


AMONGST these memorials *Crassinus* may not be forgotten, being the first man that began the battle: whom *Plutarch* calleth *C.* To the life of *Pompey*. the morning as he came out of his Tent, asked him what he thought of the successe of the battle. *Crassinus*, stretching out his right hand unto him, cried out aloud, O *Cæsar*, thine is the victory; and this day shalt thou commend me either alive or dead. And accordingly, he brake afterwards out of the ranks; and running amongst the midst of his enemies, with many that followed him, made a great slaughter. At last one ran him into the mouth that the sword's point came out at his neck, and so slew him.

By him, and others of like courage and worths, was *Cæsar* raised from the extremity of his wants, and the disgrace of his former losses, to the chieftest height of earthly glory: and herein might well assume unto himself, that which was formerly said of the people, *Magna populi Romani fortuna, sed semper in malis maior resurrexit*; Great is the fortune of the people of *Rome*; but it still grows greater & increaseth by troubles: together with that of *Plutarch*, *Rei inventa Romanorum arma*, The *Roman* Arms are things invincible. *Lucan* speaking of *Scæva* formerly mentioned, saith, *Lucan*, *facile, facit, Hæthrew a great deal of valour to get Rome a Lord*. But upon *Crassinus* he saith a heavy doom.

*Diti tibi non mortem, que cunctis paret paratur;*  
*Sed sensum post sua tunc dedit, Crassine, morti;*  
*Cujus tota manu commisit Lucæ bellum,*  
*Primaque Thessaliam Romano sanguine tinxit.*

Maist thou not only dy, which all men do;  
But dy, and have thy senses after too,  
A lance thrown by thy hand the fight began.  
When with brave *Roman* bloud *Thessalia* ran.

CHAP.



## CHAP. XXXIII.

Cæsar presseth hard after the Enemy, and taketh the Camp.

Cæsar.

**P**ompey's soldiers being thus forced to fly into their Camp, Cæsar thinking it expedient to give them no time of respite, exhorted the Army to use the benefit of Fortune, and to assault the Camp: who notwithstanding the extreme heat (for the business was drawn out until it was high noon) were willing to undergo any labour, and to yield obedience to his commandments. The Camp was industriously defended by the Cohorts that had the guard thereof; but much more stoutly by the Thracians, and other succours of Barbarous people. For such soldiers as were fled thither out of the battell, were so terrified in mind, and spent with weariness, that most of them (having laid aside their Arms and Military Ensigns) did rather think how they might best escape, then to defend the Camp. Neither could they which stood upon the Rampier any longer endure the multitude of weapons; but yawning with wounds, forsook the place, and presently fled into the high Mountains adjoining unto the Camp, being led thither by the Centurions and Tribunes of the soldiers.

In the Camp were found tables ready laid and prepared with linen, together with cupboards of plate furnished and set out, and their Tents strewn with fresh herbs and rushes; and that of Lentulus and divers others with Treasuries, and many other superfluities, discovering their extreme luxury and assurance of victory. Whereby it was easily to be conceived, that they nothing feared the event of that day, being so carefull of such unnecessary delights. And yet for all this, they upbraided Cæsar's patient and miserable Army, with riot and excess: to whom there were always wanting such requisites as were expedient for their necessary use.

Pompey, whenas our men were come within the Camp, having got a horse, and cast away all Ensigns of Imperiall authority got out at the Decumane gate, and made towards Larissa as fast as his horse could carry him. Neither did he stay there; but with the same speed (having got a few followers that escaped

by flight) passing night and day, came at length to the Sea side with a troop of thirty horse, and there went aboard a ship of burthen: complaining that his opinion only deceived him; being as it were betrayed by such as began first to fly from whom he hoped chiefly to have had the victory.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**V**7 Whereas it is said, That a dilatory course is very profitable and safe; we are to understand it as a chief and main point in the duty of an Embassadors, to temperize in things which are pressed hard upon him: as being accountable for words and time; but no way charged with expeditions of war; wherein Protraction is oftentimes the interrupter of absolute victory, and the only supplanter of that which is desired. *Pincere se's Humilibus seculis uti seculis.* Those know not well enough how to get the victory, *Humilibus*, but thou knowest not how to use it; it was a common byword, and happened then well for the State of Rome. But now it fell out otherwise; having met with one that knew how to conquer, and how to follow victory to purpose.

For notwithstanding the battell he had fought, and the advantage he had thereby gotten, might have seemed sufficient for one daies labour; yet he would not let occasion passe, without taking the benefit that was then offered: and never ceased until he had forced the Camp, and overtaken those that escaped the battell: and so made victory sue unto him, by driving the nail home to the head. In regard whereof, he did not unskilfully for his word or Motto, (as they call it) *in diebus et noctibus*. BY DEFERRING NOTHING.

## CHAP. XXXIV.

Cæsar besiegeth those that were escaped into the Hills.

**C**æsar having got the Camp, instantly required the soldiers not to look after pillage and booty, and let slip the means of ending the rest of their business. Which after he had obtained, he began to inclose the Hill about with works of fortification. They of Pompey's party, distrustful the place, for that the Hill had no water, left it at an instant. And all

those that were partakers of that fortune made towards Larilla. Which Cæsar observing, divided his forces, and commanded part of the Legions to remain in Pompey's Camp, and part he sent back into his own; and leading four Legions along with him, he took a nearer way to meet with them; and having gone six miles he embattled his forces. Which they perceiving, broke themselves unto a high Hill, under which lay a River.

Cæsar persuaded the souldiers, albeit they were spent with continual labour all that day, and that night was now at hand, yet they would not think it much to cut off the River from the Hill by a fortification, to keep them from watering in the night, which work being perfected they began by Commissioners to treat of conditions of yielding themselves. Some few of the Senators escaped in the night-time away by flight.

Cæsar as soon as it was day, caused them all to come down from the Hill into the Plains, and there to cast away their Armes; which they performed without refusal, and casting themselves upon the earth, their hands spread abroad, with shewing of many tears, desired mercy. Cæsar comforting them, commanded they should stand up; and having spoken somewhat touching his clemency, a little to ease them of their fears, he gave them all their lives with safety; commanding the souldiers not to hurt any of them, nor that they should want any thing that was theirs.

These things being thus achieved with diligence, he caused other Legions to meet him from the Camp, sending those he had with him to rest themselves; and the same day came to Larilla. In this battell he lost not above two hundred souldiers; but of Conjurors, traitors, men, he lost thirty. And Crastinus fighting valiantly was slain (of whom we formerly made mention) with a sword thrust into the face. Neither was this last which he said as he went to the battell: for Cæsar was persuaded, that Crastinus behaved himself valiantly in that fight, and did deserve as well of him as a man possibly could.

There were slain of Pompey's Army about fifteen thousand: besides there were of them that yielded themselves above twenty thousand. For such Cohorts as were in the Forts did likewise yield themselves to Sulla; and many fled into the next Towns and Cities. Of military Embosses there were brought out of the battell to Cæsar one hundred and fourscore, with nine Eagles. L. Domitius flying out of the Camp into the Mount, joining for want of strength, was slain by the horsemen.

## OBSERVATIONS.

And thus we see the issue of that battell, and the victory which Cæsar obtained at as cheap a rate as could be imagined: for there were slain twenty three thousand of the enemy, and as many taken by rendering themselves, with the losse of two hundred souldiers, and thirty Centurions; amongst whom was *Crastinus*: whose death obliged Cæsar to make this honourable mention of his valour. But as it is observed by *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*, *Non Deus quipsum se ducibus, pro salute omnium qui certamen inuent, spem forem sedit: nec ea condidit, ore meritis accepimus; in omnes homines devocamus, nullo ex nostris amissio*. No God can promise a General the safety of all his men: neither do we take commands upon that condition to conquer all our enemies without the losse of a man.

## CHAP. XXXV.

*Lælius* attempteth to block in the Haven at Brundisium: and *Caïus* fetch Cæsar's ships at Messina.




About the same time *D. Lælius* came with his Navy to Brundisium; and according as *Luco* formerly did, took the Island in the mouth of the Port. And in like manner *Vatinius*, Governour of Brundisium, having furnished and sent out certain Skiffes, invited out *Lælius* to prey, and of them took a Gallie with two lesser ships that were further shot out into the straits of the Port: and also had disguised his Centurys along the shore, to keep the Mariners from fetching water. But *Lælius* having the time of the year more favourable, and fitter for sailing, supplied his Army with water from *Cortu* and *Dyrrachium*: neither could he be beaten off his designe, nor be driven out of the Port, or from the Island, either with the dishonour of the ships be lost, or with severity and want of all necessities, untill he heard of the battell in Thessalia.

About the same time also *Caïus* came into Sicilia with the Navy of Syria, Phœnicia and Calicia. And whereas Cæsar's ships were divided into two parts, *Pub. Sulpicius* Prætor being Admirall of the one half, and lying at *Vicione* in the Straights, and *M. Pomponius* Admirall of the other half at *Messana*; *Caïus* came first to *Messana*, and was arrived before *Pomponius* heard of his coming: by which means he surprised him, distracted, and much annoyed, without any order or guards. And finding a strong

Lib. I.

Cæsar.

Incedant  
magis  
pne  
manus  
in  
in  
lib.



strong and favourable wind, filled the ships of burthen with Rosin, Pitch and Tallow, and the matter of firing; and sending them out to Pompeius Navy, he burned all the ships being in number thirty five, amongst which there were twenty that had decks. By means whereof they conceived such a terror, that albeit there was a legion in Garrison at Mellanage, the Town was hardly kept. And, that certain Messengers coming post, brought news at the same instant of Cæsar's victory, most men thought the Town would have been lost: but the news coming so opportunely, the town was kept.

Caïus departed from thence, and went to Sulpicius fleet at Vione; where, on ships being brought to shore for fear of the like danger, he there did as he did before, for finding the wind good, he sent in forty ships of burthen, supplied with matter to burn the Navy. He first having taken hold of both Corners of the fleet, five of them were begun to be further carried with the winds, the soldiers of the old legions which were left for the defense of the shipping, and were of the number of them that were sick, did not endure the dishonour: but getting aboard of their own accord, put the ships from the shores, and setting upon Caïus fleet, took two Gallies in one of the which was Caïus himself; but he being taken out with a Skiff, fled away. And furthermore, they took two Triremes. Not long after certain news came of the battell in Thessalia, so that Pompey's party believed it for before that time, it was thought to be but a thing given out by Cæsar's Legates, and other of his friends. Whereupon Caïus departed with his Navy, and left those places.

## OBSERVATIONS.

The branches of a Tree do receive life from the stock, and the stock is maintained by the root, which being once cut asunder, there remaineth no life for stock or bough, leaf or branch. Accordingly it happened with this large-spread Party; the root whereof was then in Thessalia: and being broken asunder by the violence of Cæsar's forces, it booted not what Lælius did at Brundisium, or Caïus either at Mellanage or Vione. For all the parts were overthrown with the body: and the fortune of the battell over-ruled other petty losses whatsoever; being so powerfull in the opinion of the world, its loss fortune, *eadem etiam fœvor hominum inclinât*, that what way soever fortune goes, the same way goes the favour of the people. Or, as Lucan saith,

*Rapimus quo cuncta feruntur.*  
We're snatched that way that things are carried.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

Cæsar pursueth Pompey: who is slain in Egypt.

**C**æsar setting all other things apart, thought it expedient for him to pursue Pompey into what parts soever he should betake himself, least he should raise new forces, and renew the war again: and thereupon made forward every day, as far as his Cavalry was able to go; commanding one Legion to follow after by lesser journeys. There was a proclamation made in Pompey's name at Amphipolis, that all the youth of that Province, as well Greeks as Citizens of Rome, should come to be enrolled for the war, that it was not possible to discover, whether Pompey did it to take away all cause of suspicion, that he might the longer hide his purpose of striking away, or whether he went about by new levies to keep Macedonia, if so man pressed hard after him.

Howsoever he himself lay at Anchor there one night. And calling unto him his ancient Hosts and Friends, he took so much money of them as would defray his necessary charges: and understanding of Cæsar's coming, within a few daies he hoised sail and departed thence, arriving at Mitylene, where he was kept two daies with foul weather; and there reinforcing his fleet with some Gallies he took to him, he went into Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. There he understood, that by the general consent of the Antiochians, and such Citizens of Rome as were there residing, the Citadell was already taken to keep him out: and that Messengers were sent about, to those that were fled from his Party into the bordering Cities, forbidding them to come to Antioch; for if they did, they should hazard it with the danger of their heads. The like happened to L. Lentulus, who the year before was Consul, and to Pub. Lentulus, of Consular dignity, and to some other at Rhodes. For as many as fled thither after Pompey, and came unto the Islands, were neither received into the Town nor into the Haven; but were commanded by Messengers sent unto them, to depart from thence, and forced to weigh anchor against their will. And now the fame of Cæsar's coming was spread abroad throughout all the Cities.

Whereupon Pompey, leaving off his purpose of going into Syria, having taken what money he found in Banks, besides what he could borrow of his private friends, and putting aboard a great store of Brasse for the use of war; with two thousand Armed men (which he had raised partly out of the towns, and partly had forced

Pompeius  
Troglus  
Lib. 2.  
Lib. 3.

forced up amongst the Merchants; and such others of his followers whom he thought fit for this business, he came to Pelusium. There by chance was King Ptolemy's child within years, with great forces making war against his sister Cleopatra, whom a few Months before, by means of his Allies and Friends he had thrust out of his Kingdom: And Cleopatra's Camp was not far distant from his.

Pompey sent unto him, that in regard of ancient Hospitality, and the amity he had with his Father, he might be received into Alexandria; and that he would aid and support him with his wealth and means, being now fallen into misery and calamity. But they that were sent having done their message, began to speak liberally to the King's soldiers, and to exhort them, that they would stand to Pompey, not despising the low ebb of fortune he was brought to. Amongst them were many that had been Pompey's soldiers in Syria, and had brought them to Alexandria; and upon the ending of the wars, had left them with Ptolemy, the father of this child. These things being known such as had the procuration of the Kingdom in the minority of the Boy, whether they were induced through fear of gaining the Army, (as afterwards they confessed) whereby Pompey might easily seize upon Alexandria and Egypt; or whether despising his fortune (as for the most part, in time of misery a man's friends do become his enemies;) did give a good answer publicly to such as were sent, and would him to come unto the King: but secretly plotting amongst themselves, King Achillas, a chief Commander, and a man of singular audacity, together with L. Septimius, Tribune of the soldiers, to kill Pompey. They giving him good words, and he himself also knowing Septimius to have led a Company under him in the war against the Ptoys, went aboard a little Bark with a few of his soldiers: and there was slain by Achillas and Septimius. In like manner L. Lentulus was apprehended by commandment from the King, and killed in prison.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IF I here now demanded, Where was Cæsar's decline of Peace? and Why pursued he not a treaty of Composition, at this time, whereas his tale would have been heard with gladness, and any conditions of atonement very acceptable to the vanquished? the answer is already made in the beginning of this Commentary; That there was but one time of making peace: & that was when both Parties were equal; which was now past, and Cæsar too far gone, to look

back upon any thing that might work a reconciliation. The one was crept to high, and the other cast down to lows, that they seemed not compatible in any Medius, although it were to the saving of the Empire. However, it is not denied but that Pompey gave great occasion of these wars. For Seneca saith; He had brought the Commonwealth, to that state, that it could not longer stand, but by the benefit of servitude. And he that will look into the relations of this confusion, shall find all those Causes corruptor, or ruining causes, which are noted by Aristotle to threaten the welfare of a State, in the excess of Pompey's exorbitancy. For, having nothing in a Man, he held all his fortunes by the tenure of *Meritum*; and was overgrown, full, with too much honour, secondly, with too much wealth, thirdly, with too much power; whereby he exceeded the proportion of his fellow-Citizens; and dissembled the beauty of that State, whose chiefest graces were in a fitting equality. And adding to these the convulsions of fate, he made no difficulty to engage Rome in a bloody war; as having no other hope, but in the confusion of Arms.

It is laid that at his arrival at *Misene*, he had much conference with *Cratippus*, whom Tully mentioned in his Offices: wherein, amongst other remontrances, the Philosopher made it plain, that his count of government had brought a necessity of changing that State from the liberty of a Commonwealth, to the condition of a just Monarchy. And such it fell to Cæsar's fortune, if there were any thing committed in the seizure, he may take the benefit of the general pardon, excepted by *Triebellius Pollus*. That no Nation can shew a Man that is altogether blameless.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning the State of *Aegypt*, we are to note that Alexander the Great being cut off by death, his Captains laid hold upon such Provinces and Kingdoms as were under their commands: amongst whom one *Ptolemy* the son of *Lagus* a Macedonian, seized upon *Aegypt*, where he reigned 40 years; and of him were all his successors called by the name of *Ptolemy*. This first *Ptolemy* posselt himself of Egypt about the year of the world 3640: which was 275 years before Pompey's overthrow. His son, that succeeded by the name of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, caused the Bible to be translated out of Hebrew into Greek by 70 Interpreters, which are called the *Septuagint*; and made the famous Library which was burned in these wars.

The

The Father of this young *Ptolemy*, was the ninth in succession from the first, and at his death, made the people of Rome Tutors to his children. His eldest son and Cleopatra his daughter, reigned together six years; but in the end fell to strife and wars, and were deeply engaged thence when Pompey arrived. But shortly after Cæsar do ordered the difference, that he set the Crown upon Cleopatra's head; who held it peaceably, until she came to play that tragical part with Antony: which being ended, the Kingdom was then reduced to a Province, under the obedience of the Roman Empire.

Concerning this miserable end of *Pompey*, it is truly said of Seneca, that Death is alike to all: for although the wars are diversely which it happens yet they all meet in the same end. And inasmuch as *Pompey* hath declined particularly the manner of this Catastrophe, it shall not be impertinent to insert his relation thereof.

When Pompey heard news that King *Ptolemy* was in the City of Pelusium with his Army, making war against his sisters, he went thither, and sent a Messenger before unto the king, to advertise him of his arrival, and to intreat him to receive him. King *Ptolemy* was then but a young man, inasmuch that one *Photion* was governor all the whole Realm under him. He altered a Council of the chiefest, and wisest men of the Court, who had such credit and authority as it pleased him to give them. They being assembled, he commanded every man in the Kings name to say his mind touching the receiving of Pompey, whether the king should receive him or not. It was a miserable thing to see *Ptolemy*, an Eunuch of the Kings, and *Theodorus* of Chios, an hired Schoolmaster to teach the young king Rhetorick, and *Achillas* an *Aegyptian*, to consult amongst themselves what they should do with Pompey the Great. There were the chiefest Councillors of all his Eunuchs, and of those that had brought him up.

Now did Pompey ride at anchor upon the shore side, expecting the resolution of this Council: in the which the opinions were divers; for some would not have him received; but others contended that he should be received. But the Rhetorician *Theodorus*, to shew his eloquence, persuaded them that neither the one, nor the other was to be accepted. For, quoth he, if we receive him, we shall have Cæsar our enemy, and Pompey our Lord; and if we do deny him on the other side, Pompey will do us wrong, refusing him, and Cæsar for not keeping of his word: therefore this would be the best resolution, he told them, to send to kill him, for thereby they should win the good will of the one, and not fear the displeasure of the other. And some say moreover that he added this mock

widall, A dead man bites not. They being determined of this among themselves, gave *Achillas* commission to do it. He taking with him *Septimius*, who had charge aforetime under Pompey, and *Sabinus*, another Centurion ally, with three or four soldiers besides, they also towards Pompey's Gallies, about whom were at that time the chiefest of his trains to see what would become of this matter. But when they saw the likelihood of their entertainments, and that it was not in Princely shew nor manner, nor nothing answerable to the hope which *Theophanes* had put them in, seeing to few men come to them in a sifter-boat; they began then to mislaid the small account that was made of them and counselled Pompey to return back, and to launch again into the sea, being out of the danger of the lurking eye of a Dart.

In the mean time they saluted Pompey in the and *Septimius* role, by the name of *Imperator* in the Roman tongue, by the name of *Imperator* as much as sovereign Captain; and *Achillas* also spoke to him in the Greek tongue, and bade him come into his boat; because that by the shore side there was a great deal of mud and land banks, so that his Gallies should have no water to bring him in. At the very same time they saw afar off divers of the Kings Gallies, which were arming with all speed possible, and all the shore besides full of soldiers. Thus though Pompey and his company would have altered their minds, they could not have told how they have escaped; and furthermore, shewing that they had mistrusted them, then they had given the murderer occasion to have executed his cruel murder of Pompey, whether the king should receive him or not. It was a miserable thing to see *Ptolemy*, an Eunuch of the Kings, and *Theodorus* of Chios, an hired Schoolmaster to teach the young king Rhetorick, and *Achillas* an *Aegyptian*, to consult amongst themselves what they should do with Pompey the Great. There were the chiefest Councillors of all his Eunuchs, and of those that had brought him up.

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The man that into Court comes free,  
Must there in state of bondage be.

They were the last words he spake unto his people, when he left his own Gallies, and went into the *Aegyptian* boats, the land being a great way off from his Gallies. When he saw never a man in the boat speak friendly unto him, beholding *Septimius*, he said unto him; Me thinks, my friend, I should know thee, for that thou hast served with me heretofore. The other nodded with his head, that it was true, but gave him no answer nor shewed him any courtesy.

Pompey seeing that no man spake to him, took a little book he had in his hand, in which he had written an Oration that he meant to read unto King *Ptolemy*, and began to read it.

ie. When they came near to the shore, *Cornelia* with her servants and friends about her, stood up in her ship in great fear, to see what should become of *Pompey*. So she hoped well when she saw many of the Kings people on the shore, coming towards *Pompey* at his landing, as it were to receive and honour him. But even as *Pompey* took *Philip* his hand to arise now *Calpurnius*, came forth behind him, and thrust him through with his sword: next unto him also *Salpurnius* and *Achillas* drew out their swords in like manner. *Pompey* then did no more but took up his gown with his hands, and hid his face, & mainly abode the wounds they gave him, only fighting a little. Thus, being 59 years old, he ended his life the next day after the day of his birth.

They that rode at anchor in their ships, when they saw him murdered, gave such a fearful cry, that it was heard to the shore: then weighing up their anchors with speed they hoisted sail and departed their way, having wind at will that blew a lusty Gale. As soon as they had gotten the main Sea, the *Ægyptians* which prepared to row after him, when they saw they were past their reach, and unpossible to be overtake, they let them go. Then having licken off *Pompey's* head, they threw his body over-board, for a miserable spectacle to all those that were detestous to see him.

*Philip* his enfranchised bond-man, remained ever by it, until such time as the *Ægyptians* had teen it their bellies full. Then having washed his body with salt water, & wrapped it up in an old shirt of his, because he had no other shift to lay it in, he sought upon the sands, & found at length a piece of an old fishers boat, enough to serve to bury his naked body with, but not all fitted out. As he was busie gathering the broken pieces of this boat together, thither came unto him an old *Romian*, who in his youth had served under *Pompey*, and said unto him; O friend, what art thou that preparest the funerals of *Pompey* the Great? *Philip* answered that he was a bond-man of his, enfranchised. Well, said he, thou shalt not have all this honour alone: I pray thee we let me accompany thee in to devout a deed, that I may not altogether repent me to have dwelt so long in a strange Country, where I have abidden such misery and trouble; but that to recompence me withall, I may have this good hap, with mine own hands to touch *Pompey's* body, and to help to bury the only and most famous Captain of the *Romans*.

The next day after, *Lucius Lentulus* (not knowing what had passed) coming out of *Cyprus*, sailed by the shore side, and perceived a fire made for funerals, & *Philip* standing by it; whom he knew not at the first. So he asked him What is he that is dead, said buried there? But

straight fetching a great sigh, Alas, said he; perhaps it is *Pompey* the Great. Then he lauded a little, and was straight taken and slain. Thus was the end of *Pompey* the Great. Not long after *Cæsar* also came into *Ægypt*; that was in great wars; where *Pompey's* head was presented unto him; but he turned his head aside and would not see it, and abhorred him that brought it as a detestable murderer. Then taking his Ring wherewith he sealed his Letters, whereupon was given a Lyon holding a sword, he built out a weeping, *Achillas* and *Phœnias* were put to death. *Ptolemy* himself also being overthrow in battell by the River of *Nilus*, vanished away, and was never heard of after. *Theodorus* the Rhetorician clowned *Cæsar's* hands, and wandered up and down *Ægypt* in great misery, despised of every man. Afterwards *Marcius Brutus* (who slew *Cæsar*) conquering *Asia*, met with him by chance, and putting him to all the torments he could possibly devise, at the length flew him. The ashes of *Pompey's* body were afterwards brought unto his wife *Cornelia*; who buried them in a town of hers, by the City of *Alia*.

And having in this manner paid the tribute which the law of Nature doth exact, the law of the Twelve Tables did free his Spulchre from any further disturbance; *Ubi corpus demortui hominis conditur, sacer esto*. Let that place be facied, where the body of a dead man is buried. Only this may be added; That as *Fabius* was called *Maximus*, *Scipio Magnus*, and *Pompey Magnus*, which titles they carried as marks of special Nobleness; to raise them above the common worth of men; so their ends made them lie with the lowest of the State. According to that of *Seneca*; *Inter omnes distinguimur exequiis* *aquatur*: Here we are distinguished by distances; but death makes us all equal.

## CHAP. XXXVII.

Prodigious Accidents happening upon the Battell in Phalaris. *Cæsar* cometh into *Ægypt*.

**C**æsar coming into *Asia*, found *T. Flavius* *Ampius* going alone to take the money out of the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*; and for this cause to have called together all the Senators that were in the Province, that he might use them as witnesses in the matter. But being interrupted by *Cæsar's* arrivall, he fled away. So that two severall times, the money was saved at *Ephesus* by *Cæsar's* means. It was first found very certain, that in the Temple of *Minerva* at *Elis* (a just calculation of the time being taken) the same day that *Cæsar* over-

threw *Pompey*, the Image of *Victory* which stood before *Minerva*, and looked towards her private quarters, did turn it self towards the Portall and the Temple etc. And the same day likewise there was such a noise of an Army twice heard at *Antioch* in *Syria*, and such sound of *Trumpets*, that the City ran in Armes to keep the walls. The like happened at *Ptolemy*. And likewise at *Pergamus*, in the remote and hidden places of the Temple, which are called *Adyta*, into which it is not lawful for any man to enter but the Priests, were bells heard to ring. Besides at *Tialles* in the Temple of *Victory* (where they had set up a Statue to *Cæsar*) there was shewed a Palm-tree which in those duties was grown from between the joints of the stones out of the pavement.

*Cæsar* staying a few daies in *Asia*, hearing that *Pompey* was seen at *Cyprus*, and conjecturing he went into *Ægypt*, for the amitie and correspondency he had with that King, domesticke and other opportunities of the place; he came to *Alexandria* with two legions, one that he commanded to follow him out of *Thellania*, and another which he followed out of *Achaia*, upon *Ptolemy's* a Legation together with eight hundred horse, ten Gallies of Rhodes, and a few ships of *Asia*. In these Legions were about three thousand and two hundred men; the rest were either wounded in the fight, or spent with travell, and the length of the conveyance. But *Cæsar* trusting to the same of his great exploits, did not doubt to go with these weak forces, thinking every place would entertain him with safety.

At *Alexandria* he understood of *Pompey's* death: and as he was going out of the ship, he heard a clamour of the souldiers, which the King had left to keep the town, and saw a concourse of people gather about him, because the bundle of Rods was carried before him; all the multitude crying out, that the Kings authority was diminished. This tumult he might perceive there were often uprores and commotions of the people for every day, and many of the souldiers were slain in divers parts of the City. Whereupon *Cæsar* gave order for other Legions to be brought him out of *Asia*, which he retained and impelled of *Pompey's* souldiers. He himself was flattered by the winds called *Hecates*, which are against them that sail from *Alexandria*.

In the mean time, forasmuch as he conceived that if the controversy between the King and his sister did appertain to the people of *Rome*, then consequently to him, as Consul, and so much the rather it concerned his offices for that in his former Consulship, there was a league made by the decree of Senate with *Ptolemy* the Father: in regard thereof he signified

that his pleasure was, that both the King and his sister *Cleopatra* should dismisse their Armies, and rather plead their Cause before him, than to decide it by Armes.

There was at that time one *Thothius* an *Eunuch* that had the administration of the kingdom during the minority of the Child. He first began to complain among his friends, & to take it in scorn, that the King should be called out to plead his Cause; and afterwards having gotten some assistance of his Kings friends, he drew the Army secretly from *Ptolemy* to *Alexandria*, and made *Achillas* (formerly mentioned) General of all the forces; inciting him forward as well by his own promises, as from the Kings and instilling him by Letters and Messengers what he would have done.

*Ptolemy* the Father, by his last Will and Testament, had left for heirs the eldest of two sons, and likewise the eldest of two daughters: and for the confirmation thereof, had in the same Will charged and required the people of *Rome* by all the gods, & by the league he made at *Rome*, to see this accomplished. For which purpose he sent a copy of his Will to *Rome*, to be kept in the Treasury; which by reason of the publick occasions, that admitted no such business for the present, were left with *Pompey*, and the Original, signed and sealed up, was brought to *Alexandria*.

While *Cæsar* was handling these things, being very desirous to end these controversies by arbitrement, it was told him on a sudden, that the Kings Army and all the Cavalry were come to *Alexandria*. *Cæsar's* forces were not such that he durst trust upon them, to hazard battell without the town; only it remained, that he kept himself in such places as were most fit and convenient for him within the town, and to learn what *Achillas* intended. However, he commanded all the souldiers to arme; and exhorted the King, that of those which were nearest unto him, and of greatest authority, he would send some to *Achillas*, to know his meaning.

*Dionotides* & *Scrapion* being deputed thereunto, having been both Embassadors at *Rome*, and in great place about *Ptolemy* the Father, they came to *Achillas*: whom as soon as they were come in his presence, and before he would hear or understand what they would have, he commanded to be taken away and slain. Of whom one having received a wound, was carried away by his own people for dead: the other was slain outright. Whereupon *Cæsar* thought to get the King into his own hands; thinking that his Name and Title would prevail much among his people, as do to make it appear, that this war was rather moved by the private practice of some sedition.

tious thieves, then by order and commandment from the King.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**he multiplicity of occasions and troubles which happen to such as have the ordering of many businesses of import, doth make that of *Plinius* often remembred; *Petrus negotiis novis accersunt, nec tamen priore pergitur;* *tot malis, tot quasi catenis, manus inde occupat, omni agmen extenditur*: New businesses come in the neck of old, and yet the first are not dispatched with so many ties and chains as it were, is the troupe of businesses every day made longer and longer. For albeit *Pompey* had now spent his money, and was no more to appear in *Armes* against *Cæsar*; yet his hap was by flying, to draw him (as it were) by way of revenge into a place where he was necessary to be intangled in a dangerous war.

To their prodigies here mentioned, may be added that of *Julius Cæsar*; that the same day the battell happened, there fell out a strange wonder at *Pharus*: where a certain Priest called *Ceregrinus*, of Noble race and Holy life, suddenly fell into an extatic, and said, he saw a great battell arise out of *Darts* and *Piles* the thick in the aires, some flying and some falling, great slaughter accompanied with many lamentable groans and cries: and in the end cried out, that *Cæsar* had got the victory. For which he was mocked for the present; but afterwards held in great admiration.

*Plinius* maketh the small increase of *Nilus* to be a fore-teller of *Pompey's* death; *Africanus* *Plinius* *collelo*: *veluti necem Africanus prodigium Nilum* *flumine* *conferre*. The last increase of *Nilus* was at the time of the *Pharsalia* battell; the very river prodigiously swelling (as it were) a detestation of the murder of the great *Pompey*.

## CHAP. XXXVIII.

*Cæsar* landeth his forces, taketh *Pharus*, and causeth *Phoebus* to be slain.

**T**he forces that were with *Achilles* were either for their number or for the expectation in war, to be concerned. For he had twenty two thousand men in *Armes*. These troops consisted of the *Gabinian* soldiers, which were now grown into a custom of life and liberty of the *Egyptians*; not having forgot the name and discipline of the people of *Rome*, had there many rich men, and most of them had children. To these

were added such as were gathered from the thieves and robbers of *Syria*, the Province of *Cilicia*, and other intimate Regions: besides many banished men; and others condemned to die, but fled thither. And for all our inquiries, there was ever a sure and certain receipt at *Alexandria*, and a certain condition of life: for upon giving up of his names he was presently enrolled a soldier. And if one chanced to be taken and apprehended by his Master, he was presently released by the consent of soldiers; who being all in the same condition, did strive for him as for themselves. These required the Kings friends to be plain; these were accustomed to rob rich men of their goods to better their pay, to besiege the Kings house to expell him out of the Kingdom; and to send for others home, according to an old custom and privilege of the *Alexandrian* Army.

There were besides two thousand horse, that had been of ancient continuance in many of the wars held at *Alexandria*; and had brought back *Ptolemy* the father, and restored him to his kingdom; had slain *Brutus* two sons; and had made war with the *Egyptians*; and this use and knowledge they had of war. *Achilles* resting to these forces, and continuing the small number of *Cæsar's* troops; did take and possess *Alexandria*; and for his assistance that part of the town which *Cæsar* held with his men, did first of all endeavour to break into his house. But *Cæsar* having observed the colours in the streets and waters, did beat out the assault. At the same time they fought the battle at the Port; and it came to length to a very forcible encounter: for having drawn out their troops, the fight began to be hot in many streets and lanes; and the Enemy in great numbers went about to possess the towers of the Gallies; of which there were some at the Port, that were sent to serve *Pompey*; and returned some again after the battell in *Thestia*. These were all *Evirmes* and *Quinquere* men; and ready to go to sea.

Besides these, there were twenty two, which were always accustomed to be the best, for the defence of *Alexandria*; and were all furnished with darts: which if they had taken, together with *Cæsar's* shipping they would have had the Haven and the Sea at their command; and by that means, hindered *Cæsar* from success and provision of victual. In regard whereof they fought hard on both sides; *Achilles* expecting victory, and our men for their safety. But *Cæsar* obtained his purpose; and because he was not able to keep so many several things with so small forces, he set them all on fire together with those that were in the *Reads*; and presently landed some soldiers at *Pharus*, which is a tower in an Island of a great height; built

with strange workmanship, taking that name from the Island. This Island lieth over against *Alexandria*; and so maketh it a Haven. But former Kings had enlarged it nine hundred paces in length by raising great mounds in the Sea; and by that means had brought it so near to the town, that they joyed them both together with a bridge.

In this Island dwell divers *Egyptians*, and made a Village of the biggest of a town; and what ships forever had fallen off their courses, either by tempest or error, were there robbed by these *Egyptians*. For by reason of the narrow entrance, no ships can come into the Haven but by the favour and leave of them that hold *Pharus*. *Cæsar* being afraid of this, while the Enemy was busy in fight, landed his soldiers, took the place, and there put a garrison. Whereby he brought it to pass, that both corn and succours might safely come by sea to supply him: for he had sent to all the confining Regions for aid. In other places of the town they fought, that they gave over at length upon equal conditions: (which happened by reason of the narrowness of the passages) and a few of each side being slain, *Cæsar* took in such places as were most convenient for himself fortified them in the night. In this quarter of the Town was contained a little part of the Kings house (wherein he himself at his first arrival was appointed to lodge) and a Theatre joined to the house, which was in stead of a Castle, and had a passage to the Port, and to other parts of Road. The darts following he increased these fortifications; to the end he might have them as a wall against the enemy; and thereby need not fight against his will.

In the mean time, the younger daughter of King *Ptolemy* hoping to obtain the Crown now in question, found means to converse herself out of the Kings house to *Achilles*; and both jointly together undertook the managing of

that war. But presently there grew a controversy between them, who should command in Chief; which was the cause of great larges and rewards to the soldiers; either of them being at great charges and expences to gain their good will.

While the Enemy was busy in these things, *Phoebus*, the Governor of the young Kings, or Superintendent of the Kingdom, sent *Cæsar's* party five Messengers to *Achilles*, exhorting him not to desert in the business, or to be discouraged. Upon the discovering and apprehension of which Messengers, *Cæsar* caused him to be slain. And these were the beginnings of the *Alexandrian* war.

## OBSERVATIONS.

*Pharus* is a little Island in the Sea over against *Alexandria*; in the midst whereof *Ptolemy Philadelph* built a tower of an exceeding height, all of white Marble. It contained many Stages, and had in the top many great Lanterns, to keep light in the night for a mark to such as were at Sea. The Architect engraved thereupon this inscription; *Sostratus Gindarus*, the son of *Dexiphanes*, to the Gods Conservators, for the safety of Navigators.

It was reckoned for one of the seven Wonders of the world. The first whereof was the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*. The second was the Sepulchre which *Artemisia*, Queen of *Caria*, made for her Husband *Mausolus*, whose ashes she drank. The third was the Colossus of the Sunne at *Rhodes*. The fourth was the Walls of *Babylon*. The fifth was the Pyramids of *Egypt*. The sixth was the Image of *Jupiter Olympus* at *Elis*, which was made by *Phidias*; and contained threecore cubites in height; and was all Ivory and pure Gold. And the seventh was this *Pharus*.

## FINIS.



A CONTINUATION  
of the  
VVARRRES  
in  
GALLIA,

Beginning where *Cæsar* left, and deducing the History  
to the time of the *CIVILE WARRRES*.

Written by A. HIRTIUS PANSÆ.

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VVith some short Observations thereupon.

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Together with  
The MANNER of our MODERN  
TRAINING, or TACTICK  
PRACTISE.

---

LONDON,

Printed by ROGER DANIEL: 1633.

*De rebus in rebus superioribus liberis rebus.*

# THE EIGHTH COMMENTARY OF THE VVARRES IN GALLIA;

Written by *AULUS HIRTIUS.*

## CHAP. I.

The *Gallies* raise new troubles in divers places. *Cæsar* scattereth and wasteth the *Bituriges*, and after that the *Carnutes*.

**A**fter that all *Gallia* was subdued, so far as much as *Cæsar* had retired no part of the former Summer from warre, he was desirous to refresh his Souldiers after so great pains taken, the rest of the winter season; when news was brought him that many States at the selfsame time, did lay their heads together again about warre, and make conspiracies. Whereof there was reported a very likely cause; in that it was known to all the *Gallies*, that there could not any power so great be assembled into one place, as should be able to withstand the *Romans*: neither if many States at once made war in divers places at one instant, could the army of the people of *Rome* have sufficient, either of aid, or of time, or of men of warre to pursue all at once; and there ought not any State to refuse the lot of their misfortunes, if by the respite thereof, the rest might set themselves at liberty.

The which opinion to the intent it should not settle in the minds of the *Gallies*, *Cæsar* leaving *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with charge of his winter garisons, went with a strong company of horsemen the last day of *December* from *Bibracte* to his twelfth Legion, which he had placed not farre from the borders of the *Hedui*, in the country of the *Bituriges*; and tooketh thereunto the eleventh Legion which was next unto it. Leaving two Cohorts to defend his stuff and carriages, he led the rest of his army into the most plentifull fields of the *Bituriges*: the which being a large country and full

of towns, could not be kept in aw with the garisoning of one Legion amongst them, but that they prepared for warre and made conspiracies.

By the sudden coming of *Cæsar*, it came to passe (which must needs happen to such as are unprovided and scattered abroad) that such as were tilling the ground without fear, were surprised in the fields by our horsemen, before they could get them into the Towns. For at that time, the common token of invasion which is wont to be perceived by burning of houses, was by *Cæsar's* commandment forbore, lest they should either want forrage and corn if they were minded to make any further rode into the country, or else, that their enemies for fear of the fires, should convey themselves out of the way.

After that many thousands of men had been taken, the *Bituriges* being sore afraid, such of them as could escape out of the *Romans* hands at their first coming, upon confidence either of the old acquaintance and familiarity that had been privately between them, by reason of resorting as guests one to another, or of their mutual agreement and partaking in the same devices, fled into the next cities: but all was in vain. For *Cæsar* by great journeys came so suddenly upon all places, that he gave not any city leisure, to think of the safeguard of other folks rather then of themselves. Through the which speed, he both kept his friends faithfull unto him, and put the wavering sort in such fears, that he compelled them to be glad to receive peace.

The matter standing in this case, when the *Bituriges* saw that through *Cæsar's* gentleness there was yet a way for them to return into his favour again, and that the next States had delivered him hostages, and were thereupon received to mercy, without further punishment: they themselves did in like wise. *Cæsar*, because his men had patiently endured so great travel in the winter

## The eighth Commentary of

winter dayes, through most cumbersome wayes, in intolerable cold weather, and continued most resolutely in the fame to the uttermost, promised to give to his souldiers two hundred sesterces apiece, and a prey: & so sending his Legions again into their wintering places, he himself returned into *Brabate* the twentieth day after his setting forth. There as he was ministering of Justice, the *Bituriges* sent messengers unto him, desiring help against the *Carnutes*, whom they complained to make waite upon them.

Upon the receipt of this news, when he had not lain in garrison yest eighteen dayes, he draweth the fourteenth and sixteenth Legions out of garrison from the river *Arar*, where he had placed them for the speedy purveyance of corn and victuals, as was shewed you in the last book: and with those two Legions went to prosecute the *Carnutes*.

When our enemies heard of the coming of our army, the *Carnutes* moved with the calamity of others, left their towne and villages that they dwelt in, which they had made upon the sudden with little cottages for necessities sake to keep off the winter; (for since they were conquered of late, they had lost many of their walled towns;) and fled scattering abroad. *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he would not put his souldiers to the abiding of the unreasonable sharp storme which chiefly at that time fell, encamped himself within *Genabum*, a town of the *Carnutes*, and housed his souldiers partly in the buildings of the *Gallies*, and partly in such buildings as being unfinished they thatched in hattle with the straw that was brought in to cover their tents and cabins. Nevertheless he kindly abroad his horsemen and auxiliary footmen into all parts whether he heard his enemies retired: and that was not in vain; for commonly our men returned with a great booty.

The *Carnutes* being put to it with the hardship of the winter, and the terror of the dangers, being driven out of house and home, and not daring to stay any where any long time, the woods being not able to defend them from the bitterness of the storme, were scattered abroad, and with the losse of a great part of themselves dispersed into the next cities.

### CHAP. II.

The *Bellocaci* and other States under the leading of *Corbicus* and *Comius* invade the *Suessones*: *Cæsar* marcheth against them.



As far as that hard time of the year, thinking it enough to disperse the powers that were assembling, to the intent no beginning of warre might spring up, and weighing how

much it concerned him, to prevent any open warre from breaking out the beginning of the next summer; he placed *C. Trebonius* in garrison at *Genabum* with those two Legions that he had there about him: and forasmuch as he was by often messages certified from the men of *Rhemes*, that the *Bellocaci* (who excelled all *Gallies* and the *Belge* also in military fame) and the States adjoining unto them, under the conduct of *Corbicus* of *Bellocaci* and *Comius* of *Arras*, levied men of waite, and assembled them into one place, to the intent with their whole power to invade the borders of the *Suessones*, which were appertaining to the men of *Rhemes*; thinking it stood not only upon his honour, but also tided to his own security for the future, to save his allies, which had deserved well of the Commonwealth from disputation and damage, he called the eleventh legion again out of garrison. Moreover he wrote to *C. Fabius* to bring the two legions that he had, into the confines of the *Suessones*; and sent for one of those two legions that were with *L. Labienus*. So according as his garisons lay for the purpose, and as the state of the warre required, to his own continual trouble, he put sometimes one of his legions and sometimes another, to march from their quarters.

With this power that he had assembled he went against the *Bellocaci*; and encompassing himself in their country, sent abroad his horsemen into all quarters to glean up some of them, by whose means he might learn what his enemies purposed to do. His horsemen doing their duty, brought word how few were found in the houses, and those not such as had stayed behind to till the ground, (for they were purposefully removed out of all places) but such as had been sent back again to sowe. Of whom *Cæsar* enquiring in what place the forces of the *Bellocaci* were, and what was their intent; found that all the *Bellocaci* were gathered together into one place; and that the *Ambiani*, *Aulerci*, *Caledones*, *Velocasses*, and *Atrebatii* had chosen a very high ground to encamp in, enclosed with a troublesome marsh, and had conveyed all their stuff into woods that were farther off. Of the which warre there were many Noblemen that were ringleaders, but the multitude obeyed *Corbicus* chiefly, because they understood that he had most the name of the people of *Rome*: And that *Comius* of *Arras* was a few dayes before gone to fetch aid of the *Germani*, who were their next neighbours, and swarmed in multitude of people. He learned moreover at their hands, that the *Bellocaci* by the consent of all the Noblemen, at the earnest instance of the Commons, were determined, if *Cæsar* came (as it was said he would) but with three legions, to offer him battell left afterward to redress

## Cæsars Warres in Gallia.

disadvantage and hinderance, they should be compelled to encounter with his whole host: And if he brought a greater power with him, then to keep themselves still in the same ground that they had chosen, and by ambushes to keep the *Romans* from forrage (which by reason of the time of the year was scarce, and also lay scattering) and from corn, and other victuals and things necessary for their army.

The which things when *Cæsar* understood by the contriving report of many, considering how full of wisdom this project was, and how farre from the rashnesse that the barbarous people are wont to use, he determined to make the least advantage of all things, to the intent his enemies disdainning his small company, should make the more haste to come into the field. For he had three old practised legions, the seventh, eighth, and ninth, of singular valour and prowesse; and the eleventh, which was of chosen young men of great hope and towardnesse, which having at that time received eight yeares wages, was notwithstanding look'd upon as not comparable to the other three either for standing, or for valour and courage.

Wherefore summoning an assembly, and there declaring all things that had been reported unto him, he confirmed the hearts of the common souldiers; if peradventure with the number of three legions he might draw out his enemies to fight with him in the field. He let his battell in this order: the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions went before the carriages, and the eleventh followed in the rear thereof; the which notwithstanding was but small, as it is wont to be in such expeditions: and this he did, lest the enemies should find a greater number than they expected. By this means, in a square battell almost, he brought his host in sight of his enemies sooner then they looked for him.

When the *Gallies* beheld these legions, so suddenly set in order marching toward them, as it had been in a pitched field (whereas it was reported to *Cæsar* that they intended to carry on their businesse with confident boldnesse,) whether it were for the perill of the encounter, or the suddennesse of our coming, or that they looked to see what we intended to do, they set themselves in order of battell before then camps, and would not descend from the higher ground. Albeit that *Cæsar* was desirous to have fought with them, yet wondering at the great number of his enemies, he pitched his camp directly over against theirs, on the other side of a valley, which was more in deepeste downward, then in widenesse any way at the bottom. This camp he commanded to be fortified with a rampier of twelve foot, and an open gallery to be builded upon it according to the measure of the same height, and a double ditch to be made of

fifteen foot apiece, with sides plumme down, and many towers to be reared of three stories high, and to be joynted together with drawbridges to let down at pleasure, the fronts whereof were fenced with grates of wicker; to the intent the enemy might be repulged with double force of defendants: of which the one from the Bridges, the more out of danger they were by reason of the height, so much the bolder and the farther off might they fend their darts; the other the nearer they were placed to their enemy upon the Rampiers, so much the better should they be covered from the artillery that might fall down upon them; and over the gates he made high towers. This kind of fortification was to high purposes: for by the greatnesse of his works and his pretence of feare, he hoped to put the barbarous *Gallies* into a great confidence; and whensoever he should have occasion to send out farre for forrage or victuals, he saw that the camp might be defended with a small power, the strength of the fortifications was so great. In the mean while parties on both sides would severall times go out and skirmish in the marsh that was between our two camps: the which oftentimes either the *Gallies* and *Germani* that were of our host would passe, and eagerly pursue their enemies; or else in like manner our enemies passing over it, did send our men farther off.

It happened in our daily foraging (as there was no other shift, forasmuch as we were faine to fetch forrage at houses that stood scattering farre asunder) that our forrages being delivered in disadvantageous places, were entrapped. The which thing as it was some losse to us of our beasts of carriage, and slaves, so it heightened the foolish courages of the barbarous *Gallies*; and that so much the more, because *Comius* of *Arras* (who we said before was gone to fetch aid of the *Germani*) was returned with some horse; of whom although there was not above the number of five hundred, yet the *Gallies* were puffed up at the coming of the *Germani*.

### CHAP. III.

*Cæsar* strengthens himself with more forces. The men of *Rhemes* assisted by the *Enmy*, and they again by the *Germani* on *Cæsar's* party.



When *Cæsar* perceived how his enemies kept themselves many dayes together within their camp, which was fortified both with a marsh and also with advantage of the ground, and that he could neither assault them without manifest perill, nor inclose the place where they were with any fortifications, without a greater army, he directed his letters to *Trebonius*,

business that he should with all haste possible send for the thirteenth legion which wintered amongst the *Rauriges*, under *T. Sextius*, the Legate, and to with three legions make long marches to come to him. In the mean season he sent out by turns the horsemen of *Rhemes* and of the *Ulpiones* and other States, of whom he had called forth a great number, to follow the foragers, and to withstand the sudden assaults of the enemy.

This being done day by day, and our men taking now less heed, because it was an ordinary matter with them, (which thing for the most part cometh to passe by daily custome) the *Bellocaci* with a band of chosen footmen, knowing the places where our horsemen daily kept their standings, laid ambushes in woody places: and the next day they sent thither their horsemen, first to draw out our men into the danger of their ambushments, and then to assail them as they were enclosed. The lot of this ill luck lighted upon the men of *Rhemes*, whose turn it was to perform the duty that day. For they, when they had espied the horsemen of their enemies upon the suddain, despising them because they were little in numbers, followed them over-greedily, and were enclosed by the footmen. Whereby being disordered, they retired more hastily then horsemen are accustomed to do in battell, with the losse of *Vertico* the Prince of their State, and Captain of their horsemen. Who being scarce able to sit upon a horse by reason of his age, would notwithstanding (according to the custome of the *Gallies*) neither seek to disburden himself of the Captainship by excuse of his age, nor suffer the encounter to be fought wih out him. With this lucky battell, wherein they slew the Prince and Captain of the men of *Rhemes*, the courages of our enemies were heightened and raised: and our men were taught by their own harms, to search the places better where they should keep their standings, and to follow their enemy more adively when he fled. In the mean while ceased not the daily skirmishes in the sight of both our Camps, which were made at the fords and passages of the marsh.

In this kind of exercise, whereas the *Germani* (whom *Cæsar* had for the same purpose fetched over the *Rhene*, that they should fight intermingled with his horsemen in the battell) had all boldly passed the marsh, and slaying a few that made resistance, followed eagerly upon the rest of the multitude; not only they that were overthrown at hand or wounded aloof, but also they that were wont to succour afaire off, were so stricken with fear, that they ran away shamefully; and never left flying from higher ground to higher, which they oftentimes lost, before they either recovered into their Camps, or (as some

did for very shame) fled farther off. With whose danger the rest of the host was so troubled, that it can scarcely be judged whether good successe were it never to (small) would make them more arrogant, or a misfortune (were it never to mean) would make them more cowed and fearful.

#### CHAP. III.

The *Gallies* discamp, and are pursued by *Cæsar*. The routing of part of them, and the death of *Cobus*.

**A**FTER they had lunked many dayes in the same Camps, when the Captains of the *Bellocaci* understood that *C. Trebonius*, one of *Cæsar's* Legates, was at hand with mo Legions, the like feare as was at *Alexia*, they sent away in the night all such as by reason of yeares or otherwise wanted strength, and all such as wanted armour among them, and with them they sent away also their carriages. While they were setting forth this troubled and confused company, (for the *Gallies* even when they go lightly, are wont to have a great multitude of Carts following them) day-light came upon them; and therefore they let their men in battell-array in their camp, lest the *Romans* should pursue, before the company of their carriages could get any thing forward. But *Cæsar* thought it not good to assail them that were ready to defend themselves, having to high a hill to climb up unto them; and yet he thought to come to near them with his host, as that they might not depart out of the place where they were without danger, our men being hard at hand ready to fall upon them. Therefore whereas he perceived that the troublesome marsh parted Camp from Camp, (the difficult passage whereof might hinder the speedy pursuit of our enemies) and that the same ridge of the hill which went from the farther side of the marsh almost to the camp of the enemies, was raised from their said camp with a small valley: he made bridges over the marsh, and passing over his army, got quickly into the plain of the said ridge, the which on two sides was fortified with a steep descent. There embattelling his men, he came to the farthest end of the ridge: and ordered his battels in such a place, from whence with an engine artillery might be to advantage the thickest of the enemies.

The *Gallies* trusting to the advantage of this place, when they would neither have refused the encounter, if perchance the *Romans* should have adventured up the hill against them, nor yet durst by little and little diminish their battell by severing themselves, lest when they had been out of array, they might hap to have been let up-

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on, kept themselves in order of battell. Whole wishfull *Cæsar* perceiving, kept twenty Cohorts in a readinesse, and pitching his tents in the same place, commanded his camp should be fortified. As soon as the works were finished, he fit his Legions in array before the *Rompies*, and appointed the horsemen to their standings with their horses ready brulled.

When the *Bellocaci* saw the *Romans* in a readinesse to pursue them, and that themselves could not without perill either lodge that night, or continue any longer in the same place where they were, they devised this shift to recover themselves. In the place where they were let together, (for it is declared in *Cæsar's* former Commentaries, how the *Gallies* are wont to fit down in the battell) they received from hand to hand one of another bundles of straw and fagots, whereof there was great store in their camp, and caft it all on a heap before their battell, and in the later end of the day, at a watch-word that was given, they set on fire all at one instant: by means whereof the continual flame suddenly took away the fight of all their army from the *Romans*: and therewithall the savage *Gallies* fled away as fast as their legs could bear them.

Albeit that *Cæsar* could not perceive the departing of his enemies, by reason of the flame that was betwixt them; yet notwithstanding, so far as he suspected it to be a deceit practised by them, that they might the safer fly away, he marched his footmen forward, and sent his officers to pursue them. Howbeit for fear of treachery in the businesse, lest perhaps his enemies should abide still in the same place, and only draw us forth into a ground of disadvantage, he went the slower pace. His horsemen fearing to venture into the smoke and thick flame (and if any were so resolute as to enter it, they could scarce see the fore-parts of their own horses) lest they should be intrapped, gave the *Bellocaci* free liberty to recover themselves whither they would. Thus our enemies by their flight, which was mixt with fear and subtilty, escaping without any losse, went but ten miles off, and encamped themselves in a very advantageous ground. From whence by laying ambushes both of horse and foot in divers places, they did the *Romans* great displeasure as they went a foraging.

After this had happened many and sundry times, *Cæsar* learned of a captive, that *Corbicus*, Captain of the *Bellocaci*, had chosen out of his whole host, six thousand of the valiantest footmen, and a thousand horsemen, which he had laid in ambush in the same place whether (for the plenty of provision and corn that was there) he judged the *Romans* would tend to foraging.

This being known, *Cæsar* bringeth forth more legions then usually, and sendeth his horsemen before as he was wont to do, to follow and catch his foragers. Among them he mingled for their assistance many light-armed footmen, and himself with his legions followeth as near as possibly he might. The enemies that they were laid in ambush, having chosen a field for their purpose, not above a mile over every way, environed round about, either with cumbersome woods, or else a very deep river, better it with their ambushments, as it had been with a toil.

Our men, so far as they were privy to the design of their enemies beforehand, being ready both with heart and hand to fight, seeing their legions followed hard after them, would refuse no encounters; but went rank by rank down into the said places. At whole coming, *Corbicus* thinking an occasion of doing some good to be fallen into his hands, first discovered himself with a small number, and giveth charge upon the next troops. Our men stoutly withstand the brunt; & flock not many into one place at once; which in skirmishes of horse is wont commonly to happen through fear, and their clustering together turneth to their own losse. They being thus engaged in small parties, and having a care still that their fellows should not be circumvented, the rest brake out of the woods while *Corbicus* was fighting. Then was the encounter hot and doubtfull. After it had continued indifferently a good space, by little and little came their footmen in array out of the woods, which compelled our horsemen to give back. But they were quickly relieved again by the light-armed footmen; which as was said were sent before our legions who being intermixed among the horsemen fought stoutly.

The encounter continued a good while doubtfull. But as the course of waire requires, they that had withstood the first brunt of them that lay in ambush for them, had thus much the advantage, that they received not unawares any foil at their hands. In the mean while our legions drew nearer, and divers messengers brought word both to our men and to our enemies at one and the same time, that the General was at hand with his army in battell array. Which thing being known, our horsemen trusting to the help of the Cohorts, lay about them very eagerly, lest if they should have delayed the matter, they might have given the footmen part of the honour of the victory. Upon this our enemies hearts began to fail; and they sought to fly by several wayes, but all was in vain. For by the disadvantage of the same places in which they would have inclosed the *Romans*, were they themselves taken tardy and could not get out. Notwithstanding, being vanquished and altogether out of heart, when they had lost the greatest part of

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their company, like men amazed they betook themselves to flight; and some made toward the woods, others toward the river, where being overtaken by our men that followed eagerly after them, they were all slain. In the mean time *Corbennus*, whose heart could by no misfortune be daunted or overcome, never departed out of the battle, nor made toward the woods, neither could by the entreaty of our men be persuaded to yield himself; but fighting most valiantly and hurting many of our men, he so farre exasperated the victors, that they could not forbear to throw their darts at him, and dispatch him.

## CHAP. V.

The remainder of the *Gallies* submit themselves to *Cæsar*. *Comius* in danger to be slain by treachery.

**W**hen the matter being brought to this passe, *Cæsar* pursuing his newly-got victory, so much as he thought that his enemies being discouraged with so great a misfortune, would immediately upon the news thereof forsake the place where they were encamped, which was said to be not above eight miles from the place where the slaughter was made; although he saw it would be some trouble to him to passe the river, yet passed he his army, and marched toward them. But the *Bellovaci* and the other States upon the return of a few of their men, and those wounded out of the chafe, which had escaped the mischance by means of the woods, understanding by them their own great misfortune and misery by the death of *Corbennus*, the loss of their horcemen, and the slaughter of their best self footmen, and mistrusting that the *Romans* would out of hand come upon them; immediately called an assembly by the sound of a trumpet, and cried all with one voice, to send ambassadors and hostages to *Cæsar*.

When *Comius* of *Atrebas* perceived that this motion would be entertained, he fled to those *Germani* of whom he had borrowed assistance to the warre. The rest sent ambassadors presently unto *Cæsar*, desiring him to content himself with that punishment of his enemies, which if he might have laid upon them without battel in their chief prosperity, they were well assured that of his clemency and courtesy he would not have done it. The *Bellovaci* said that their power was weakened by the loss of their horcemen; many thousands of their choicest footmen were cut off; scarce any escaping to bring tidings of the slaughter: yet notwithstanding their great misfortune, they had by that battel received this happiness, that *Corbennus*, the author of the

warre and raider of the multitudes, was slain. For as long as he was alive, the Senate could never bear so great sway in the city, as the rude and unskillfull commonalty.

As the ambassadors were speaking these things, *Cæsar* put them in mind, that about the same time the last year, the *Bellovaci* and other States of *Gallia* raised warre, and that they above all others stood most stiffly in their opinions; and would not be reduced to obedience by the submission of the rest. He told them, he knew and understood it was an easie matter to lay the fault of their offence upon him that was dead. But he was sure that there was no man of so great power, that against the noblemen wills, the Senate resisting him, and all good men withstanding him, could with a weak handful of the commonalty, raise a warre, and go through with it. Nevertheless he was satisfied with the punishment which they had brought upon themselves.

The night following, the ambassadors returned this answer to those that sent them, and forthwith they gave hostages. Then also the ambassadors of other States, which waited to see what success the *Bellovaci* would have, came to *Cæsar*, giving hostages, and performing his commands; only *Comius* stood off, who durst not for fear trust his life into any mans hands. For the year before *Titus Labienus* perceiving how while *Cæsar* was ministering justice in the higher *Gallia*, *Comius* stirred up the States and made confederacies against *Cæsar*, thought he might without being accounted a faith-breakers revenge his treacherous carriage. And thereupon, because he thought he would not at his sending, for come into the camp, left he should by such a message make him more cautious, he sent *C. Volusenus Quadratus* to murther him, under pretence of communicating with him; and for the performance of the matter, he sent with him certain selected Centurions for the purpose. When they came to conference, and that *Volusenus* (as it was agreed upon) had caught *Comius* by the right hand, one of the Centurions, as if he had been moved at the strangeness of the matter, gave *Comius* a shrewd blow on the head with his sword; wherebeit he could not dispatch him, because his friends step in and saved him. By and by was drawing of swords on both sides, and yet none of both parties were minded to fight, but to fly a way our men, because they believed that *Comius* had had his deaths wound; the *Gallies*, because perceiving the treachery, they feared there had been more behind than they saw. Upon which business it is reported, that *Comius* vowed he would never come in the fight of any *Roman*.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar* disposed his forces into severall parts of *Gallia*, and himself witheth the country of *Ambriox*.

**W**hen *Cæsar* had subdued the Nations that were most warlike, perceiving there was now no City that prepared warre, to stand against him, but that many to shew the present yoke of the *Roman* Empire, left they towns and fled out of the fields, he determined to send his army abroad into divers quarters. *M. Antonius* the Questor with the eleventh legion he took to himself. *C. Papius* the Legate with twenty five cohorts he sent into the farthest part of all *Gallia*, because he heard say that certain States were there in arms, and that he thought *C. Catinus Reblus* the Legate had not a sufficient strength of those two legions that were with him already. *T. Labienus* he called unto him from the place where he was; and the twelfth legion which wintered under him, he sent into *Gallia Togata*, to defend the towns that the *Romans* had there peopled with their own Citizens, lest any such harm should happen to them by invasion of the barbarous people, as had happened the summer before to the *Tergessini*, who were surprised and spoiled of their goods by their suddain invasions.

He himself set forward to wait and spoil the borders of *Ambriox*; who lying before him for fear from place to place, when he saw there was no hope to get him into his hands, he thought it was most for his honour, to do to spoil his country of people, buildings and carrels; that his countrymen might lo hate him (if fortune relieved any countrymen for him) that for the calamities he had brought upon his country, he might never have access thither again.

After he had sent abroad his host into all parts of *Ambriox* his country, and waited all places with slaughter, burning and rapine; having slain and taken prisoner a great number of men, he sent *Labienus* with two legions among the *Treviri*; whose country, by reason of the nearness thereof unto *Germany*, being daily invaded to the wars, is not much unlike to the *Germani* in rudeness and savageness of life; neither did they obey the commands of *Cæsar*, at any time longer than we had an army in that country to compel them.

## CHAP. VII.

A new war raised in the territories of the *Pitones*. *C. Fabius* putteth to fight the forces of *Dumnacus*: subdueth the *Garnates* and *Arenorici*.

**I**n the mean season *C. Catinus* the Legate, understanding by the intelligence and letters of *Dumnacus*, (who had continued always firm to the friendship of the people of *Rome*) that a great number of cities were removed in the borders of the *Pitones*; so much as a part of that City had renounced their obedience, went to the town of *Lemovicum*. When he came near the town, and understood by his prisoners, how that *Dumnacus* Captain of the *Andes* with many thousands of men had enclosed *Dumnacus* and that *Lemovicum* was besieged; he durst not with his weak legions adventure upon his enemies; but pitched his Camp in an advantageous ground. *Dumnacus* hearing of the approach of *Catinus*, turned all his power against the *Rhinus* legions, determining to sit upon them in their Camp. After he had spent many dayes in the assault, and had lost many of his men, and yet could not break down any part of their fortifications, he returned again to besiege *Lemovicum*.

At the same time, *C. Fabius* receiveth many Cities by composition, and assureth them with hostages; and is advertised by *Catinus* letters, of those things that were done among the *Pitones*. Upon the knowledge whereof, he stretcheth forth to relieve *Dumnacus*.

But *Dumnacus* understanding of *Fabius* coming, forasmuch as he thought he should hazard the losing all if at once he should be compelled both to abide the *Rhinus* his enemies without, and also to have an eye to and stand in fear of the towns, retired suddenly with all his forces from the place, and could not think himself to be sufficiently in safety, before he had passed his army over the river *Loire*, which by reason of the greatness thereof, was to be passed by a bridge, and not other wise.

Although *Fabius* was not yet come within sight of his enemies, not had joyined with *Catinus*, yet forasmuch as he was thoroughly informed by such as knew the coast of the country, he suspected that his enemies would take that way which they did. Therefore he made with his army to the said bridge where his enemies had passed, and commanded his horsemen to go no farther before the footmen, than that they might upon occasion retire into the same Camp without striking them horse. One horse as was commanded them, overtook the host of

*Dumnacus* and set upon them; and assaulting them flying and amazed, as they marched with their luggage at their backs, slew a great number and took a great prey: and so with good success retired into their camp.

The night following *Fabius* sent his horsemen before, to provide, that they might encounter the enemy, and slay all the whole army until he should overtake them. *Q. Asius Varus* the commander of the horse, a man of singular courage and wildome, having encouraged his men and overtaken the body of his enemies, disposed certain of his troops in places convenient, and with the rest of his horsemen gave charge upon his enemies. The cavalry gave the enemy fought to much the more boldly, because their foot were ready to assist them, who being mingled through the whole army, as often as occasion was, did succour them against our men. The encounter was very sharp. For our men despising them whom they had vanquished the day before, and remembering that the legions followed at their heels, ashamed to give ground, and desirous to get the day before their coming, fought very valiantly against the footmen. On the other side, our enemies believing that no greater forces of ours were behind, according as they had seen the day before, thought a fair opportunity offered them to destroy our cavalry utterly.

When they had fought a good while very eagerly, *Dumnacus* made a battle to relieve his Cavalry, when occasion should be. But on the sudden our enemies cried our legions coming up close together: at the sight of whom their horse were stricken into such a fear, and the foot so amazed, that breaking through their carriages, with great clamour and confusion they betook themselves every where to flight. Then our Cavalry, who a little before had their hands fully being heartened with joy of the victory, raised a great shout on all sides, and casting themselves amongst them as they fled, made slaughter of them as farre as their horses breaths would serve to pursue them, and their arms were able to strike them. Inasmuch that having slain above twelve thousand men, armed, and such as for fear had cast away their arms, they took all their carriages, none escaping.

Out of the which chafe forasmuch as it was certainly known, that *Draupes* the *Senon* was escaped (who when *Gallia* first began to rebel gathered to him men of desperate fortunes out of all places, setting boundmen at liberty, entertaining outlaws of all countries, and receiving high-way thieves, had cut off the carriages and victuals of the *Romans*) was going toward the Province with five thousand men at the most, which he had rallied after the chase; and that *Luterius* of *Cabors* joyned himself with him,

who in the former Commentary is said to have attempted an invasion of the Province at the first insurrection of *Gallia*; *Canninus* the Legate with two legions pursued after them, left some great dishonour might be received by those loose fellows terrifying and harailling the Province.

*G. Fabius* with the rest of the army went against the *Canninus*; and the other States, whose power he knew to be crushed in the battle that was fought against *Dumnacus*. For he doubted not, but he should find them more tractable to deal with, by reason of the late overthrow: whereas if he should give them time of repite, by the instigation of the said *Dumnacus*, they might be raised again. *Fabius* with marvellous good luck and speed brought those States to submission. For the *Canninus*, who had been oftentimes before ill-handled by us, yet would never listen to peace, now gave hostages, and came into subjection. And the rest of the States situate in the farthest parts of *Gallia*, bordering upon the sea, which are called *Armorica*, following the example of the *Canninus*, at the coming of *Fabius* with his legions amongst them, performed his commandments without delay.

*Dumnacus* thus driven out of his own country, wandering and lurking in corners alone, was compelled to betake himself to the uttermost countries of all *Gallia*.

#### CHAP. VIII.

*Draupes* and *Luterius* seize upon *Uxellodunum*. *Canninus* pursueth them, overthroweth their forces, taketh *Draupes* prisoner, and with *Fabius* besiegeth *Uxellodunum*.

**B**UT *Draupes* and *Luterius*, when they understood that *Canninus* approached with his army, perceiving they could not without manifest perill enter the bounds of the Province, considering how the army pursued them, nor yet range abroad on thieving at their pleasure, stayed together in the country of the *Cadurci*. There *Luterius* (who in times past while he was in prosperity, was able to sway greatly with his countrymen, and had gotten great estimation among the rude people, as one that was ever a beginner of new designs) took with his own and *Draupes* his forces, a town called *Uxellodunum*, which had been formerly in his tuition, a place excellently well fortified by the natural situation thereof, and caused the townsmen to joyn with him.

To this town *Canninus* forthwith came; and perceiving that all parts of the same were fortified

with craggy cliffs, inasmuch that though no man were there to defend it, yet were it a hard matter for men in their armour to get up; knowing also that the moveables of the townsmen were great, which if they should go about to carry privily away, they could not escape either our horsemen or footmen: he divided his Cohorts into three parts, and made three Camps upon a very high ground; from which by degrees, as his army was able, he determined to draw a Rampier and trench round about the town.

The townsmen perceiving that, and remembering the miserable condition of *Alesia*, feared the like siege. *Luterius* especially, who had tasted the smart of such misfortune, advised them to lay for corn beforehand: whereupon they determined by general consent, that leaving a part of the army for the defence of the town, *Luterius* and *Draupes* with the best-provided, should go forth to fetch in corn. This counsel being approved of, the next night *Draupes* and *Luterius* leaving two thousand armed men behind them, drew the rest out of the town. After a few days being abroad, they brought in a great quantity of grain out of the country of the *Cadurci*, who partly were willing to help them therewith, and partly durst not withhold their taking it, as not being able to make their part good against them. Oftentimes also they would fly out in the nights, and assault the castles of our camp. Upon which consideration *C. Canninus* stayed the making of fortifications round about the town, lest he should not be able to defend the circumvallation when it was finished, or else should be forced to let but weak watches in so many places at once.

When they had gotten together a great quantity of grain, *Draupes* and *Luterius* took up their standings not above ten miles from the town, the better at times to convey it in; and they parted the charge between them. *Draupes* tarried behind with part of the army to keep the Camp; *Luterius* drove the beasts with their carriages toward the town: and setting guards there for his defence, about ten of the clock in the night purposed by narrow ways through the woods to convey the corn into the town. The watchmen of our Camp hearing the noise of their feet, and the sounds which were sent out reporting what was a doing, *Canninus* caused his Cohorts to arm themselves quickly, and about break of day made attempt out of the next castles upon the forrangers. Who being frighted with the suddenness of the mischief, fled to their guards. Which as soon as our men perceived, they flew more fiercely upon them, and suffered none to be taken alive. *Luterius* fled from thence with a few, but returned not to his Camp.

After this good success, *Canninus* understood by his prisoners, that part of the army was behind in the Camp with *Draupes*, not above twelve miles off. Which when he had learned by many to be truth, believing that one of the Generals already put to flight the remnant of the army being terrified, might easily be overthrown; he thought it a great piece of happiness, that none escaped from the slaughter into the Camp, to carry tidings of the mishap to *Draupes*. And forasmuch as he saw there was no danger in putting the matter to trial, he sent all his horsemen and the *German* footmen, swift and nimble fellows, before to the Camp of his enemies. One of his legions he left in his Camp, and the other cald of all carriages, he took with him.

When he came near his enemies, his scouts that he had sent before brought word that (as the custom of the barbarous nations commonly is) they had abandoned the higher ground, & evacuated themselves by the River side; & that our horse and the *German* had flown upon them suddenly ere they were aware, and charged them. Upon the receipt of this news, he halted forward with his legion well armed and well appointed: and to the sign being given suddenly on all sides the higher places were taken by our men. At the doing whereof, the *German* and our Cavalry seeing the Ensigns of our Legions fought very stoutly: and by and by all our Cohorts charged upon them round; so that in the conclusion, they were all either slain, or prisoners, and a great booty taken. *Draupes* himself was also taken in the same conflict.

*Canninus* having done his work successfully, without almost any hurt at all to his soldiers, returned to besiege the town: and having now destroyed his enemy without, for fear of whom he could not before divide his garrisons, nor environ the town with fortifications; he commanded the works to be carried on round about the town. The next day came thither *C. Fabius* with his forces, and took another part of the town to besiege.

#### CHAP. IX.

*Cæsar* having punished *Gaurantius* for the revolt of the *Cannus*, joyneth with *Canninus* and *Fabius* before *Uxellodunum*, where he depriving them of water the town yielded. *Cæsar* catcheth off their night haids.

**W**HEN the mean time, *Cæsar* left *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with fifteen Cohorts among the *Bellovaci*, to prevent any new confederacies amongst them for the future: and he himself visited the other States, charging them

with no hostages, and with comfortable words raising the fearful hearts of them all.

When he came amongst the *Carnutes*, in whose country (as *Cæsar* hath declared in his former Commentary) the warre first of all began, inasmuch as he perceived them to be chiefly afraid, as being conscious to themselves of their fault, to the intent he might the more speedily deliver the rest of the State from fear, he demanded *Guturatus*, the ring-leader of that mischief, and raiser of the rebellions, to be delivered unto him to be punished: who albeit he trusted not himself with his own countenances, yet all men made no diligent search for him, that he was found out and brought to the Camp. *Cæsar*, contrary to his own nature, was compelled to punish him whether he would or no, by the importunity of his soldiers, who imputed all the dangers and losses that they had sustained by this warre, unto *Guturatus*: inasmuch that his body after it was in a manner whipped to death, was beheaded.

While *Cæsar* tarried here, he was advertised by severall letters from *Caunius*, what was done to *Drapes* and *Luturius*, and how the townsmen perceived in their resolution: the small number of whom although he despised, yet he deemed their villainousness worthy of severe punishment; lest they might give occasion to all *Gallias*, to think that they wanted not strength, but constancy and resolution to withstand the *Romans*; or lest by their example, other cities of *Gallias*, should attempt to recover their liberty: especially seeing he was sure that all the *Gallies* knew his commission lastled but one summer longer, which if they could hold out, they should need to fear no danger after. And therefore leaving *Q. Calenus* the Legate behind with two legions to follow leisurely after him: by easy marches he himself with all his Cavalry made haste to *Caunius*.

When *Cæsar*, contrary to all mens expectations was come to *Uxellodunum*, and saw the town environed with fortifications, perceiving that it was not for him to break up his siege on any conditions, and learning moreover by run-aways that the town had great abundance of victuals: he was forced to cut off the water from his enemies.

There was a river that ran through the bottom of the valley, which environed well-near all the hill whereon the town stood, from whence the descent was rough and steep on all sides. The nature of the place would not suffer this stream to be turned any other way. For it ran in such sort at the very foot of the hill, that there could be no ditch cut low enough to drain it. The townsmen had hard and very steep coming down to it, inasmuch that if our men without

them, they could not without wounds or danger of their lives, either come down to the river, or get up the steep hill again. Which distress of theirs *Cæsar* well knowing, placed archers and slingers, and other artillery also, against such places where the easiest coming down was, to keep the townsmen from the water of the river: who afterward came for water all to one place. For under the very walls of the town there gushed out a great spring of water, on that side where there was a place almost of three hundred foot not encompassed with the river.

Now whilst all the rest waited, and only *Cæsar* perceived, that this spring might be taken from the town, though not without great damage: began to raise Vines directly against it toward the hill, and to make mounts, with great labour and continual fighting. For the townsmen came running down from the higher ground, and fought with our men at a distance without danger, wounding many of them that pressed too forwardly. Notwithstanding our men were nothing deterred from bringing forward their Vines, endeavouring to overcome the crab: the steeple of the place, with their labour and works. At the same time they drew privy mines to the head of the spring, which kind of work they might do without any danger or mistrust of their enemies. A mount was cast up six foot high, and thereupon was raised a tower of ten stories: not such a one as might equal the height of the walls, (for that was not possible to be done any way) but such a one as might exceed the top of the spring. From which conveying darts with engines to the brim of the spring, so that the townsmen could not fetch water without danger, not only all sorts of cattle, but also a great number of men died for thirst.

The townsmen greatly astonished hereat, filled barrels with grease, pitch and flint, and setting them on fire rolled them down upon our works, and at the same time also fought very desperately, with the perill of fighting to keep the *Romans* from quenching the fire. Suddenly there was a great flame in our works. For whatsoever was thrown down from that steep place, the same laying against the Vines and rampiers, took hold upon the things that layed them. On the other side, our Soldiers, albeit they were hindered both with the dangerousness of the encounter, and with the disadvantage of the place, yet they bare out all things with a stout courage. For the thing was done both in an eminent place, and also in the sight of our army: and a great cry was raised on both sides. So that every man as far as he could, especially the most daring, (to the intent his valour might the better be known and testified) ventured himself upon the fire, & the weapons of his enemies.

*Cæsar*

*Cæsar* when he saw many of his men wounded, commanded his Cohorts to climb up the hill on all sides of the town, and to raise a shout as if they purposed to scale the walls. Wherewith the townsmen being frighted, forthwith as they knew not what was doing in other places, called back their men from assailing our works, and placed them upon the walls. So our men having respite from fighting, did quickly either quench the works that were on fire, or else cut them off from the rest.

The townsmen stubbornly standing out, though they had lost a great part of their men by thirst, and continuing still unanimously resolved, at length the vines of the spring were cut off within the ground by mines, and turned another way: by means whereof the fountain of running water was presently dried up. Which to daunted the hearts of the defendants, who believed it could not be done by the wit of man, but came to pass by the will of the gods; that when they saw there was no other remedy, they yielded themselves.

*Cæsar* being assured that his clemency was sufficiently known to all people, and therefore he needed not to fear that it would be imputed to the cruelty of his nature, if he dealt something harshly with them; and besides that, considering with himself, that it might well be thought he little regarded the good successe of his counsells and undertakings, if by suffering such things unpunished, others should be encouraged to rebel in divers places: he thought it requisite to hold the rest in awe by the punishment of these. And therefore he cut off the hands of as many of them as were able to bear arms, and let them live still, that the punishment of such wicked men might be more manifest to the world.

#### CHAP. X.

*Drapes* dieth, *Luturius* brought to *Cæsar*, *Labienus* good successe against the *Treviri*. *Cæsar* after his expedition into *Aquitania*, putteth his army into winter-quarters.

**D**RAPES, whom I declared to have been taken by *Caunius*, whether it were for vexation and grief that he was in bands, or for fear of more heavy punishment, fasted a few dayes from meat, and so starved.

At the same time *Luturius*, that escaped by flight from the battel (as I shewed before) fell into the hands of *Epaulnatius* the *Arvernian*. For in often shifting from place to place, he was faine to venture himself upon the courtesy and civility of many, because he thought he could never continue any long time in one place without danger, his heart misgiving him how much he had deserved to have *Cæsar* his enemy. *Epaulnatius* the *Arvernian* being a faithfull friend to the

people of *Rome*, as soon as he had gotten him into his hands, brought him without further delay bound unto *Cæsar*.

In the mean time *Labienus* warreth profreously against the *Treviri*: and having slain many both of the *Treviri* and also of the *Germani*, who were ready to assist any man against the *Romans*, got the chief of them alive into his hands; among whom was *Surus* the *Heduan*, a man of great valour and noble birth, who alone of the *Heduan* had unto that day continued in arms against the people of *Rome*.

*Cæsar* knowing thereof, and forthwith as he saw his affairs went well forward in all parts of *Gallias*, weighing with himself how all *Celtica* and *Belgica* were the former Summers conquered and subdued, and that he had never all this while wasted *Aquitanias*, only he had made a kind of entrance into it by certain victories gotten by *P. Crassus*: he marched thither with two legions, with intent to bestow the later part of the summer there. Which thing (as he had done all others before) he dispatched quickly and luckily. For all the States of *Aquitania* sent ambassadors unto him, and gave him hostages.

After the accomplishment of these things, he went to *Narbone* with his guard of horsemen, and sent his foot into their wintering-places by his Legates. Four legions he placed in *Belgium* under *M. Antonius*, *C. Trebonius*, *P. Vatinus*, and *Q. Tullius*, Legates. Two he quartered amongst the *Heduan*, whom he knew to be of greatest authority in all *Gallias*. Two more he placed amongst the *Treviri* in the borders of the *Carnutes*, to be a stay to all the country that lay upon the sea-coast. The other two he placed in the borders of the *Lemovii*: not farre from the *Arvern*: that so there might not be any part of *Gallias* without an army.

After he had tarried a few dayes in the *Province*, and then speedily taking cognizance of all their courts, sitting upon publick controversies, and rewarded such as had deserved well, (for he had a great desire to understand how every man had carried himself towards the commonweal during the generall rebellion of all *Gallias*, which he had born out through the faithfulness & assistance of the said *Provinces*) as soon as he had dispatched these things, he returned to his legions into *Belgium*, and wintered at *Nemausocema*.

#### CHAP. XI.

*Caunius* of *Arras* overthrowen in a battel of horse by *C. Volusenus*, submitted to *M. Antonius*, and received pardon.

**W**HILE he was there, he understood that *Caunius* of *Arras* had encountered with his Cavalry. For *Antonius* being come into his winter-quarters, and the city of *Arras* con-

X x continu

continuing firmly loyall, *Comius*, who after his wound that we spake of before, was wont still to be ready at hand to his countrymen at every stirre, to the intent that if they would begin any new rising, they should not want a head and a captain for the war; as long as the city continued obedient to the *Romans*, he with his horsemen maintained himself and his followers by thieving, for laying the wayes, he cut off many conveyes that were going with provision to the *Roman* garisons. *C. Volusenus Quadratus*, the generall of the horse was appointed to winter in the same place with *Antonius*; him did *Antonius* tend to pursue the horse of his enemies. *Volusenus*, beside the singular valour that was in him, did also beare a great hatred toward *Comius*, and for that cause was the more willing to execute the thing that was commanded him. Wherefore placing divers ambushes, he oftentimes set upon *Comius* horsemen, and put them to the worle.

At last, when the contention grew more vehement, and that *Volusenus*, desirous to cut off *Comius* himself, followed him somewhat more eagerly with a small party, and *Comius* on the other side fled the faster away, thereby to draw him farther from his company; at length spying his advantage, *Comius* suddenly cried out to all his men, that as they were true unto him they should stand to him, and not suffer the wound that was given him basely under colour of friendship, to be uncovered; and therewithall turning his horse, he runneth from the rest of his company upon *Volusenus*. All his horse followed, and because there were but a few of our men, they made thim retreat, and pursued them. *Comius* putting spurs to his horse, encountered the horse of *Quadratus*, & with his spear thrust *Volusenus* by great violence through the thigh.

When our horse saw that their Captain was wounded, they bestirred themselves, and turning again upon the enemy, put them back. Many of the enemies by the violent charge of our men were beaten off and wounded: of whom some were overthrowen in the chace, and some were taken prisoners. As *Comius* escaped any farther mishap by the swiftnesse of his horse: so our Generall being by him in this battell sore wounded, was carried into the Camp in such a case, that it was not likely he should have lived. And *Comius*, whether it were that he thought himself sufficiently revenged, or because he had lost a great part of his men, sent messengers to *Antonius*, giving hostages, and assuring him that he would continue where it should please him to appoint, and do whatsoever he should command him. Only one request he made, wherein he besought him to beare with his fearfulness, that he might not be forced to come in the sight of any *Roman*. Which request *Antonius* judging to

proceed out of a reall feare, and not without good cause, he pardoned him according to his desires, and received his hostages.

## CHAP. XII.

While *Cæsar* is busie in quieting and ordering things in *Gallia*, and visiting some municipall towns in *Italy*, his enemies conspire against him at *Rome*.

**D**URING the time that *Cæsar* wintered in *Belgium*, his chief purpose was, to keep the States in amity, and to take away all hope and occasion of warre: for he intended nothing lesse, then the carriage of his businesse, so as he should be constrained to have warre at the time of his departure: lest when he should withdraw his army, he should leave any troubles behind, which all *Gallia* could willingly engage in, so that it might be without present danger. And therefore by entreating the cities honourably, by rewarding the noblemen highly, by burdening the country with no new impositions, he easily kept all *Gallia*, which now was tired out with so many unfortunate battels, in quiet and obedience.

Winter being over, *Cæsar*, contrary to his customes, halsteth into *Italy* with as much expedition as might be, to treat with the municipall towns and colonies, and to commend unto them the suit of his Quæstor *M. Antonius* for the Priesthood. For he made all the friends for him he could, both because the same *Antonius* was his very dear friend, whom he had sent before to sue for that promotion, as also to oppose the factions and unreasonable proceedings of a few men, who by putting *Antonius* beside his purpose, sought to dilapage *Cæsar* now going out of his command.

Albeit he had tidings by the way before he came near *Italy*, that *Antony* was made Augur, yet he thought he had as good reason as before, to visit the municipall towns and colonies, both to give them thanks for appearing in the businesse, and for their civility shewed in the behalf of *Antony*; as also to commend unto them his own cause, touching the honour which he purposed to sue for the next year: and that the rather, because his adversaries proudly made their brag, that *L. Lentulus* and *C. Marcellus* were created Consuls, to deprive *Cæsar* of all honour and authority; and that the Consulship was wrested from *Sergius Galba*, though he had more voices on his side, because he was a familiar friend of *Cæsar*, and had been engaged unto him as his Legate.

*Cæsar* at his coming among the municipall towns, was entertained with extraordinary affection and respect: that being his first coming from the warres in *Gallia*. Nothing was omitted

ted that could be devised for the decking and adorning of their gates, wayes, and places where *Cæsar* should passe. All the people came forth with their children to meet him by the way; sacrifices were every where offered; the temples and market-places were hanged with clothes of tapestrie: so that a man would have thought by the expressions of joy, there had been some great triumph expected and provided for. So great contentment was among the richer sort, and such hearty expression among the meaner sort.

When *Cæsar* had lightly passed through all the counties of *Gallia Togata*, he returned with all speed to his army at *Nemetocenna*, and calling all his legions out of their winter-quarters into the country of the *Treburii*, he went thither, and there mustered them. *T. Labienus* he made governour of *Gallia Togata*, thereby to get himself the more favour and furtherance in his suit for the Consulship. He himself removed from one place to another, according as he found it necessary for health. And albeit he heard offences that *Labienus* was solicited strongly by his enemies, and was also advertised how it was carried on by a small faction at *Rome*, to take away part of his army from him by a decree of the Senate: yet notwithstanding he neither gave credit to any thing that was reported of *Labienus*, nor would be drawn to do any thing contrary to the authority of the Senate. For he believed that if the Senators might give their voices freely, he should easily obtain his purpose.

For *C. Curio* Tribune of the people, who had taken upon him the defence of *Cæsar*'s cause and dignity, had oftentimes propounded to the Senate, that if the fear of *Cæsar*'s army prejudiced any man, and seeing that the authority and power of *Pompey* did not a little keep the Courts in awe; that both of them might lay down their arms and dismiss their armies: and so should the City be at liberty to use her own right as she pleased. This he not only propounded, but began to divide the Senat about it: which the Consuls and the friends of *Pompey* commanded should not be done: and so ruling the matter as they listed, they departed. This was a great testimony of the whole Senate, and agreeable to their former act.

For *Marcellus* the year before, opposing *Cæ-*

*sar*'s dignity, contrary to the law of *Pompey* and *Crassus*, and having put up a bill to the Senate for the discharge of *Cæsar* before the time of his commission was expired; when they had given their voices, *Marcellus*, who sought all his honour by working spite against *Cæsar*, departed aside, and the Senate fell all of them quite upon other matters.

This did not at all daunt the spirits of *Cæsar*'s enemies, but rather stirred them up to strengthen their party, and thereby to compell the Senate to approve of that which they had determined. Hereupon a decree was made, that *Cneius Pompeius* should send one legion, and *Cæsar* another, to the warre against the *Parthians*. But it was easily discerned that both these legions were taken from *Cæsar*. For the first legion, which *Cneius Pompeius* had sent unto *Cæsar* levied in the *Provinces*, he gave unto *Cæsar* as one of his own number. Nevertheless, albeit that no man need doubt but that *Cæsar* was spoiled at the pleasure of his enemies, yet he sent *Pompey*, his legion again: and of his own force he ordered the fifteenth legion which he had in the hither *Gallia*, to be delivered to him according to the decree of the Senate. In the room whereof he sent the thirteenth legion into *Italy*, to ly in garrison in the same place from whence the fifteenth was drawn.

Then he distributed his army into winter-quarters. *C. Trebonius* with four legions he placed in *Belgium*: *C. Fabius* with as many amongst the *Heduii*. For this he thought would be the best way to keep *Gallia* in most safety and quiet, if the *Belgae*, who were the most valourous, and the *Heduii*, who were of most authority, had forces quartered among them to keep them in obedience. This done, he took his journey into *Italy*.

When he came thither, he understood that the two legions which he had dismissed, which by the decree of the Senate should have been employed in the *Parthian* warre, were by *C. Marcellus* the Consul delivered to *Pompey*, and kept still in *Italy*. Although by this dealing it was evident to all the world, what was intended against *Cæsar*, yet *Cæsar* determined to take all things patiently, as long as he had any hope left to decide the controversy rather by the law then by the sword.



# OBSERVATIONS UPON THE EIGHTH COMMENTARY OF THE WARRES IN GALLIA.

**S**ome attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gallies to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be lorded over by strangers; and others, to the too great clemency of Cæsar. I grant that clemency apt to pardon emboldens to revolt; for that we easily forget all benefits which do not intirely establish our liberty: but if cruelty causeth them lesse frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous; for that when despair driveth men thereunto, and that the hope of safety resteth onely in victory, the revolted become all valiant, obstinate, constant, and faithfull to the end; which never faileth out where there is hope of the enemies clemency. We have here plentifull examples thereof. Cæsar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gallies hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his clemency; which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts: and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by foul and unworthy aits; as when the Veneti under publick faith imprisoned the Roman officers, which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army. But I cannot excuse that of Uxellodunum. On the contrary, the cruelty of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alva, drove poor fishermen so into despair, that they have shaken off his insupportable yoke; and with an admirable conjuncy have maintained and enriched themselves, and are grown so potent, as that they are able to resist him by

land, and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies.

Cæsar serveth us also by his care and industry to get intelligence of the enemies proceedings; (whether by taking prisoners in the field, or by having good spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successfull designs having been founded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he which assaulteth hath more courage then he which is assailed, and alwayes believeth the assailant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well-exercised and well-disciplined army is able to do in such a case, is to defend it self; but where are new-leveied souldiers, fall out great disorders: which was the reason he took so much care to fortify his camp very strongly, to the end he might defend it and all his baggage with a few men, and might without danger execute many brave designs, being alwayes assured of his retreat. Let us farther take view of the siege of Uxellodunum: which Cæsar judging to be impregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of corn, undertaketh by a great & dangerous labour to keep them from water, which was from a fountain without the town, from whence they were only supplied: which the besieged perceiving, having set fire on Cæsar's works, by a sally they hindered him from quenching it. Cæsar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place, resolveth to make an assault upon the town; which apprehension caused them to retreat.

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## THE MANNER OF OUR MODERN TRAINING. Or TACTICK PRACTISE.

By CLEMENT EDMONDS, Remembrancer of the  
City of LONDON.



Orasmuch as my purpose was to make this task of Observations as a parallel to our modern Discipline, I did not think it fit to mingle the Tactick Practise of these times with the use of foregoing ages, but rather to shut up these Discourses therewith, as the second line of this warlike parallel, which is thus drawn in the best fashion of modern Art.

In the knowledge of marshalling an Army, there is nothing more especially to be regarded, then that from a confused company of men, having chosen the fittest for the wars, we should so place and digest a convenient number of them, that in marches, in incamping, in battels we may be able with a few well ordered to encounter a farre greater array in confusion, and to overthrow them. From hence *Aeneas* did define the Art of war, to be the knowledge of warlike motions.

Before this unexpert army shall be able to be moved in such fashion, it shall not be amiss to acquaint it with the most usuall terms, wherewith they shall be often commanded into diverse postures, as occasion shall be offered. For as in the art of Fencing, no man shall be able to turn and wind his body for his best advantage to offend his enemy, or defend himself, unless first his master shall instruct him in the severall parts and postures thereof: so every souldier, or the whole troupe as one body, or one souldier, shall never be readily instructed to transform or turn it self by divers motions into different forms, unless they

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first understand what is meant by Fronts and Flanks, by Files and Ranks, what by Leaders and Followers, by Middlemen and Bringers up. By this means each souldier understanding what the terme doth signifie, shall readily both apprehend and execute such commandments as the Captain or Officer shall direct him.

A File is a certain number of men following singly one Leader unto the depth of 8 or 10, as they shall be commanded. The ancients have called this File *Seriem*, *ordinationem*, or *decuriam*. It consisteth of Leaders and Followers, placed according to their worth and valour: and especially there ought to be regarded, the Leader or *Decurio*, the fifth, sixth, or Middlemen, and the tenth and last called the Bringer-up or *Tergiductor*.

First therefore, every souldier being aptly fitted unto his severall armes according to his worth, age and stature, they are to be disposed into severall files, wherein every one is especially to acknowledge his leader or foremost man to be the authour of all his motions: & therefore duly attending what directions shall be commanded, each follower shall according to the motions of his leader or foremost man, order his own; and is to be excused, if he attend the motions of his leader before he move himself.

When many files are thus disposed together, all the leaders making one and the same front, and their followers observing likewise one and the same proportion of distance before, and after, and on each side, these Files thus joynt make one Battallion, the front whereof is called a Rank, and so likewise the second and third, in depth, according to the number of men in each file. The first, second and third, and so forward in each file, are called Sidemen, in respect of the same numbers in the next file. Neither must every souldier onely regard the motions of his Leader, but he must also diligently respect his sidemen, and such as shall be placed on his right and left hand, called his ranks: so that both in files and ranks he may alwaies be found in the same distance wherein he is commanded.

It should be impertinent to the purpose to prescribe a certain number of souldiers unto these Battallions, onely thus much for the proportion: that it ought never to exceed so much, but that it may easily upon any occasion be changed into such a form or fashion to fight, as may be thought fittest for the present.

The length of this Battallion is diversly termed amongst the Latines, as *Frons*, *Facies*, *Adversus*, *Jugum*, &c. but in our modern practise, most familiarly the Front or Rank.

The breadth of the Battallion, which is from the leader to the bringer-up, with the distance between all the followers, is said to be the length or depth of one file or flank.

In the disposing of souldiers into files and ranks, besides their observing a right line in their places and standing, we must likewise especially respect the different worth and quality of the souldiers; that every one according to his worth may be sited unto his proper place, and accordingly receive advancement, as the death of his Leaders, and true value of his desert by his Commander shall give occasion.

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First therefore there must be especial choice made of the leaders of each file, or first front or ranks of the Battallion, of the most expert, ablest, and best-armed men: because that as from them the rest are to receive directions of their after-motions; so in them the greatest hope of the day doth consist.

Next unto the first it must be provided, that the bringers up or last rank, called *Tergiductores*, be little inferior, well experienced, wise and valiant; that they may both know when to reprehend their former Ranks, and urge them forward, if they see them declining or yielding upon false occasions; as also to be able upon any sudden alarm given in the rear, to turn faces about and make themselves a Front for the best resistance.

Neither must it be neglected concerning the second and ninth ranks, that they also may be furnished with the next most sufficient men; both because of their nearness unto danger, as also that if their leaders or bringers up shall either be slain, or disabled by wounds, they may presently succeed in their places and make them good.

There is also a good decorum to be observed in the middlemen, or fifth and sixth ranks, both for the men themselves and their armes: that in our marches, when the middlemen or sixth ranks shall be called up to front with their leaders, they may in some sort and proportion answer their places; as also when we double our front, by calling up middlemen to fight in a greater breadth, they may not be unfurled: but especially in marches, that they may be able to make the best resistance, when they shall become the flanks of the Battallions.

As these respects ought to be observed in ranks, so the files also are not without their different degrees of dignity. As the leader of the right-hand file is accounted to have the first place of honour in the Battallion: for he doth not onely lead the rest in his own file, but he is the author and beginner of the motions of the whole Battallion.

The leader of the left-hand file hath the next place, because that he with the leader of the right-hand file, do alwaies in their marching and imbatalling rectifie or rank the whole front of the battallion: and so consequently all the next of their files as they stand in order, even untill the middle, who are accounted the last in dignity.

The Battallion being thus disposed into files and ranks, and each file and rank according to his worth and experience rightly advanced: it followeth that there should be a just distance proportioned between either, that at all times upon all occasions, they might be found ready, and in comeliest fashion, either to offend their enemy, or defend themselves. These distances which every follower must observe in respect of his leader, and every leader and follower in respect of the sidemen, may be reduced unto three severall Orders, as followeth.

The first is called open Order; the distance whereof is twelve foot between every follower and his leader, or between every file; and six foot between them and the sidemen, or between every rank. This order is commonly used upon marches when the enemy is known to be farre off,

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as also in private exercising of souldiers for their severall managing of their armes. It differeth somewhat from the *Ordinatus miles* amongst the *Romans*, who alwayes observed but four cubits in files and ranks.

Order.

The second distance is called Order, when we contract the battallion both in length and breadth, and gather the souldiers within a nearer scantling both in files and ranks, that is, by observing six feet in their files between the follower and leader, and three feet between the ranks or sidemen. This distance is used when we march toward an enemy near at hand, or in marches by reason of the opportunity of the place suspiciously dangerous. This is also near unto *Denisius ordo*, but onely that that was but two cubits in both files and ranks.

Close order, pouldron to pouldron.

The third and last order, is when either we attend the enemy his present assault, or that we intend to charge him upon our securest and best distance; when every follower standeth three feet, or his rapier length behind his leader, and a foot and a half from the sidemen or files; or when every souldier occupieth but one foot and a half for his own station, joyning pouldron to pouldron, or target to target. This differeth from *Confignatus ordo*, because that alloweth but one cubit for files and ranks, and this close order alloweth one cubit in the file, but two in the ranks.

The manner of charging with five ranks.

This distance doth agree also best with the length of our pikes of 15 or 16 feet long. For it is thought fit oftentimes that the battallion consisting of ten ranks, there should not charge more at one time then the 5 foremost, so that the pikes of the fifth rank might be three foot over the foremost shoulder; and the other five ranks should in this close order, or nearer if it be possible, follow the other charging, with their pikes advanced, untill some occasion should require their charge. In the mean time they should perform their dutie, in keeping the five foremost ranks from retiring, and besides adde strength unto the charge or shock.

*The manner of exercising of composed Battallions, with their different motions.*

**T**He files and ranks being thus understood, disposed and ordered, and all parts and members of the battallion being joyned in their just proportion and distance, able and fit to be altered upon any sodain occasion (as if it were but one entire body) into severall and divers postures, and to make resistance unto what forces soever shall oppugne the same: it might be thought needlesse to have made the disposition of the members so exact, unless by continuall practise and exercise they might be made nimble and ready, not onely to defend themselves and their whole body on all sides, but also to be able to offend whensoever they shall espie the least occasion of advantage.

The terms of direction or command, which are commonly used in this modern discipline of martiall exercise, as they are not many, onely answering to

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to the different postures which are required in the Battallion; so they are and must be short and perspicuously plain, that by this means being sodainly uttered, easily apprehended and understood, they may as speedily be put in execution by those which shall be commanded.

First therefore, that the Battallion may be commanded into some one fashion or posture, from whence it shal be fit to convert it self into all other, the Captain or Officer shall bid them stand in front. When every particular souldier composing himself after his foremost leader, standeth comely in file and rank, fronting unto some certain place, or to the Captain, as shall be thought best for the present.

In this and all other directions whatsoever, it shall be especially observed, that every follower attending what is commanded, mark his next leader, and accordingly move himself, as he shall see him move first.

The Battallion therefore thus fronting, if the enemy should suddenly either assault the right or left flank, it shall be commanded to turn faces to the right or left hand, when every souldier observing his leader shall turn his face, and make his flank his front according to the direction.

There is also a doubled motion or declination to the right or left hand, when every souldier observing his leader shall turn their bodies twice to the right or left hand, and by that means become turned with their faces where their backs were, as if they expected an enemy in the rere, or being to perform some other motion that may be offered: beginning this alteration from the right or left hand as shall be commanded.

As every particular souldier in the troupe is thus commanded at sometimes to turn his face to the right or left hand, or about, the Battallion standing in order, that is, according to the distance before named; so the whole Battallion being reduced into their close order, is commanded to turn as one body to the right or left hand. It is performed thus: Imagine the Battallion stand first in order, it shall be commanded that they close their files to the right hand; when the right file standing still, the rest turning their faces to the right hand, march into their close order and return as they were: next that they close their ranks from behind, when every follower marcheth forward to his leader unto his rapiers point as is said before. This done, (the leader of the right file standing immovable) all the rest (as the body of a ship or a great gate) turn about that leader, as about the hinge or center, every one keeping the same distance and order wherein they were first placed, as if they were but one entire body.

When the same Battallion is to be restored into the same station wherein it was first, it is commanded; Faces about to the left hand, and march into your order from whence you were closed. Then let your leaders or first ranks stand still, and the rest turning faces about, march ranks in order as before: then turn as you were, and you are restored.

When the whole Battallion being in their close order should turn about and make the Rere the Front, it is done by a double turning or declination, and commanded to wheel about, which is answerable to the former faces about or mutation,

Stand in front. In souldier's rank.

Faces to the right or left hand. Declination in souldier's rank.

Faces about to the right or left hand. Duplication declination or mutation.

Wheel to the right or left hand. Conversion in souldier's rank.

As you were. Revolution. Reversal.

Wheel about. In souldier's rank.

Relies on.

There is also another wheeling in this sort, when the front changeth the aspect thrice, for as wheeling about maketh the Front the Rere, so this wheeling from the right hand to the left, or contrariwise : which fashion is so fel. dome used, that we scarce afford it a name.

In all such motions and alterations, it is most fit that all men perform their directions with their pikes advanced, being in that fort most easie to be commanded, as also lesse troublesome to their followers and leaders.

### Countermarching Files and Ranks.

There is also another means to prevent the enemy his assaulting us in the rere or flank, lest he should find our worst men least able to make resistance ; and this is performed by countermarching both files and ranks three divers wayes apiece.

File.  
from the  
rere  
to the  
front  
evolutio  
Macedonian.

The first was used by the *Macedonians*, after this fashion : First the leader turneth his face about towards the right or left hand, and so the next follower marching behind his leader turneth also, and so the third and fourth, untill the bringer up have carried himself out into a new place in the rere further from the enemy, as he was before next unto him. But this neither was nor is accounted safe or secure, because it doth somewhat resemble a flying or running away from the enemy, which might give him no small encouragement, and therefore it is not much in practise.

Only at some times, the bringers up marching throughout beyond the leaders, untill they possesse the same space before them which they did behind them, all turning their faces about, make their leaders to affront the enemy, who were before farthest from them.

From the  
front  
through  
Laconic  
evolutio.

The *Lacedaemonians* used the contrary, as it were pursuing the enemy : the bringer up first being turned face about, and so the next marching before him, and so the third, untill the leader himself became also turned, and in the foremost front unto the enemy. Which with us is somewhat otherwise, but yet both affronting, and as it were pursuing the enemy : because our leaders first begin this motion, and so countermarching through on the right or left hand, become in the front in a new space of ground, who were before in the rere.

From the  
front and  
flank.

Chorica  
evolutio.

The third and last was invented by the *Persians*, whom when the place or near approach of the enemy would not suffer to change their ground, they were wont to countermarch the front to the right or left hand : and being come unto the depth of the bringers up, to stand still untill the other half file had likewise marched forth, and fallen upon their leaders in every file. In all these it is especially commanded, to march still in the same distance, and by whole ranks, to prevent confusion, which (especially the enemy at hand) must needs be most dangerous, and therefore carefully to be avoided.

Counter-  
marching of  
ranks.

In like sort the ranks may countermarch, when either the right wing would be strengthened by the left, or the left by the right, alwayes marching by whole files towards the right or left hand, according as they shall have the direction,

either

either changing the ground, or upon the same ground, as in the former counter-marches.

There is used also another kind of strengthening both the front and flank when occasion shall be offered, viz: by doubling either files or ranks. And this, either by doubling the number of souldiers in the same files or ranks, keeping still the same breadth and depth of ground ; or else by doubling the ground, keeping the same number of souldiers. The files are doubled, when the second file shall insert it self into the first, the leader thereof putting himself a follower unto the leader of the first, and the next follower follower to the next in the first file, and so forwards. And likewise the fourth file inserting it self into the third, and the sixth into the fifth. And this is to be performed when the Battallion standeth in his order.

To double the place or depth, is when the same number of men shall put themselves out of their order into their open order, either by advancing forward, or by falling backwards, as they shall be commanded.

The ranks are doubled two manner of wayes : either by inserting the second into the first to the right or left hand, as before in the files, or else (the enemy being at hand) by joyning whole troupes together to the right or left wing, according as occasion shall be offered : and this is held to be the safest when the enemy is near, to avoid confusion. It is performed either in the same ground, or by doubling the ground, when either we desire to exceed the front of our enemy his battallion, or to prevent left we our selves be included. The terms to both are ; Double your files or ranks to the right or left hand : and when you would have them return again into their proper places, is commanded ; As you were.

The ordinary directions which are especially given in these martial exercises are, first that no man in the time of exercising or marshalling shall be lower then his Officer : but every one attending to his place, when he is commanded, shall diligently hearken to such directions as shall be given. The Captain in the front shall speak, and the Sergeants in each flank shall give the word unto the Lieutenant or Ensigne in the rere : who as in his proper place, seeth all things executed accordingly as the Captain shall command. It shall be unpoffible to performe any thing herein, unless first every one do exactly observe his leader and his sideman : and to this purpose it is often commanded, Keep your files, Keep your ranks.

### Of Marches.

IN champains there needs no great labour to marshall particular troupes for their after-marches : because they may march either by whole divisions, observing only their course of indifferency, that every division may every third day have the vanguard ; or else in such form and fashion as the General hath propofed for a day of battell, according as the danger of an expected enemy shall give occasion. But because all countries will not afford a champain for

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the marching of an army, and therefore not possible to march far with many troupes in front, nor many files of any one troupe or division, by reason of often straights, and passages betwixt hills, woods, or waters; It is provided, though by long induction, the whole army shall be extended into a thin length and few files, yet the souldiers well disposed shall be as readily able to defend themselves and offend the enemy on their flanks (from whence only in such streights the danger is imminent) as if they were to affront an enemy with an entire battallion in a champaign country.

In streights  
or narrow  
passages.

How to  
march in a  
division &c.  
such a  
march.

First therefore a division or Battallion being ordered and drawn before the Quarter, into one even front of just files, ten in depth; the musketers equally divided on the right and left flanks of the pikes, all standing in their order, that is to say, six feet distant in files and ranks; the Captain carefully provideth, that the first, fifth, sixth and tenth ranks be alwayes well filled and furnished with his most able and best-armed souldiers. Which done, he commandeth first the middlemen or half files to come a front with their leaders; so that the division becometh but five in depth. Next he commandeth to turn faces to the right or left hand, as direction shall be to march from that quarter: and so the whole division resteth ready in his fashion to march five in front, the one half of the musketers in the vanguard and the other in the rere, the pikes in the battell, and both flanks well furnished with the ablest & best men to offend or defend, as there shall be occasion: that is to say, the right flanks with the first and fifth ranks, and the left with the sixth and tenth ranks. If occasion afterwards shall be given of a halt in a champaign or before the quartering, the Captain commandeth first unto all, (they being first closed into their order) Faces as you were; next unto the half files; Faces about; and march out, and fall again upon your files. By which means the division becometh again reduced into the same front and fashion from whence it was first transformed, ready to encounter an enemy, or to be drawn into the Quarter.

To reduce  
them, in  
two three  
first front.

The manner  
of the great  
pikes with  
pikes.  
Five ranks  
only.

By the  
whole  
depth.

To charge  
with mus-  
ketiers.

When pikes are to charge pikes in a champaign, it useth to be performed two severall wayes. First the whole division being commanded into their close order, the five first ranks charging their pikes, every follower over his leaders shoulder directeth his pike as equally as he can, & the first rank shall have three feet of his pike over the foremost shoulder. The other five ranks with their pikes advanced follow close up in the rere, either ready to second the foremost, or to be employed in the rere as occasion shall be offered. Otherwise and most usual, when the whole depth of the files throughout the division shall charge together, all fast locked and united together, and therefore most able to make the strongest shock offensive or defensive: provided alwayes that none mingle their pikes in others files, but the whole file one in anothers shoulder.

In charging with musketers, it is observed no way convenient that there should be too many in a rank, or that the ranks should be too long. For the first rank is commanded to advance ten paces before the second, and then to discharge, and wheeling either to the right or left hand, falleth into the rere; and so the second advancing to the same distance, discharge and wheelerth as before; and likewise the third, and so forward as long as the Officer shall be

com-

commanded. Which shall not so well be performed the ranks being extraordinary long, because it will require so long a time to wheel from the front, that the second may succeed, unless by direction the rank may divide it self, the one half to the right hand and the other to the left in wheeling to the rere.

There must  
not be too  
many in a  
rank.

In the retreat the whole ranks having turned their faces about, are to march three or four paces forward: their chief officer coming in the rere, first commandeth the last rank to make ready, and then to turn faces about & discharge, and wheel about to the head or front of the division: and being clearly passed, the next rank to perform as much: and so the rest in order.

In charge  
retreat.

Where the passages are narrow, and the division cannot come to charge in front, as between two waters or woods, the manner of charging is different: for there being five or ten files led in the induction, that file which flanketh the enemy discharge first onely, and the rest marching continually forwards, it standeth firm untill the last rank be passed, and then sleeveth it self on the left flank and makes ready; and so the second file and the third, so long as the enemy shall continue, there being a continuall discharging by files as before by ranks. Unless it be in the passes of Ireland, meeting with an irregular enemy, where they use to intermingle their files of shot with pikes, that the one may be a defence for the other, when the enemy shall come up to the sword, as they use there very often.

The manner  
of charging  
by files in  
narrow  
passages.

In the passes  
of Ireland.

#### How directions are delivered in the warres.

ALL directions in the wars have ever been delivered either by signes subject to the eye, by word of mouth, or the sound of a drumme, or some such warlike instrument. Concerning those visible signes displayed unto the souldiers, the falling of mists, the raising of dust, showers of rain & snow, the beams of the Sun, hilly, uneven and crooked passages, by long experience have found them to be most doubtfull and uncertain; as also because, as it was a matter of great difficulty to invent different signes upon all sodain occasions; so it is almost an impossibility, that the common souldier (who oftentimes is found scarce capable of the understanding of plain words distinctly pronounced) should both apprehend and understand sodainly, and execute directly the true sense and meaning of his Commanders signes.

By signes.

The Drum and Trumpet are yet used. But because many different sounds are not easily distinguished in souldiers understanding, without some danger of confusion, we onely command by the inarticulate sounds, to arm, to march, to troup, so charge, and to retreat: with all which severall notes the souldier is so familiarly to be acquainted, that so soon as he hears them beaten, he may be ready sodainly to put them in execution, as if he heard his Captain pronouncing as much.

By drum or  
trumpet.

The directions by word of mouth are infinite, according to the different occasions which shall be offered; yet alwayes with this caveat, that they be short, yet perspicuous, without all ambiguity, and plainly pronounced, first by the Captain,

By word of  
mouth.

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The most  
full dis-  
tinction  
terms in ex-  
ercising a  
battalion  
or division.

Captain, then derived by the Sergeants through the division or Battalion. Though infinite, yet the most usuall are these: To your armes: Keep your files, keep your ranks: Follow your leader: Leaders look to your files: Keep your distance: Faces to your right hand: Faces to your left hand: Close your files: Close your ranks: Stand as you are: As you were: Faces about to the right hand: Wheel about to the right or left hand: Double your ranks: Double your files: Leaders countermarch through to the right or left hand: Leaders counter-march to the right or left hand and stand: Middlemen come forth and fall upon your leaders. Besides many fit terms commanded in managing particular armes, as pikes and muskets, which are omitted.

And thus much touching the Tacick practise of our modern wars: which I have the rather added, in regard that diverse souldiers, as unacquainted both with the manner and the value thereof, do think a heap of people unmartialled, to be as available for a great designe, as any other number distinguished in files and parts, and disposed for facile and easie motions, according to the powerfull circumstances of time and place. Wherein, howsoever the practise of the *Turk* and the *Hungarian* may seem to give warrant to that opinion, yet the use of Armes amongst the *Gracians* and the *Romans*, whose conquering armies are pregnant witnesses of the excellency of their militarie discipline, shall speak sufficiently for order and Tacick motion, as most necessary parts in a well-ordered war.

F I N I S.

